

~~TOP SECRET W/ ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJ: Non-WMD Declaratory Policy for Iraq

- The attached briefing, an update of work done months ago, is a useful compendium of Iraq-related declaratory policy themes for selected key audiences.
- Please distribute it to those responsible for public affairs, public diplomacy and information operations.

EOD / DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	_____
Case No.	CDP-11-1
No.	_____
Document No.	1

Declaratory Policy on WMD

- In addition to developing themes for key audiences, we should address the following issues having to do with declaratory policy:
 - Declaratory policy with respect to WMD use by the Iraqi regime
 - A possible ultimatum to be issued to the Iraqi regime prior to the start of hostilities.
 - Themes for a presidential speech on the eve of an Iraqi operation.

Declaratory policy with respect to WMD use by the Iraqi regime:


- Fundamental fact is our publicly-announced policy of "regime change."
 - Saddam is likely to believe that he cannot physically survive regime change.
 - Unless we can, and are willing to, offer him some *credible* hope of comfortable survival, he may figure he has little to lose by using WMD, *once he believes his downfall is imminent.*
 - In any case, he may not be interested in exile, if that means living quietly under conditions of virtual house arrest.
- We should aim to delay Saddam's recognition of the *imminence* of his downfall for as long as possible.
 - Saddam appears to believe that he is good at political maneuvering, and that he can outmaneuver us, despite our intentions.
 - Thus, our goal should be to convince him that he has more time to maneuver than he actually does.
 - When the end comes, it must come quicker than he imagines.
- In addition, we should try to persuade those who would have to carry out his orders to use WMD not to do so.
 - Suggested themes are contained in the "Declaratory Policy" briefing.

- These themes are best conveyed privately, if channels can be identified.
- The more difficult part is to determine what to say publicly.
- We wish to portray our action as a *liberation* of Iraq from a tyrant – thus it is difficult to threaten retaliation against Iraqi society generally for actions taken by its oppressor.



b1

- We can make general statements, as we did in the Gulf War and since. Without withdrawing NSA, we can imply that it would not apply in this case.
- U.S. “will not tolerate” WMD use. “The American people would demand the strongest possible response.” (President Bush to Saddam, 9 Jan 91)
- “...if any nation uses weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies, it may forfeit its protection from U.S. nuclear attack under the 1995 pledge [Statement of NSA by Secretary of State Christopher].” (Robert Bell, Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control Policy, NSC staff, 1997)



b1

- Message should be directed at Iraqi officialdom generally:
 - “Unless you are guilty of atrocities, you can survive the downfall of the Ba’athist regime and play a role in the new Iraq.”
 - Should we publish a (short) list of “wanted” criminals, in order to give hope to those not on the list?
- However, if WMD are used, all bets are off. In that case, we may decide that *no high official of the regime can be allowed to play a role in the new Iraq.*

- "Unless you can show that you tried to prevent WMD use, you are likely to be punished for complicity in the crimes of the Ba'athist regime."

Ultimatum

- At some point, we should announce that Saddam's opportunity to accept UNMOVIC has passed.
 - We would recount the entire history of Iraq's deception and cheating with respect to inspections.
 - We would conclude that that history shows that inspections can not be an effective means to enforce the disarmament provisions of UNSCR 687.
- At that point, or soon after, we could deliver an ultimatum:
 - Iraq must unconditionally commit itself to WMD disarmament and to the war on terrorism.
 - Iraq must turn over to U.S. control all al Qaida suspects in Iraq.
 - Iraq must extradite Yasin (suspect in first WTC bombing.)
 - Inspectors to be allowed in, with complete, unrestricted access, including:
 - Inspectors can order the destruction of any WMD facility, weapon, delivery means, etc.
 - Inspectors can interview Iraqi personnel outside Iraq (with their families also outside Iraq).
 - Inspectors to be accompanied by U.S. (and coalition?) troops to enforce these provisions.
- Iraq must comply with __ days.

Presidential Announcement

- Present: The Danger We Face:
 - Build on State of the Union and West Point speeches.
- Past: History shows that these dangers aren't just theoretical.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1/Agri/1000

- History of Iraq's deception and cheating with respect to inspections.
- History of Iraq's use of WMD
- Future: A better future for the Iraqi people, and for the Middle East:
 - Wrong to assume that Iraq can't enjoy the benefits of democracy and progress.
 - Iraqi people want to throw off tyranny. They should have the opportunity to do so.
 - Highlight work already done by Iraqi opposition to plan for post-Saddam Iraq.
 - Statement of political principles by the opposition.
 - Commitment to territorial integrity of Iraq.
 - Given its natural and human resources, no reason Iraq can't become an advanced society.

[REDACTED] b2, b6

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRT
Feb 05

23 Aug 02

Amnesty and Regime Change

"We can do this the easy way, or we can do it the hard way"

Concept

- Regime change does not necessarily equal war – there are other ways to change the regime.
- Aside from a coup or internal collapse of the regime, it might be possible to induce Saddam and his inner circle to give up.
- Even if it is a long shot, it may be worthwhile trying. In any case, it shows that we are trying to avoid military conflict.

Proposal

- We announce that our overriding goal is to rid Iraq of a regime that
 - threatens us,
 - threatens Iraq's neighbors, and
 - oppresses its people.
- Toward this end, we announce that general amnesty of all officials, military and civilian, of the regime, under the following conditions:
- Saddam and a small number of his inner circle (perhaps 12 people in all) will be amnestied if they surrender power and leave Iraq within ____ days.
 - We will help them find a place of exile.
- All other regime members will be amnestied if they:
 - Do not commit any war crimes or atrocities after the date of the announcement.
 - Do not resist efforts by the U.S. or the Iraqi people to get rid of the Ba'athist regime and replace it by a broad-based, representative government.

~~Classified by USDP/...~~
~~...~~
~~...~~

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JUNE 29, 2007
07-F-1332

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- Cooperate fully with any South Africa-style "Truth and Reconciliation" commission, or similar body, that may be established by the new Iraqi government.
- We would have to decide how to broach this proposal to the opposition, and whether we would give them a veto over it.

Assessment:

- Unlikely that Saddam and his closest cronies would accept such an offer:
 - More interested in power than money and comfort.
 - Wouldn't believe that they could be safe outside Iraq and out of power.
- Pros and cons, below, assume that offer will not be accepted by Saddam.
 - Some lower-level officials might abide by conditions.

Pro:

- Demonstrate our desire to avoid conflict.
- Make clear that our motive is not hatred of Saddam.
- Sow distrust among regime officials, if some show an interest in obtaining amnesty.
 - Encourage lower-level officials to find creative ways to sit out the war.

Con:

- Could demoralize members of the opposition.
 - Would antagonize them if they disagreed with it, and we proceeded to make the offer anyway.
- Going to such lengths to avoid conflict could sow doubts about our resolve and ultimate willingness to use force.
- Might not be able to deliver, if the opposition or Iraqi populace were determined to exact revenge on Ba'athist officials.

b2, b6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRT
Feb 05

Importance of Congress Acting Now vs. Later

- Our ability to extract an acceptable UN Security Council resolution depends crucially on other countries believing that, if necessary, we are perfectly willing to act alone against Iraq.
- If faced with a choice between a strong UNSC stand and US unilateral action, many countries will opt for the former.
- However, if faced with a choice between a strong UNSC stand and a weak UNSC stand, many of those same countries will opt for the latter.
- Hence, the success of the President's strategy of convincing the UN to face up to its responsibilities with respect to Iraq depends very much on preserving the impression that the US is ready to act alone if necessary.
- For this reason, a Congressional resolution before the election recess is very important.
- If there is no visible progress toward a resolution, the urgency currently felt at the UN will dissipate.

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JUNE 29, 2007
07-F-1332

~~SECRET~~

A political roadmap to a new Iraqi government

Prior to Liberation

- The Iraqi opposition should take the initiative to organize a political conference to include the Group of Six, the Iraqi Turkmen Front (hereafter "Group of Seven") and representatives from the other opposition groups upon which there is consensus.
- In relation to post-liberation Iraq's character, the political conference should:
 - Declare the sovereign unity of Iraq and outline consolidated vision for the future of Iraq.
 - Publish a Bill of Rights based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights with specific guarantees to all minorities.
 - Lay the framework for an independent judiciary and a creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
 - Guarantee free exercise of faith and a separation of mosque and state.
 - Receive non-binding briefings from the State Department-organized "Future of Iraq Project" sub-committees.
 - State should hand leadership of the Future of Iraq Project to whatever structure emerges at the conference.
- In relation to post-liberation Iraq's regional relations, the political conference should:
 - Renounce all aggressive intent against Iraq's neighbors and renounce WMD aspirations and support for terrorism.
 - Appoint a commission of former Iraqi military officials to serve as a provisional command for a free Iraqi army and liaison for demobilizing Saddam's elite units.
 - Announce (with U.S. support) that it favors establishing a free Iraqi army that would be strong enough to defend Iraq.

~~Classified by William J. Luti~~
~~Reason: E.O. 13526~~
~~Declassify on: 24 Nov 2012~~

- The political conference should lay the groundwork for a post-liberation government, and so should:
 - Announce its decision to organize a Constitutional Convention based upon the Salahuddin Statement of 1 Nov 1992, upon the liberation of Iraq.
 - Publish a statement welcoming the expertise and assistance of all Iraqi exiles. Such a statement should not mention restoration of property seized during nationalization and ethnic cleansing; this is a Pandora's box.
 - Disseminate a prioritized platform for the reconstruction of Iraq, giving special attention to hard-hit Shi'i areas and Kurdish/Turkmen cities subject to ethnic cleansing.
 - Commit to a non-ethnic, non-sectarian census (to prevent "proportional representation" arguments).
- The Iraqi opposition political conference should also establish representations in other countries:
 - Such representatives will seek to gather support for the US efforts on behalf of the Group of Seven
 - This will allow the Group of Seven to accommodate the myriad of Iraqi opposition groups.
 - Shadow opposition offices demonstrate U.S. diplomatic seriousness to states sitting on the diplomatic fence.
 - Shadow opposition offices can facilitate donor assistance upon liberation.
 - Such representations bestow legitimacy upon a shadow Iraqi regime while sidestepping fractious debate over ministerial posts.
 - There is precedent as the [Iraqi] Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG] has offices in European and Middle Eastern capitals.
 - In the interim, KRG offices should become joint representations with the greater Iraqi opposition by welcoming personnel from other groups to deal with Iraqi issues outside the Iraqi Kurdistan region (this will facilitate the eventual closing of KRG offices).

~~Classified by William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason: E.O. 13526~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

During hostilities

- Iraqi opposition groups should publicly call on Iraqi army units to accept the command of the free Iraqi army.
- The demobilization commission should assist U.S. forces in disbanding Republican Guards, Special Republican Guards, and Saddam Husayn's intelligence services.
- U.S. forces will consolidate control over Iraqi WMD and arrange for their safe disposal.
- The free Iraqi army should help the U.S. create new (vetted and de-politicized) police, intelligence, and internal security organizations.
 - The U.S. will secure isolated facilities to serve as screening centers for those suspected of war crimes.
 - After initial screening, war crimes suspects will be transferred outside of Iraq until possible trial.
- There should be special consideration for security at the Shi'i holy shrines at Najaf and Karbala.
 - Islamist or Iranian operatives may try to draw U.S. forces into a polarizing stand-off and then depict the U.S. as battling Islam.
 - The U.S. military should plan in advance to prevent Shi'i shrines becoming the foci of conflict. SCIRI control would be a mistake.
- Iraqi opposition groups should film torture centers and liberation celebrations.

Post-Liberation, Phase I: U.S./Coalition administrative control

- Iraq will not be treated as a defeated enemy. From Principals on down, the U.S. rhetoric should celebrate liberation and partnership and announce intention to hand power over to the Iraqis.
- Upon fall of Saddam, the U.S. will submit a Security Council Resolution lifting sanctions on Iraq, and the USG will unfreeze Iraqi assets.

~~Classified by William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason: 1.5(a)(1)~~
~~Declassify on: 3 Oct 2012~~

- Newly liberated areas will come under immediate security and relief control of U.S.-led coalition forces. This authority may be exercised through a combined Joint Task Force (JTF), led by a U.S. commander.
- The U.S. will respect existing administrative divisions; accordingly, the JTF will appoint a U.S. military governor or liaison for each governorate. The U.S. military governor will appoint U.S. liaisons in each sub-district. Military governors, liaisons, and Iraqi opposition figures will work to identify local notables to facilitate transition to future stages.
- The U.S.-led coalition will create a military administration, which will actively delegate responsibility to the Iraqi opposition as the security situation stabilizes.
 - Members of the Iraqi opposition will coordinate aid delivery so as to build legitimacy. The Iraqi opposition will request that the U.N. Secretary General and NGOs coordinate aid through the Iraqi opposition.
 - U.S. and Coalition forces will help build an Iraqi police force and security apparatus.
- The military administration, in consultation with the Iraqi opposition, will manage Iraqi government television and radio stations.
 - There will be an immediate ban on incitement against any ethnic or religious group.
 - U.S. military authorities will arbitrate disputes between Iraqi opposition groups regarding programming.
 - The U.S. government will initially subsidize Iraqi television and radio.
 - National news will be subtitled in Kurdish. In Kurdish areas, Kurdish news will be subtitled in Arabic.
 - Existing ethnic television and satellite stations will continue to operate.
- The World Food Program (which currently manages oil-for-food rations) should conduct a non-ethnic, non-sectarian census upon the restoration of security and the settling of internally-displaced persons.

~~Classified by William J. Law~~
~~Reason: 1.5 (b)(1)~~
~~Declassify: 2 Oct 2012~~

Post-Liberation, Phase II: Transitional Authority

- Upon restoration of basic security and successful completion of a census, a Group of Seven "Transitional Authority" will convene a Constitutional Convention and select delegates to it.
- The organization of the Constitutional Convention should be as follows:
 - The U.S. will appoint an Iraqi opposition figure to be chief liaison between the U.S. and the Transition Authority.
 - To maintain credibility, the chief liaison should have a record of opposition prior to 1990, and be from a prominent family. He should have no history of being an employee of an U.S. Department, agency, or endowment, nor should he be a former high-level military official.



b1

- The 18 existing provinces will send equal numbers of delegates. At least one-half should be liberated Iraqis in order to co-opt homegrown opposition. External opposition leaders will base provincial affiliation upon ancestral town.
- Such a system will undercut Kurdish claims for ethnic autonomy, and Shi'i claims for proportional representation.
- Actions of the Constitutional Convention should include:
 - Writing a constitution.
 - Stability and a representative government will be best ensured by a constitutional bicameral federal system. Federal units will be based upon existing provincial boundaries. A bicameral legislature will prevent any ethnic or sectarian group from domination.

~~Classified by William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason: 1.4 (b,dp)~~
~~Declassify on: 2 Oct 2012~~

- A presidential system will smooth transition to democracy so as not to replicate the aftermath of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution.
- While some Kurdish groups seek ethnic federation, Sunni Arab, Turkmen, and Shi'i Arab groups indicate consensus can be reached on administrative federalism.
- The KRG should become an "Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Authority" akin to the Tennessee Valley Authority (or the 1950's-era Karun River Authority in Iran). Its headquarters should remain in Erbil.
 - Provincial governors and legislatures may vote whether to join the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Authority.
 - The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Authority may independently solicit international aid projects but may not have foreign relations, its own militia, or control its own oil fields.
- The Constitution should enshrine a set percentage of oil revenue for the central government and the division of remaining revenue among the provinces according to proportion of the population. The basis of such a system currently exists in UNSCR 986 (the oil-for-food program).
 - All oil resources will remain under the control of the Iraqi central government, subject to any contractual obligations undertaken by the Iraqi central government.
- Ceremoniously proclaiming an end to the "Republic of Fear."
- Proclaiming an Iraqi Bill of Rights.
- Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to work in concert with U.S. war crimes prosecutions.
- Announcing plans to abolish the death penalty for political crimes.
- Announce willingness to account for all Kuwaiti POWs
- The Transitional Authority might invite Kuwaiti experts to begin immediate investigations.

~~Classified by William J. Luri~~
~~Reason: 1.5 (b,d)~~
~~Declassify on: 2 Oct 2017~~

- The U.S. should urge the Kuwaiti government to respond by renouncing all further reparation claims.
- Upon ratification of the Constitution, the Chief Liaison between the U.S. and the Constitutional Convention shall assume the duties of interim president and announce elections.

Post-Liberation, Phase III: Elections

- The U.S.-Transitional Authority liaison will become interim president for a two-year period to allow for stability prior to nationwide presidential elections.
 - The interim president will appoint an Iraqi representative to the United Nations.
- The interim president should immediately call for two rounds of elections in order to create the new, democratic Iraqi government.
 - Rolling municipal elections will introduce Iraqis to voting and will allocate city council, and mayoral seats.
 - These will be followed by provincial elections in which the local populace will elect a provincial governor, provincial representatives to the central government's "Senate," and electoral district representatives to the central government's new Majlis.

Post-Liberation, Phase IV: Hand-off

- The interim president will formally inaugurate parliament and will appoint ministers. There will be Shi'i, Sunni, and Kurdish vice presidents.
 - Key ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, and Treasury) should informally be distributed among Iraq's various ethnic and sectarian groups.
 - The Education Ministry should announce plans to cleanse textbooks of hate and intolerance and to build an education system to promote democracy, private property, and free markets.
- The new parliament will ratify the Constitution.
 - The new government should memorialize those killed by Saddam. This promotes a sense of common Iraqi identity.

~~Classified by William J. Lami~~
~~Reason: 5.4(d)~~
~~Declassify on: 2 Oct 2012~~

- The U.S. military will withdraw as the elected officials consolidate control, subject to any basing rights negotiated with the interim president.
- After two years, there will be internationally-supervised presidential elections.

~~Classified by William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason for Policy~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

October 10, 2002

MORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
R POLICY

OM: Bill Luti *WJL*

SUBJECT: Declaring an Iraqi Provisional
Government.

This paper outlines the advantages and
disadvantages of recognizing an Iraqi
Provisional Government prior to liberation.

Recognition of a provisional government will
facilitate moving ahead with military
training.

~~Classified by DMSD-NESA, William J. Luti~~
~~Exon. 1.5 (a)~~
~~Declassify: 10 October 2012~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

OSD/SP/NESA
10 October 2002

Pros and Cons of a Provisional Government

- There are calls in the press and from within the Iraqi opposition to form a provisional government prior to liberation. There are advantages and disadvantages to this:
- Advantages:
 - Demonstrates seriousness of Iraqi liberation planning.
 - Might encourage defections so long as resulting "Iraq Liberation Organization" (ILO) welcomes participation of Iraq's internal opposition.
 - Increases pressure upon Saddam.
 - Facilitates training and operational deployment of the Free Iraqi Force (FIF) in these ways:
 - The ILO could provide nationality documentation to volunteers. Documentation may be needed in transit to training sites.
 - The ILO would provide international legal status for FIF combatants. Saddam's regime would be liable for war crimes in event of their capture and mistreatment.
 - The ILO could be the military justice authority over the FIF personnel, thereby saving the U.S. military the requirement.
 - The ILO would be the single partner with whom the USG would negotiate such matters as FIF personnel salaries, claims, and long-term obligations. The USG would not have to sign "contracts" with 3,700 or more individuals or with the various opposition groups.
 - Allows leadership to emerge from within a common political body.
 - Provides better legal basis/political cover for post-liberation governance.
 - A streamlined voice prior to liberation eases transition to post-Saddam era.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

OSD/SP/NESA
10 October 2002

- Provides a vehicle for the Iraqi opposition to approach other governments.
- An Iraq-wide forum potentially dilutes ethnic and sectarian interests.
- **Disadvantages:**
 - Risk that groups won't work together, damaging the opposition's reputation.
 - Tiny groups with questionable constituencies may filibuster agreements.
 - May constrain U.S. Iraq policy flexibility.
 - Without real power, the opposition has little incentive to address issues responsibly.
 - Arguments within opposition distract from the end goal of ousting Saddam.
 - Practical problem of where to host ILO.
- **Recommendations:**
 - DoD should immediately convene a meeting of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) committee [REDACTED] b1
 - The ILA committee is a good venue to build unity and trust among Iraqi groups in advance of declaration of an ILO.
 - The ILA committee can decide: leader selection standards, salaries and per diem for volunteers, relationship of opposition groups with volunteers once training begins, and date and place for training.
 - Tell the Iraqi opposition that the U.S. Government will promptly recognize an ILO comprising most of the major Iraqi opposition groups.
 - The U.S. Government should recognize legitimacy of a provisional government upon declaration.
 - The U.S. Government should not ask Iraqi opposition forces to fight as stateless persons on the battlefield.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

OSD/SP/NESA
10 October 2002

- The ILO will not dispense ministries or hierarchical leadership, but will open offices in important capitals.
 - This avoids squabbling over ministries and positions.
 - Representation offices allow the Iraqi opposition to dispense patronage.
 - Such offices can gather support for US efforts on behalf of the ILO.
 - After liberation, such offices can coordinate donor assistance.
 - Such offices can merge with (and absorb) the Kurdistan Regional Government representations.
- ILO can make agreements with the U.S. relating to aid and governance in the post-Liberation period.

Victory in Iraq

Definition of Immediate Victory:

- Removal of the current Iraqi regime:
 - Exile or capture of Saddam, his sons, other designated members of the top leadership (see DIA briefing).
 - Dismantling of elite security/military organizations (including Saddam's Bodyguard, Special Security Organization, etc.)
 - Purging of key Ba'athist officials and regime supporters from other governmental institutions.
- Establishment of coalition (U.S.-led) military administration in Iraq:
 - New security institutions established throughout the country.
 - No significant armed resistance to military administration.
 - No significant armed separatist activity.
 - Elimination of terrorist bases and safe haven.
 - Reconstruction of Iraq underway, financed in large part by oil revenues collected and disbursed on a national basis.

Instrument of Conflict Termination:

- Would depend on circumstances.
- Most likely: surrender of all Iraqi armed forces, signed by highest ranking Iraqi officer available.
- Other possibilities include:
 - Surrender by political ruler who takes control of Iraq in aftermath of a coup, or as a result of collapse of current regime.
 - Proclamation of U.S. military administration following the disintegration of Iraqi armed forces, and in the absence of any organized political rule in the country (aside from purely local authorities).

~~SECRET~~

- Agreement between U.S. and a self-proclaimed "provisional government" under the same conditions as described in the previous bullet.

Definition of Ultimate Victory:

- Replacement by a broad-based, representative government that:
 - Renounces WMD.
 - Doesn't support terrorism.
 - Seeks to live in peace with its neighbors.
 - Respects individual rights of all Iraqis.

~~SECRET~~

Questions for [redacted] b6

1. Describe the Jund al-Sham group and its relation with al Qaida. Who was its leader? What is the group's likely objective?
2. Describe al Qaida's relationship with Iran? With Iraq? With Sudan?
3. Within al Qaida, who played the leading role in unconventional weapons programs? Where were programs located in Afghanistan? Was there a chemical program in Sudan? Who provided assistance?
4. Describe the leadership structure of al Qaida? How were decisions made? What significant groups or individuals were associated with al Qaida but not officially part of al Qaida?
5. Where would al Qaida flee after Afghanistan was lost? What pre-existing arrangements and/or instructions existed and were articulated to the al Qaida rank and file? What areas or countries would al Qaida members avoid at all costs?
6. What are the greatest fears or strategic concerns of al Qaida leaders?
7. Describe the types of training activities at Tamak Fann?
8. What governments sent emissaries to meet with senior al Qaida leaders? When did those meetings occur and what was discussed?
9. What are the major sources of al Qaida's money?
10. Describe the debate within al Qaida over how close its relationships should be with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya?
11. What are/were the major political cleavages/divisions/tensions within the al Qaida leadership? Did they break down along ethnic/national lines, along philosophical/ideological lines, other?
12. In the absence or death of UBL, who would be the leading leadership contenders?
What preparations and policies were established within al Qaida to ensure continuity of operations if senior leaders were killed or captured?
13. What is the strategy of al Qaida; what are its objectives? To what extent is it consistent with the strategies of Iran? Iraq? Syria?
14. Attacking the United States seems to violate jihadist doctrine? What faction(s) advocated the attacks? What faction(s) spoke in opposition?

ADD ON QUESTIONS

15. What was al Qaeda's relationship with Saudi Arabia? Saudi intelligence? Bin Laden family members?
 16. What were al Qaeda's contacts/cells in Southeast Asia? (follow up on Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia). Any knowledge about the role played by Mohamed Jamal Khalifa (UBL brother-in-law) in Southeast Asia?
 17. What does he know about Khalid Sheik Mohamed a/k/a Mukhtar al Baluchi? Who were his contacts in the Philippines? Malaysia?
 18. What were al Qaeda's contacts in Chechnya?
 19. Is he aware of any al Qaeda contacts in the Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia, Albania etc)
 20. Provide the name of any NGOs and/or charities that provided funding to al Qaeda (1) in the United States and (2) abroad
 21. Who in al Qaeda had the main contacts with Sudanese intelligence? Who had most contacts with Libyan intelligence? Does he know any names of Sudanese or Libyan intelligence officers who had contact with Iraqi intelligence in the Sudan or elsewhere?
 22. Any contacts between al Qaeda operatives and/or associates with Iraqi intelligence in the UAE?
 23. Any knowledge of Ansar al Islam? Who were its leaders? Any contacts with al Qaeda? Any Kurds prominent within al Qaeda, ie on the shura council?
-



Discussion: Possible Contingencies

December 2002

-Classified by USDP Douglas J. Feith
-Recess-1-5-07
-Declassify on 14 Oct 12

12/9/02 5:45 PM

DOB / DFOISK	
SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	_____
Case No.	_____
Doc No.	_____
Document No.	_____

Possible Contingencies

- Saddam loses power "prematurely" --
 - he is replaced by a new strongman.
 - he is replaced by anarchy.
- Israeli retaliation:
 - against Iraq.
 - against Syria (following Hezbollah attack).
- Other "third party" involvement:
 - Iran.
 - Turkey (not in coordination with U.S.)
- Iraqi use of WMD:
 - Against U.S. troops.
 - Against country supporting U.S. war effort.



Outline



For each contingency:

- Description of scenario.
- Key principles for dealing with it.
- Course of Action

New Strongman in Iraq

Description:

- A senior military or security officer replaces Saddam.
- He announces his intention to abide by all UN Security Council resolutions.
- Intense international pressure to cease (or not commence) hostilities.
- Danger of "Saddamism without Saddam."

Key Principles:

- New strongman likely to be similar to Saddam in ambition, political attitudes and methods of operation.
- Broad-based, representative government necessary to resolve outstanding problems with Iraq:
 - Can't have confidence in any inspection regime unless Iraqi government is cooperative and acts in good faith.

New Strongman in Iraq: Course of Action

Demand that the new ruler:

- Turn over power to civilian, broad-based, representative government within weeks.
 - Immediately enter into internationally-supervised negotiations with all segments of Iraqi society, including opposition groups.
- Take immediate steps to facilitate inspections:
 - Permit overflight by U-2s, Predators; cease firing on aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones.
 - Send key WMD scientists (with families) to NY to be interviewed by inspectors.
- Dismantle elite security organizations, including SSO.
- End restrictions on media, including foreign media.

Key is to make demands that can be met
immediately.

12/9/02 5:45 PM

Anarchy in Iraq

Description:

- Current regime loses power; no one able to reassert control.
- Kurds advance on Kirkuk and Mosul.
- Internecine violence spreads (e.g., Sunnis vs Shi'a in Baghdad).

Key Principles:

- U.S. can't avoid responsibility for restoring order.
 - Important that U.S. be able to influence events in Iraq and the formation of the new government.
- To maintain territorial integrity of Iraq, U.S. must ensure that oil revenues remain under central control.

Anarchy in Iraq: Course of Action

- Convene, under nominal UN auspices, a conference of interested parties:
 - Iraqi opposition groups ("external" groups).
 - Kurdish parties.
 - Tribal leaders.
 - Shi'a representatives (religious, tribal).
 - Anyone exercising authority (excluding those tainted by Ba'athist atrocities).
- Seize main oil fields and key energy infrastructure.
- Provide security for UN/NGOs involved in food distribution and other humanitarian activities.

12/19/02 5:45 PM


7

Israeli Retaliation Against Iraq

Description:


- Iraq attacks Israel with WMD (delivered by missile or terrorists).
- Israel decides to retaliate, regardless of U.S. pressure.

Key Principles:



b1

Israeli Retaliation Against Iraq: Course of Action



b1

12/9/02 5:45 PM


~~TOP SECRET~~

Israeli Retaliation Against Syria

Description:

- Hezbollah launches rocket attacks against northern Israel.
- Israel decides to retaliate against Syria, regardless of U.S. pressure.

Key Principles:



b1

Israeli Retaliation Against Syria: Course of Action

- [REDACTED] b1
- Demand that Syria turn over those responsible for rocket attacks on Israel.
- Warn Iran not to interfere.

Iranian Involvement

Description:

- Iran exerts its influence in southern Iraq to:
 - bolster influence of Islamist groups.
 - encourage terrorism against U.S. and coalition troops.

Key Principles:

- U.S. should seek to reduce Iranian influence among Shi'a population.

Iranian Involvement: Course of Action

- Emphasize to Iraqi Shi'a the advantages of remaining within Iraq.
- Contrast Iraqi economic prospects with Iranian economic decline under clerical rule.
- [redacted] Iran with prospect of [redacted] b1
- "We solve [redacted] problem, you stay out of Iraq." b1

Description:

- [REDACTED] seizes Mosul and Kirkuk to prevent [REDACTED] occupation. b1
- [REDACTED] Turcoman population to claim Kirkuk area and establish an autonomous zone.

Key Principles:

- U.S. remains committed to territorial integrity of Iraq.
- U.S. recognizes legitimacy of [REDACTED] concern. b1

Course of Action

4 Maintain political pressure on [REDACTED] to moderate its actions.

- [REDACTED] b1

- Establish political forum in which [REDACTED] concerns can be raised.
- Goal of forum would be to commit all participants to territorial integrity of Iraq.

• ~~MD~~ Use Against U.S. Troops

Description:

- Iraq uses chem/bio weapons against U.S. troops in the field.

Key Principles:

- U.S. demonstrates that such action will be punished severely.
- U.S. takes greater risks to conclude war quickly.

WMD Use Against U.S. Troops: Course of Action

- Signal possibility of U.S. escalation to deter future use.
- Adjust tactics (e.g., increase dispersal of forces).
 - Be willing to accept increased risk to speed up tempo of operations.
- Ease restrictions on attacking high collateral-damage targets.

12/9/02 5:45 PM

17

~~TOP SECRET~~

WMD Use Against Country Supporting U.S. Effort

Description:

- Iraqi launches missile with chem/bio warhead against Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
- Terrorist attack using WMD against these countries.

Key Principles:

- U.S. must demonstrate that such action will be punished severely.

WMD Use Against Country Supporting U.S. Effort: Course of Action

- Signal possibility of U.S. escalation to deter future use.
- Ease restrictions on attacking high collateral-damage targets.
 - Be willing to accept increased risk to speed up tempo of operations.
- Readjust logistics (e.g., over-the-shore delivery).
- Major IO campaign.

Next Steps

- Issues to be decided:
 - Should we determine a policy to deal with the "strongman" scenario *now*?
 - (Most imminent -- it could happen at any time.)
 - When to discuss deconfliction with the Israelis?
 - What type of nuclear "posturing" should be considered?
- CENTCOM is dealing with the WMD response issues.
 - Battlefield.
 - SPOD/APODs.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DRT
Feb 05

Stipend Scale for the Free Iraqi Forces

All amounts are monthly, payable after 30 days service

Base Pay: \$1000.00

Allowances:

Dependent support \$150.00

Qualification pay:

English fluency: \$200.00

Medical degree: \$250.00

Engineering degree: \$200.00

Leadership Incentives:

NCO level: \$150.00

Officer level: \$250.00

DRT
Feb 05

Considerations for Post-liberation Iraq

The Administration is actively examining options for post-liberation Iraq in the event the President decides that it is necessary to use force to enforce UNSCR 1441 and previous UN Security Council Resolutions.

These options cover such subjects as humanitarian assistance, protecting energy infrastructure, the participation of Free Iraqis at an appropriate stage to begin the creation of pluralistic, broadly representative democratic institutions.

Several agencies within the Administration are involved in these discussions, under the aegis of the National Security Council:

- **Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction**
 - Goal: limit undue humanitarian suffering and support stability through:
 - Early introduction of U.S. civilian agencies.
 - Full integration of U.S. civilian agencies with military forces.
 - Early funding and reintroduction of UN relief and NGO assistance.
- **Energy Infrastructure**
 - Goal: address a number of possible contingencies concerning Iraqi oil in order to assure continuing oil production through:
 - Assurance of repairs to oil facilities damaged during potential hostilities or deliberately by Saddam.
- **Views of Free Iraqis**
 - The Administration has worked diligently to encourage a pluralistic Iraqi opposition:
 - Over 300 diverse Iraqis met together recently in London and formed a consensus on a common democratic vision for their country.
 - Later in January 2003, 65 Iraqis nominated at the London conference will meet to discuss next steps.
 - The Administration has also reached out to technically competent Iraqi expatriates for their views. The State Department's "Future of Iraq

17 January 2003

Working Groups" have given free Iraqis the opportunity to begin planning for the "day after" regime change in their country.

- Groups which have met to date include:
 - Transitional Justice
 - Public Finance
 - Democratic Principles
 - Health/Humanitarian Services
 - Water, Agriculture, and Environment
 - Economy and Infrastructure
 - Public Outreach
 - Defense Policy and Institutions
- Groups that will meet in the near future include:
 - Oil and Energy
 - Education
 - Refugee and Migration Policy
 - Foreign and National Security Policy
 - Media
 - Civil Society Capacity Building
 - Anti-corruption Measures
- Concepts from these working groups will be considered during interagency discussion of post-liberation humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.

Post-Saddam Governance

- No decisions have been reached on the post-Saddam governance of Iraq. The following illustrates the kinds of things that are under consideration:
 - Phase I: Immediate Post-Liberation Military Administration – in place no longer than necessary – responsible for the following:
 - Security and stability.
 - Control, exploitation, and disposal of Iraqi WMD materials.
 - Elimination of terrorist infrastructure and safe-havens in Iraq.
 - Documentation and exposure of Iraqi WMD links to terrorism, etc.
 - Humanitarian relief.
 - Identify and detain individuals responsible for war crimes and violations of the laws of armed conflict.
 - Identify Iraqi leaders who can facilitate transition to future phases.

17 January 2003

- Phase II: Transitional Authority
 - Upon restoration of basic security, re-establish Iraqi rule at the local level through elections.
 - Convene an Iraqi Constitutional Convention.
 - Encourage formation of a stable and representative government.
 - Transition from humanitarian assistance to a functioning economy based on private property ownership and the rule of law.
 - Complete census and set the stage for elections.
- Phase III: Transition to Broad-Based Iraqi Government
 - Elections to create the new, more democratic Iraqi government.
 - Appoint an Iraqi representative to the UN.
 - Key ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, and Treasury) should be *informally* distributed among Iraq's various ethnic and sectarian groups.


~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DRT
Feb 05

ISA NESA
02 03 03

**DoD Comments on
Combating Extremism and Promoting Reform in the Muslim World**

- DoD ~~recomm~~ recommends a strategy of targeted initiatives rather than setting up a new bureaucratic office, such as:
 - *Promoting long-term Educational Reform.* Expend resources on Islamic educational systems that further free thought, develop skills, and encourage analytical thinking.
 - Sponsor secular magnet schools in major Muslim cities.
 - Provide curricula development assistance to Muslim Education Ministries.
 - Endow university chairs in the Muslim world for study of democracy.
 - *Providing Support to Genuine Reformers.* Identify and support key individual reformists and organizations inside and outside the US to propagate pro-reform, pro-liberty and tolerant Islam.



b6

- *Strengthening Cross-Cultural Understanding.* Improve US capabilities of promoting its message in Muslim countries.
 - Expand our translation efforts in Arabic, Urdu, Pashto, Farsi/Dari, Turkish, Indonesian to promote Western-Islamic intellectual thought.
 - Establish a magazine (i.e., Encounter), to be a forum/vehicle for Muslim opinion.

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JUNE 29, 2007
07-F-1332

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified by: DA 3D SP4 LSA William J. Law~~
~~Reason: 1.5 (d)~~
~~Declassify: 2 Feb 2013~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OS//SI//NSA/NESA
02 03 03

Suggested Themes

- Muslim world is not a monolithic entity; a tailored approach will be required to account for political, social, and economic diversity found in each country region.
- Emphasis should be on visible programs of support (political/financial) to demonstrate long-term US commitment to stability and prosperity in the Muslim world.
- Appeal to values that are fundamentally American—liberty, freedom of choice, private property rights and the abundance opportunities for self-actualization—these are shared by much of the Muslim population.
- Promote aspects of Islamic history that recalls the civilization's inclusiveness, tolerance, scientific advances, and multi-cultural legacy.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified by: DL SU SP NSA/William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason: 1.3 (d)~~
~~Declassify: 2 Feb 2012~~



*Enemy Prisoners of War
Policy Questions*

9 January 2003

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JUNE 29, 2007
07-F-1332

**DRT
Feb 05**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Derived from multiple sources
DECL ON 8 Jan 2018
OSD Policy/ISA/NES/NSP

23

Definitions



- Combatants
 - Personnel engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict:
 - members of armed forces.
 - militia and volunteer corps.
 - paramilitary and armed police.
 - members of *levee en masse*.
 - Lawful targets unless “out of combat”
 - Immune from prosecution for violent acts as long as committed in accordance with the laws of armed conflict.

Definitions



• Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs)

- Combatants are entitled to EPW status if captured.
- Treatment and responsibilities:
 - humane treatment.
 - protected against violence and humiliation.
 - reprisals prohibited.
 - assembled in camps by language and custom.
 - adequate quarters.
 - adequate food and clothing.
- EPWs may be released on *parole* (grant of freedom upon promise not to engage in further hostilities) provided that EPW acceptance is voluntary.
- Upon cessation of hostilities--EPWs entitled to release and repatriation.



EPWs Pose Two Challenges

• Operational

• Policy

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Declassify on: Multiyear Basis
DECL ON: 0-Jan-2013

Operational Challenges



- Transition from combatant to EPW.
- Large numbers (CENTCOM est. 40,000):
 - Impede movement.
 - Logistics drain.
 - How do we handle?
 - Do they stay in bypassed cantonments?
 - Do we send them to the rear?
 - How do we provide for their care?
 - Can they help us to reach U.S. objectives?

EPWs Could be Useful



- Provide Intelligence.
- Public Witnesses to Saddam's Brutality.
- Changed Allegiance
 - DOD/GC believes – allowed under Geneva Convention.
 - But...
 - difficult to command and control forces who have changed allegiance.
 - commanders have historically preferred capitulation.
 - must ensure change in allegiance is voluntary.
 - they retain EPW status and may not be used in combat (Geneva Convention).

Policy Issues



- Public diplomacy:
 - Prisoner Treatment.
 - Utility in IO campaign.
 - Potential for changing allegiance.
- Postwar processing and re-integration into society/new Iraqi Army.
- Drain on humanitarian assistance.

Recommended Way Ahead



• Declaratory Policy on EPWs:

- Iraqi Prisoners of War will be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
- We understand that many Iraqis are forced to fight against their will.
- Iraqis who refuse unlawful orders, refuse to fight or who wish to assist Free Iraqi Forces in the liberation of Iraq will be looked upon favorably.
- US objective should be early re-integration of EPWs into Iraqi society and the new Iraqi Army at the end of hostilities.

*“Declaratory Policy” Themes
for Key Audiences*

February 2003

EOD / DFOISR	
REGULATORY CONTROL	
Case No.	
Case No.	
No.	
Document No.	7

What is "Declaratory Policy"?

- "Declaratory policy" refers to all messages related to an Iraq operation that elements of the USG transmit --
 - Either publicly or privately --
 - To a government, an entire society, a segment of society, or selected individuals.
- It includes messages transmitted --
 - by diplomacy, mass media, the internet, mail, and individual contacts.

b1

Goals of Declaratory Policy

- Present the grounds for the war to the international community.
- Influence specific countries to support our military operations, or at least not to oppose them.
- Demoralize elements of the Iraqi regime.
- Influence segments of Iraqi society to:
 - Oppose the current regime, or at least not help defend it.
 - Defect to the opposition when military operations begin.
 - Welcome U.S. forces and cooperate with them.
 - Not obey orders.
 - In particular, not obey an order to use or facilitate the use of WMD/ballistic missiles.

WMD declaratory policy has been dealt with separately

Treatment of Those Guilty of Atrocities

- A new government of Iraq and/or the U.S./coalition will punish at least some of those guilty of atrocities and war crimes.
 - At the same time, we want as many current military officers and government officials as possible to abandon the current regime and cooperate with the opposition and the U.S.
- Required: Publication of a limited "wanted" list?
- Would give those not on the list the hope that they could avoid prosecution.
 - We could indicate that those with checkered pasts, but who were not on the list, could redeem themselves by helping liberate Iraq.
 - A crucial support for the WMD declaratory policy.

*Publication of this list is a prerequisite
for many of the desired messages to elements of the Iraqi government.*

Dealing with Saddam and His Inner Circle

- Once a decision is taken on whether to offer Saddam, his sons, and other top officials asylum in return for surrendering power, a declaratory policy would have to be drafted to support it.
 - Until then, we should avoid statements or actions that might foreclose the possibility of offering asylum.
 - E.g., creation of an international tribunal with an independent prosecutor with whom we were obligated to cooperate.
- In any case, "buzz" about asylum as a possible outcome of the current situation is desirable:
 - High officials in Iraq would have to wonder whether there wasn't some fire beneath all that smoke.
 - They would be led to consider their own survival strategies.

Role of the Opposition

- Many themes will be more effective if Iraqi opposition groups also transmit them:
 - Threats/promises to deal with individuals or countries according to their support for Iraqi liberation.
 - Vision of a future Iraq:
 - territorial integrity.
 - broad-based government, etc.
- The more united the opposition is, the more effectively it can convey these themes.
- Our dealings with the opposition should be guided by the desirability of having effective and credible opposition spokesmen convey these themes.

Nature of the New Iraqi Government

- Messages to segments of Iraqi society (Kurds, Shi'a, Sunni elites, Sunni tribes) will be affected by policy decisions concerning the nature of the new Iraqi government.
- For example:
 - Should U.S. or the opposition describe the new government as "democratic"? (Could lead Sunnis and Kurds to see it as Shi'a-dominated.)
 - How much autonomy do U.S. and the opposition envision the Kurds having?
 - What role will the tribal structures have? How can the U.S. and the opposition assuage fears of the tribal leaderships that a new government will marginalize them?
- As the opposition and the USG engage more actively in discussions about the future of Iraq, the resolution of these issues will affect the messages transmitted to segments of Iraqi society.

Selected Target Audiences

- Iraqi officialdom
- Iraqi military generally
 - Officers
 - Officers with WMD roles*
- Scientists/Technicians in the Iraqi WMD program*
- Oil industry officials and workers
- Iraqi populace generally
- Kurds
- Shi'a
- Sunni tribes
- Urban Sunni elites
- Turcomans
- Saddam Hussein
 - Qusay
 - Uday
- Syrian government
- Iranian government
 - Disaffected Iranian population
- France, Russia, China

This briefing deals with themes for key audiences.

General themes are in the "Iraq Information Strategy" paper

**WMD-related themes included in WMD Declaratory Policy*

Getting the Message to Iraqis

General messages:

- Official statements and news releases.
- Voice of America.
- Other US controlled radio and TV broadcasts.
 - Intrusive Information Operations.
 - COMMANDO SOLO and direct satellite broadcasts.
 - Use liberated Iraqi stations.

Targeted messages:

- Direct contact with military officers, scientists, technological elite, and oil industry leadership, and individuals close to them:
 - Mail.
 - Email.
 - Telephone calls.
- Break into existing Iraqi military communications nets.
- Leaflets and broadcasts directed to individual military units.
- Personal interactions with [redacted] or DoD personnel. b1

Iraqi Officialdom

Objective:

- Demoralize the regime.
- Persuade officials that the Ba'athist regime is doomed.

Rationale:

- Weaken will to oppose U.S. military action.
- Heighten the "shock and awe" effect.

Modality:

- All methods, including targeted messages where feasible.

Text:

- "We are in a new world since September 11. The U.S. is a different country. There is no way that the regime can survive a determined U.S. assault."
- "Once U.S. military operations begin, the regime is doomed. It will be every man for himself. Think *now* about how you will save yourself and your family."

Iraqi Military Generally

Objective:

- Reduce will to fight.
- Persuade military personnel to concentrate on surviving the conflict and securing their role in the new Iraq.

Rationale:

- Facilitate U.S. military operations.

Modality:

- Public messages (e.g., radio broadcasts)
- Broadcasts by the Iraqi military opposition.

[REDACTED]

b1

Text:

- "Don't die in a futile struggle to save a doomed and discredited government. Think now about ways you can avoid danger."
- "Iraq will need a strong army in the future. The army will be respected because it will defend the Iraqi people, not oppress them. Don't lose your chance to be part of the new Iraq's army by fighting for the current government."

Iraqi Military Officers

Objective:

- Persuade military officers to concentrate on surviving the conflict and securing their role in the new Iraq.
- Persuade officers to seek ways to bring their units over to the opposition, or at least to keep them out of battle.

Rationale:

- Facilitate U.S. military operations.

Modality:

- Public messages (e.g., radio broadcasts)
- Broadcasts by the Iraqi military opposition.

b1

Text:

- "You should think *now* about the role you want to play in the strong army that Iraq will need in the future. The army will be respected because it will defend the Iraqi people, not oppress them. Your prospects will depend on how you conduct yourself in the struggle to liberate Iraq. If you can rally your troops to the opposition in that struggle, you will be rewarded."
- "You have an obligation to your men. Don't sacrifice them in a futile struggle. Instead, think *now* of ways you can save them by avoiding battle."

Oil Industry Personnel

Objective:

- Prevent regime sabotage of oil fields.
- Facilitate earliest possible resumption of oil production.

Rationale:

- Funds will be needed for reconstruction.
- Avoid ecological disaster.

Modality:

- Targeted messages (if individuals can be identified).
- Radio broadcasts.
- Messages from Iraqi opposition groups.

Text:

- "You are responsible for protecting a resource vital for Iraq's future. Don't let the regime destroy the patrimony of the Iraqi people. Think *now* about how you can protect this resource."
- "You will be held personally responsible for deliberate environmental damage."

Iraqi Populace

Objective:

- Cause populace to focus on surviving the coming conflict.
- Persuade populace that regime change is their only chance for a better future.

Rationale:

- Weaken regime's ability to mobilize populace in its defense.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts, mainly by opposition.

- [REDACTED]

b1

Text:

- "Iraq has the natural and human resources to be an advanced country. Saddam's wars and repression have held Iraq back. Only Saddam's downfall will remove the obstacles that prevent Iraq from being prosperous and strong."
- "The government is doomed. Think now about how you will survive the coming conflict. Don't do anything that will cause the new government of Iraq to distrust you."

Kurds

Objective:

- Persuade Kurds that an Iraq operation is in their interest (i.e., it won't cause Saddam to retaliate against them; won't harm their autonomy and standard of living.)

Rationale:

- Encourage cooperation with U.S. personnel in Kurdish area.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts.
- Official statements reported in Kurdish mass media.

Text:

- "Saddam is merely biding his time. He has never reconciled himself to Kurdish autonomy. If he is allowed to continue developing weapons of mass destruction, it is only a matter of time before he will feel strong enough to attack you. Your freedom and prosperity can be secure only if there is a civilized government in Baghdad."
- "Your leading role in the liberation of Iraq will guarantee that you are fairly represented in the new government of Iraq. You can continue to govern yourselves as an equal partner in the new Iraq."

Objective:

- Persuade Shi'a to welcome and cooperate with U.S. forces.

Rationale:

- Facilitate military operations.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts.

b1

Text:

- "You have an important role to play in the new Iraq. There will be a broad-based representative government in which you will have a major say." (Policy decision on whether to refer to new Iraqi government as "democratic" would affect message.)
- "When U.S. forces arrive in your area, stay home. Do not impede their movement. Any disorder only delays the liberation of Iraq."

Sunni Tribes



Objective:

- Persuade tribal leaders that they will be respected in the new Iraq.

Rationale:

- Facilitate cooperation with U.S. personnel in western Iraq.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts.
- Targeted messages to tribal leaders (if feasible).

Text:

- "Traditional tribal organizations will have a role in the new Iraq."
- "Don't jeopardize your status in the new Iraq by cooperating with the doomed and discredited Ba'athist government. Don't be tempted by any offers that a desperate Saddam might make to you."

Urban Sunni elites

Objective:

- Allay fears that regime change will mean loss of status.

Rationale:

- Prevent any rallying around Saddam by scared members of the Sunni elite.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts.
- Targeted messages (from opposition members living abroad).

Text:

- "Unless you are guilty of atrocities, you can maintain a position of respect in the new Iraq. Your skills will be needed in the reconstruction of the country. Don't jeopardize your chance to participate in the rebuilding of Iraq by fighting for the doomed and discredited Ba'athist government."

TURCOMANS

Objective:

- Obtain support of Turcoman population for an Iraq operation.

Rationale:

- Help solidify Turkish cooperation.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts.

Text:

- "The U.S. is committed to ensuring that the new Iraqi government will respect the rights of all minorities."
- "Turkey will be a full partner of the U.S. in any Iraq operation. You will not be forgotten."

Syrian Government

Objective:

- Deter Syria from using Iraq operation as an opportunity to increase terrorist attacks against Israel.

Rationale:

• [REDACTED]

b1

Modality:

- Diplomatic contacts.

Text:

- "U.S. will not tolerate interference or increased terrorist attacks on Israel. U.S. would be forced to take action against Syrian WMD facilities in that case."
- "Syria faces a fundamental choice about its future orientation. It should draw the appropriate lesson from the fate of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq."

Iranian Government

Objective:

- Deter military intervention.

Rationale:

- Facilitate our military operations.

Modality:

- Indirect diplomatic contacts.

Text:

- "U.S. will not tolerate military interference. U.S. is prepared to destroy your navy, air force, ports and WMD facilities in case of interference."
- "U.S. views Iran differently than Iraq. We believe that internal political processes will bring about change in Iran, obviating the need for U.S. military action."

Disaffected Iranians



Objective:

- Persuade disaffected Iranians to see an Iraq operation as a hopeful sign.

Rationale:

- Deter Iranian government from causing trouble, by focusing its attention on its internal problems.

Modality:

- Radio broadcasts, including Iranian dissident broadcasts.

Text:

- "A new wind is blowing in the region. Soon Iraq will be free. Don't lose hope that the Iranian people can also liberate their country."

France, Russia, China



Objective:

- Obtain as much support as possible from these governments.
- Deter them from causing diplomatic complications [REDACTED] b1

Rationale:

- Facilitate U.S. operations.

Modality:

- Diplomatic contacts
 - Contact between opposition groups and these governments.

Text:

- "We want you to be able participate in the reconstruction of Iraq, including its oil industry, and in the rebuilding of its armed forces. But the Iraqi people will remember who supported Saddam's tyranny and who helped in their liberation."
- For Russia: "Only an Iraq that is a normal member of the international community can even think about renegotiating its debts. As long as the current regime is in power, this can never happen." (Depends on policy adopting toward Russia in connection with a second UN Security Council meeting.)

REC

OSD PL
3/11/03



Anatomy of Saddam's Tyranny

"I see heads that are ripe, and I am the one to pluck them... O people of Iraq, people of discord and deceit...I will tie you up like a bundle of twigs. I will beat you like stray camels."

- Mandatory recitation in Iraq's ninth grade curriculum.

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JUNE 29, 2007
07-F-1332

~~SECRET~~

DRT
Feb 05

30



Saddam's rise to power

- 1937: Saddam Hussein born in Tikrit, Iraq.
- 1956: Saddam joins the Ba'ath Party.
- 1959: Saddam attempts to assassinate the Iraqi prime minister; flees Iraq to Egypt.
- 1963: Coup brings Ba'ath party to power briefly. Upon collapse of Ba'athist government, Saddam takes charge of the Ba'ath security apparatus.
- 1968: Ba'athist coup; Saddam purges dissent.
- 1969: Saddam becomes Vice President; consolidates power; Jews, Shi'a publicly hanged in streets of Baghdad
- 1970s: By early 1970s, Saddam has full behind-the-scenes control.
- 1974: Purges against minorities, Shi'a, and communists begin.
- 1979: Saddam becomes President. Within a week, hundreds of rivals executed.
- 1980: Saddam attacks Iran; starting war that kills one million.
- 1987: Anfal campaign begins. 182,000 Kurds "disappear." Chemical weapons used against civilians in 40 different towns.
- 1990: Saddam invades Kuwait.
- 1991-: Ethnic cleansing of more than 100,000 Kurds and Turkoman from Kirkuk, Sinjar regions.



The Ideological Basis of Tyranny

- Saddam heads the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Iraq's only legal political party.
- The Ba'ath party, founded in 1940, embraces Pan-Arabism.
 - Advocates unity of all Arabs under one ruler.
 - Non-Arab minorities do not have full rights.
 - Party ideology is an Arab adaptation of fascism.



"The Leader...is the master of the singular 'Idea' from which he separates and casts aside all those who contradict it."

—Michel 'Aflaq, founder of the Ba'ath party

"The ancestry of the Ba'ath may be found not in the Middle East, not in Islam, not in Arabism, but in the Nazi Party and the Communist Party, two sources of inspiration which mingle very well in Ba'athist practice...."

—Bernard Lewis, history professor emeritus at Princeton University.



Key Instruments of Saddam's Tyranny

- Revolutionary Command Council.
 - Highest echelon of the Iraqi government.
 - Seven members preside over Iraqi Ba'ath party.
- The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (*Hizb al-Ba'ath al-'Arabi al-Ishtiraki*)
 - Party branches permeate all public institutions, armed forces, work places, schools and universities, and community organizations.
 - Very hierarchical. Members encouraged to report others' disloyalty to advance.
 - Key membership consists of approximately 25,000 persons.
- National Security Council (*al-Majlis al-Amn al-Qawmi*)
 - Headed by Saddam Hussein, chaired by his son Qusay
 - Consists of representatives of the Office of the Presidential Palace and security agencies.
- Ministry of Information
 - Escorts and monitors foreigners, all press, in charge of spontaneous demonstrations.
 - Controls all television, radio, and newspapers.
 - Saddam's son Uday controls much of the media.



Key Instruments of Saddam's Tyranny cont'd

- Security and Intelligence Services of the Iraqi Regime
 - Special Security (*al-Amn al-Khas*)
 - Overseen by Saddam's son Qusay.
 - Spies on Iraq's other security services
 - Conceals WMD programs
 - Controls Iraq's "special weapons" including WMD.
 - General Security (*al-Amn al-'Amm*)
 - Detects dissent among general public
 - General Intelligence/Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) (*al-Mukhabarat al-Amah*)
 - Monitors Ba'ath Party and other organizations.
 - Military Intelligence (*al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyah*)
 - Ensures loyalty of military officer corps
 - Military Security (*al-Amn al-'Askari*) detects and purges dissent within the military.

Key Instruments of Saddam's Tyranny cont'd



- The Special Protection Apparatus (*Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa*)
 - Guards Saddam Hussein.
- The Special Republican Guard (*al-Haris al-Jumhuri al-Khas*)
 - Headed by Saddam's son Qusay.
 - Acts as praetorian guard and a counter-coup force.
 - Deployed around Baghdad, Saddam's palaces
- Saddam's Fedayeen
 - Headed by Saddam's son Uday.
 - Perpetrates terror among populace
 - In 2000, summary decapitation of several dozen women for dissent.



Key Principles for Post-Conflict Governance

- President Bush's vision:

"... We will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected."

"The nation of Iraq—with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people—is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom."

"The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder."

—President George Bush, February 26, 2003.



Dismantling the Instruments of Tyranny *(Implementing President Bush's vision)*

- Dismantling tyranny's tools:
 - Iraqi Intelligence Services
 - Special Security Organizations
 - Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard
 - Closing the Ministry of Information
 - Proclaiming: "We hereby declare the Ministry of Information to be abolished forever" will be a cause for celebration in Baghdad, and will reinforce pro-Western democrats throughout the Middle East.
- Supporting Free Iraqis:
 - Iraqis who have lived outside Iraq have a better understanding of concepts of democracy than those who have lived only under Saddam's totalitarian regime.



De-Ba'athification

(Key to Fulfilling the President's Vision)

- Need for De-Ba'athification:
 - The Ba'ath Party permeates all levels of society.
 - Iraqis despise the Ba'ath Party as a symbol of dictatorship.
- Process of De-Ba'athification:
 - The Ba'ath Party—with approximately 1.5 million members—is hierarchical.
 - The vast majority are opportunists and will abandon their membership.
 - The top tier are in key positions of influence on the municipal, provincial, and central government levels.
 - De-Ba'athification will be a gradual process.
 - Iraqis will be able to identify top-tier Ba'athists in their midst.
 - We need not arrest Ba'athists unless they are suspected war criminals.
 - Iraqis might establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC).
 - The TRC might solicit testimony from Ba'athists in exchange for immunity and/or enfranchisement in the democratic process.
 - Interim appointments and eventual elections will replace top-tier Ba'athists.



Key Principles for Post-Conflict Governance

• The Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA):

- The U.S. may recognize the IIA as the legitimate governmental authority in Iraq, pending the Iraqi people's ratification of a new constitution and election of a new government in accordance with that constitution.
- The IIA will consist of three councils:
 - Iraqi Administrative Council might consist of 11 Free Iraqis and 10 newly-liberated Iraqis. Responsibilities might include:
 - Conduct of Iraq's foreign affairs, appointment of ambassadors, etc.
 - Consultation with the Office of Reconstruction Assistance (Jay Garner's shop).
 - Running ministries upon hand-off by the Office of Reconstruction Assistance.
 - Oversight of a non-ethnic, non-sectarian census and creation of a voter registry.
 - Oversight of local elections (with international observers).
 - Judicial Council might consist of 9 prominent Iraqis not compromised by the Ba 'ath
 - Will recommend reform of Iraq's legal code, judicial courts, and oversee trial of prominent members of the Ba'ath regimes.



Key Principles for Post-Conflict Governance cont'd

- The Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) continued:
 - The Constitutional Commission:
 - Might consist of 54 members (three from each province).
 - Will create an independent Election Commission.
 - Will draft a new Constitution.
 - The draft constitution will be subject to ratification by the newly-elected parliament.
- What the Iraqi Interim Authority might accomplish:
 - Iraqi democrats can issue a Bill of Rights allowing Iraqis to build their own legitimacy.
 - The IIA might assume legal authority on behalf of the Iraqi people, easing transition.
 - Iraqis can help coordinate relief and reconstruction with Coalition partners.
 - The IIA can facilitate the process of bringing underrepresented Kurds and Shi'a into government.
 - The IIA can begin to build autonomous democratic institutions.
 - Given its natural and human resources, Iraq has the potential to become a free and progressive society.



Key Management Considerations (Vetting)

- Assume that vetting is DOD's responsibility.
- Conduct inter-agency coordination at the lowest possible level -- bring the big issues to senior DOD leadership for resolution.
- Maintain unity of command up the DOD chain to the President.
- Attempt to maintain maximum U.S. control, especially through the early period, while keeping a large international humanitarian assistance operation in place -- reporting through the DOD chain.
- Publicize all Iraqi groups and officials selected to perform key functions as interim in nature. Interim appointments and groups will:
 - Evolve over time.
 - Have natural biases.
- We will have to calibrate over time.

Instructions to Iraqi Armed Forces Coalition Provisional Authority Directive

You are now a surrendered force under the control and authority of the Commander of Coalition Forces that are conducting military operations within Iraq. All Iraqi military personnel will be treated humanely and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and the Law of War. Our fight was with the regime of Saddam Hussein that oppressed the people of Iraq. The people of Iraq are not our enemy.

At this moment in Iraq's history, I ask that each one of you in the Iraqi armed forces carefully consider your personal conduct and how future generations will remember your actions. The eyes of all Iraqis are now upon you, as are the world's. Much depends on the events of the next few days. There are some in Iraq who hope to profit from the turmoil. These people will attempt to incite violence and cause chaos. You, as members of the military, swore to defend the nation -- and its people -- and you must not allow this to happen. You will serve your country best by contributing to an orderly and peaceful transition to the Coalition Provisional Authority.

The soldiers of the Coalition are the best trained and equipped in the world. They will not hesitate to intervene to stop criminal acts.

There are several guidelines you must abide by. You must comply with all orders and instructions issued by Coalition Forces. To help in these important efforts, you must do the following:

- Cease all combat operations against Coalition Forces immediately. Prominently display a large white flag in front of your headquarters, and place large white flags on all equipment, vehicles, and facilities. These markings must be clearly visible from the air.
- If you are currently located at a garrison, barracks, or cantonment, remain there to await orders and instructions from Coalition Forces. If you are not located in a garrison, barracks, or cantonment, remain at your current position. Do not move more than one kilometer from your vehicle or your position. Do not convoy or march to any other location unless directed and escorted by Coalition Forces.
- If your Commanding Officer is not present, the senior ranking Officer or Non-Commissioned Officer shall take charge, see to the safety and welfare of his troops, secure all weapons, maintain order and unit integrity, conduct an inventory of all personnel and weapons, and remain in place pending instructions from a Coalition Force Officer.
- Do not threaten Coalition Forces or interfere with any operations.

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

- Immediately obey all orders and instructions issued by Coalition Forces.
- Do not contact other Iraqi military or paramilitary forces or other internal security units, or personnel. Within 72 hours, a Coalition Forces representative will contact you and give you additional instructions.
- Turn off all radars, computers, and communications systems immediately, and leave them off. ICENTCOM should be authorized to determine any exceptions to this general rule.
- Immediately park all military aircraft away from runways. Do not block, damage, or destroy any roads or runways.
- Immediately park all vehicles. Place all heavy and/or crew served weapons systems in formations. Rotate all weapons tubes over the back deck. Clear all weapons. Park all vehicles in squares no larger than a battalion size.
- Unload ammunition from every vehicle and weapon. Store all ammunition separately and safely away from all weapons systems.
- Secure all personal weapons in unit arms rooms or locked within tactical vehicles. Do not damage or destroy these weapons. Officers may retain their side arms to defend their subordinates against persons attempting or committing acts likely to cause serious bodily injury or death. Prepare written inventories of all weapons for presentation to Coalition Forces representatives. Be prepared to surrender these weapons if ordered by Coalition Forces representatives.
- Do not destroy or disable any military weapons, equipment, official or personal records, or facilities. Do not destroy or disable any communications equipment, computer, or cryptological devices of any kind.
- Do not attempt to leave your unit. Remain in uniform at all times. Maintain unit integrity and good order and discipline your units. Obey the orders of your commanders that are consistent with the terms of surrender. Commanders must treat subordinates fairly and humanely. Corporal punishment of subordinates is prohibited.
- Immediately notify Coalition Forces of any storage or production facility related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missiles.
- Immediately notify Coalition Forces of the location of all mines, minefields, man-portable air-defense systems, and anti-aircraft systems.
- You will receive food, water, and medical care if required. Should your soldiers require immediate medical treatment or food or water, display a large crescent of any color that is visible from the air. Do not attempt to make contact with Coalition Forces by firing flares or any other method. Coalition Forces will contact you.

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

- Do not damage or destroy transportation systems, public utilities, factories, or natural resources and facilities associated with their extraction, processing, and storage.

REMEMBER: If you pick up arms, resume combat operations, or threaten any Coalition Forces after surrendering, you will be attacked. If you survive, you may be subject to prosecution.

General Tommy R. Franks
Commander of Coalition Forces

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~FINAL USDP
18 March 2003

Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq

Coalition Provisional Authority Directive

To ensure the safety, security, and public order of the people of Iraq and Coalition Forces,

1. All persons in Iraq are directed to:
 - a. Lay down arms, cease resistance, and obey all orders of the Coalition Forces;
 - b. Not make threats against the Coalition Forces;
 - c. Not carry out acts of reprisal or violence against other Iraqi people, the Coalition Forces, or neighboring peoples. This includes theft and looting of public and private property;
 - d. Not carry or possess weapons or ammunition in public, and not possess explosives. Do not fire weapons in celebration – may be mistaken for hostile fire.
2. Iraqi government employees (civilian and military) shall provide any requested assistance to Coalition Forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority at all levels and without hesitation. They are instructed to prepare for surrender to Coalition Forces all equipment including weapons, equipment, codes and other information, including but not limited to maps of minefields and locations of areas used for weapons research, testing, or storage, as well as any other dangerous or sensitive sites. The Iraqi military forces will receive separate special instructions concerning the surrender of military weapons.
3. Additionally, all persons in Iraq are hereby ordered to:
 - a. Report all suspected terrorists to the Coalition Provisional Authority or Coalition Forces;
 - b. Cease all work immediately on any programs for the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missiles, and other advanced military technologies; report in a full and factual manner information on such programs; and preserve all records;
 - c. Report in a full and factual manner information pertaining to prisoners and missing persons from the conflicts with Iran and Kuwait; and preserve all records;
 - d. Report in a full and factual manner information pertaining to property and documents seized by Iraqi nationals during the conflicts with Iran and Kuwait, whether the seizures were made pursuant to military commands or orders, or for personal gain; and preserve all records;

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~DRT
Feb 05

e. Report in a full and factual manner information pertaining to all military and civilian regime leaders, their subordinates, and anyone who may have committed crimes and atrocities against the people of Iraq, Iran, or Kuwait; or against the economic patrimony of Iraq, such as energy facilities; and preserve all records;

f. Safeguard public property and protect it from damage or destruction. This includes all public infrastructure, energy facilities, official records of any kind in any form (paper, electronic, magnetic tape, compact disc, or any other form of storage). Report any suspected destruction or the threat of destruction to Coalition Forces immediately.

4. The following temporary conditions concerning public order and safety are in effect:

a. A curfew is declared -- all persons shall remain in their homes and other places of residence from [7 PM until 6 AM] [one hour after evening prayers until dawn] daily. The following persons are exempted: police, law enforcement, fire, ambulance, hospital, and other public safety and health agency personnel while performing official duties during curfew hours or transiting to or from their places of work; persons requiring emergency medical care; and officials and employees of public services, utilities, and other authorized essential work;

b. Unless otherwise suspended by direction of the Coalition Provisional Authority, all local government services shall continue to function: All government employees are to report to their places of work and perform their normal duties as usual, unless otherwise directed;

c. Private shops, markets, and other businesses shall operate during non-curfew hours at the discretion of their proprietors;

d. All mosques and other places of worship shall remain open;

e. After the Coalition Provisional Authority determines it is safe, all schools shall reopen and remain open during non-curfew hours. When that happens, teachers and students should report to school;

f. Unless otherwise suspended by direction of the Coalition Provisional Authority, police and law enforcement agencies, courts, fire departments, ambulance services, banks, postal services, media and other public safety and health agencies will continue to function under the oversight, direction, and orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority and will operate during curfew and non-curfew hours;

g. Hospitals will operate 24 hours/day, during curfew and non-curfew hours;

h. Persons incarcerated in prisons and other government facilities shall be treated humanely, and all corporal/capital punishment is suspended. All confined persons shall remain incarcerated pending additional orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority;

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~

- i. Current rationing cards for food, medicine, and clothing shall continue in use.
5. Full members of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Hizb al-Ba'ith al-Arabi al-Ishiraki al-Iraqi) and Officers of the Iraqi security forces are to identify themselves at once to Coalition Forces Authorities, and await instructions from them.
6. Any person violating any of the provisions of this directive shall, upon conviction by a Coalition Provisional Authority Court, be liable to lawful punishment as such court may determine.
7. This directive shall become effective on the date of its promulgation.

General Tommy R. Franks
Commander of Coalition Forces

~~SECRET UNTIL RELEASED~~