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# DETAILED ANALYSIS REPORT EXERCISE POWER PLAY 79 (U)

16 AUGUST 1979

Prepared by:  
Exercise Plans and Analysis Division  
Operations Directorate (J-3)  
OJCS

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
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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (U) Introduction. This report contains the analysis of 11 functional areas which OJCS selected for special attention during Exercise POWER PLAY 79. It addresses only JCS systems and procedures. The analysis of individual performance was not an objective. Figure EX-1 lists the functional areas for analysis.



3. (U) Exercise Considerations

a. (U) The Joint Staff conducted the exercise concurrently with several real-world crises. Some senior-level personnel who would normally play in an exercise did not because of the real-world events. Others participated on a limited basis. This situation was apparent especially at the NMCC where the Joint Staff conducted only one decision briefing for the Operations Deputies and none for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the period of play at Site R one flag officer acted as the Director, Joint Staff; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the National Command Authorities. These artificialities significantly affected the decisionmaking process.

b. (U) Exercise artificialities also included:

(1) (U) Exercise participants used an unrealistic Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for reinforcement play

(2) (U) The Joint Staff did not exercise the Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan (JEEP) realistically because of administrative considerations

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EX-1

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



Figure EX-1. (U) Exercise POWER PLAY 79 Time Flow

EX-2




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(3) (U) Several commands used response cells to represent command center personnel; other commands used the exercise as a training vehicle for new or reserve personnel

(4) (U) Surrogate players filled most of the key roles within the NMCC and ANMCC.

c. (U) The analysts considered the impact of these artificialities wherever possible in the analysis.

4. (U) Exercise Participation. Commands and agencies participated during Exercise POWER PLAY 79 as follows:



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
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5. (U) Scenario Synopsis

a. (U) General. Figure EX-1 relates the key events to the exercise days on which they occurred and to the functional areas included in this analysis.

b. (U) Initial Situation (Prior to 6 March)



c. (U) Period of Increasing International Tensions (6-16 March)

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
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d. (U) General War Operations (17-23 March)

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[Redacted]



6. (U) Significant Findings. The most significant findings from the analysis of the functional areas are listed below. A short discussion of the supporting analysis follows each finding. The page or pages referenced at the end of each finding contain a more detailed discussion.

a. (U) NATO Secure Voice Communications



b. (U) Chemical Weapons Procedures

(1) (S) Finding. Exercise POWER PLAY 79 highlighted the need for procedures and organizational responsibilities to process chemical weapons requests. (IV-6)


(2) (S) Discussion. A senior player stated that the OJCS requires better operational procedures and delineation of organizational responsibilities for processing requests for deployment and employment of chemical weapons. There is also a need to develop compatible operational release procedures for chemical weapons between US and NATO staffs.

c. (U) Nuclear Weapon Release Procedures

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d. (U) Secure Voice and Video at Site R



e. (U) Televised Briefings from the NMCC Current Situation Room

(1) (U) Finding. Inadequate NMCC Current Situation Room lighting and improper chart design hampered quality of TV reproduction of briefings. This same finding was generally prevalent throughout Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. The quality of TV reproduction improved after relocation to the ANMCC. (IV-4)

(2) (U) Discussion. NMCC briefers conducted briefings in the Current Situation Room. These briefings were televised throughout the NMCC area. A variety of technical difficulties detracted from satisfactory video display. Difficulties included inadequate lighting and charts not designed for TV reproduction (wrong letter size, improper density, poor color choice, and acetate coverings). Players watching the briefings on television had great difficulty

reading the charts. After the third day of exercise play data collectors noticed that many players stopped watching the televised briefings. During Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78, many of these same conditions occurred with the same relative degree of severity.

f. (U) Crisis Action System (CAS) Procedures

(1) (U) Finding. In general, all participating agencies and commands within the WWMCCS complied with the prescribed CAS procedures. Participants employed correct message types and formats at the proper time during the planning cycle. However, the published procedures during the exercise did not specify a requirement to include component commands as information addressees on key CAS messages. (XI-2, XI-5 through IX-8)

(2) (U) Discussion. During the final 3 days of the exercise, the Joint Exercise Control Group initiated a controlled action simulating a crisis situation in Saudi Arabia. The Joint Staff responded to this situation using CAS procedures. Participants employed correct message types and formats at the proper time during the planning cycle. The information that the supported and supporting commands and the Transportation Operating Agency provided was sufficient to support decisionmaking. The published procedures during the exercise did not specify a requirement for inclusion of component commands as information addressees on key CAS messages. The readdressal of these messages caused inordinate delay in initiating vital planning actions. [The latest revision (7 May 1979) to the CAS procedures recommends inclusion of component commands as information addressees.]

g. (U) Command Center Facilities


(1) (U) Finding. The physical separation of the Operations Planners Group and the Emergency Coordination Groups hampered coordination efforts and increased action response times. (IV-2)

(2) (U) Discussion. The location of the Emergency Coordination Groups is on the floor above the Operations Planners Group in the NMCC. A senior player,

[REDACTED]

responding to a questionnaire, stated that this separation degrades coordination efforts and increases the response time by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

h. (U) Arms Export Control Act



i. (U) International Logistical Agreements

(1) (U) Finding. The OJCS and other participating US commands responded well to the exercise objectives of testing and evaluating international agreement procedures. The OJCS and US commands complied with pertinent agreement procedures. The exercise demonstrated the need to continue emphasis on international agreements and seek expanded play in future exercises. (XII-5 through XII-13)

(2) (U) Discussion. This was the first exercise to emphasize the importance of international logistical agreements. Player actions generally complied with

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agreement provisions and served to focus attention on issues having a significant bearing on logistical support of allied efforts. However, the OJCS does not maintain a central repository of international agreements nor could the analyst locate one within the Department of Defense.

(3) (U) Finding. The signatory nations to bilateral and multilateral agreements normally require development of supplemental arrangements and plans. The participating nations are still negotiating and developing the supplemental plans required to implement the BENELUX LOC agreements. (XII-2, XII-3)

(4) (U) Discussion. The parties to the BENELUX LOC agreements signed the basic agreements in 1971. National representatives concluded and signed the supplemental arrangements in 1975. The nations have not completed development of many implementing plans.


j. (U) Deployment Monitoring Procedures

(1) (U) Finding. The new deployment monitoring procedures were effective. The proper authorities submitted OPREP-2 and -4 deployment execution monitoring reports. (XI-9, XI-10)


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k. (U) Operations Planners Group Organization

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


(3) (U) Finding. Assignment to the Operations Planners Group of two officers with expertise in NATO procedures expedited the response to NATO-related actions. (IV-2)



(5) (U) Finding. The assignment of Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers as players in the Operations Planners Group provided valuable training to these officers. (IV-18)

(6) (U) Discussion. Eight Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers participated as players in the Operations Planners Group. These officers received outstanding training in the Emergency Operating Procedures of the Joint Staff.







1. (U) War Powers Reporting System

(1) (U) Finding. The Joint Staff's compliance with the War Powers Reporting System procedures was timely and adequate. (VI-4) ?



m. (U) Command Center Continuity



n. (U) Automatic Data Processing Support

(1) (U) Finding. Remote terminals provided timely support to Joint Staff elements. The automatic data processing support personnel completed 90 percent of the requests within the time period established by the requestor. (IX-7)

(2) (U) Discussion. Remote terminals met the response time goals established for automatic data processing systems. Additionally 90 percent of the recorded 75 automatic data processing requests were completed within the time period specified by the requestor. This performance facilitated the compilation and updating of information required by decisionmakers.

(3) (U) Finding. The Honeywell Information System computers supporting the NMCC and ANMCC were available between 93 and 97 percent of the time during the exercise. However, the mean time between outages did not meet the goal established for automatic data processing systems. (IX-10, IX-11)

(4) (U) Discussion. The production system computer at the Pentagon was available 93 percent of the time during the exercise. The two computers at Site R were available 95 and 97 percent of the time, respectively. The NMCS goal established for mean time between outages is not less than 36 hours. None of the Honeywell Information System computers met this goal.

7. (U) Summary. The exercise participants successfully achieved the objectives of Exercise POWER PLAY 79. US play was interfaced successfully with NATO WINTEX/CIMEX 79 play. The participants gained excellent training particularly in NATO alert systems and CHOP of forces to NATO.

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## GLOSSARY (U)

AAC	Alaskan Air Command
AAFCE	Allied Air Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AAP-6	NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use (NATO)
AAW	antiair warfare
AB	air base
AC	Alert Center (NMIC)
ACC	Army Communications Command
ACCHAN	Allied Command Channel (NATO)
ACE	Allied Command, Europe (NATO)
ACEREP	ACE Reporting System (NATO)
ACFT	aircraft
ACLANT	Allied Command, Atlantic (NATO)
ACP	Allied Communication Publication; alternate command post
ACTICE	Authority for the Coordination of Inland Transportation in Central Europe
ADCOM	Aerospace Defense Command
A&DCP	Analysis and Data Collection Plan
ADP	automatic data processing
AFB	air force base
AFCE	air force civil engineers
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)
AFEOC	Air Force Emergency Operations Center
AFFIS	Airfield Facilities File Information System
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe (NATO)
AFOC	Air Force Operations Center
AFRED	Air Force Readiness Command
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AGCY	agency
AGI	intelligence gathering ship
AIG	address indicator group
AIM	air intercept missile
ALIMPREP	Alert Implementation Report
ALPHA	TTY circuit
AMA	Alternate Military Authority
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMPS	Automatic Message Processing System
AMPS-P	Automatic Message Processing System, Pentagon
AMPS-R	Automatic Message Processing System, Site R

## UNCLASSIFIED

ANALIT	Analytical Intent Message
ANMCC	Alternate National Military Command Center
ANMIC	Alternate National Military Intelligence Center
ANOVA	analysis of variance
AO	action officer
ACTN	ACE Operational Telegraph Network
APPLE JACK	exercise term for an Air Defense Emergency condition
ARRED	Army Forces Readiness Command
ASAP	as soon as possible
ASC	AUTODIN Switching Center
ASD (MRAL)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)
ASM	air-to-surface missile
ASSESSREP	Assessment Report
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)
ATPOS	Atomic Post Strike Results Report
ATRES	Resume of Atomic Post Strike Results
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTODIN-I	IEMATS transmitted message received on a message center AUTODIN terminal
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AVE	average
BENELUX	Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (NATO)
BIG NOISE	exercise term for an Air Defense Emergency
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BOCCA	Board for Coordination of Civil Airlift (NATO)
BRAVO	TTY circuit
C <sup>2</sup>	command, control
C <sup>3</sup>	command, control, and communications
C/A	crisis action, course of action
C&C	command and control
CAO SOP	Coordination of Atomic Operations Standing Operating Procedures
CARSTRIKFOR	Carrier Striking Force
CAS	Crisis Action System
CASFDD	Crisis Action System Force Deployment Data

## UNCLASSIFIED

CAT	Crisis Action Team
CCPDS	Command Center Processing and Display System
CCSA	Command and Control Support Agency
CCTC	Command and Control Technical Center
CCTV	closed circuit television
CDN	Canadian
CENTAG	Central Army Group (NATO)
CHOP	change in operational control of US Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	content indicator code
CIG	Current Intelligence Group (NATO)
CIMEX	Civil-Military Exercise (NATO)
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAD	Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command
CINCEASTLANT	Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic Area (NATO)
CINCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)
CINCHAN	Commander in Chief, Channel and Southern North Sea (NATO)
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCMAC	Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
CINCNORTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe (NATO)
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, US Air Force Europe
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, US Army Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces Europe
CINCWESTLANT	Commander in Chief, Western Atlantic Area (NATO)
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations

## UNCLASSIFIED

COCKED PISTOL	exercise term for DEFCON 1
COD	Computer Operations Division
COG	Current Operations Group
COINS	Community Online Intelligence System
COMAAC	Commander, Alaskan Air Command
COMAAFCE	Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (NATO)
COMCARSTRIKFOR	Commander, Carrier Striking Force (NATO)
COMCARSTRIKGP	Commander, Carrier Striking Group (NATO)
COMCENTAG	Commander, Central Army Group (NATO)
COMFAIRMED	Commander, Fleet Air, Mediterranean
COMIBERLANT	Commander, Iberian Atlantic Area (NATO)
COMICEDEFOR	Commander, Iceland Defense Force
COMJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
COMSECONDFLT	Commander, Second Fleet
COMSIXTHFLT	Commander, Sixth Fleet
COMSPOT	Communications Spot Report
COMSTANAVFORLANT	Commander, Standing Naval Force Atlantic (NATO)
COMSTAT	Communications Status Report
COMSTRIKFLTANT	Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic (NATO)
COMSTRIKFOR SOUTH	Commander, Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
COMSUBEASTLANT	Commander, Submarine Force, Eastern Atlantic Area (NATO)
COMSUBLANT	Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet
COMSUBWESTLANT	Commander, Submarine Force, Western Atlantic Area (NATO)
COMUSFORAZ	Commander, US Forces Azores
CONPG	Chairman, Operational Nuclear Planning Group
CONUS	continental United States
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
COFG	Chairman, Operations Planners Group
CP	command post
CPX	command post exercise
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence Report
CSP	Crisis Staffing Procedures
CSR	Current Situation Room
CTF	Commander, Task Force
CV	aircraft carrier
CWO	communications watch officer

## UNCLASSIFIED

DA	Department of the Army
DARCOM	US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DAS	Director, Administrative Services
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCAOC SD(CMC)	DCA Operations Center, Support Division (Cheyenne Mountain Complex)
DCI	Director, Central Intelligence
DCPA	Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
DCS	Defense Communications System
DDO	Deputy Director for Operations
DEFCON	defense readiness condition
DEPMAS	Deployment Management System
DGZ	desired ground zero
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAOLS-COINS	DIA Online System--Community Online Intelligence System
DICINCUSNAVEUR	Directing Staff, Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces Europe
DICO	Data Information Coordination Office
DIN	Defense Intelligence Notice
DISIDS	Display and Information Distribution Subsystem
DIV	Division
DJS	Director, Joint Staff
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DATANET	HIS front-end network processor
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DPC	Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
DSP	Defense Support Program
DTG	date time group
EA	emergency action
EAM	emergency action message
EAP	Emergency Action Procedures
EAST	CINCEASTLANT (NATO)
EASTLANT	eastern Atlantic
ECCCS	European Command and Control Communications System
ECG	Emergency Coordination Group
ECR	Emergency Conference Room
EMAS	Exercise Message Analysis System
EMATS	Emergency Message Automatic Transmission system

## UNCLASSIFIED

ENDEX	end of exercise
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedures
EUCOM	US European Command
EVAC	Evacuation File
EX	Exercise
EXPLAN	Exercise Plan
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAST PACE	exercise term for DEFCON 2
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FOB	forward operating base for NEACP
FORGEN	Force Generation Report
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FORSTAT	Force Status and Identity Report
FPA	Federal Preparedness Agency
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRN	force requirement number
FSB	Force Status Branch
GENSER	general service communications
GLI	guide list item
GMT	Greenwich mean time
GOVT	government
GSA	General Services Administration
H	hours
HIS	Honeywell Information System
HOT BOX	exercise term for a Defense Emergency
HOTSIT	hot situation message
HQ	headquarters
IBER	COMIBERLANT (NATO)
IBERLANT	Iberian Atlantic Area (NATO)
IC/A	Island Commanders-Authority
ICEDEFOR	Iceland Defense Force
ID	identification; infantry division
IEMATS	Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
IMAF	First Marine Amphibious Force
IMP	interface message processor
INDIC	indications message
INDICOM	indications intelligence communications
INFO; INF	information
INR	State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau
INTEL	intelligence

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## UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

INTSUM	Intelligence Summary Report
ISCOM	Island Command
ISD	Information Systems Division
ITF	Intelligence Task Force
J-1	Personnel Directorate
J-3	Operations Directorate
J-4	Logistics Directorate
J-5	Plans and Policy Directorate
J-6	Communications and Electronics Directorate
J3I	J3 Instructions
JAI	Joint Administrative Instruction
JCC	Joint Coordination Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSTELCON	JCS telecommunications
JCSAN	JCS Alerting Network
JCS MC	JCS Message Center (Pentagon)
JECG	Joint Exercise Control Group
JEPP	Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan
JOPS	Joint Operational Planning System
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JSCO	Joint Staff Communications Office
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFAK	Joint Task Force Alaska
LANDSOUTH	Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LANTFLT	US Atlantic Fleet
LAUNCHREP	Launch Report (NATO)
LCC	Logistics Coordination Center
LERTCON	alert condition (JCS Alert System)
LEA	US Army Logistics Evaluation Agency
LOC	lines of communication
LSWD	large screen wall display at the NMCC
M	minutes
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MAR	March
MARREP	Maritime Reporting System, ACLANT-ACCHAN (NATO)

## UNCLASSIFIED

MC	Military Committee (NATO); US Marine Corps (US); message center
MGMT	management
MDW	Military District of Washington
MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force
MIL	Military
MILCOM	Military Committee (NATO)
MILINREP	ACLANT Report
MILREP	Military Representative to NATO
	Military Committee
MIN	minutes
MM	millimeter
MNC	Major NATO Command (NATO)
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MSC	Military Sealift Command (USN); Major Subordinate Command (NATO); Major Subordinate Commanders (NATO)
	Master Scenario Event List
MSEL	message(s)
MSG(S)	Message Terminal Area; message traffic analysis
MTA	mean time between outages
MTBO	Military Traffic Management Command
MTMC	mean time of outage
MTOO	Military Vigilance (NATO)
MV	Missile Warning Display System
MWDS	
NA;N/A	not applicable
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NAF	Naval Air Facility
NAMILCOM	NATO Military Committee
NAR	no action required
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSOUTH	Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCPS	Nuclear Contingency Planning System
NCS	National Communication System; NORAD Computer System
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters (Canada)
NEACP	National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NMCC	National Military Command Center

## UNCLASSIFIED

NMCS	National Military Command System
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
NO	number
NOIWON	National Operations Intelligence Watch Officers Net
NOMS	Nuclear Operations Monitoring Sub- system
NOPLAN	no plan
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group (NATO)
NPIC	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA/CSS	NSA/Central Security Service
NSC	National Security Council
NTC	Naval Telecommunications Center
NTS	Naval Telecommunications System
NUCWA	Nuclear Weapons Accounting System
NUDET	Nuclear Detonation Report
NWCS	NATO-Wide Communication System
NWSB	Nuclear Warfare Status Branch
OASD (IL)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation and Logistics)
OASD (MRAL)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics)
OASD (PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OBE	overtaken by event(s)
OCEANLANT	Ocean Atlantic Command (NATO)
OCR-EMERG	Operational Change Report-Emergency Operational Report
OI	Operating Instruction
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ONPG	Operational Nuclear Planning Group
OP/GSA	Office of Preparedness, General Services Administration
OPCON	operational control
OPG	Operations Planners Group
OPLAN	operations plan
OPORD	operations order
OPREP	Commander's Operational Report
OPS	operations
Ops Deps	Operations Deputies
OPSUM	operational summary

## UNCLASSIFIED

ORBAT	Order of Battle
ORBATTOALAND/ AIR/SEA	Order of Battle Transfer of Authority/ Land/Sea/Air
ORIG	origin, originator
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OT	operations team
OTIS	operations team intelligence section (ANMCC only)
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAM	pamphlet
PARA	paragraph
PAX	passenger
PL	Public Law
PMR	Permanent Military Representative
POD	point of departure; port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POV	privately owned vehicle
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Principal Subordinate Command (NATO)
PSVP	Pilot Secure Voice Program (NATO)
PTC	Pentagon Telecommunications Center
PUB	publication
RA	Reinforced Alert (NATO)
RCPAC	Reserve Component Personnel Accounting Center
RECCE	reconnaissance
RECON	JRS Reconnaissance Report
RECON-5	Reconnaissance Mission Following Report
REP	Representative
RMCCP	Rhein Main Consolidated Command Post
ROE	rules of engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROUND HOUSE	exercise term for DEFCON 3
SA	Saudi Arabia; Simple Alert (NATO)
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO)
SAGA	Strategic Analysis and Gaming Agency
SAGE	Strategic Analysis Guidance and Estimates

## UNCLASSIFIED

SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAS	special ammunition site
SAT	Saturday
SCARS	Status, Control, Alerting, and Reporting System
SDIN	Special Defense Intelligence Notice
SEC	Secretary
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECONDFLT	Second Fleet
SELREL	selective release
SELRIP	Selective Release Improvement Program
SENDFILE	WIN file transfer program
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SHOC	SHAPE Operations Center
SIC	subject indicator code (NATO)
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SIT	situation
SITREP	Commander's Situation Report
SIXTHFLT	Sixth Fleet
SJCS	Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SLBM	sea-launched ballistic missile
S/MRC; SMRC	SACLANT Manual Relay Center
SM	Secretary JCS Memorandum
SOA	status of action
SOP	standard operating procedure
SOS	speed of service
SPIREP	Spot Intelligence Report
SQD	squadron
SR	senior
SRTC	Site R Telecommunications Center
SSBN	ballistic missile nuclear submarine
SSN	nuclear submarine
SSO	special security office(r)
STANAG	Standardization Agreement (NATO)
STANAVFORLANT	Standing Naval Force Atlantic (NATO)
STARTEX	start of exercise
STRIKFLTLANT	Striking Fleet Atlantic (NATO)
STRIKFORSOUTH	Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe
STRIK	strike; COMSTRKFLTLANT
STRIKSUM	Strike Summary (NATO)
SUBEASTLANT	Submarine Force, Eastern Atlantic Area (NATO)
SUBWESTLANT	Submarine Force, Western Atlantic Area (NATO)

## UNCLASSIFIED

SUM	Summary
SUN	Sunday
SUPPLAN	supporting plan
SYS	system
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAD	time available for delivery
TARE	Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment
TAW	Tactical Airlift Wing
TELECON	telephone conference
TELNET	telecommunications network program
TFS	tactical fighter squadron
TG	Task Group
TLCF	teleconference
TOA	time out of AMPS; Transportation Operating Agency; transfer of authority
TOF	time of file
TOP	Time-Sensitive Operation Planning
TOR	time of receipt
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TS	TOP SECRET
TSE	target support element
TSS	time sharing system
TTY	teletypewriter or teleprinter
TV	television
U and S	unified and specified
UK	United Kingdom
UNITREP	unit report
UN	United Nations
UNK	unknown
UNODIR	unless otherwise directed
URGORBAT	ACE report
URGWORBAT	ACE report
US	United States
USA	US Army
USADC	US Antilles Defense Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USCGC	US Coast Guard Cutter
USCINCAFRED	Commander in Chief, US Air Force Readiness Command
USCINCARRED	Commander in Chief, US Army Readiness Command
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCREDE	Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command

## UNCLASSIFIED

SUM	Summary
SUN	Sunday
SUPPLAN	supporting plan
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TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAD	time available for delivery
TARE	Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment
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TOF	time of file
TOP	Time-Sensitive Operation Planning
TOR	time of receipt
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TS	TOP SECRET
TSE	target support element
TSS	time sharing system
TTY	teletypewriter or teleprinter
TV	television
U and S	unified and specified
UK	United Kingdom
UNITREP	unit report
UN	United Nations
UNK	unknown
UNODIR	unless otherwise directed
URGORBAT	ACE report
URGWORBAT	ACE report
US	United States
USA	US Army
USADC	US Antilles Defense Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USAREUR	US Army Europe
USCGC	US Coast Guard Cutter
USCINCAFRED	Commander in Chief, US Air Force Readiness Command
USCINCARRED	Commander in Chief, US Army Readiness Command
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCREDE	Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command

## UNCLASSIFIED

USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
USDAO	US Defense Attache Office
USDELMC	US Delegate to NATO Military Committee
USEUCOM	US European Command
USFA	US Forces, Azores
USFJ	US Forces, Japan
USFK	US Forces, Korea
USIDF	US Iceland Defense Force
USLO	US Liaison Office
USMC	US Marine Corps
USN	US Navy
USNMR	US NATO Military Representative
USREDCOM	US Readiness Command
USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
USTDC	US Taiwan Defense Command
UW	unconventional warfare
WASHFAX	Washington Area Secure High Speed Facsimile System, formerly LDX
WDE	White Dot Echo
WEST	CINCWESTLANT (NATO)
WESTLANT	Western Atlantic Area (NATO)
WHCA	White House Communications Agency
WHSR	White House Situation Room
WIN	WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WINTEX	Winter Exercise (NATO)
WPRS	War Powers Reporting System
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System
XO	executive officer
Z	message indicator for FLASH precedence; Greenwich mean time
ZULU	Greenwich mean time

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SECTION I


(U) GENERAL

1. (U) Analysis Task Organization. The Exercise Plans and Analysis Division, Operations Directorate, OJCS, was responsible for the planning, data collection, and analysis of Exercise POWER PLAY 79. The Command and Control Technical Center, DCA, provided technical assistance.

2. (U) Analysis Objectives. This report contains the analysis of 11 functional areas which OJCS selected for special attention. The analysis addresses only JCS systems and procedures. The analysis of individual performance was not an objective. Subparagraphs 2a-k below list the analysis objectives for each of the 11 functional areas.

a. (U) Selective Release of Nuclear Weapons

(1) (U) Provide summary data on SELREL messages to and from the OJCS. These data should include message titles, timing, compliance with format standards, and general content. The analyst will make a comparison among communications systems used; i.e., AUTODIN and NATO TTY. He will consider internal US and NATO information flows separately.



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[REDACTED]

(5) (U) Determine the amount of ADP support, including WIN, provided to operational users in developing or responding to SELREL requests.

[REDACTED]

b. (U) Execution Monitoring

[REDACTED]

(a) (U) Execution of nuclear operations

(b) (U) Direction and execution of conventional operations which involved:

1. (U) Review, revision, or application of peacetime ROE

2. (U) Application of US or NATO alert systems

3. (U) Change of operational control (CHOP) of forces to NATO.

(2) (U) Determine if execution monitoring procedures adequately supported the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) (U) Determine if the execution monitoring information presented to the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was timely and accurate.

(4) (U) Determine if command center procedures and systems supported the timely and accurate:


(a) (U) Development of NCA and JCS decisions and instructions for conventional operations into orders

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (U) Communication of the orders to subordinate commanders.

c. (U) Command Center Operations



(4) (U) Determine the adequacy, availability, reliability, and flexibility of internal distribution channels and procedures for command center processing of information received from record messages, voice communications, displays, and video images.



(6) (U) Determine whether the environmental support provided the CSP elements and decisionmakers was adequate, timely, and tailored to the situation.

(7) (U) Determine whether the procedures used in preparing and presenting decision briefings were adequate and timely.

d. (U) Operations-Intelligence Interface

(1) (U) Determine if the operations-intelligence interface provided accurate, timely information to support planning and decisionmaking.

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) Determine if the established procedures which provide strategic and tactical warning and threat assessment to operational decisionmakers were accurate, adequate, and timely.

(3) (U) Determine if the tactical warning and threat assessment information provided by the CCPDS was accurate, timely, and had utility for decisionmakers.

(4) (U) Determine if the information provided to operational decisionmakers by the operations-intelligence interface adequately supported their requirements.

e. (U) War Powers Reporting System. Determine how the WPRS performed in the exercise. Determine the timeliness, accuracy, and adequacy of information reporting.

f. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface

(1) (U) Determine if the information provided through the NATO element of the WWMCCS-NATO interface was timely, accurate, and adequate.

(2) (U) Compare the information provided by both elements of the WWMCCS-NATO interface. Determine the timeliness, accuracy, and adequacy of reporting on the same events through WWMCCS and NATO channels.

(3) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the WWMCCS-NATO interface in sending timely, accurate, and adequate information through parallel channels.

g. (U) Message Traffic Analysis

(1) (U) Determine whether the originator properly assigned precedence in accordance with telecommunications economy and discipline policy and procedures.

(2) (U) Determine the degree of compliance with prescribed procedures, standards, and formats including the use of MINIMIZE.

(3) (U) Determine whether the various precedences of incoming report messages met SOS objectives.

(4) (U) Determine possible correlation among events, precedence, message type, originator, classification, volume, and message length.

(5) (U) Determine whether the length of FLASH and IMMEDIATE precedence messages complied with objectives established in ACP 121 US SUPP-1 (E).

h. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support

(1) (U) ADP Support Provided to the NMCS

(a) (U) Determine what use the NMCS made of WWMCCS standard application software systems and other special purpose application software systems.

(b) (U) Determine the effectiveness of ADP support provided to the NMCS.

(2) (U) Unified Command Command Center Use of WWMCCS Standard Application Software Systems. Determine what use the Unified Command Command Centers made of WWMCCS standard application software systems.

(3) (U) WWMCCS Intercomputer Network

(a) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the WIN in terms of network availability.

(b) (U) Determine what use the participants made of the WIN capabilities.

i. (U) NMCS Command Center Continuity and Relocation

(1) (U) Determine if the COOP-OJCS procedures used to transfer primary NMCS command center responsibility from the NMCC to the ANMCC were timely, adequate, and reliable.

(2) (U) Consistent with exercise constraints, determine if the OJCS followed the Joint Emergency Evacuation Plan procedures to relocate personnel from the Pentagon to Site R.

(3) (U) Determine if the NMCC, when primary, provided critical update information to the alternate command centers in a timely, adequate, and reliable manner.

j. (U) Crisis Action System

(1) (U) Determine if WWMCCS exercise participants followed prescribed CAS procedures.

(2) (U) Determine whether exercise participants provided decisionmakers with timely planning information for each phase of CAS.

(3) (U) Determine if there were any significant delays in the processing and transmittal of CAS information within the WWMCCS.

(4) (U) Determine the adequacy of the planning information.

k. (U) Logistics

(1) (U) Determine if US procedures established to comply with NATO standardization agreements, and related bilateral and multilateral international agreements, were adequate to insure timely response.

(2) (U) Determine if the content of incoming logistical messages provided sufficient information to link a specific message with a specific agreement.

(3) (U) Determine if logistic support information provided from allied sources, either as requests or advisories, complied with the provisions of the appropriate agreements.

(4) (U) Determine if the information provided in accordance with specific agreements was adequate to support US action and decisionmaking without additional input.

(5) (U) Determine if compliance with provisions of individual agreements significantly increased logistical staff workloads and personnel requirements.

3. (U) Analysis and Data Collection

a. (U) Analysis and Data Collection Plan. The Joint Staff published the Analysis and Data Collection Plan as Appendices 1 and 2 to Annex G to the COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0014 on 5 February 1979. This plan detailed the analysis objectives for Exercise POWER PLAY 79. The analysis plan presented system descriptions, criteria for analysis, and methodology for analysis and data presentation. The data collection plan presented data collection locations, requirements, and forms.

b. (U) Data Collectors. The OJCS assigned data collectors during the period 6 through 23 March 1979 to LANTCOM, USEUCOM, MAC, USREDCOM, ARRED, AFRED, SHAPE, the Washington based TOAs, the NMCC, and the ANMCC. Data collectors were trained on 27 February 1979 and debriefed during March and April 1979.

c. (U) Data Collected. Data collectors completed forms and collected messages, computer printouts, memorandums, logs, copies of briefing scripts and slides, and other files at each participating command center.

d. (U) Analysis Considerations

(1) (U) The Joint Staff conducted the exercise concurrently with some real-world crises. Some senior level personnel who would normally play in an exercise did not because of the real-world events. Others participated on a limited basis. This situation was apparent especially at the NMCC where the OJCS conducted only one decision briefing. During the period of play at Site R one flag officer was at one time the exercise Director, Joint Staff, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NCA. These artificialities greatly biased the decisionmaking process.

(2) (U) Exercise artificialities also included the unrealistic TPFDD used for reinforcement play and the OPSEC requirement to use secure communications

[REDACTED]

even for unclassified information transfer. Additionally, the Joint Staff did not exercise the JEEP realistically because of administrative convenience. Several commands used response cells to represent command center personnel; other commands used the exercise as a training vehicle for new or reserve personnel. Surrogate players filled most of the key roles within the NMCC and ANMCC. There was no data collection at the NEACP. The analysts attempted to minimize the impact of these artificialities wherever possible.

(3) (U) Whenever this report identifies personnel by title, the reader should recognize that the title refers to a surrogate player; e.g., the exercise President or the exercise COPG.

4. (U) Exercise Message Analysis System. The EMAS assisted in the collection of messages received or transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The analysts used this system extensively in the analysis of message traffic during the exercise.

5. (U) Detailed Analysis. Sections II through XII provide the detailed analysis for each functional area. Each section contains a general analysis statement, detailed analysis results keyed to the specific analysis objectives listed in paragraph 2 above, and findings. The system descriptions provided in Appendix 1 describe how the system functioned so that the reader may view procedural deficiencies and other analysis highlights in proper perspective.

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
SECTION II

(U) SELECTIVE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. (U) System Description. Tab A to Appendix 1 describes the Selective Release System.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations



b. (U) General




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
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c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) Summary of SELREL Messages (Analysis objective 2a(1))



(g) (U) Tables II-1 and II-2 summarize the NATO SELREL-related messages and provide information on their general contents.



(i) (U) Table II-4 summarizes NATO SELREL-related messages.

(2) (U) Timeliness (Analysis objectives 2a(1) and 2a(2))

(a) (U) General



a. (U) NATO TTY. This is the generic name for the NATO GENSER message system for record message traffic used by all NATO elements.





Table II-1. (U) SELREL, SACLANT SELREL-Related Message Content

II-4

Table II-2. (U) SELREL, SACEUR SELREL-Related Message Content



II-5

Table II-3. (U) SELREL, US SELREL EAM Content





Table II-4. (U) SELREL, NATO SELREL-Related Message Data



II-7

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




Figure II-1. (U) SELREL, Flow of SELREL-Related Messages

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(b) (U) Warning Messages



II-10

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


Figure II-2. (U) SELREL, SACEUR Request One Timeline

II-11

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


Figure II-2. (U) SELREL, SACEUR Request One Timeline

II-11

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


Figure II-3. (U) SELREL, SACLANT Request One Timeline

II-13

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


Figure II-4. (U) SELREL, SACLANT First Conditional Request Timeline

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



Figure II-5. (U) SELREL, SACLANT Second Conditional Request Timeline


II-15

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


(f) (U) Summary




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
(3) (U) Compliance (Analysis objective 2a(1))




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(4) (U) Accuracy (Analysis objective 2a(1))




(5) (U) Design Adequacy (Analysis objectives 2a(2),  
2a(3), and 2a(4))




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(6) (U) ADP Support (Analysis objectives 2a(3) and 2a(5))



(7) (U) Secure Voice Systems. Sections IV (IV-6) and VII (VII-9) include discussions of secure voice systems. (Analysis objective 2a(b))

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Table II-5. (U) SELREL, ADP Support to the ONPG

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
3. (U) Selective Release of Nuclear Weapons Findings

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Table II-6. (U) SELREL, Secure Voice Communications Related to SELREL



II-23

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
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SECTION III

(U) EXECUTION MONITORING

1. (U) System Description. Tab B to Appendix 1 describes the Execution Monitoring System.



b. (U) General. The analysis includes an examination of execution monitoring procedures used during the exercise. The functions analyzed are nuclear and conventional operations. Conventional operations include review, revision, or application of peacetime ROE; application of US or NATO alert systems; and CHOP of forces to NATO.\* The analyst

\* (U) JCS Pub 1 and NATO AAP 6 define change of operational control (CHOP) as the date and time at which responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another. OJCS more familiarly uses CHOP in a broader sense to include not only the date and time but also the process by which responsibility passes. Section III uses CHOP in this broader sense.

III-1

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
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investigated the adequacy, timeliness, and accuracy of information provided to decisionmakers. The analysis also covered the development of decisions and communication of resultant orders to subordinate commands.

c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) Design Adequacy (Analysis objectives 2b(1), (2), (3), and (4))

(a) (U) Nuclear Operations




III-2

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
Table III-1. (U) Execution Monitoring, Reports Received  
and Sent by the JCC Concerning the SACEUR  
Nuclear Strike



III-3

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(b) (U) Conventional Operations

1. (U) Rules of Engagement

a. (U) General



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b. (U) CINCLANT ROE

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


Figure III-1. (U) Execution Monitoring, CINCLANT ROE

III-6

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c. (U) ROE Procedures. Table III-2 lists the results of OJCS, LANTCOM, and USEUCOM responses to a ROE procedural adequacy questionnaire.




2. (U) Applications of US or NATO Alert Systems




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Table VII-4. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface, SITREP-OPSUM  
Format




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
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
(4) (U) Adequacy (Analysis Objectives 2b (1), (2), and (3))



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3. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface Findings




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SECTION VIII

(U) MESSAGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

1. (U) System Description. Tab G to Appendix 1 describes the Message Traffic Analysis System.

2. (U) Analysis




b. (U) General. This section examines the JRS reports and GENSER messages sent or received at the NMCS and used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The analyst investigated the timeliness of the JRS reports and the information provided in GENSER messages. EMAS provided information about the degree of attainment of SOS and message length objectives for the various precedences. The analyst investigated the correlation among precedence, message type, originator, classification, and message length. EMAS reports which included special message text groupings and numerical summaries of JRS reports and GENSER traffic provided a basis for the

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c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) Timeliness of Performance (Analysis objective 2g(2) and (3))



VIII-3




Figure VIII-1. (U) MTA, Cumulative Distribution by Percent, JCS Incoming Message Communications Time, by Precedence

VIII-4





Figure VIII-2. (U) MTA, Comparison of FLASH and IMMEDIATE SOS Performance Among Recent Exercises

Table VIII-1. (U) MTA, Compliance of SITREPs with JRS Guidance, Receipt Deadlines



VIII-5

9-111A





Figure VIII-3. (U) MTA, Comparison Among Recent Exercises of Timely Receipt of JRS SITREPs, Percent Reaching NMCS by 0400Z

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(b) (U) Length of High Precedence Messages



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Table VIII-2. (U) MTA, Compliance with Guidelines for JRS Reports

Table VIII-3. (U) MTA, FLASH and IMMEDIATE Message Lengths, Percent Meeting ACP-121 Standards, by Exercise Day

VIII-6

VIII-10





Figure VIII-4. (U) MTA, Percent of FLASH and IMMEDIATE Messages Meeting JCS Length Criteria by Exercise

COMMUNICATIONS

VIII-11



COMMUNICATIONS


Figure VIII-5. (U) MTA, FLASH and IMMEDIATE Message Lengths, Cumulative Distribution by Length

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b. (U) Over 75 percent of the FLASH messages were shorter than the average exercise message.

c. (U) The average JCS outgoing IMMEDIATE message was longer than the average JCS incoming IMMEDIATE message.

d. (U) Over 60 percent of the IMMEDIATE messages were shorter than the average exercise message.



VIII-12

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VIII-13




Figure VIII-6. (U) MTA, Percent of JCS Incoming and Outgoing Messages by Precedence and Classification

VIII-14




Figure VIII-7. (U) MTA, Percent of Messages Classified SECRET and Sent Using IMMEDIATE Precedence During Recent Exercises

VIII-15






Figure VIII-8. (U) MTA, Percent Messages Transmitted as FLASH During Recent Exercises



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(3) (U) Correlation between Information and Events  
(Analysis objective 2g(4))



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VIII-18





Figure VIII-10. (U) MTA, Daily JCS Incoming and Outgoing Messages by Precedence

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


a. (U) The table provides the average daily message volume for each period for each message group. The table also shows the length of each period. These averages do not consider the daily variations in data or the influence of extreme values.



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VIII-22



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Figure VIII-11. (U) MTA. Daily Message Volume for Exercises  
PRIME TARGET 77 and POWER PLAY 79

Table VIII-4. (U) MTA, ANOVA Test Results, Average Daily Message Volume  
by Period, by Message Groups

VIII-23

VIII-25





Figure VIII-12. (U) MTA, Daily Percent of JCS Incoming Messages Meeting SOS Objectives

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VIII-26




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
Figure VIII-13. (U) MTA, Daily Percent of JCS Incoming FLASH Messages Meeting SOS Objectives

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(4) (U) Adequacy (Quantity) of Information (Analysis objective 2g(4))




3. (U) MTA Findings



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Table VIII-6. (U) MTA, Daily Message Traffic by Report Type




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Table VIII-7. (U) MTA, Daily Messages Originated by Command

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6 that specifically adapt JRS reports to WIN capabilities.

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VIII-30

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


Table VIII-5. (U) MTA, Comparison of Average Daily Number of Messages,  
by Type, for Selected Exercises and Real-World Crises

VIII-31/32

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SECTION IX

(U) WWMCCS ADP SUPPORT

1. (U) System Description. Tab H to Appendix 1 describes the WWMCCS ADP support system.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

(1) (U) The limited participation of organizations below the level of unified and specified commands degraded the completeness and validity of exercise data bases.

(2) (U) The exercise scenario scripted the flow of forces deploying to USEUCOM thereby limiting the utility of the JOPS and DEPMAS.

b. (U) General. The analysis focused on an examination of the utility and effectiveness of WWMCCS ADP support. Results of the analysis were compared with the goals for ADP systems as set forth in JCS Pub 19, Vol IV, "WWMCCS Performance Criteria."

c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) Joint Staff Uses of Application Software Systems (Analysis objective 2h(1))

(a) (U) DICO personnel processed 65 ADP support requests using the remote terminals located in the OPG administrative area and the FSB, ISD. Figure IX-1 shows the application software systems that terminal operators accessed to support participant requirements and the number of times they accessed each system.

(b) (U) LCC personnel processed 18 ADP support requests using the remote terminal located in

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the LCC. Figure IX-1 reflects the application software system usage pattern for LCC information requests.

(c) (U) The Operations Directorate Response Cell processed 33 ADP support requests using a remote user terminal. Figure IX-1 shows the application software system usage pattern for Operations Directorate Response Cell information requests.

(d) (U) The SOA application software system is a new ADP program which provided the OPG with an automated status of action file. Figure IX-1 shows that the DICO, LCC, and Operations Directorate Response Cell personnel accessed this file 28 times. This figure represents queries as to the status of a certain action. The figure does not reflect DICO personnel terminal activity to update records in the SOA file. There were 601 OPG action items.

(e) (U) Figure IX-1 indicates that DICO, LCC, and Operations Directorate Response Cell personnel participated in the USCINCREC WIN conference (WIN TLCF) a total of 18 times. This terminal activity reflects Joint Staff personnel sending or receiving a conference message.

(f) (U) Figure IX-2 reflects the number of exercise participant ADP support requests for each day of the exercise. The number of requests includes WIN utilization and accesses of local data bases.

(g) (U) Data collectors interviewed exercise participants who requested ADP support during the exercise. These interviews provided data to support the analysis of the following aspects of ADP support:

1. (U) The method that the participant used to request support
2. (U) The method that ADP personnel used to satisfy the request

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



Figure IX-1. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Systems Utilization Data

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Figure IX-2. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Number of Participant ADP Support Requests by Exercise Day

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3. (U) Participant's intended use of the ADP output.

(h) (U) Data collector interviews for 75 ADP support requests provided the following information:

1. (U) Participants requested ADP support person-to-person; i.e., participant to DICO personnel or terminal operator, for 90 percent of the requests. The other 10 percent of ADP requests were memos or telephone calls.

2. (U) DICO personnel or remote terminal operators processed 89 percent of the requests for information using a remote terminal. DICO personnel provided participants with an onhand report for 11 percent of the requests.

3. (U) Participants requested ADP support for the following general reasons:

a. (U) Support staff planning functions

b. (U) Respond to question by external agency

c. (U) Prepare for a briefing.

(2) (U) Unified Command Center Use of WWMCCS Standard Application Software Systems. (Analysis objective 2h(3)). Data collectors at the command centers of participating unified commands were not able to collect sufficient data for a thorough analysis. They encountered problems within the respective command centers in identifying and defining usage of WWMCCS standard systems as opposed to command unique systems. The analyst did examine available data to support the following general statements:

(a) (U) USEUCOM. Completed data collection forms and data collector observations indicated that command center personnel used UNITREP (formerly FORSTAT), JOPS, NCPS, NUCWA, and RECON.

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The USEUCOM Data Services Center provided four remote terminals to support exercise participants. USEUCOM was not a WIN node during Exercise POWER PLAY 79.

(b) (U) LANTCOM. Completed data collection forms and data collector observations indicated that command center personnel used LANTCOM application software systems in support of their functions. Data collection forms indicated minimal use of JOPS and UNITREP. LANTCOM participated in the USREDCOM WIN teleconference.

(c) (U) USREDCOM. Completed data collection forms and data collector observations indicated that command center personnel used JOPS and UNITREP in support of their functions. A large number of remote terminal log entries indicated use of DEPMAS, a USREDCOM application software system. In addition, USREDCOM convened a WIN teleconference during the exercise. Subsequent paragraphs contain the analysis of the WIN conference.

(3) (U) Effectiveness of ADP Support (Analysis objective 2h(2))

(a) (U) Accuracy. Data collector interviews with exercise participants who requested ADP support revealed that for most requests the user considered the information accurate. Exercise participants' comments on UNITREP and DEPMAS information inaccuracies totaled less than 1 percent of 75 interviews. Participants considered the information inaccurate when they compared it with information obtained through messages or telephone calls.

(b) (U) Responsiveness

1. (U) Designated data collectors monitored a remote terminal located in the DICO and recorded terminal response times with the aid of a stop watch. Measurement periods were for 1 hour every 4 hours during the exercise. Data collectors did not record WIN TLCF and TELNET response times. Data

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collectors recorded two response times:  
terminal response and entry response.

a. (U) Terminal response time is the elapsed time from the terminal transmit signal to the appearance of the first character of the computer's response on the terminal screen.

b. (U) Entry response time is the elapsed time from the terminal transmit signal to the end of the computer's response or to the end of a full terminal screen, whichever is shorter.

2. (U) The mean terminal response time was 1.5 seconds which meets the criteria of 2 seconds as expressed in JCS Pub 19, Vol IV. The mean entry response time was 10.8 seconds which meets the criteria of 2 minutes for ad hoc queries. Table IX-1 provides a comparison of these terminal response times with response times recorded during Exercises ELITE Trooper 78 and NIFTY NUGGET 78.

3. (U) Turnaround time starts when a participant requests information and ends when ADP support personnel deliver the information to the requestor. The mean turnaround time for 75 ADP support requests during Exercise POWER PLAY 79 was 85.6 minutes. The minimum turnaround time was 2 minutes and the maximum was 540 minutes. The median turnaround time was 30 minutes. The median, which represents the middle data point, provides a better indication of turnaround time than the mean which was influenced by nine turnaround times in excess of 120 minutes. Figure IX-3 shows turnaround times by exercise day.

4. (U) Data on 75 ADP support requests indicate that ADP support personnel completed 90 percent of the requests within the time period specified by the requestor.

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


Figure IX-3. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Turnaround Times for NMCS ADP Requests by Exercise Day

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Table IX-1. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Comparison of Mean Terminal Response Times for Exercises ELITE TROOPER 78, NIFTY NUGGET 78, and POWER PLAY 79

MEAN TERMINAL RESPONSE TIMES (SECONDS)

EXERCISE	TERMINAL RESPONSE	ENTRY RESPONSE
ELITE TROOPER 78	2.1	5.5
NIFTY NUGGET 78	3.4	6.4
POWER PLAY 79	1.5	10.8

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(c) (U) Design Adequacy. Data collectors interviewed exercise participants who requested ADP support during the exercise. These interviews determined if the ADP product met the user's requirements. The following comments pertain to 48 requests for information from JOPS, UNITREP, and DEPMAS:

1. (U) Forty-four participants indicated that the ADP product provided the information requested.
2. (U) Sixteen participants indicated that they had to correlate ADP output data with other data sources.
3. (U) Thirteen participants indicated that the output format needed improvement. Output products provided too much detail.

(d) (U) Availability. The analyst reviewed System Operations Logs and CCTC, DCA, C100 Graphic Reports to determine system outages. The analyst considered all outages (total system, DATANET, and TSS) which rendered the system unavailable to a user from a remote terminal as specified in JCS Pub 19, Vol IV.

1. (U) Computer outages reduced availability of the HIS 6080 production system in the Pentagon for 27.3 hours during the exercise. This represents approximately 7 percent of the exercise period. The MT00 was 45 minutes. The MTB0 was 11.1 hours. This MTB0 does not meet the goal of a MTB0 of not less than 36 hours as expressed in JCS Pub 19, Vol IV.

2. (U) Computer outages reduced availability of the HIS 6060 (W) computer system which is located at Site R for 21.2 hours. This represents approximately 5 percent of the exercise period. The MT00 was 26 minutes. The MTB0 was 7.5 hours. During the period after relocation, 200700-230700 March, computer outages reduced availability of the HIS 6060 (W) computer system for 2.4 hours.

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This represents approximately 3 percent of the exercise period when the HIS 6060 (W) computer provided primary support to the ANMCC. During this period the MTOO was 20.8 minutes. The MTBO was 8.7 hours.

3. (U) Computer outages reduced availability of the HIS 6060 (V) computer system which is located at Site R for 11.2 hours. This represents approximately 3 percent of the exercise period. The MTOO was 27 minutes. The MTBO was 15.2 hours. During the period after relocation, computer outages reduced the availability of the HIS 6060 (V) computer system for 44 minutes. This represents approximately 1 percent of the exercise period when the HIS 6060 (V) computer provided primary support to the ANMCC. During this period the MTOO was 14.7 minutes. The MTBO was 17.3 hours.

4. (U) The production system was not available for 13.1 hours on March 15, 1979. Problems with disk files caused this prolonged outage. During this period, the DICO maintained ADP terminal support by switching remote terminals to the HIS 6060 (W) system at Site R.

5. (U) Table IX-2 reflects the number of outages by type for the three systems analyzed.

6. (U) Table IX-3 provides a comparison of system availability data with data recorded during Exercises ELITE TROOPER 78 and NIFTY NUGGET 78.

(4) (U) Effectiveness of the WIN. (Analysis objective 2h(4)). The analyst examined WIN daily statistics to determine WIN effectiveness in terms of site availability.

(a) (U) Table IX-4 shows the daily host down times in minutes for the WIN host sites. The mean daily host down times during the exercise ranged from 33.9 minutes to 121.5 minutes.

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Table IX-2. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Number of System Outages by System by Type

COMPUTER SYSTEM	SYSTEM OUTAGES		DATANET	TSS
	SCHEDULED	UNSCHEDULED		
HIS 6080 PRODUCTION	10	15	6	5
HIS 6060 (W)	4	28	17	1
HIS 6060 (V)	7	16	3	0

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
Table IX-3. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Comparison of System Availability Data for Exercises ELITE TROOPER 78, NIFTY NUGGET 78, and POWER PLAY 79

EXERCISE	COMPUTER SYSTEMS								
	HIS 6080 (PRODUCTION)			HIS 6060 (W)			HIS 6060 (V)		
	PERCENTAGE TIME AVAILABLE	MTOO (MINUTES)	MTBO (MINUTES)	PERCENTAGE TIME AVAILABLE	MTOO (MINUTES)	MTBO (MINUTES)	PERCENTAGE TIME AVAILABLE	MTOO (MINUTES)	MTBO (MINUTES)
ELITE TROOPER 78		NOT RECORDED		98	21	934	99	19	840
NIFTY NUGGET 78	98	16	308		NOT RECORDED			NOT RECORDED	
POWER PLAY 79	93	45	667	95	26	450	97	27	910

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Table IX-4. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, WIN Host Down Times (Minutes) by Site by Exercise Day



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(b) (U) Table IX-5 shows the daily IMP down times in minutes. The mean daily IMP down times during the exercise ranged from 0.9 minutes to 39.8 minutes.

(c) (U) Table IX-6 reflects the daily WIN communication line down times in minutes. The mean daily line down times during the exercise ranged from 5.3 minutes to 64.9 minutes.

(d) (U) Table IX-7 shows the daily percentage of available time for WIN host sites. The mean daily site availability during the exercise ranged from 90.9 percent to 96.9 percent.

(e) (U) The analyst used the data in Tables IX-6 and IX-7 to calculate the probability of accessing the USREDCOM host computer from a terminal in the NMCC. The analyst did not compute this probability from data derived from repeated attempts to access the USREDCOM host computer. Instead, the analyst assumed that the mean daily percentage of time that each site was available closely approximated the probability that each site was available at any time during the exercise. Site availability includes host computer and IMP availability. Similarly, the analyst assumed that the mean daily percentage of time that a communication line was available closely approximated the probability that a line was available at any time during the exercise. Using these assumptions, the analyst calculated the following probability of access:


1. (U) From Table IX-7, the probability that the NMCC site was available,  $P(\text{NMCC})$  is .909. The probability that the USREDCOM site was available,  $P(\text{USREDCOM})$  is .927.

2. (U) There are two communications paths from the NMCC to USREDCOM. Figure H-3 shows the two paths. One path uses lines 5, 8, and 7. The other path uses lines 9, 2, and 3. Table IX-6 shows the mean daily line down times in minutes. The analyst

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Table IX-5. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, WIN IMP Down  
Times (Minutes) by Site by Exercise  
Day




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
Table IX-6. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, WIN Line Down Times  
(Minutes) by Site by Exercise Day



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Table IX-7. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, WIN Site Availability  
(Percentage of Time) by Exercise Day



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converted these data into probabilities of the lines being available. For lines 5, 8, and 7, the probabilities are  $P(5) = .97$ ,  $P(8) = .98$ , and  $P(7) = .99$ . The probability that all three lines in this path are available,  $P(5, 8, 7)$  is equal to the product of the probabilities of each of the three lines being available. Therefore  $P(5, 8, 7) = .97 \times .98 \times .99$  or  $P(5, 8, 7) = .941$ . For the other path,  $P(9) = .97$ ,  $P(2) = .95$ , and  $P(3) = .97$ . Then  $P(9, 2, 3) = .97 \times .95 \times .97$  or  $P(9, 2, 3) = .893$ . Since a user can access the USREDCOM host computer when either or both paths are available, the probability that a line path is available.  $P(\text{line})$  equals  $P(5, 8, 7) + P(9, 2, 3) - [P(5, 8, 7) \times P(9, 2, 3)]$ . Then  $P(\text{line}) = .941 + .893 - (.941 \times .893)$  or  $P(\text{line}) = .994$ .

3. (U) The analyst then used the following equation to compute the probability of accessing the USREDCOM host computer from a terminal in the NMCC.  $P(\text{access}) = P(\text{NMCC}) \times P(\text{line}) \times P(\text{USREDCOM})$ . Using the above probabilities,  $P(\text{access}) = .909 \times .994 \times .927$  or  $P(\text{access}) = .837$ .

(5) (U) Use of WIN Capabilities (Analysis objective 2h(5))

(a) (U) Teleconferencing

1. (U) USCINCREC convened a WIN conference at 232049Z February 1979 and terminated the conference at 231300Z March 1979.

2. (U) Conference participants originated a total of 410 messages during the exercise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff originated 11 of the 410 messages. Figure IX-4 depicts the number of messages that conference participants originated. USCINCREC and his component commanders originated 63.2 percent of the conference messages.

Table III-2. (U) Execution Monitoring, Procedures for Dissemination of ROE, LERTCON, and CHOP of Forces Information

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3. (U) Alert Procedures. Table III-1 lists the results of USEUCOM, LANTCOM, and USEUCOM responses to an alert procedures adequacy questionnaire.

(1) (U) Eighty-eight percent (28 of 32) of the respondents indicated that procedures for changing LERTCON were adequate.

(2) (U) Twelve percent (4 of 32) of the respondents indicated the procedures needed improvement. Of the four negative comments, two indicated a need to simplify the system, and two indicated a need for more people to understand the system.


3. (U) CHOP of US Forces to NATO

a. (U) General



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b. (U) CHOP of US Forces Procedures.  
Table III-2 lists the results of OJCS,  
LANTCOM, and USEUCOM responses to a CHOP  
procedural adequacy questionnaire.

(1) (U) Seventy-nine percent (26 of  
33) of the respondents indicated CHOP  
procedures were adequate.




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
(2) (U) Timeliness (Analysis objectives 2b(1), (3), and (4))

(a) (U) Alert Implementation Reports (ALIMPREPs)



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Table III-3. (U) Execution Monitoring, ALIMPREPS 7




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
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Figure III-2. (U) Execution Monitoring, Cumulative Distribution of Elapsed Times of ALIMPREPs

(b) (U) Transfer of Authority (TOA) Messages.  
Table III-4 lists the TOA messages sent during the exercise. TOA messages provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff with accurate and timely information on the transfer of US Forces to NATO.



1. (U) Various commands sent 62 SPIREPs to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DIA.



(3) (U) Accuracy (Analysis objectives 2b(3) and (4))

(a) (U) CHOP of US Forces to NATO



Table III-4. (U) Execution Monitoring, Transfer of Authority (TOA) Messages

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


Table III-5. (U) Execution Monitoring, Report Response Time, OPREP-3 PINNACLE  
(Initial Reports - Enemy Initiated Actions)

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3. (U) Execution Monitoring Findings

[REDACTED]

b. (U) Conventional Operations

(1) (U) CHOP of Forces

[REDACTED]

(b) (U) The OPG provided NATO authorities with timely information on the US implementation of NATO alert measures. (III-11)

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) Orange Crush. NATO reporting of Operation ORANGE CRUSH was minimal and NMCC briefers did not brief the information available. (III-17)

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SECTION IV

(U) COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS

1. (U) System Description. Tab C to Appendix 1 describes the Command Center Operations systems.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

(1) (U) Constraint. Ongoing real-world crises limited the key players' participation in the exercise. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received no decision briefings at the NMCC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff delegated decision authority to lower levels, and the OPG generally approved actions. This process may have unrealistically shortened response times for some actions, as it eliminated the time necessary to prepare and conduct decision briefings.

(2) (U) Prerequisites. The NEACP did not participate in the exercise. Therefore, there was no data to permit the analyst to examine the interplay of the NMCC and ANMCC with the NEACP. Also, data collection did not occur at CINCAD, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC headquarters which precluded analysis of exercise play related to these commands.

b. (U) General. The analysis focused on an examination of the procedures and systems employed in the NMCC and ANMCC. Procedural analysis determined the adequacy, timeliness, and effectiveness of procedures; compliance of JCS emergency action procedures with published procedures; responsiveness of crisis staffing procedures; and the adequacy and timeliness of procedures used to prepare and conduct decision briefings. Systems analysis determined the adequacy, availability, and timeliness of displays, video images, and IEMATS. Also analyzed was the adequacy and timeliness of environmental support provided to decisionmakers.

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
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c. (U) Analysis Results

- (1) (U) Design Adequacy (Analysis objectives 2C(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7))

(a) (U) General. A senior player commented that space limitations in the OPG area require separation of OPG members from ECGs. This separation degrades coordination efforts and increases the response time by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) (U) Status of Actions



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Table IV-1. (U) Command Center Operations, Summary of OPG Actions

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


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(c) (U) Briefings



2. (U) NMCC briefers conducted briefings in the CSR, which were televised throughout the NMCC area. A variety of technical difficulties detracted from satisfactory video display and hampered the quality of the NMCC briefings. These difficulties included inadequate lighting in the CSR and use of charts not designed for best TV reproduction (wrong letter size, improper density, poor color choice, and acetate coverings). During Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78, many of these same conditions occurred with the same relative degree of severity. The quality of presentations improved after relocation to the ANMCC.



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Table IV-2. (U) Command Center Operations, NMCC or ANMCC Briefings by Exercise Day

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4. (U) Representatives of Defense Agencies (DMA, DCA, and DCPA) and the Department of State received daily briefings at the NMCC except on weekends. The well-received briefings kept ECG members current with exercise play.

[REDACTED]

(e) (U) Voice Communications

[REDACTED]

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(f) (U) Displays. The only displays in the OPG area were the SOA boards and a briefing schedule board. Numerous players indicated that a display in the OPG area showing the US and NATO alert status would have been useful.

(g) (U) Weather Briefings. Weather briefers consistently provided accurate environmental information during the exercise. Table IV-3 provides the number and times of weather briefings conducted during the exercise. Weather briefers conducted 49 briefings at the NMCC and 8 at the ANMCC.

(2) (U) Timeliness (Analysis objectives 2C(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7))

(a) (U) Status of Actions

1. (U) Table IV-4 presents a review of assigned suspense and actual completion times for a random sample of 82 OPG-completed actions. The sample size represents the total population of 520 OPG-completed actions. The analyst is 95 percent confident that percentages provided in subparagraphs 1a and 1b are accurate within 10 percent if applied to the total population.

a. (U) Action officers completed actions prior to assigned suspense time in 26 percent (21 of 82) of the cases sampled. The AOs completed the 21 actions in an average time of 3 hours 6 minutes prior to assigned suspense times.

b. (U) Action officers completed 74 percent (61 of 82) of actions sampled with an average elapsed time of 12 hours 15 minutes after the assigned suspense time.

Table IV-3. (U) Command Center Operations,  
Environmental Support




Table IV-4. (U) Command Center Operations, Time Between Action Suspense Targets and Actual Completion Times for Sample of OPG Actions

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2. (U) The OPG XO did not assign a suspense time in 13 SOA log actions listed. In these cases, the OPG XO directed that the action officer complete the action as soon as possible. Table IV-5 presents the results of actions assigned an ASAP suspense.

a. (U) Three of the 13 actions required no response.

b. (U) Action officers completed the remaining 10 actions in an average of 19 hours 30 minutes with the range being 15 minutes to 59 hours 32 minutes. This is about 5 hours longer than the average elapsed time for SOA sample cases assigned suspense times (see Table IV-6).

3. (U) Table IV-6 summarizes data on an OPG sample of 33 actions processed to completion.

a. (U) The average elapsed time between receipt of the requirement at the OPG AMPS printer and assignment of the requirement was 1 hour 21 minutes.

b. (U) Average elapsed time between assignment of the requirement and completion of the action was 14 hours 44 minutes.

c. (U) The total elapsed time for an action from receipt at the OPG AMPS printer to completion averaged 16 hours 5 minutes.





Table IV-5. (U) Command Center Operations, Time Between Assignment and Completion for Actions with ASAP Suspense


IV-11

Table IV-6. (U) Command Center Operations, Processing Times for Sample of OPG Actions

Table IV-7. (U) Command Center Operations, Timeliness  
of LERTCON Attainment




IV-13



(d) (U) Weather Briefings. Weather briefers presented the most current information available. The briefers updated weather information using CAWSS data until approximately 1 hour before scheduled briefing time. Satellite imagery vugraphs used in briefings generally had valid times less than 5 hours old; however, several were up to 10 hours old.

(3) (U) Effectiveness (Analysis objective 2C(1))

(a) (U) OPG



IV-15




Figure IV-1. (U) Command Center Operations, OPG Status of Actions Processing, Daily Distribution

IV-17






Figure IV-2. (U) Command Center Operations, Exercise Message Distribution

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3. (U) Eight Army National Guard and US Army Reserve officers participated in Exercise POWER PLAY 79 as OPG XO's and as Operations Directorate Response Cell members. They received valuable training in OJCS crisis action procedures and their excellent performance enhanced the overall exercise results.



(b) (U) Operations Directorate Response Cell. The Operations Directorate response cell had two action officers with expertise in emergency action procedures assigned. They processed only emergency action-related requirements. They provided timely and accurate emergency action messages which enhanced the response cell's overall effectiveness.



(4) (U) Compliance (Analysis objectives 2C(1), (2), and (3))


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(a) (U) Emergency Action Procedures



(b) (U) Crisis Staffing Procedures


1. (U) The CSP directs directorates and agencies to prepare shift summaries of actions processed under MOP-133 procedures. The analyst found no such summaries.



(5) (U) Accuracy, Utility, and Reliability (Analysis objectives 2C(2), (4), and (5))



Table IV-8. (U) Command Center Operations, EAMs Originated  
in NMCC and ANMCC



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(6) (U) Flexibility (Analysis objective 2C (6))

(a) (U) Briefers used real-world weather except for one briefing. On 13 March, the weather briefer used artificial weather because of extreme real weather conditions in the North Atlantic area. The use of artificial weather in a specific area, while using real weather in other areas, was confusing. Thus, briefers presented only real weather thereafter.

(b) (U) Weather briefers prepared two special weather reports. On 12 March, briefers prepared a special briefing for the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff, to be presented at 121630Z. The briefing did not occur. The second report, provided by a briefer at the ANMCC on 18 March, was a special report of a Pacific tropical storm.

3. (U) Command Center Operations Findings


a. (U) Procedures

(1) (U) Assignment to the OPG of two officers with expertise in NATO procedures expedited the response to NATO-related actions. Two Operations Directorate response cell officers with expertise in emergency action procedures expedited the preparation of EAMs. (IV-2, IV-18)



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b. (U) Facilities and Visual Aids

(1) (U) Inadequate CSR lighting for TV transmission and improper design of charts hampered quality of TV reproduction of NMCC briefings. This same finding was generally prevalent throughout Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. Quality of TV reproduction improved after relocation to the ANMCC. (IV-4)

(2) (U) The physical separation of OPG and ECG members hampered coordination efforts and increased action response times. (IV-2)

(3) (U) A general absence of displays in the OPG area hampered the ready access of alert status information. (IV-7)



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[REDACTED]

c. (U) Communications Systems

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) OPG players reported a requirement for a hardware alarm (audio or light) to warn that a FLASH-precedence message had arrived. The alarm would facilitate expedited processing. (IV-18)

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IV-23

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
SECTION V

(U) OPERATIONS-INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE

1. (U) System Description. Tab D to Appendix 1 describes the Operations-Intelligence Interface.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations



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
(4) (U) Two factors unrealistically restricted operational personnel from requesting information and briefings from the intelligence community. First, surrogate players represented senior principals. Second, players were aware of the time schedule requirements in the coordinated scenario.

b. (U) General

(1) (U) The analysis focused on a detailed examination of the operations-intelligence interface (intelligence flow to NMCS operational personnel). Logs, messages, briefing material, intelligence products, and data collection forms were examined by the analyst. His examination of intelligence data, other than products furnished to operational personnel, was limited to abstracts of actions performed. The analyst determined the accuracy, adequacy, and timeliness of interface information used to support planning and decisionmaking.

(2) (U) Tab D to Volume I of the Exercise POWER PLAY 79 A&DCP established the analysis objectives and their functional area limitations. This tab limited postexercise analysis of the operations-intelligence interface to the receipt and use of all source intelligence by NMCS operational personnel. Consequently the analysis does not include the flow of operational information to the intelligence community.

b. (U) Analysis Results




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(2) (U) Adequacy (Analysis objectives 2d(1), (2), and (3))



1. (U) DIA provided the intelligence input for the daily JCS SITREPs throughout the exercise.
2. (U) DIA published INTSUMs, DINs, and SDINs as required by the scenario throughout the exercise.
3. (U) The ITF-ANMIC initiated and prepared 22 point papers and appraisals throughout the exercise. These included 12 Defense Intelligence Appraisals.



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Table V-1. (U) Operations-Intelligence Interface,  
DIA Support to NMCS and Others




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Table V-2. (U) Operations-Intelligence Interface,  
DIA Tasking




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
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(3) (U) Accuracy (Analysis objectives 2d(1), (2), and (3))



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
(b) (U) A review of operations-intelligence interface data collection forms completed by players showed general player satisfaction with information accuracy. Player comments ranged from remarks such as "very responsive and accurate" to "unable to judge the quality and accuracy of DIA-supplied data."

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(b) (U) Paragraph 2c(2)(c) discusses requests for additional or amplifying intelligence information. The absence of identifiable formal requests precludes a corollary timeliness analysis. Players did not maintain timeliness data on informal requests for additional or amplifying intelligence information. In most cases, players orally requested information or support from the DIA representative. The representative then informally tasked the ITF or ANMIC orally or by memorandum. The ITF or ANMIC responded through the DIA representative to the requestor. An examination of operations-intelligence interface data collection forms shows satisfaction with the timeliness of requested information.



V-12

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



Figure V-1. (U) Operations - Intelligence Interface, 17 March  
Significant Event Timeline

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


3. (U) Operations-Intelligence Interface Findings

a. (U) Exercise participants indicated general satisfaction with the adequacy, accuracy, and timeliness of intelligence products. (V-10, V-11)

b. (U) The assignment of DIA representatives within OJCS, particularly the OPG, provided an effective intelligence element interface. The OPG DIA representative was the focal point for responsive informal tasking and for timely notification. (V-2, V-10, V-12, V-15)


c. (U) Exercise participants indicated general satisfaction with intelligence element responses to requests for support and information. (V-10)



f. (U) Intelligence information provided by formal briefings was generally adequate and accurate.

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Principal participants asked relatively few questions. Information so provided was timely within the constraints imposed by adherence to scheduled briefings. (V-7 through V-9, V-11)



V-16

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SECTION VI


(U) WAR POWERS REPORTING SYSTEM

1. (U) System Description. Tab E to Appendix 1 describes the war powers reporting system.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

(1) (U) Pre-STARTEX WPRS Associated Events. Exercise players assumed initial war powers reporting had begun prior to Exercise POWER PLAY 79 STARTEX. This is a valid assumption for the following reasons:



(b) (U) PL 93-148 requires that the President report to Congress within 48 hours when US Armed Forces are introduced:

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
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1. (U) "Into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances"

2. (U) "Into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces"


3. (U) "In numbers which substantially enlarge US Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation."

(c) (U) Since US air and land reinforcements began arriving in Europe on 1 March, the President should have reported to Congress by 3 March, 48 hours later.

  
b. (U) General. The analysis objective was to provide information on the effectiveness of the OJCS procedures in the war powers reporting system. The analyst investigated the timeliness of WPRS reports to the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also, a determination was made of the extent of compliance in the exercise with the criteria of PL 93-148.

c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) Compliance (Analysis objective 2e)





(2) (U) Adequacy. (Analysis objective 2e). The WPRS adequately supplied information to the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Legal Adviser stated that the present WPRS is responsive.


(3) (U) Timeliness (Analysis objective 2e)

(a) (U) Figure VI-1 presents a timeline of the salient WPRS events for the Balkan area UW commitment.



b. (U) War Powers Reporting System Findings

a. (U) The Joint Staff complied with the WPRS procedures. (VI-1 through VI-4)






Figure VI-1. (U) War Powers Reporting System,  
WPRS Timeline

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c. (U) The Joint Staff notification on WPRS to the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was timely and adequate. (VI-4)

d. (U) The Joint Staff provided the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the necessary information required by J3I 3000.1B. (VI-2, VI-3)

VI-6

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
SECTION VII

(U) WWMCCS-NATO INTERFACE

1. (U) System Description. Tab F to Appendix 1 describes the WWMCCS-NATO interface.

2. (U) Analysis

(U) Exercise Considerations



(2) (U) Generally, headquarters below the MSC or component command level did not participate. Even with simulation, this factor limited the type and volume of information available within each element and across the interface.



(4) (U) The two exercises, POWER PLAY 79 and WINTEX/CIMEX 79, although compatible overall, differed in scope and purpose in some respects. Exercise controllers maintained essential coordination through


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
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key exercise events and their timing. Consequently, certain events had to take place as planned, regardless of ongoing player actions and interests. This requirement to maintain exercise coordination limited information requests to some extent.



b. (U) General




c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) General




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


(b) (U) NATO Messages. NATO messages available at the NMCS encompass the following categories.



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(1) (U) The DPC sent agendas for the daily exercise DPC meetings from 6 through 23 March, for a total of 19. The DPC also sent messages for each exercise DPC meeting. The DPC sent a total of 17 such messages from 6 through 23 March. The DPC Alerts Committee sent a total of 35 messages from 7 through 17 March.

(2) (U) The NATO Headquarters Current Intelligence Group (CIG) prepared and sent 51 NATO-wide intelligence summaries from 6 through 23 March. The NATO Headquarters Current Operations Group (COG) prepared and sent 48 NATO-wide operational summaries from 6 through 23 March. NATO Headquarters also sent a total of 12 NATO-wide politico-military assessments from 7 through 19 March.

(3) (U) The NAMILCOM sent the results of its daily exercise meetings in messages

VII-4

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



Figure VII-1. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface, NATO Communications


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Table VII-1. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface, NATO Headquarters Messages by Originator, Type, and Number Received by OJCS

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


b. (U) MNC. The two MNCs of interest, ACE and ACLANT, used various communications paths to send messages through the interface to the WWMCCS element. Tab F describes these paths.




c. (U) NATO Secure Voice Communications






(2) (U) Timeliness (Analysis Objectives 2b (1), (2), and (3))

(a) (U) WWMCCS Element



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
(b) (U) NATO Element



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
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(c) (U) Comparison. The analyst used two equivalent reports, one from each element of the interface, to compare timeliness of information. Insufficient data from subordinate headquarters limited the comparison to the unified command-MNC level. The analyst compared USCINCEUR (unified command) SITREPs with SHAPE (MNC) OPSUMs.


1. (U) SITREPs

a. (U) The JRS specifies that unified and specified commands submit SITREPs daily, or more frequently if required. The commands submit SITREPs as of 2400Z. The commands will send SITREPs by AUTODIN to insure receipt in Washington no later than 0400Z the following day. The SITREP is a narrative report formatted at the discretion of the submitting commander. The originator determines the appropriate precedence.




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2. (U) OPSUMs



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
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Table VII-2. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface, USCINCEUR SITREP-SACEUR OPSUM TAD Comparison (Time Late After 0400Z)


TABLE VII-3. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface, Comparison of SACEUR OPSUM TADs by Communications Path

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(3) (U) Accuracy (Analysis Objectives 2b (1), (2), and (3))



(b) (U) The analyst compared SACEUR OPSUMs and USCINCEUR SITREPs to determine the relative accuracy of information available through each interface element. Table VII-4 shows SACEUR OPSUMs and USCINCEUR SITREPs in outline format. As noted previously both commands submitted daily reports as of 2400Z from 7 through 23 March. The analyst compared daily reports for this period with the exception of 7, 16, 18, and 21 March. (OPSUMs were not available for the 4 days listed.) The two type reports differ in format and purpose (see paragraph 2c(2) above).

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


Figure IX-4. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, WIN TLCF Message Distribution by Originating Participants

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3. (U) Figure IX-5 summarizes the percentage of messages by general subject area.

(b) (U) File Operations

1. (U) There were 12 recorded Joint Staff queries of the USREDCOM DEPMAIS data base using the WIN.

2. (U) On the first day of the exercise, MAC attempted to send an air movement flow plan file to the NMCC. Computer outages and IMP outages either at the sending or receiving sites hampered this effort. After two days of unsuccessful attempts, MAC was able to complete the transmission. Upon receipt of the file, DICO personnel determined that the file was not in a standard format. CCTC, DCA, computer programmers wrote a program to reformat the file into a useable form. These problems prevented Joint Staff personnel from having the current MAC air movement flow plan for OPLAN 4014X for the first 3 days of the exercise.

3. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support Findings

a. (U) Joint Staff elements used the UNITREP, (formerly FORSTAT), JOPS, DEPMAIS, AFFIS, and EVAC application software systems. In addition, the OPG and other Joint Staff elements used a new SOA file to monitor the completion of staff actions. (IX-3)

b. (U) Remote terminals located in the DICO, LCC, and Operations Directorate Response Cells provided primary support to Joint Staff elements. The DICO, LCC, and Operations Directorate Response Cell processed a total of 116 reported information requests during the exercise. (IX-1 and IX-2)

c. (U) The unified command centers used the UNITREP and JOPS WWMCCS standard application software systems. Detailed data on the unified command centers' use of these systems were not available for analysis. Data collectors were not able to collect sufficient data for a thorough analysis. (IX-5 and IX-6)




Figure IX-5. (U) WWMCCS ADP Support, Percentage Distribution of WIN Messages by Category

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d. (U) Remote terminals provided timely support to Joint Staff elements. The mean terminal response time for ad hoc queries was 1.5 seconds. The mean entry response time was 10.8 seconds. Both of these times meet the response time goals established by JCS Pub 19, Vol IV. (IX-7)

e. (U) The mean turnaround time for 75 ADP support requests was 85.6 minutes. The median turnaround time was 30 minutes. The ADP support personnel completed 90 percent of the requests within the time period established by the requestor. (IX-7 and IX-8)

f. (U) The HIS 6080 production system was available 93 percent of the time during the exercise. The MTOO was 45.4 minutes and the MTBO was 11.1 hours. The MTBO of 11.1 hours does not meet the goal of a MTBO of not less than 36 hours established by JCS Pub 19, Vol IV. (IX-10)

g. (U) The HIS 6060 (W) computer at Site R was available 95 percent of the time during the exercise. The MTOO was 25.5 minutes and the MTBO was 7.5 hours. During the period after relocation, the HIS 6060 (W) was available 97 percent of the time. The MTOO during this period was 20.8 minutes and the MTBO was 8.7 hours. (IX-10)

h. (U) The HIS 6060 (V) computer at Site R was available 97 percent of the time during the exercise. The MTOO was 26.9 minutes and the MTBO was 15.2 hours. During the period after relocation, the HIS 6060 (V) was available 99 percent of the time. The MTOO during this period was 14.7 minutes and the MTBO was 17.3 hours. (IX-11)


i. (U) The mean daily percentage of WIN site availability times over the period of the exercise ranged from 90.9 percent to 96.9 percent (IX-15)

j. (U) Participating commands and agencies used WIN teleconferencing during the exercise. Conference participants originated 410 messages. USCINCRD and his component commanders originated 63.2 percent of the conference messages. (IX-19)



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
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SECTION X

(U) NMCS COMMAND CENTER CONTINUITY AND RELOCATION

1. (U) System Description. Tab I to Appendix 1 describes the NMCS command center continuity and relocation system.

2. (U) Analysis




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
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c. (U) Analysis Results


(1) (U) Adequacy. (Analysis objectives 2i(1),(3), and (6))

(a) (U) COOP-OJCS



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Table X-1. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, Variance in  
COOP-OJCS and JAI 3000.1I Items




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(b) (U) Pre-positioned Publications



- a. (U) World Atlas
- b. (U) Websters Geographic Dictionary
- c. (U) A document containing details of NATO military command organization and areas of responsibility

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
(c) (U) Communications

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(2) (U) Timeliness. Analysis objectives 2i(1), (3), and (4)

(a) (U) OPG Continuity


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
X-7

Figure X-1. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, OPG  
Shift Changeover and Relocation

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(b) (U) Relocation




2. (U) JEEP



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Table X-2. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, Critical NMCS Update Information



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




Figure X-2. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, Relocation Elements

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


c. (U) Conduct





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(4) (U) Accuracy. (Analysis objective 2i(4) and (5)).  
The newly implemented SOA computerized file insured continuous ANMCC updating through the WIN. This new updating capability made the SOA listing more available. The ANMCC, however, did not have an updated SOA accounting at the time the ANMCC became primary. Figure X-3 shows why this occurred.







Figure X-3. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, SOA Update Timeline

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3. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation Findings



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
SECTION XI

(U) CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM

1. (U) System Description. Tab J to Appendix I describes the Crisis Action System (CAS).


2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations



(2) (U) A separate consideration was the requirement that exercise participants be familiar with the new OPREP-2 and -4 deployment execution monitoring message instructions prior to STARTEX.

b. (U) General



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
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(3) (U) The analyst examined messages, logs, memorandums, reports, briefing slides and scripts, and completed data collection forms to analyze the performance of CAS procedures during Exercise POWER PLAY 79.

c. (U) Analysis Results

(1) (U) Compliance (Analysis objective 2j(1))

(a) (U) Figure XI-1 presents the key CAS events associated with each CAS phase plotted against exercise day.



XI-2

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



Figure XI-1. (U) CAS, Key Events by Exercise Day/CAS Phase

XI-3

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(1) (U) The analyst examined the key CAS messages (WARNING ORDER, ALERT ORDER, OPORD, Commander's Estimate, Evaluation Request, and execution planning messages) for compliance with the provisions of JOPS, Vol IV, and SM-725-78.

1. (U) Warning Order Deficiencies

a. (U) The WARNING ORDER did not provide any possible courses of action or available forces for consideration. It imposed a 4-hour suspense time for reply.

b. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not address the WARNING ORDER to the major component commands of the supported and supporting commanders.


2. (U) CASFDD Development

a. (U) The combined WARNING ORDER deficiencies led the USCINCEUR CAT to prepare the Commander's Estimate without first seeking an evaluation from the component and supporting commands. Thus, the Commander's Estimate did not contain any CASFDD.

XI-5

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


c. (U) The extended delay in development of CASFDD inhibited CINCMAC from preparing and submitting an OPREP-1 Preliminary Closure Estimate.

d. (U) It is therefore significant that the ALERT ORDER established an execution target date of 24 March without a preliminary closure estimate from the TOA.


e. (U) The OPREP-1 OPOD contained sufficient information to support continued planning requirements. It requested USCINCRED to provide requisite CASFDD. The execution planning messages that USCINCARRED and USCINCAFRED generated without delay responded directly to this urgent requirement for firm CASFDD.

(m) (U) During CAS, Phase III, the supported commander did not adhere strictly to the TOP procedures prescribed in SM-725-78. As stated in 2c(1)(c), he elected not to seek evaluation responses from his component and supporting commands, the Services, and TOAs due to the severe time constraints. The major component commands were unable to commence their planning actions until they received the Commander's Estimate. Even then, USCINCEUR did not seek an Evaluation Response until nearly 7 hours had elapsed. He also limited distribution to his immediate components and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supporting commander and his component commands initiated their preliminary planning based on a Joint Chiefs of Staff readdressal of the Commander's Estimate.




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


4. (U) With the single exception of the misunderstanding about the report submission frequency requirement, CINCUSAREUR followed the prescribed reporting procedures correctly. USCINCARRED incorrectly reported the POE in the POD data element in their first two reports. USCINCRED advised USCINCARRED of this procedural error with immediate corrective results. The two reporting commands submitted a combined total of 23 OPREP-2 and 9 OPREP-4 messages between 14 and 23 March.


(2) (U) Design Adequacy (Analysis objectives 2j(1) and 2j(4))



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(b) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff Information Requirements



a. (U) Availability of one US Army brigade

b. (U) Availability of two USAF tactical fighter squadrons


c. (U) Dates that above units were available for deployment

d. (U) Gross movement data in terms of passenger and short ton requirements.



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5. (U) The prompt and detailed USCINCAFRED and USCINCARRED responses satisfied the additional JCS planning information requirement in this instance.

(3) (U) Timeliness (Analysis objectives 2j(2) and 2j(3))

(a) (U) Figure XI-2 presents the duration of the CAS phases identified during Exercise POWER PLAY 79. The chart shows that there was a total of 57 hours and 37 minutes available for CAS play.

(b) (U) Phases III and V, which require intensive participation of the supported commander, were notably brief. The Joint Chiefs of Staff limited the supported commander to 4 hours and 20 minutes to develop the Commander's Estimate in a NOPLAN situation. The truncated time constraint precluded full participation of the component and supporting commands during Phase III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff used 20 1/2 hours in Phase IV to decide on a course of action and issue the ALERT ORDER. Yet they only allowed 8 hours for the supported commander to generate the OPORD in Phase V. This particular time constraint is questionable because the execution target date of 24 March provided a minimum of 41 hours for execution planning.

(c) (U) The supported commander satisfied the imposed deadlines for submission of the Commander's

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


Figure XI-2. (U) CAS, Duration of Phases Identified During Exercise  
POWER PLAY 79

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Estimate and OPORD despite lack of sufficient time for full exchange of information. Exchange of planning information using OPREP-1 message format with IMMEDIATE precedence and WIN was effectively swift. There was an unexplained 5-hour procedural delay by the Joint Staff in transmitting the WARNING ORDER message.

(d) (U) CINCUSAREUR assumed that daily deployment monitoring reports would be sufficient. The implementing message, which CINCUSAREUR did not receive, directed report submission within 1 hour of unit departure at POE and arrival at POD.

3. (U) Crisis Action System Findings

a. (U) In general, all participating agencies and commands complied with the prescribed CAS procedures. (XI-2, XI-5 through XI-7)

b. (U) Participants followed the TOP procedures prescribed in SM-725-78. USCINCEUR did not initiate the exchange of evaluation request and response messages before submitting the Commander's Estimate because of severe time constraints over which he had no control. (XI-2, XI-5 through XI-8)

c. (U) Participants employed correct message types and formats at the proper time during the planning cycle. (XI-2, XI-5 through XI-8)

d. (U) The published procedures at the time of the exercise did not specify a requirement for inclusion of component commands as information addressees on key CAS messages. (The latest revision (dated 7 May 1979) to JOPS IV (CAS) recommends inclusion of component commands as information addressees of key CAS messages.) It was therefore necessary for the supported and supporting commanders to readdress the JCS WARNING ORDER and ALERT ORDER to their respective component commands. The readdressal of these messages caused inordinate delay in initiating vital planning actions in a time-sensitive situation. (XI-5, XI-7)

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- e. (U) The information that the supported and supporting commands and the TOAs provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with SM-725-78 was sufficient to support decisionmaking. (XI-8, XI-11)
- f. (U) The proper authorities submitted the OPREP-2 and -4 deployment execution monitoring reports. In the initial instance, USCINCARRED erroneously reported the POE as POD. USCINCRD took immediate effective action to correct this error. CINCUSAREUR submitted summary messages at extended intervals instead of within the prescribed 1-hour time limit. (XI-9, XI-10)
- g. (U) Transmission of CAS information by AUTODIN, using WIN, and secure voice was satisfactory. (XI-2, XI-5 through XI-8)
- h. (U) Participating commands and agencies provided requisite planning information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a timely manner. However, there is no record that the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained NCA approval of the courses of action set forth in the ALERT ORDER. CINCMAC did not have sufficient time to complete and submit a detailed flow plan prior to ENDEX. (XI-2, XI-8)
- i. (U) The supported commander experienced some difficulty in preparing an appropriate OPORD. The main sources of difficulty were:
- (1) (U) The absence of component commander's evaluation responses in Phase III
  - (2) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff directing a course of action that differed substantively from the action courses offered in the Commander's Estimate, a situation which could occur in any crisis
  - (3) (U) The 8-hour time constraint to develop the OPORD in a NOPLAN situation.

Despite these difficulties, the Supported Commander produced an adequate OPORD within the imposed time limit. The OPORD contained the minimum essential information required to support continued planning. (XI-7)

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j. (U) The only procedural problems which contributed to delays in processing CAS information were the time constraints on preparation of the Commander's Estimate and OPORD. (XI-2, XI-5)

k. (U) The exercise players could identify the first five phases of CAS. The final phase, Execution, did not occur. (XI-12)

XI-14

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SECTION XII

(U) LOGISTICS


1. (U) Systems Description. Tab K to Appendix 1 describes the functions of international logistical agreements.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

(1) (U) The analysis of international logistical agreement play was limited to data collected from major US commands.

(2) (U) Subordinate logistical operating units did not participate in the exercise. Exercise players assumed or created agreement information normally furnished by these units to stimulate player action. The analysis draws no inferences from the simulated data.



c. (U) Analysis Results. Players developed sufficient logistic agreement play during the exercise to support limited analysis. Play was heaviest in the European Command area. Play varied from singular actions which exercised the provisions of selected standardization agreements to actions involving multinational coordination and cooperation.

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(1) (U) Design Adequacy (Analysis objectives  
2k(1), (2), (4), and (5))

(a) (U) Documentation. The United States is a party to many bilateral, multilateral, and NATO standardization agreements.

1. (U) DA Pamphlet 310-35, December 1978, provides an index of NATO standardization agreements.

2. (U) The analyst did not identify a reference document which listed bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded between the United States and NATO member nations.

3. (U) The analyst did not identify a single complete repository of agreement documents which the OJCS could use for support. The Department of the Air Force does have an office maintaining standardization agreements.

(b) (U) Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements

1. (U) The signing of a basic agreement is frequently only the first step in concluding an agreement. The basic agreement often requires the signatory nations to negotiate and conclude a number of supplemental arrangements. Upon conclusion of the arrangements the nations then develop implementing plans. The total process normally spans many years.

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(c) (U) NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG). STANAGs generally are not as complex as other

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agreements. National representatives negotiate and conclude STANAGs to satisfy specific objectives. STANAGs, which establish procedures, stipulate the specific actions required. The nations publish guidance supplementing the STANAG when deemed appropriate.

(d) (U) Evaluation. Operating units are essential to the implementation and execution processes for most international agreements. The absence of operating units in command post exercises restricts testing and evaluation of procedures to those accomplished by participating player staffs.

1. (U) In Exercise POWER PLAY 79, players did not encounter problems in processing clearly defined logistic agreement actions.


2. (U) Players developed and exchanged numerous messages simulating Sailing Signals (STANAG 2166) and Forecast of Onward Movement (STANAG 2165). The only problem noted was the inability of player staffs to simulate and provide all the data required. Exercise planners and controllers discussed and recognized this constraint during preexercise planning conferences.

3. (U) The Joint Staff did not require personnel augmentation to handle the limited number of agreement-related actions processed. USEUCOM processed a greater number of agreement actions, but provided no evidence of staffing augmentation to accommodate the workload.

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


a. (U) This Act gave the President emergency authority to provide materiel assistance to allied nations when deemed in line with US interests. The President delegated the authority to the Secretary of Defense. On 14 March, the Secretary of Defense further redelegated authority to the Service Secretaries and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided notification and implementing guidance to unified and specified commands early on 15 March.

b. (U) The Defense Resources Act also provided authority for the United States to sign STANAG 2135.

c. (U) Passage of the Act and the signing of the STANAG provided major commanders the authority necessary to logistically support allied efforts.

(2) (U) Compliance (Analysis objectives 2k(1) and  
(3))



(b) (U) Activation of the BENELUX LOC

1. (U) USCINCEUR initiated action to activate the BENELUX LOC in accordance

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
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with applicable bilateral agreements. USCINCEUR sent the original request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 March. The Joint Staff coordinated the request with the Department of State.

2. (U) The Department of State sent a message on 7 March to the ambassadors of the three American Embassies concerned; i.e., Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The Department of State message directed the Ambassadors to contact appropriate Government officials and request activation of the LOC.


3. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff then authorized USCINCEUR to coordinate subsequent actions directly with the national Ministers of Defense. Early on 8 March, USCINCEUR sent a message to the Ministers restating the US request for LOC activation.

4. (U) The Ministers of Defense of Belgium and the Netherlands responded approving the LOC activation request.




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2. (U) The LCC started work on the request. There is no record that the LCC immediately notified the OPG as required by the OJCS Crisis Staffing Guide. The OPG did not record the action until work on it was nearing completion in the LCC.

3. (U) The JCS response sent to the USDELTC did indicate the various actions the United States planned to take to increase production. 1



(f) (U) On 16 March, the Commander, US 60th Ordnance Group, advised the Belgium Ministry of Defense that a programmed ammunition shipment would not arrive. The message complied with provisions of STANAG 2156, Surface Transport Request, and provided Belgium the information necessary to reprogram national support resources.

XII-6

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(3) (U) Timeliness (Analysis objectives 2k(1) and (3))

(a) (U) Information available for analysis was not sufficiently detailed to provide time relationships between staffing functions; e.g., administration, research, coordination, etc. Therefore, the analyst used time elements available.

(b) (U) Table XII-1 provides data for five separate actions. The OPG assigned the actions to the LCC. The first three actions are clearly related to specific international agreements. The last two appear to be agreement-related, but the analyst could not identify them as specific international agreements. A discussion of each action follows:

1. (U) Activation of the BENELUX LOC

a. (U) Figure XII-1 depicts the sequence of events leading to simulated LOC activation.

b. (U) The analyst could not establish a reason for the 4 hour 41 minute difference between the 061113Z message DTG and a 061554Z TOF of USCINCEURs initial message. The TOF does explain the 061604Z arrival time at the OPG.

c. (U) Exercise documentation does not reveal the specific staffing actions which occurred prior to dispatch of the Department of State message.

d. (U) The OJCS delayed dispatch of its message to USCINCEUR pending release of the Department of State message to the US Embassies.

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Table XII-1. (U) Logistics, Processing Times for International Agreement  
Related Actions

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



Figure XII-1. (U) Logistics, Activation of the BENELUX LOC

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2. (U) Request for Emergency Authority to Issue US Materials



d. (U) On 13 March, Congress passed the Defense Resources Act. Presidential delegation of authority to implement followed on the 14th. USCINCEUR provided the necessary authority and basic guidance verbally to CINCUSAREUR on 15 March. Figure XII-2 depicts the sequence of events.



XII-10

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(S. INT)



Figure XII-2. (U) Logistics, Request for Authority to Provide Logistics Support




XII-11

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
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3. (U) Procurement from Allied Nations. A USAREUR request for authority to procure combat rations addressed another emergency authority problem: obtaining supplies from allied nations. Again, passage of the Defense Resources Act provided the necessary authority to major commanders.

4. (U) Canadian Request for Airlift Support



c. (U) The Secretary of Defense approved the Joint Staff recommendations on 16 March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the final response.



XII-12

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
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5. (U) SACEUR Request to Increase Munition Production

a. (U) An assistant to the USDELMC requested information directly from the LCC by telephone. The LCC accepted the request and initiated action, but apparently did not immediately notify the OPG. This would account for the late OPG action assignment time reflected in Table XII-1.

b. (U) The USDELMC requested a report of proposed US actions not later than 110500Z March. The LCC completed the action at 102145Z. Discussion with player personnel indicated the OJCS made changes in the message content after it left the LCC. Prior to the 0500Z suspense, an LCC representative telephoned the assistant to the USDELMC and provided the essence of the message. The OPG released the actual message at 0645Z.

d. (U) Other Observations



(S) (U) Play with Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA). OJCS legislative plans expressed a better understanding of FPA roles as a result of exercise play interaction. FPA assistance with actions relating

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to legislative proposals received special favorable comment.




(a) (U) The Authority for the Coordination of Inland Transportation in Central Europe (ACTICE)

(b) (U) The Board for Coordination of Civil Airlift (BOCCA).

While interaction with US and allied commands did take place, agreements, charters, and terms of reference for these organizations are incomplete.

3. (U) Logistics Findings

a. (U) The OJCS and other participating US commands responded well to the exercise objectives of testing and evaluating international agreement procedures. The OJCS and US commands complied with pertinent agreement procedures in processing agreement actions during Exercise POWER PLAY 79. The exercise demonstrated the need to continue emphasis on international agreements and seek expanded play in future exercises. (XII-5




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c. (U) The OJCS does not maintain a central repository of international agreements nor did the analyst locate a single repository within the Department of Defense. (XII-2)



e. (U) The OPG recorded and assigned an action over 15 hours after the LCC received the telephone request from the USDELMC. The OJCS Crisis Staffing Guide requires immediate notification of the OPG. (XII-6, XII-12, and XII-13)

f. (U) An allied request for airlift support required forwarding to the Secretaries of Defense and State prior to final action. The request was either made out-of-channels or related to an agreement which was not identified. OJCS processed it as an out of-channel request. The total US action time consumed 56 hours 28 minutes due, in part, to the requirement to staff it outside the OJCS. (XII-12)

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APPENDIX 1

(U) SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS

(U) Tabs A through K provide system descriptions for the eleven functional areas selected for analysis during Exercise POWER PLAY 79.

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
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TAB A

(U) SELECTIVE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS



3. (U) Organizational Structure

a. (U) US Entities

(1) (U) Nuclear-capable unified and specified commands capable of NATO-related actions.

(a) (U) LANTCOM

(b) (U) USEUCOM

(c) (U) SAC.

(2) (U) OJCS

(a) (U) ONPG

(b) (U) OPG

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
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- (c) (U) DDO
  - (d) (U) EA Element
  - (e) (U) JCS Message Center and the JSCO
  - (f) (U) Other Joint Staff Elements.
- (3) (U) Ops Deps
  - (4) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
  - (5) (U) The Secretary of Defense
  - (6) (U) The Secretary of State
  - (7) (U) The President
  - (8) (U) US Special Ammunition Supply Detachments
  - (9) (U) Supporting Entities
    - (a) (U) DCA (CCTC)
    - (b) (U) DIA
    - (c) (U) DNA
    - (d) (U) NSA/CSS
    - (e) (U) DCI
    - (f) (U) Services.
- b. (U) NATO Entities
- (1) (U) NAC
  - (2) (U) DFC and Ministerial Council Planning Committee
  - (3) (U) MC
  - (4) (U) US Mission NATO
  - (5) (U) MNC (See Table A-1)

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
Table A-1. (U) SELREL, NATO Nuclear Interest Commands




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(6) (U) MSC (See Table A-1)

(7) (U) PSC (See Table A-1).



a. (U) Inputs



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



Figure A-1. (U) SELREL, Information Flow of SELREL-Related Messages During Exercise POWER PLAY 79

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
(2) (U) Messages



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b. (U) Outputs. The following are the outputs from the US procedures only. ]



c. (U) Communications

(1) (U) US Systems

(a) (U) Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System

(b) (U) Automatic Digital Network

(c) (U) Automatic Secure Voice Network

(d) (U) European Command and Control Console System.

(2) (U) NATO Systems. The majority of NATO communications systems are 66 wpm TTY with torn-tape relays. The SELREL process may use the following NATO systems.

(a) (U) Status, Control, Alerting, and Reporting System

(b) (U) Selective Release Improvement Program

(c) (U) NATO-Wide Communication System

(d) (U) Pilot Secure Voice Program. )

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
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TAB B

(U) EXECUTION MONITORING

1. (U) Definition :



2. (U) Purpose. The execution monitoring process provides information on the progress of current military operations

\* (U) JCS Pub 1 and NATO AAP 6 define change of operational control (CHOP) as the date and time at which responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another. OJCS more familiarly uses CHOP in a broader sense to include not only the date and time but also the process by which responsibility passes. Tab B uses CHOP in this broader sense.

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and events to the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This information is necessary to facilitate decisionmaking. The process also provides orders to commanders as a result of the decisionmaking.

3. (U) Organizational Structure

- a. (U) NCA
- b. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. (U) OJCS
  - (1) (U) Ops Deps
  - (2) (U) NWSB
  - (3) (U) OPG/ONPG
  - (4) (U) DDO
  - (5) (U) JCS MC
  - (6) (U) JSCO
  - (7) (U) JCC
  - (8) (U) ANMCC COD.
- d. (U) Unified and specified commands
- e. (U) Operating commands
- f. (U) Forces
- g. (U) Service headquarters
- h. (U) Major NATO commands
- i. (U) DCA (CCTC).

4. (U) System Flow

- a. (U) Inputs. Structured reports, pre-positioned information, briefings, and ad hoc communications convey execution monitoring information and provide inputs to the process.

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(1) (U) Structured Reports. Tab C describes the reports listed below.

(a) (U) CAO SOP Report (Nuclear). ATRES

(b) (U) Other JRS Reports (Nonnuclear)

1. (U) UNITREP (formerly FORSTAT)

2. (U) OPREP

3. (U) OPREP-3 PINNACLE

4. (U) RECON-5

5. (U) SITREP

6. (U) SPIREP.

(c) (U) JCS Alert System Reports

1. (U) Declaration

2. (U) Exceptions

3. (U) Deviation

4. (U) Attainment

a. (U) Attainment Progress


b. (U) Final Attainment.

(2) (U) Pre-positioned Information

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


(b) (U) JCS Alert System



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
(c) (U) NATO Alert System



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Table B-1. (U) Execution Monitoring, Approximate Equivalents of US and NATO Alert Systems




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
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


(d) (U) CHOP of United States Forces to NATO



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b. (U) ADP and Display Systems

(1) (U) ADP. In Exercise POWER PLAY 79 the JCC used application software to reformat NATO nuclear execution reports into CAO SOP reports. Figure B-1 depicts this process.

(2) (U) Displays.



(b) (U) DISIDS. The DISIDS is a closed circuit video signal switching system within the NMCC and contiguous OJCS areas.


c. (U) Outputs. Supporting staffs translate NCA and JCS direction and guidance resulting from consideration of execution monitoring information into orders for delivery to subordinate commanders. US inputs to NATO are for coordination only. The NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the following orders and positions:

(1) (U) Rules of Engagement. These orders modify published ROE or provide ad hoc guidance.

(2) (U) JCS Alert System. These orders posture US Forces at the desired level of readiness.

(3) (U) NATO Alert System. Coordination messages inform NATO of the US position on declaration of states, stages, and measures.

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Figure B-1. (U) Execution Monitoring, ADP Processing of NATO Nuclear Execution Reports

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(4) (U) CHOP of US Forces. These orders provide forces to CINCLANT or USCINCEUR for CHOP to NATO.

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
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TAB C

(U) COMMAND CENTER OPERATIONS



2. (U) Purpose. Command center operations provide the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a focal point to receive warning and intelligence. They make accurate and timely decisions based on this information, issue orders to appropriate commanders, and monitor their execution.

3. (U) Organizational Structure

a. (U) Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The WWMCCS provides the NCA and other appropriate commanders with the capability to exercise operational direction of US military forces in peacetime and through all levels of conflict. Figure C-1 depicts the WWMCCS relationships between DOD and non-DOD agencies.

b. (U) Crisis Staffing Procedures. The CSP prescribe the emergency procedures used in situations ranging from low-level crisis to general war involving US Forces. These procedures apply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agencies responsive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

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


Figure C-1. (U) Command Center Operations, WWMCCS Relationships

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
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collaborating DOD and federal agencies. These procedures group agency representatives functionally to facilitate prompt coordination of military recommendations to the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. (U) Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System. The IEMATS is the primary means for rapid transmission, in record form, of JCS EAMs.

d. (U) Emergency Action Procedures. The EAP establish procedures for the receipt of information and issuance of orders.

e. (U) Environmental Support Systems. The NMCS environmental support system provides weather and ocean forecasts. The forecasts contribute to the development, approval, and execution of military operations and plans.



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4. (U) System Flow

a. (U) Inputs

(1) (U) SITREP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commanders, Services, and Commander JTF-Alaska originate SITREPs. SITREPs give notification of critical situations; a continuous appraisal of existing political, military, and operational situations and plans; and advise of reporting commands' readiness.

(2) (U) SPIREP. Unified and specified commands, Services, and military units of divisional equivalence submit SPIREPs. The SPIREP provides timely intelligence regarding events that could have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations.

(3) (U) NUDET. CINCNORAD, CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and USCINCSO submit NUDET reports. The NUDET provides information about nuclear detonations on friendly areas.


(4) (U) OPREP. Designated commands submit OPREPs in accordance with established directives. The OPREPs provide all echelons of command with essential information concerning the planning (OPREP-1), initiation (OPREP-2), termination or results (OPREP-4), and summary (OPREP-5), of military operations. The OPREP-3 report is the single vehicle within the JRS for reporting incidents or events. The flagword PINNACLE denotes that the incident or event being reported warrants national-level interest.

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(6) (U) UNITREP (formerly FORSTAT). The Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, Services, Service major commands, major component commands, DNA, DCA, and DIA submit the UNITREP. The UNITREP provides information on the identity and status of each unit of the Armed Forces of the United States.



Support Monitoring Report submitted by DCAOC SD(CMC), NCS/DCAOC, DCA Europe, and DCA Pacific. The report provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other addressees with pertinent information concerning conditions which impose a serious impediment to communication operations within the DCS.

(9) (U) COMSTAT. The COMSTAT is an Operational Support Monitoring Report submitted by DCA. The report provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other addressees with essential information on the global communications situation in the DCS.

(10) (U) DIN. The DIN is an Intelligence Report submitted by DIA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other addressees. The DIN provides timely intelligence regarding events that could have a significant effect on future planning.

(11) (U) SDIN. The SDIN is an Intelligence Report which provides timely intelligence regarding events that could have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations. DIA submits


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the report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other addressees.

- (12) (U) OCR-EMERG. The OCR-EMERG is a Nuclear Weapons Report. Commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands and the Services submit the report to DNA. The report provides the ANMCC with a source of information on nuclear weapon stockpiles and storage and nuclear delivery capabilities.
- (13) (U) EAMs. Emergency Action Messages are a series of messages which contain significant, time-sensitive orders, directives, authorizations, and information. Both US and NATO military authorities and commands submit and receive EAMs.
- (14) (U) JCS Alert System Reports. The Joint Chiefs of Staff use JRS information as the major means of assessing the readiness of the unified and specified commands. They use certain additional reports described below to monitor the progress of alert actions.



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2. (U) Final Attainment Report. This report advises the Joint Chiefs of Staff that unified and specified commands have completed, or excepted and reported, all actions for a LERTCON.

(15) (U) Crisis Action System Directives. Tab J describes the ALERT ORDER, DEPLOYMENT ORDER, PREPARATION ORDER, and EXECUTE ORDER.

b. (U) Display Systems



(2) (U) DISIDS. The DISIDS is a closed circuit video signal switching system within the NMCC and contiguous OJCS areas.

c. (U) Outputs

(1) (U) NMCC or ANMCC

(a) (U) EAMS

(b) (U) JCS SITREPs

(c) (U) SOA Reports

(d) (U) Strategic posture charts

(e) (U) DIN


(f) (U) SDIN.

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(2) (U) ANMCC as the NEACP Support and Backup Facility



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TAB D

(U) OPERATION-INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE

1. (U) Definition. An information exchange interface exists between the NMCS and selected US intelligence activities. The interface accommodates a two-way flow. NMCS command centers provide operational information to DIA, CIA, NSA/CSS, and the Department of State Intelligence and Research (INR) Bureau. These agencies provide intelligence information to NMCS command centers. Information exchange occurs both on a routine, repetitive basis and on an ad hoc basis. During crisis periods the exchanges intensify. This tab considers only one element of the operations-intelligence interface. This element is the intelligence information flow from the US intelligence community to NMCS operational personnel. This tab does not discuss the operational information flow to the US intelligence community.


a. (U) Strategic Warning. This is notification that enemy-initiated hostilities may be imminent. Notification may vary from minutes to days prior to the initiation of hostilities.

b. (U) Tactical Warning. This is notification that the enemy has initiated hostilities. It can include notification of an enemy missile launch.

c. (U) NMCS. Within the WWMCCS the NMCS is the priority component supporting the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within the NMCS, the primary command center (NMCC, ANMCC, NEACP) provides the means for situation monitoring across the conflict spectrum. Situation monitoring includes the correlation and presentation of strategic and tactical warning, operational information, and intelligence. Intelligence activities provide all-source intelligence and strategic warning information to the NMCS command centers. Within the NMCC, Current Situation Room (CSR) personnel compile, graphically display, and disseminate significant crisis information. The CSR is the focal point for the integration of operations and intelligence information.


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
3. (U) Organizational Structure. Figure D-1 is a simplified information flow diagram keyed to the organizations and systems described below.

a. (U) Organizations



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Figure D-1. (U) Operations-Intelligence Interface

(5) (U) NMCC-ANMCC.

(6) (U) Ops Deps. The Ops Deps receive and review actions, options, and recommendations with intelligence input from the OPG and ONPG. The Ops Deps may approve the OPG options and recommendations, return them for further consideration, or request additional information. If the Ops Deps approve the OPG actions or recommendations they send them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(7) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff review the options and recommendations from the Ops Deps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff may request

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additional information or return the options or recommendations for reconsideration. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the options or recommendations they may forward them to the NCA for final approval, as appropriate.



b. (U) Systems

(1) (U) Reports

(a) (U) JRS. The JRS provides a system of reports. Certain reports (OPREP-3 PINNACLE, SITREP, SPIREP) provide intelligence information.

(b) (U) Intelligence Reports. The intelligence community uses specialized intelligence reports. These include:



(2) (U) Communications


(a) (U) AUTODIN. AUTODIN is the primary DOD worldwide system for secure record communications.

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(b) (U) AUTOVON. AUTOVON is the DOD worldwide nonsecure voice communications system.

(c) (U) AUTOSEVOCOM. AUTOSEVOCOM is the DOD worldwide secure voice communications system.



4. (U) System Flow

a. (U) Inputs

- (1) (U) OPREP-3 (PINNACLE)
- (2) (U) SITREP
- (3) (U) SPIREP
- (4) (U) INDICATIONS Reports
- (5) (U) INDIC
- (6) (U) HOTSIT
- (7) (U) ANALIT.

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b. (U) Outputs

(1) (U) DIN

(2) (U) SDIN

[REDACTED]

(4) (U) Defense Warning Appraisal

(5) (U) Daily Indications Status Report

(6) (U) Strategic Warning Message

(7) (U) Defense Intelligence Appraisal

(8) (U) Strategic Posture Charts. The NMIC AC or ITF prepare Strategic Posture Charts. These are tabular listings of hostility indications. The NMIC and the NMCC use them initially as quick references.

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TAB E

## WAR POWERS REPORTING SYSTEM

1. Definition. The war powers reporting system produces information to satisfy the demands of Public Law 93-148, the "War Powers Resolution."

a. Background. The "War Powers Resolution" is the short title for the House of Representatives Joint Resolution Number 542 voted by the 93rd Congress of the United States. This resolution became Public Law 93-148 on 7 November 1973. This law will "insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations."

b. Criteria. PL93-148 states that the President will report to Congress within 48 hours when US Armed Forces are introduced:

(1) "Into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances"

(2) "Into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces"

(3) "In numbers which substantially enlarge US Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation."

c. Reporting Elements. The Congress requires special information elements concerning deployed forces which include:

(1) The circumstances necessitating the introduction of US Armed Forces

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(2) The constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place

(3) The estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

2. Purpose. The WPRS provides procedures for the identification and reporting to the NCA of War Powers Resolution required information.

3. Organizational Structure. Figure E-1 is a simplified information flow diagram of the WPRS under EOP, keyed to the headings below.

a. General. There are two types of circumstances where the WPRS procedures initiate the information flow.

(1) The receipt in the NMCC or the ANMCC of an operational commander's force movement notification, force movement request, operations report, or intelligence report

(2) The NCA or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs a force movement for which the WPRS may be applicable.

b. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. Operational circumstances which necessitate employing US Armed Forces under hostile conditions may confront commanders of unified and specified commands. Alternately, the imminence of hostilities may require the movement or substantial augmentation of their forces. In either case, commanders send a force movement notification or request by voice and message to the NMCC DDO and the JCS Message Center. The actual message format will vary according to the circumstances and the reporting system used.

c. OJCS. The WPRS applies to all reports of hostilities or imminent hostilities and force movements involving US Armed Forces. Since the WPRS responds to the legal requirements of PL93-148, legal rather than operational staffs will make determinations of applicability.

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


Figure E-1. War Powers Reporting System, WPRS Under EOP

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(1) NMCC DDO. The movement notification or request from the operational commander arrives first at either the NMCC DDO or the JCS Message Center. If the JCS Message Center receives the message, the AMPS will furnish a copy to the NMCC DDO. In either case the NMCC DDO will notify the COPG.

(2) JCS Message Center. The JCS Message Center uses an SOP to determine the AMPS distribution of incoming messages. The SOP reflects action responsibilities as determined by the Military Secretaries of the OJCS directorates. The JCS Message Center revises the SOP periodically to reflect current organizations and functions. The JCS Message Center routes the force movement notification or request to the NMCC DDO, the OPG, and the Operations Directorate Response Cell using AMPS.

d. OPG and Ops Deps. The force notification or request may arrive at the OPG over the AMPS printer, by a telephone conversation, or as a memorandum. The notification format will vary according to the circumstances and the communication method used. The COPG directs the Operations Directorate Response Cell to prepare a WPRS notification memorandum for the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, if the operational commander's message is a request for force augmentation, the COPG directs the Operations Directorate Response Cell to prepare an OJCS Summary Sheet and deployment implementer. The COPG issues an action directive to the Operations Directorate Response Cell. Additionally, the WPRS procedures require the OPG to make early informal notification to the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OPG Team Chief notifies the Legal Adviser by telephone or memorandum that a developing situation may require WPRS action.

e. Operations Directorate Response Cell

(1) The Response Cell prepares the OJCS Summary Sheet with deployment implementer and the WPRS notification memorandum. The WPRS notification memorandum provides the following data:

(a) Circumstances necessitating introduction of the US Armed Forces

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- (b) Nature of the threat
- (c) Interests to be protected
- (d) Units involved
- (e) US Armed Forces present in the area prior to the introduction of the new force
- (f) Nature and scope of allied contribution
- (g) Estimated outcome and expected termination
- (h) Constitutional and legislative authority.

(2) After coordination, the Response Cell forwards the OJCS Summary Sheet with deployment implementer and WPRS memorandum to the OPG for approval.

### f. OPG, Ops Deps

(1) The OPG approves and forwards the OJCS Summary Sheet with deployment implementer to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Summary Sheet will contain the note: "The movement of Armed Forces calls for consideration of whether a report to Congress is required under the terms of the War Powers Resolution (PL93-148). An initial report of details (will be) (has been) provided to the Legal Adviser to OJCS (as soon as possible) for this purpose."

(2) The OPG approves and forwards the WPRS notification memorandum to the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon receipt of the WPRS notification memorandum, the Legal Adviser determines if the situation meets the WPRS criteria. The Legal Adviser will decide all cases of doubt in favor of reporting under WPRS. If appropriate, the Legal Adviser prepares a draft Presidential implementer and forwards the notification memorandum and draft Presidential notification to the OSD General Counsel. In addition, he advises the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, of his determination of applicability of WPRS.

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h. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, receives a briefing on the recommended deployment implementer. If the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, approves the deployment implementer, he sends or takes it to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, sends the approved implementer to the operational commander. The OJCS role in the WPRS ceases at this point.

i. OSD General Counsel. The OSD General Counsel receives the WPRS notification memorandum from the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the General Counsel agrees, he forwards the memorandum with proposed Presidential implementer to the Secretary of Defense.

j. Secretary of Defense. The OSD General Counsel may brief the Secretary of Defense on the matter. If the Secretary of Defense agrees, he sends it to the Secretary of State.

k. Secretary of State. With the advice of his General Counsel, the Secretary of State determines WPRS necessity. If the Secretary of State agrees, he approves the notification memorandum and sends it to the President.

### l. President

(1) The Secretary of State may brief the President on the matter. If the President agrees, he approves the notification and sends it to the Congress.

(2) The second of the two circumstances where the WPRS may become operable begins when the President receives information through diplomatic, intelligence, or military channels. If this information causes him to determine that military force is appropriate, he sends or gives the Secretary of Defense his guidance or order. The Secretary of Defense issues instructions to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, issues instructions to the COPG. Processing of the action from this point forward is identical to that described in the first circumstance.

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## 4. System Flow

### a. Inputs

(1) SITREP

(2) SPIREP

(3) OPREP

(4) EAM

(5) Other operational and intelligence voice or record messages and reports that contain information on hostilities or force movements involving the US Armed Forces.

### b. Outputs

(1) OJCS Summary Sheet

(2) COPG Memorandum

(3) Memorandum to the OSD General Counsel from the Legal Adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

(4) Proposed Presidential implementer

(5) Memorandum to the Secretary of State from the Secretary of Defense.

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TAB F

(U) WWMCCS-NATO INTERFACE

1. (U) Definition. The WWMCCS-NATO interface consists of those communications, reporting systems, and procedures which support US and NATO command and control requirements. The interface provides the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information about US Forces committed to NATO.

a. (U) The WWMCCS is the worldwide US military command and control system. It provides for operational direction and support of US Forces.

b. (U) NATO does not have a command and control system similar to the WWMCCS. NATO has different requirements as a multi-national entity covering a wide geographical area. These requirements exist, in part, to support international consultation at the highest level of the alliance, the North Atlantic Council-Defense Planning Committee (NAC/DPC). NATO must also control an extensive range of widely dispersed, multi-national military forces. The NATO military structure does not have a uniform command and control system. It has, instead, procedures which accommodate differences between the member nations, and between the United States and NATO overall. NATO C<sup>3</sup> and reporting procedures parallel the two major NATO commands (MNC) to which the United States commits forces.

c. (U) The United States commits forces to Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). The Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), respectively, command ACE and ACLANT. The commitment of US Forces to NATO, with dual responsibilities for the US commanders concerned, creates a unique command and control situation. Although the committed forces come under NATO operational control, force support remains a US responsibility. US Forces conduct operations under international (NATO) control, not under national (US) control.

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d. (U) The United States commits operational forces assigned to the component commands of USEUCOM, the US unified command for Europe, to ACE. The commander of USEUCOM, USCINCEUR, is also SACEUR. The United States commits operational forces assigned to the naval component command of the US unified command for the Atlantic Ocean, LANTCOM, to ACLANT. The commander of LANTCOM, CINCLANT, is also SACLANT.

e. (U) The committed US Forces use two reporting systems, NATO and US, and three reporting channels: NATO, US Joint Command, and US Service. Generally, committed US Forces send operational reports only through NATO channels in NATO format. Committed US Forces send monitoring and support reports through US Joint or Service channels in US format.


(1) (U) US Forces report in accordance with JCS Pub 6, Joint Reporting Structure (JRS). The JRS establishes the reporting system to provide information necessary to make or recommend military decisions. The JRS groups reports by broad functional areas. Three of these report groups are of interest: operational status, situation monitoring, and operational support monitoring. Operational status reports, OPREPs and SITREPs in particular, are not available after US Forces transfer to NATO operational control (CHOP\*). The United States must use appropriate NATO reports in lieu of JRS operational status reports.

(2) (U) After CHOP, US Forces send operational reports in the appropriate NATO format through NATO channels. Forces which CHOP to ACE use the ACE Reporting Procedures (ACEREP). Forces which CHOP to ACLANT use the Maritime Reporting System of ACLANT and ACCHAN (MARREP). ACEREP differs from the JRS in format, frequency, data summarization, and communication methods. MARREP is similar to ACEREP but varies in format and frequency since ACLANT is comprised wholly

\* (U) JCS Pub 1 and NATO AAP-6 define change of operational control (CHOP) as the date and time at which responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another. OJCS uses CHOP in a broader sense to include not only this date and time but also the process by which responsibility passes. Tab F uses CHOP in this broader sense.


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of naval forces. The NATO element of the WWMCCS-NATO interface must provide operational reports of US interest. JRS monitoring and support reports will continue to be available through the WWMCCS.



2. (U) Purpose. The WWMCCS-NATO interface provides information for US command and control purposes which is otherwise unavailable. Such information is essential both for fulfillment of US obligations to NATO and for the maintenance of US interests. The NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff use the information provided through the interface as a basis for decisionmaking on major issues. These issues include the transfer of US Forces to NATO operational control, the selective release of nuclear weapons, and support for forces under NATO control.

3. (U) Organizational Structure. Figure F-1 is a simplified information flow diagram keyed to the organizations and systems described below.



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Figure F-1. (U) WWMCCS-NATO Interface  
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a. (U) Organizations

(1) (U) US

(a) (U) US Forces After CHOP to NATO. Operating forces of the three component commands of USEUCOM and the naval component command of LANTCOM CHOP to NATO. These forces continue to send JRS situation and operational support monitoring reports. These forces send appropriate JRS reports on Joint and Service matters to their respective component commands.

(b) (U) Component Commands. The component commands receive JRS reports from the Service operational forces. The component commands send reports on Joint matters to the appropriate unified command, USEUCOM or LANTCOM, and on Service matters to their Service headquarters.

(c) (U) Unified Commands. The unified commands, USEUCOM and LANTCOM, receive JRS reports from their component commands. The unified commands also receive NATO (ACEREP, MARREP) reports from the two MNCs, ACE and ACLANT. The unified commands send reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the NMCS.

(d) (U) Services. The Services receive reports from the component commands. The Services send these reports, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the NMCS.

(e) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff receive reports from the unified commands or the Services, as appropriate, through the NMCS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also receive reports and information from NATO. This information is available in two channels, US and NATO. The US National Military Representative (USNMR) at ACE and the US Liaison Officer (USLO) at ACLANT send information by US communications. The US Permanent Military Representative to NAMILCOM and the US Ambassador (US Mission NATO) to the NAC/DPC send information by US communications. The MNCs, NAMILCOM, and NAC/DPC send information by NATO communications.

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(f) (U) NCA. The NCA receive information from both US and NATO sources from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NCA also receive information from the US Ambassador to NATO by US communications and from the NAC/DPC by NATO communications.

(2) (U) NATO

(a) (U) US Forces After CHOP to NATO. After CHOP to NATO operating forces of the component commands send operational reports in NATO format. ACE forces use ACEREP and ACLANT forces use MARREP. The forces send reports to the appropriate principal subordinate commands (PSC).

(b) (U) PSC. The PSCs receive ACEREP and MARREP reports, as appropriate, from the operating forces. The PSCs send ACEREP or MARREP reports to their major subordinate commands (MSC). Within ACE, certain PSCs also send reports to ACE.

(c) (U) MSC. The MSCs receive ACEREP or MARREP reports from their PSCs. The MSCs send reports to the appropriate major NATO commands (MNC), ACE or ACLANT.

(d) (U) MNC. The two MNCs, ACE and ACLANT, receive ACEREP and MARREP reports, respectively, from their MSCs. ACE also receives PSC reports. Within NATO, the MNCs send reports to the NAMILCOM and to the NAC/DPC. The MNCs also send reports and information directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, using NATO or US communications. The USNMR at ACE and the USLO at ACLANT also send reports by US communications.

(e) (U) NAMILCOM. The NAMILCOM receives MNC reports and provides information and advice to NAC/DPC. The NAMILCOM also sends reports and information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff using NATO communications. The US Permanent Military Representative to NAMILCOM sends information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by US communications.

(f) (U) NAC/DPC. The NAC/DPC receives reports, information, and advice from the MNCs and NAMILCOM.

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The NAC/DPC informs and consults the NCA by NATO communications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also receive these NAC/DPC messages. The US Ambassador to NATO sends reports and information to the NCA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also receive these reports and information by US communications.

b. (U) Systems

(1) (U) Reports

(a) (U) United States--JRS. The Joint Reporting Structure provides a system of reports for US Forces use. Of primary interest in this tab are operational status, situation monitoring, and operational support monitoring reports.

(b) (U) NATO--ACEREP MARREP. Forces assigned to ACE use ACEREP and forces assigned to ACLANT use MARREP. After CHOP, US Forces use the appropriate system for sending operational reports within the NATO military structure.

(2) (U) Communications

(a) (U) United States

1. (U) AUTODIN. AUTODIN is the primary DOD system for secure record communications.

2. (U) AUTOSEVOCOM. AUTOSEVOCOM is the primary DOD secure voice communications system.

3. (U) AUTOVON. AUTOVON is the DOD nonsecure voice communications system.

4. (U) Naval Telecommunications System (NTS). The NTS is the Navy-wide communications system and includes all naval communication resources ashore and afloat.

(b) (U) NATO

1. (U) TTY. NATO has secure low-speed manual and automatic TTY networks for secure record communications within NATO and with member

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nations. The networks of interest in this tab are:

- a. (U) NATO-Wide Communications System (NWCS)
- b. (U) ACE Operational Telegraph Network (AOTN)
- c. (U) ACE Common User Relay Network.

2. (U) NATO Clear Voice Network (NCVN). The NCVN is a combination of command center to command center, dedicated nonsecure voice communication networks.

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(c) (U) Interoperability

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
2. (U) Nonsecure Voice. Interoperability between US and NATO nonsecure voice systems is limited to some switchboard interconnectivity.

3. (U) Secure Voice. No physical system interconnectivity presently exists between AUTOSEVOCOM and the PSVP.

(d) (U) NMCS. In addition to the AUTODIN-NATO TTY interoperability discussed in paragraph 3b(2)(c), certain communications links are of NMCS interest.

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4. (U) System Flow

a. (U) Inputs

(1) (U) US. Operational forces send JRS reports through the unified commands.

(2) (U) NATO. Subordinate commands send ACEREP and MARREP reports through the MNCs.

b. (U) Outputs

(1) (U) US. JRS reports

(2) (U) NATO. ACEREP and MARREP reports.

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## TAB G

### MESSAGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

1. Definition. Message traffic analysis is the analysis of JRS reports and GENSER messages (transmitted by AUTODIN and WIN), and EAMs to determine various performance statistics. (As used in Tab G, the more general term "message" includes reports unless explicitly stated otherwise.) The JRS provides the basic framework for the timely reporting of information required for decisionmaking. GENSER message traffic provides additional information and includes instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the operational commands. EAMs use special formats and special communications means to speed the flow of information and directives.

2. Purpose. AUTODIN, IEMATS, and WIN, and the messages transmitted by them, provide information to the NCA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

#### 3. Organizational Structure

- a. NCA
- b. Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Ops Deps
- d. OJCS
  - (1) OPG and ONPG
  - (2) Response cells
  - (3) ECGs
  - (4) The Joint Staff
  - (5) JECG.
- d. Commanders of unified and specified commands
- e. Commanders of subordinate commands.

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4. System Flow. Table G-1 depicts the interrelationships between the message traffic elements.

a. Inputs

(1) JRS Traffic

- (a) Operational Status Reports
- (b) Situation Monitoring
- (c) Operational Support Monitoring Reports
- (d) Status Reports.

(2) JCS Directive Messages

(3) EAMs

(4) GENSER Message Traffic.

b. Outputs. The outputs include the information provided to decisionmakers and operational commanders.

c. Transmission Media and Message Processors

(1) Automatic Digital Network. AUTODIN is the primary DOD system for secure record transmission. AUTODIN is the usual and preferred media for transmission of JRS reports, GENSER messages, and EAMs among WWMCCS subscribers.

(a) AUTODIN interfaces with the IEMATS terminals and is the transmission system for IEMATS-originated EAMs.

(b) Commands without IEMATS terminals receive IEMATS-originated EAMs at their normal AUTODIN terminal.

(2) Improved Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System. The IEMATS terminal provides the capability to store and retrieve EAM formats. The operator uses the terminal to prepare specific EAMs using these formats. IEMATS routes EAMs into and out of AUTODIN at EMERGENCY (Y) precedence and some at

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Table G-1. MTA, Relationship Among Message Types, Transmission Media, AMPS Processing, and Automatic Collection

TRANSMISSION MEDIA TYPE TRAFFIC	AUTODIN	IEMATS	WIN
JRS REPORT	PROCEDURALLY PREFERRED. AMPS PROCESSES AND EMAS COLLECTS AUTOMATICALLY	TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE BUT NOT PERMITTED OPERATIONALLY	TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE. LIMITED EXERCISE USE RECORDED. NO AMPS OR EMAS INTERFACE
GENSER MESSAGE	PROCEDURALLY PREFERRED. AMPS PROCESSES AND EMAS COLLECTS AUTOMATICALLY	TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE BUT NOT PERMITTED OPERATIONALLY.	TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE. INCREASING EXERCISE USE RECORDED. NO AMPS OR EMAS INTERFACE
EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGE (EAM)	USES AUTODIN SWITCH CENTERS AND TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS. SELECTED WWMCCS COMMAND CENTERS HAVE DEDICATED EA TERMINALS. ALL OTHERS ARE SERVED BY THE COMMAND'S TELECOMMUNICATION CENTER. AMPS PROCESSES AND EMAS COLLECTS THOSE EAM WITH ROUTING INDICATOR FOR JCS		TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE. NO RECORDED EXERCISE USE TO DATE. NO AMPS OR EMAS INTERFACE
WIN TELECONFERENCE MESSAGE	NOT USUALLY USED	NOT TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE	PROCEDURALLY PREFERRED. NO AMPS OR EMAS INTERFACES

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FLASH (Z) precedence. EMERGENCY (Y) is the highest precedence in the AUTODIN system. The NMCC and ANMCC EA areas as well as EA facilities at the nuclear-capable unified and specified commands have IEMATS terminals.

(3) Automatic Message Processing Systems. AMPS is the automated message processing system for AUTODIN traffic sent from and received at the JCS Message Center and the JSCO. Figure G-1 shows a schematic of the AMPS. When AMPS outages occur or when printer traffic queues build, delays increase. This is especially true for lower precedence messages.

(4) WWMCCS Intercomputer Network. WIN is a network of selected WWMCCS computers connected by high-speed secure data links. WIN subscribers can use WIN to transfer data among themselves in a manner similar to AUTODIN. For further WIN details, see Tab H.

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TAB H

## WWMCCS ADP SUPPORT

1. Definition. ADP support is the existing capability available to command center personnel to receive, transfer, process, store, and develop information through the use of a computer system. (This excludes computers dedicated to communications systems and computers used solely in support of display systems.) The computer "system" includes the people, procedures, and software that provide the man-machine interfaces.

2. Purpose. WWMCCS ADP supporting systems facilitate the compilation and updating of information required by decision-makers. Further, ADP facilitates the timely exchange of detailed information and the production of information specified by decisionmakers.

### 3. Organizational Structure

a. Maintaining NMCS ADP Files. Figure H-1 depicts a simplified information flow diagram keyed to the organizations and systems described below.

(1) Commanders of unified and specified commands and subordinate commands, the Services, TOAs, DOD agencies, and OJCS staff members provide updated information for the NMCS files. Operational personnel provide update data through the procedures of the JRS or as direct computer inputs.


(2) CCTC, DCA, computer operations personnel receive and process the update information. If corrections are necessary, computer systems personnel amend the information in coordination with OJCS staff members, or return the data to the originator for correction and resubmission. Computer operations personnel then use valid information to:

- (a) Update existing files
- (b) Produce scheduled and special reports.

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Figure H-1. WWMCCS ADP Support, Maintaining NMCS ADP Files

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b. Access to WWMCCS ADP Support. Figure H-2 is a simplified information flow diagram keyed to the organizations and systems described below.

(1) NMCS operational personnel and other OJCS staff members may request ADP support through the DICO. Alternatively, operational personnel may request and receive information using a remote terminal.

(2) The DICO has access to the data files and programs stored in the NMCS WWMCCS computers and WWMCCS host computers at the WIN nodes. Figure H-3 depicts the WIN configuration during Exercise POWER PLAY 79. The DICO may request specific reports or query the system for the desired information.

(3) Operational personnel may use the capabilities of WIN through remote terminals. The capabilities of WIN include:


(a) Teleconferencing (TLCF). This capability allows several terminal users at geographically separated sites to conduct a conference. The participants can carry on a dialogue almost as if they were seated around a conference table. Participants can list data files and execute programs and display results to all conferees.

(b) Telecommunications Network Program (TELNET). This program allows a terminal user at one computer on the network to access and use the resources of any other computer on the network. With the TELNET program, the user can read and update data files.

(c) File transfers (SENDFILE). This capability allows a terminal user to send a tape or disc file from one host computer to a tape or disc file at a second host computer.

(4) The CCTC, DCA, Pentagon Computer Operations Division and ANMCC Computer Operations Division provide hard copy outputs on a routine or special request basis.

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Figure H-2. WWMCCS ADP Support, Access to WWMCCS ADP Support

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


Figure H-3. WWMCCS ADP Support, WIN Configuration During Exercise POWER PLAY 79

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## 4. System Flow

### a. Inputs

(1) Update Information. Commanders of unified and specified commands and subordinate commands, the Services, TOAs, DOD agencies, and OJCS staff members provide information to update and refine the data available in the various ADP files.

(2) Requests for Information. OJCS staff members request computer-based information support through the DICO or remote user terminals, as appropriate. The request may involve simple information retrieval from a stored file, or execution of an application program using information from several files.

(3) Input Method. Remote terminals provide access to the various ADP programs and files. Punched cards provide a less desirable, but sometimes necessary, input option.

### b. Outputs

(1) File Information. Computer programs may present all or portions of a stored file in an unprocessed form.

(2) Processed Information. Computer programs may present the contents of several files in answer to a specific request for information.

(3) Output Method. The computer system provides ADP products in the form of printed reports, terminal displays, punched cards, and files on magnetic tape or disc.

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TAB I


(U) NMCS COMMAND CENTER CONTINUITY AND RELOCATION

1. (U) Definition. NMCS command center continuity and relocation includes plans, procedures, systems, and facilities that enable the ANMCC and NEACP to serve as the primary NMCS command center.

2. (U) Purpose. Command center continuity assures that the performance of essential Department of Defense functions and operations can continue without unacceptable degradation.



a. (U) NMCC. The National Military Command Center, located in the Pentagon, is normally the primary command center of the NMCS. The Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff may designate one of the alternates as primary.



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




Figure I-1. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, Basic Information Flow




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Figure I-2. (U) Command Center Continuity and Relocation, Major Elements Relocation


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4. (U) System Flow



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(j) (U) JCS SITREP. The NMCC may issue a JCS SITREP to provide summary information.




1. (U) Daily Indications Status Report
2. (U) Defense Warning Appraisal Report
3. (U) Tactical Warning Message
4. (U) Strategic Warning Message
5. (U) Defense Intelligence Appraisal
6. (U) Defense Intelligence Notice
7. (U) Special Defense Intelligence Notice.


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(1) (U) Current Information from Other Commands

1. (U) SITREPs
2. (U) OPREPs
3. (U) FORGEN reports
4. (U) CAO SOP reports
5. (U) MWDS information
6. (U) Availability of unified and specified commanders
7. (U) Status of alternate command centers.





- (2) (U) SOA Reports
- (3) (U) JCS SITREPs
- (4) (U) Directives
- (5) (U) Movements.

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### a. Phase I. Situation Development. (See Figure J-1.)

(1) Commanders of unified and specified commands, operational commanders, US embassies, intelligence activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other US Governmental agencies routinely monitor world events.

(2) When a US Government official recognizes an event as being a problem bearing on US policy or interests, he initiates a voice or message report. Based on the preliminary information available, the commander of the appropriate command sends the Joint Chiefs of Staff an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT on the situation. This report includes: (a) the latest situation (b) forces available (c) where they may be committed (d) factors which may constrain employment of the available forces, (e) and actions taken or contemplated within the current rules of engagement.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff review the information received from all sources and assess the situation. The conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a problem involving US interests exists and is growing, initiates Phase II.

### b. Phase II. Crisis Assessment. (See Figure J-2.)

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff attempt to gather additional information with which to evaluate the growing situation. Applicable reporting agencies will increase the intensity and frequency of required reports, such as UNITREP (formerly FORSTAT) updates and SITREPs.

(2) During this phase, the NCA consider information available from all sources, confirm that a crisis exists, and identify national interests at stake. The NCA then promulgate diplomatic or military options.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff assess the operational and logistic implications of the military options and identify possible military courses of action.

### c. Phase III. Course of Action Development. (See Figure J-3.)

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


Figure J-1. CAS, Phase I--Situation Development

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


Figure J-2. CAS, Phase II--Crisis Assessment (U)

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


Figure J-3. CAS, Phase III--Course of Action Development

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(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff transmit these options to the supported Commander, supporting commander, Services, TOAs, and other interested commands and agencies. On receipt of the WARNING ORDER, the supported commander develops an estimate based on whether or not an applicable OPLAN or CONPLAN exists. He defines the general concept of operations and identifies supporting forces.

(2) The designated supporting commands, individual Services, TOAs, and component commands assist the supported commander in the preparation of his estimate. They provide planning information to the commander directly in OPREP-1 message form.

(3) The specific inputs from each activity will depend on the nature of the crisis, actions being considered, and the availability of a plan. The TOAs' preliminary closure estimates of the major forces and requests for loosening of established Rules of Engagement (ROE) are prime examples of key information received by the supported commander in this phase. The closure estimates may be based on notional data in Phase III, but real data should always be used when immediately available.

(4) After considering as many factors as time permits, the supported commander submits his estimate, including his recommended course of action, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in OPREP-1 message form.

### d. Phase IV. Decision. (See Figure J-4.)

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff review and refine the recommendations of the supported commander, using inputs from the Services and other agencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then present their recommendations to the NCA.

(2) The NCA consider the military recommendations and may decide on an appropriate military course of action. When the NCA approve a course of action for planning, they notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then issue an ALERT ORDER to all concerned.

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


Figure J-4. CAS, Phase IV--Decision (U)

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### e. Phase V. Operation Planning. (See Figure J-5.)

- (1) The ALERT ORDER initiates Phase V.
- (2) The ALERT ORDER normally contains the five major elements of an OPORD. These are:
  - (a) A description of the latest political and military situation
  - (b) A statement of tasks and purpose
  - (c) The course of action approved by the NCA and the combat forces approved for the operation
  - (d) Administrative and logistics details
  - (e) Specific guidance on command arrangements and any special guidance on communications or electronic warfare.
- (3) The supported commander continues to review and refine the planning accomplished during Phase III. Upon receipt of an ALERT ORDER, supporting commanders, TOAs, the Services, and component commands provide inputs with real data on numbers of people and actual weight and cube. In addition, each of these supporting activities prepares and refines his own plans in support of the supported commander's OPORD.
- (4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct an appropriate deployability posture if the NCA desire.
- (5) TOAs prepare movement tables and develop movement schedules.
- (6) The supported commander consolidates all available information and issues an appropriate OPORD in OPREP-1 message form to all concerned.
- (7) Phase V ends with a decision by the NCA to execute the OPORD or hold pending resolution of the crisis by means other than military intervention.

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


Figure J-5. CAS, Phase V--Execution Planning

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### f. Phase VI. Execution. (See Figure J-6.)

(1) If the Joint Chiefs of Staff receive a NCA decision to execute the OPORD, they promulgate that decision by transmitting an EXECUTE ORDER.

(2) The EXECUTE ORDER establishes the time phasing and provides the latest guidance.

(3) The supported commander receives the EXECUTE ORDER and implements his OPORD.

(4) The supporting commands, component commands, Services, and TOAs receive the EXECUTE ORDER and implement their separate plans in support of the approved OPORD.

(5) This concludes a sequencing of the CAS procedures, but it should be remembered that as a minimum, Phase I of CAS is always activated.

### 4. System Flow

#### a. Inputs

(1) Initiating Message. Example of message inputs which an operational commander, or other US Government official, may use to report an event and initiate CAS actions include:

(a) OPREP-3--Event/Incident Report

(b) OPREP-3 PINNACLE--CINC Assessment

(c) CRITIC--Critical Intelligence Communication


(d) SITREP--Situation Report

(e) SPIREP--Spot Intelligence Report.

(2) WARNING ORDER. After the NCA determine that a crisis situation exists, the Joint Chiefs of Staff send a WARNING ORDER to the appropriate commanders and agencies. The WARNING ORDER establishes the command

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Figure J-6. CAS, Phase VI--Execution

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arrangement (usually including designation of supported commanders) and informs the designated supported commander of some possible courses of action for his consideration. It provides him with all pertinent information available in the OJCS, and assigns response time for the Commander's Estimate.

(3) Evaluation Request. This OPREP-1 message is an amplification of the JCS WARNING ORDER. The supported commander originates the message and forwards it for action to his Service components and supporting commanders. The supported commander uses this message to establish the course(s) of action to be evaluated.

(4) Evaluation Response. This OPREP-1 message (or series of messages) is a response to the Evaluation Request. Supporting commanders and Service component commanders originate this message. Supporting commanders use this message to provide the supported commander with an evaluation of the various courses of action.

(5) ALERT ORDER. The JCS ALERT ORDER initiates Phase V, Execution Planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue an ALERT ORDER to the supported commander, supporting commands, and applicable TOAs, with information copies to the Services and other interested commands and agencies.

(6) Execution Planning Messages. The exchange of these OPREP-1 messages (or series of messages) during execution planning is for specific purposes as identified in the message subject (e.g., planning guidance, unit identification, logistic constraints, etc.). Any level of command can originate this message to update and complete all planning required to execute the approved course of action.

(7) ADP Supported Inputs

(a) Crisis participants use the OPREP-1 to exchange deployment data which they enter into the DEPMAS data base among commands and agencies.

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(b) The USREDCOM Deployment Management System (DEPMAS) is the primary planning management tool during Phases III and V of the CAS. The Commander in Chief, USREDCOM, manages the deployment of his assigned forces as prescribed in the supported commander's OPOD using the DEPMAS files. USREDCOM, in the deployment of forces, must accomplish the following services:

1. Execute the operations order using the best available information
2. Change the deployment sequence of units as directed by the supported commander
3. Add, delete, or substitute forces contained in the JCS approved force lists
4. In coordination with the supported commander, accomplish substitution of like or similar units for those not able to meet the scheduled deployment
5. Provide detailed movement status data on deploying forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supported unified or specified command, TOAs, and the component commands.

### b. Outputs

(1) Commander's Estimate. This OPREP-1 message responds to the JCS WARNING ORDER. The supported commander originates this message and forwards it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supported commander uses this message to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with recommended courses of action.

(2) Preliminary Closure Estimate. This OPREP-1 message provides the supported commander with force closure estimates for each course of action. The TOAs originate this message.

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(3) OPORD. The supported commander prepares an OPORD that contains both narrative text and CASFDD. This OPREP-1 message includes an actual troop list, movement schedules (if required), instructions for the conduct of operations in the objective area, and the logistic and administrative plan for support of the operation. It provides the basis for TOA flow plan.

(4) Flow Plan. This OPREP-1 provides all crisis participants with force and resupply movement data. The TOAs (normally MAC for a time-sensitive crisis) originate this message.

(5) EXECUTE ORDER. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the EXECUTE ORDER to direct the execution of an OPORD or the repositioning of forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the EXECUTE ORDER under the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. It passes all essential information if there is not an OPORD or when there is insufficient time to issue a WARNING ORDER and ALERT ORDER.

(6) DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER if the NCA desire. This order can increase the deployability postures, position forces, or direct other actions which may signal US intent to conduct military operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff may issue these orders at any time throughout the crisis without affecting continued CAS phased planning.

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TAB K

## LOGISTICS

### 1. Definition

a. General. The United States is a party to many international logistical agreements with member nations of the NATO Alliance. Nations generally categorize agreements as:

- (1) Bilateral--between two nations
- (2) Multilateral--between three or more nations
- (3) Standardization Agreements (STANAG)--among several or all of the NATO member nations. Standardization agreements adopt like or similar:
  - (a) Military equipment, ammunition, supplies, and stores
  - (b) Operational, logistical, or administrative procedures.

### b. International Logistical Defense Agreements

(1) General. Representatives of the Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, conclude and sign international logistical defense agreements. The basic agreement stipulates the US and foreign Government offices responsible for follow-on implementation. The Department of Defense is the US executive agency for implementation of military logistical support agreements. Authorized representatives of the Department of Defense negotiate and conclude appropriate implementing arrangements and plans. The arrangements and plans become the principal guiding documents when accomplishing agreement-related actions. Figure K-1 provides an example of the content of a basic agreement and the subjects of the relevant arrangements.

(2) Identification. Allied nations may conclude international agreements in the form of technical agreements, memorandums of understanding, plans, or

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## AGREEMENT

Basic articles may include:  
Provisions for implementation  
Types of activity authorized  
Applicable legislative provisions  
Implementing authorities  
Designation of representatives  
Ownership and disposition of resources  
Effective date

## RELEVANT ARRANGEMENTS

Arrangements relating to a basic agreement may include:  
General Technical  
Civilian Labor  
Construction  
Transportation  
Utilities  
Procurement of Supplies and Services  
Facilities  
Telecommunications

## IMPLEMENTING PLANS

Plans are developed and approved to support each specific arrangement.

Figure K-1. Logistics, Basic Agreement, Relevant Arrangements, and Plans

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by other designations having similar legal consequence. The Department of Defense does not consider the following documents international agreements:

(a) Contracts concluded under the Armed Services Procurement Regulation

(b) Foreign Military Sales Credit Agreements

(c) Foreign Military Sales Letters of Offer and Acceptance and Letters of Intent.

2. Purpose. International agreements establish a framework within which NATO member nations work to achieve Alliance objectives. National representatives develop detailed documentation in the form of arrangements and plans to support agreement provisions. Timely allied compliance and execution of plans and procedures enhance the ability of allied forces to respond to an outside threat.

### 3. Organizational Structure

a. The Department of State. The Secretary of State, in close coordination with the Secretary of Defense, concludes and signs defense-related international agreements.

b. The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense, in close coordination with the Secretary of State, establishes policy for all matters relating to international defense agreements. The Secretary of Defense delegates authority to negotiate and conclude certain agreements, arrangements, and plans to other organizations within the Department of Defense.

c. Other Department of Defense Organizations. The Service Secretaries and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, may redelegate authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The organization to which the Secretary of Defense delegates authority is responsible for compliance with the provisions of applicable DOD directives.

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### d. The Joint Logistics Directorate and the Logistics Coordination Center (LCC)

(1) Assist the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Command Authority (NCA) in matters involving international logistics.

(2) Assist the Services and the unified and specified commands in complying with the provisions of logistic agreements.

e. Unified and Specified Commands. Unified and specified commands participate, as directed, in the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of agreement-related arrangements and plans. Representatives of unified and specified commands, when delegated appropriate authority, conclude agreement-related arrangements and plans for the US Government.

## 4. System Flow

### a. Inputs

(1) Agreement Provisions. The provisions of each international agreement determine the flow of related communications.

(2) Allied Requests for Action. The LCC receives and processes agreement-related requests which the Joint Chiefs of Staff receive for action. Allied nations or commands may send requests direct to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or through unified commands.

(3) Receipt of Guidance. The Secretary of Defense, or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide agreement-related guidance to the Director of Logistics and the LCC.

(4) Requests for Guidance, Action, or Assistance. The LCC coordinates actions addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which request guidance, action, or assistance about international agreements. Other DOD agencies or major commands normally originate such requests.

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(5) Responses to US Actions. The LCC receives and processes allied responses to US agreement-related actions.

(6) Information. The LCC receives and processes information copies of agreement-related communications sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### b. Outputs

(1) US-Initiated Actions. The LCC, in coordination with the Joint Staff, initiates actions in accordance with established logistical agreements.

(2) Guidance. The LCC, in coordination with the Joint Staff, prepares logistical agreement-related guidance for major commands and other DOD-related activities.

(3) Response to Requests. The LCC, in coordination with the Joint Staff, prepares responses to logistical agreement-related requests for action or assistance.