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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

INFO MEMO

EF-0175 22 Oct 01
Schiff

October 20, 2001, 12:30 p.m.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICT

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph J. Collins, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS *Joseph J. Collins 10*

SUBJECT: United Nations (UN) – State Department Meeting, 18 OCT 2001 (U)

- Kenzo Oshima, UN Under Secretary General, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs discussed Afghanistan humanitarian assistance with Alan Kreczko, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, Migration.
- Mr. Oshima's focus for upcoming trip to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan is to increase humanitarian access, primarily from the north.
 - Convince them to open borders for cross-border humanitarian operations.
 - Priority is the central highlands - the "hunger belt".
 - When Mazar-e-Sharif falls to Northern Alliance, hopes to open Termez-Mazar corridor to enable relief agencies to meet needs of at least 40% of vulnerable population in the north. Security will be of critical importance.
 - UN pre-positioning assets in Uzbekistan; ready to move 40 tons of relief supplies immediately after opening of Uzbek border.
- UN not convinced any military support for humanitarian operations necessary, but understands DoD/CENTCOM interest in potentially providing assistance.
 - All agreed UN-CENTCOM liaison essential, but maintain low profile.
 - If military support needed, UN sees C-130's as most useful asset, possibly from several countries.
 - Does not anticipate asking for humanitarian corridors or operational pauses in bombing or need for Berlin Airlift style operation.
 - Only UNHCR should build refugee camps.

Prepared by: (b)(2), (b)(6)

Copy to:
ASD (SOLIC)
ASD (ISA)
Director, Joint Staff

~~SECRET~~

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OCT 10
Jr



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



02/014085

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, ^{(b)(2)} [redacted]) *18 OCT 2002*

SUBJECT: (U) Operation Enduring Freedom/Iraq Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Meeting

- (U) The purpose of this memo is to inform the USDP of the deliberations of the PRRC meeting September 24, 2002.
 - (U) The function of the PRRC is to facilitate informed decision making by OSD principals in the event U.S. personnel become isolated or captured in a hostile environment. (See Tab A for DoDI 2310.3, Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures).
- (U) DPMO convened the PRRC due to the increased possibility of military action against Iraq. Participants discussed possible actions required in the event personnel become isolated or captured (e.g., a downed pilot) during hostilities in Iraq.
 - (U) Offices represented include:

✓ DPMO	✓ OSD(OGC)	✓ DIA(Policy)
✓ OSD/ISA(NESA)	✓ OSD(ESC)	✓ Director CIA rep to OSD
✓ ASD(SO/LIC)	✓ Joint Staff	✓ Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
✓ ASD(C ³ I)	✓ Air Force Staff	✓ DoS Crisis Mgt
✓ ASD(PA)	✓ Navy Staff	✓ DoS(Pol/Mil)
- (U) Key items of discussion during the PRRC meeting included:
 - (U) **Legal status of isolated personnel.** If Iraqi government forces capture U.S. personnel as a result of military action against Iraq, the U.S. Government should consider them to be Prisoners of War.

^{(b)(6)} [redacted]


~~SECRET~~

➤ (U) **Public affairs guidance during and after the incident.** ASD/PA is developing generic public affairs guidance to be refined and used in the event of an isolated personnel incident.

✓ (U) DPMO will work with ASD/PA to ensure that PA guidance is developed and disseminated to all appropriate commands prior to the start of hostilities.

➤ ~~(S)~~ **Theater personnel recovery capabilities.**

✓ (U) USCENTCOM has the most robust personnel recovery planning and execution process of all the combatant commands. ~~USCENTCOM is prepared to execute the full range of recovery operations.~~



✓ (U) DPMO will work closely with the Air Staff in the event of operations against Iraq to facilitate the required call up.

➤ ~~(S)~~ **Intelligence support to personnel recovery.**

✓ (U) Joint Staff J2 briefed the current threat situation in Iraq.

— ~~(S) Iraq's defense capabilities pose a significant threat to coalition air forces, thereby making a recovery mission highly likely.~~

— ~~(S) Iraq has a well-developed counter-rescue doctrine and will likely target recovery forces.~~

✓ (U) The Chief of the Intelligence Community POW/MIA Cell briefed his organization's mission and capabilities and affirmed that they are prepared to support personnel recovery related requirements for actions in OEF and Iraq.

• In addition, participants in the meeting discussed possible changes to the PRRC, and a linking of the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group meetings with PRRC activities.

Prepared by:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

PDASD/ISA

Peter C. W. Flory

DASD (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs)

Jerry D. Jennings

08 OCT 2002

Department of Defense INSTRUCTION

June 6, 1997
Number 2310.3

SUBJECT: Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures

Reference: (a) DoD Directive 2310.2, "Personnel Recovery," December 22, 2000

1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Instruction updates policy, responsibilities and procedures under reference (a) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) PRRC.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (hereafter, the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Force Management Policy; International Security Affairs; Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; Public Affairs; Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense shall be referred to as "the OSD Components"), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and United States Joint Forces Command.

3. POLICY

It is DoD policy under reference (a) that:

3.1. Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. military, DoD civilian and contract service employees placed in danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or mission is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce the potential for captured personnel being used as leverage against the United States.

3.2. The Department of Defense has primary responsibility for recovering U.S. personnel identified in paragraph 3.1. above, who are deployed outside the United States and its territories.

3.3. When requested, and when directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), the Department of Defense shall provide personnel recovery support to other governments, agencies, and organizations, in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and memoranda of agreement or understanding.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES

4.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall authorize the convening of the PRRC, as required.

4.1.1. The function of the PRRC is to facilitate informed decision-making by OSD principals. The PRRC shall accomplish this by addressing issues impacting on the recovery incident, and by expeditiously developing coordinated policy options for the Secretary of Defense.

4.1.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)) has designated the Defense Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) as his office of primary responsibility for personnel recovery, and delegated responsibility for convening the PRRC to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoners of War/Missing Personnel Affairs (DASD (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs)).

4.1.3. The OSD Executive Support Center (ESC) has primary responsibility for notifying the Secretary of Defense, the USD(P), the ASD(ISA), and the DASD (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs) of personnel recovery incidents.

4.1.4. In the event of an actual or simulated personnel recovery incident, the OSD ESC shall provide assistance, adequate space, and necessary equipment within the ESC to support the PRRC for the duration of incident.

4.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy to provide a representative to the PRRC, as determined.

4.3. The Head of each OSD Component shall:

4.3.1. Provide a representative to the PRRC upon its activation (representative must have a current Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance).

4.3.2. Submit appropriate personal data (i.e., home and office telephone numbers, beeper number, etc.) pertaining to the PRRC representative that will ensure his or her timely notification in the event of a personnel recovery incident to the ESC and ASD(ISA). In the event this point of contact changes, submit replacement information immediately.

4.4. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall:

4.4.1. Direct DASD(POW/MPA) to activate and provide leadership to the PRRC.

4.4.2. Direct the appropriate regional bureau within ISA to provide a representative to the PRRC upon its activation, as appropriate.

4.4.3. Exercise the PRRC periodically to ensure procedures are current and coordination channels are functional.

4.5. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall direct the appropriate director within ISP to provide a representative to the PRRC upon its activation, as appropriate.

4.6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall provide a representative to the PRRC upon its activation, as appropriate.

4.7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall appoint a representative to the PRRC who shall serve with the PRRC representing the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who is the sole agent for the release of official DoD information pertaining to personnel recovery incidents for dissemination through any form of public information media.

4.8. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense shall appoint a representative to the PRRC who shall advise the PRRC on legal aspects of all matters covered by this Instruction.

4.9. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide liaison, as required, to the PRRC to ensure connectivity between the Joint Staff crisis team and OSD.

5. PROCEDURES

5.1. Upon notification by the ESC of a possible personnel recovery incident, DASD(POW/MPA), or designated representative, shall report to the ESC, assess the situation and advise the USD(P) of the necessity for convening a PRRC.

5.2. Upon notification that the USD(P) has decided to activate a PRRC, the DASD(POW/MPA) shall convene the PRRC. The function of the PRRC is to facilitate informed decisionmaking by OSD principals. The PRRC will accomplish this by addressing issues impacting on the personnel recovery incident, and by expeditiously developing coordinated policy options for the Secretary of Defense and/or the National Command Authorities. In the event the USD(P) decides a PRRC is inappropriate, DPMO shall function as an operational coordination center in support of the OSD for evolving personnel recovery policy issues until the incident is resolved.

5.3. On notification by the ESC, or other source, that a personnel recovery incident is likely or has already occurred, the DASD(POW/MPA) shall request the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) to advise the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), CIA, and to invite the DDO to designate a liaison representative to the PRRC.

5.4. When notified of a PR incident, the DASD(POW/MPA) shall assume responsibility for implementing this Instruction, and shall immediately assess the situation and, if appropriate, recommend that the USD(P) approve convening a PRRC. The PRRC shall:

5.5. Provide a personnel recovery incident report within three hours of the cell convening to the Secretary of Defense through the USD(P). This initial report shall provide, as time permits, a status report on the situation, legal status of those involved, public affairs guidance, summary of the interagency's response to the incident, and shall recommend policy options for managing the incident. The PRRC shall provide update and spot reports covering significant developments throughout the duration of the incident.

5.6. Serve as the Department of Defense point of contact for personnel recovery interagency coordination. When the Department of Defense experiences or is anticipating a personnel recovery incident, the PRRC shall establish communications with:

5.6.1. The National Security Council (White House Situation Room).

5.6.2. The Department of State Operation's Center and/or Executive Secretariat who will be requested to inform the appropriate geographic or functional bureau(s) within State to advise the PRRC if State convenes a task force.

5.6.3. The CIA representative to the NMJIC, and;

5.6.4. Other Federal Agencies as required.

5.7. Deactivate the PRRC after recovery has been accomplished, or determined to be impossible. In the event recovery is determined to be impossible, the DASD(POW/MPA) shall continue to track the individual until the fullest possible accounting is accomplished; and

5.8. Write a personnel recovery lessons learned report for OSD distribution, and a personnel recovery after action report for DoD historical files.

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

7. This Instruction is effective immediately.

Douglas J. Feith
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Action Required
By:

Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office

Routing Sheet v.2
Directorate PRP

DATE: 09/25/2002

FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Personnel Recovery Response
Cell Meeting, 24 Sept 02

Tasker Number	SUSPENSE

Name	Action	Coord	Info	Comments
DASD / Director DPMO	3	(b)(6)	↓	270902
Special Assistant				
Deputy Director				
Chief of Staff	2	(b)(6)		300902
General Counsel				
Communications				
Legislative Affairs / CC				
Family Support				
Public Affairs				
Support				
Information Systems				
Acquisition				
Security / IS Security				
Document Management				
Resource Management				
Mil/Civ Personnel				
Budget/Financial		(b)(6)		
Policy		2		Shared drive: 2 Sept (b)(6) /memos/PRRC-sept02
Personnel Account Policy		(b)(6)		
Personnel Recovery Policy		1		
Research				
Research and Analysis				
Archival Research				
Joint Commission Support				

Comments:

~~SECRET~~

INFO MEMO

I-02/01629

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

SUBJECT: Information Activities Follow-Up (U)

(U) The following responds to your request for information:

- (U) C3I turned down a J39 request for \$5 million.
 - (U) Brig Gen Catton, DASD(C3I) Ms. Hauve, and I reviewed this issue on November 5. C3I is revisiting the project and we will get back to you November 13-14.
- (U) Foreign media reaction to the President's UN speech?
 - (U) As expected, speech was more favorably received in Europe and than in Middle East (Tab A).
- (U) Prepare a template/model for strategic Information Activities campaigns:
 - (U) The Information campaign template at Tab B, "Saddam Hussein's atrocities" is the same template used for "delegitimate Suicide Bombing" (Tab C). If this acceptable, we will convert the rest of our projects to this format.
- (U) Do we have ASD(PA)'s CD-ROM on Iraq? Has it been sent to SecDef counter parts?
 - (U) The CD-ROM set "Facts about Saddam Hussein & Iraq 2" is an on going project. Copies were provide to OSD(LA) for distribution to Congress. We have produced a print ou for your information.
- (U) Where are we on merging the NSC and General PACE chart on the IO structure? (b)(6) corrected his chart to indicate it applied to Iraq only. The other PCC (Strategic Communication was not on it because (b)(6) has left Iraq to the Regional Bureaus (NEA) (Tab D).

U) COORDINATION: None

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: (b)(2),(b)(6)

~~Classified when~~
~~separated from~~
~~classified information~~

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JULY 2, 2007



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

~~INFO MEMO~~
Action

EF 770 JUN 5 2002

file

EF-16321A
I-02/007885

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(2)) 06 JUN 2002

Subject: Comment on Iraq Information Strategy Paper (U)

- ~~(S)~~ You asked us to rewrite a section of General Downing's paper on Iraq Information Strategy (page 7 of Tab A).
- ~~(S)~~ We have removed the references to nodding of the head and "bowing" to international norms and rewritten the sentence to read "we should assure these audiences that international norms do constrain the use of US power..."

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memorandum next under.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As Stated.

Prepared by: (b)(2), (b)(6)

DASD (NESA) *[Signature]* 03 JUN 2002

PDASD _____

[Handwritten signature: Rodman]

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JULY 2, 2007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FA EF1960
CA



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JUN 25 21

ACTION MEMO

I-02/009460

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(2) [redacted])

SUBJECT: State Dept Proposal for Iraqi Working Groups

- The State Dept is seeking OSD chop on proposal letter entitled "Future of Iraq Project, Seeking Steering Group Approval for First Two Working Groups" (next under).
- The letter establishes requirements for establishing the Transitional Justice Working Group and the Public Outreach Development Group.
 - These are the first two of the proposed 15 Iraqi working groups chartered to develop the framework for a democratic Iraq, post Saddam.
- Recommend approval of line-in/line out additions suggested by NESA.

USDP Decision: Approve X 6/26/02 Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: (b)(2), (b)(6) [redacted]

DASD WJ [signature]

PDASD(ISA) [signature]

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

EF1969C
Guth

24 Jul 02

DASD(NESA) *[Signature]*

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: (b)(2), (b)(6)

SUBJ: Newhouse News Service Criticism of the War on Terrorism

- The Secretary has asked you to discuss a Newhouse News Service article with him (snowflake and article attached).
- The article contains a *pot pourri* of criticisms, most of which are simply off-the-wall. The main complaint is that we lack an overall strategy for the war on terrorism.
- While basically valueless, the article does point out the need for us to be more vocal in discussing the overall strategy of the war on terrorism.
- The article approvingly cites Zbigniew Brzezinski as saying that we must define the enemy (i.e., specify who the terrorists *are*) – “You can’t wage war on a technique.”
- This is fundamentally correct. The article neglects to note, however, that the Deputy’s recent speeches have done precisely this.
- The article claims that State’s \$75 million (!) effort to “lure Muslim students to visit the United States” is contradicted by “tough new restrictions on visitors from Muslim and Middle Eastern countries.”
- The article’s other complaints are basically silly:
- First, that we are buying F-22s, which won’t help in the war on terrorism.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- This implies that the Department of Defense should resemble soccer as played by six year olds – everyone runs after the ball, nobody plays their position.
- Second, that we have set a goal of toppling Saddam Hussein.
- The article claims the attempt will alienate Islamic and Arab states. It doesn't discuss what the effect on them of our success might be.
- Third, that speaking of "terrorism" in general can involve us in other countries' fights, e.g., Israel and India.
- However, to the extent that India and Israel are plagued by radical Islamic terrorism, it *is* the same fight.
- Finally, that we are taking a number of steps with respect to nuclear weapons that contradict our non-proliferation policies.
- It is unclear what effect these alleged steps would have on the countries of concern (i.e., state sponsors of terrorism that are developing WMD). In some cases – the development of earth-penetrating warheads – the steps could enable us to respond more effectively to proliferation activities.

Newhouse.com
June 19, 2002

Analysis

What's Missing In The War On Terrorism: An Overarching Strategy

By David Wood, Newhouse News Service

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. war on terrorism, after an explosive start in Afghanistan last fall, has dwindled to a few scattered military missions and dozens of unrelated and sometimes conflicting diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement initiatives.

Critics say the Bush administration needs to devise a powerful offensive plan to coordinate America's largely untapped energy and resources. Such a strategy would sort out goals and set priorities on everything from deploying Special Forces teams to coordinating intelligence data to balancing the competing needs of security and civil liberties at home.

"What seems to be lacking in American policy-making at this juncture is not the means to fight a war on terrorism, or the public support to do so, but the grim determination to sweep away the prewar clutter, to mobilize the strength of the nation and to see the thing through," said Robert Killebrew, a retired Army strategist and senior Pentagon consultant.

"Clearly, we're moving on a lot of fronts. What I don't see yet is the offensive strategy we need to win," Killebrew said.

Experts said the strategy must clearly define the enemy. And it must be built around a powerful vision of what victory would mean -- as well as what defeat would entail.

"Terrorism is a technique, a tactic. You can't wage war on a technique," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Carter's national security adviser from 1977 to 1980.

Winning this war, said Killebrew, "is being able to walk on an airplane without fear, to enter public buildings without being searched, to welcome immigrants to this country."

As is, much of the action in the war on terrorism seems uncoordinated and counterproductive. Consider:

-- Under a budget of \$350 billion for national defense, the Pentagon's contractors are churning out such breathtakingly expensive weapons as the \$204 million F-22 stealth fighter, designed during the Cold War for fighting vast fleets of high-tech enemy bogeys. Meanwhile, troops hunting real al-Qaida terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan wear broken-down boots and carry radios that don't work.

-- The State Department is launching a \$75 million effort to lure Muslim students to visit the United States, to foster greater understanding and to shrink the "swamp" of anti-American resentment from which terrorists might draw recruits. A major focus of this effort is to counter allegations that the United States is anti-Muslim.

Yet Attorney General John Ashcroft has announced tough new restrictions on visitors from Muslim and

Middle Eastern countries, including fingerprinting and photographing them at the border. And the United States is still holding an unknown number of Muslims in secluded detention, under suspicion of ties to terrorist organizations. Both actions have drawn angry protests from Arab students.

-- Along with reducing anti-American resentment, a major U.S. goal has been to keep nuclear weapons and nuclear material away from terrorists. Part of that effort has been to dissuade countries from obtaining or using nuclear weapons technology.

But some U.S. actions send the opposite message, critics say. The Bush administration has proposed building a new earth-penetrating nuclear warhead. U.S. policy now embraces the idea of nuclear pre-emptive strikes. And in its new treaty with Russia, the United States insisted on storing weapons rather than destroying them, as it has urged other nuclear states to do.

"All these decisions have a huge impact on nuclear stability out there in the world," said Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. With the United States itself vulnerable to nuclear attack, "We, especially, should not be talking about first use of nuclear weapons," he said.

-- While trying to enlist Islamic governments in the war on terrorism, for crucial help in supporting U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives and to crack down on terrorists in their own countries, U.S. officials have set as a strategic goal the toppling of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, by military means if necessary.

The idea has found little enthusiasm in the Islamic world and could cause even more trouble ahead.

An actual attack on Iraq, said Killebrew, "will enrage our allies and make it untenable for any state to be a pro-American Arab state, and that will set back our ultimate victory in the war on terrorism for generations."

White House officials did not return repeated phone calls asking for information on strategy or comment on the critics' points.

To be sure, President Bush and his top lieutenants have often articulated broad ideas on how to fight terrorism.

In the smoky, chaotic hours after Sept. 11's stunning attacks, Bush put into motion a simple and direct policy: Terrorists were to be pursued relentlessly and given no safe haven; those who harbored or tolerated terrorists were also the enemy. Those orders spawned a flurry of diplomatic, intelligence and military activity, including the destruction last fall of Afghanistan's Taliban government.

Bush's top national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, sums up the U.S. approach this way: "Power matters."

Speaking April 29 at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, Rice said the administration intended to use its full military, economic and diplomatic muscle to deny terrorists safe haven; to prevent them from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons; and to strike before terrorists can attack.

Such efforts must at the same time advance such American values as "democracy, human rights, equal justice, free speech, the rule of law, honest government, respect for women and children, and religious

tolerance," Rice said. "We seek not merely to leave the world safer but to leave it better."

One key failing of this approach, however, is that it only vaguely defines the enemy.

Brzezinski, at a forum May 29 sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, said that defining precisely who the terrorists are -- for example, as disaffected Islamic radicals who share a hatred of American culture -- would help define how the United States should wage its war.

That, in turn, would help set a U.S. priority either on attracting Muslim students here to study -- or keeping them out.

Simply designating the enemy as "terrorists," said Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H.W. Bush in 1989-92, can get the United States mixed up in conflicts on others' terms -- like Israeli action against Palestinian "terrorists" and Indian raids against Pakistani "terrorists."

"Whenever anybody has a local conflict, they can say, 'We're fighting your fight, United States -- terrorism!' And I think we have to be very careful about that," Scowcroft said.

Moreover, some of Bush's rhetoric about the war on terrorism, without being more fully explained by a detailed strategy, has had unintended consequences, some say.

Such blunt statements as "You're either with us or against us" have encouraged zealots in the tense confrontation between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India to "ratchet up the intensity," Brzezinski said.

The dark alternative to victory, Killebrew said, "is a world where no nation is able to enforce its laws. Where kidnapping and murder are common. Where we close our borders to the world and we have to decide what is an acceptable level of fear, how many dead Americans each year is tolerable.

"The American flag won't come down, but it will be a different country. We will lose our freedoms a little more every year, along with a constant toll of dead Americans."

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SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Overview

The Gulf war damaged Saddam Husayn's biological, chemical, ballistic missile, and nuclear weapons programs, collectively referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established by the Security Council and accepted by Iraq following the war to eliminate and verify the destruction of Iraq's biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumed responsibility for dismantling Iraq's nuclear program. Further, the UN established sanctions to prevent the purchase of equipment and materials needed to reconstitute Baghdad's WMD programs and inspections to find remaining elements of these programs and deter further research or production related to WMD.

On the basis of the last seven years' experience, the world's experts conclude that enough production components and data remain hidden and enough expertise has been retained or developed to enable Iraq to resume development and production of WMD. They believe Iraq maintains a small force of Scud-type missiles, a small stockpile of chemical and biological munitions, and the capability to quickly resurrect biological and chemical weapons production.

This conclusion is borne out by gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's WMD declarations, Iraq's continued obstruction of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring activities, Saddam's efforts to increase the number of "sensitive" locations exempt from inspection, and Saddam's efforts to end inspections entirely. Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests that Baghdad has hidden remnants of its WMD programs and is making every effort to preserve them. Baghdad has also enhanced indigenous capabilities and infrastructure to design and produce WMD. Saddam's strategy in dealing with UNSCOM is unchanged; he is actively trying to retain what remains of his WMD


programs while wearing down the will of the Security Council to maintain sanctions.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections and monitoring activities have severely curtailed Iraq's WMD programs, but even a small residual force of operational missiles armed with biological or chemical warhead would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and US military forces in the region. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to employ other delivery systems. Saddam has used such weapons for tactical military purposes against Iran and to suppress rebellious segments of his population in Kurdish-held areas.

Assessment of Cooperation With UNSCOM and the IAEA

Baghdad has a long history of obstructing UNSCOM inspections and has taken an increasingly hard line since March 1996 when the UN began inspecting security facilities suspected of concealing WMD-related documents and material. UNSCOM is targeting these facilities because Iraq admitted (after Husayn Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former head of Iraqi military industries, defected in August 1995) that security organizations were involved in concealing material from the UN:

- Resolution 687 demanded that Iraq provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programs 15 days after the Security Council enacted the resolution in 1991. Nearly seven years later, gaps and inconsistencies remain in each of Iraq's WMD declarations covering chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs.
- Baghdad has modified each declaration several times to accommodate data uncovered by UNSCOM and the IAEA and has provided new information only when confronted with direct evidence. For



150 boxes of documents presented to UNSCOM at a chicken farm in Iraq in August 1995.

example, Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times within 14 months of its initial submission in April 1991 and has formally submitted six different biological warfare declarations to date, each of which UNSCOM has rejected.

Baghdad has sought to constrain UNSCOM from inspecting numerous facilities since March 1996, mostly by declaring the sites "sensitive" and the inspections a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Iraq has applied the term "sensitive" to a variety of facilities—on one occasion security officials declared a road sensitive. Most consistently, Iraq has sought to limit UN access to Special Republican Guard garrisons that are responsible for executing the highest priorities of Saddam's inner circle:

- Iraq is trying to keep the whole WMD story out of reach. UNSCOM and the IAEA have detected Iraq officials removing documents and material from buildings and even burning documents to prevent them from being evaluated. Inspectors have routinely found high-interest facilities cleaned out after their entry was delayed for several hours.
- Baghdad is interested in debilitating UNSCOM's ability to monitor elements it has declared. Iraq disabled monitoring cameras and hid production equipment after expelling US inspectors from the country in November 1997.

- Iraqi officials have interfered with inspection operations. Iraqi escorts have endangered UN helicopter flights supporting inspections by harassing the pilot and grabbing the flight controls. Security guards have harassed inspectors on the ground.

Baghdad has tried to generate a public impression of cooperation while working hard to conceal essential information on the scope and capabilities of its WMD programs. It has allowed UNSCOM to monitor dormant WMD production facilities and has provided incomplete documentary evidence to support its claims. For example, Iraq dramatically disclosed nearly 700,000 pages of WMD-related documents following Husayn Kamil's defection. Sparse relevant information was buried within a massive volume of extraneous data, all of which was intended to create the appearance of candor and to overwhelm UNSCOM's analytic resources:

- For example, Iraq released detailed records of how many ballpoint pens it ordered in the late 1980s, but it has not provided records of how it procured biological precursors or supported claims that it destroyed missile warheads capable of delivering biological and chemical agents.
- UNSCOM and the IAEA have examined much of the documentary material and concluded that, despite advertisements to the contrary, Iraq did not release its most important WMD-related documents.

Biological Weapons

No concrete information on the scope of Iraq's biological warfare program was available until August 1995, when Iraq disclosed, after Husayn Kamil's defection, the existence of an offensive biological warfare (BW) capability. Iraqi officials admitted that they had produced the BW agents anthrax¹ (8,500 liters), botulinum toxin² (19,000 liters), and aflatoxin³ (2,200 liters)

¹ Inhalation of anthrax spores—an infectious dose is about 8,000 spores or less than one-millionth of a gram—is fatal within five to seven days nearly 100 percent of the time.



Remains of chemical/biological-warfare-agent-filled missile warheads secretly destroyed by Iraq.

after years of claiming that they had conducted only defensive research. Baghdad also admitted preparing BW-filled munitions—including 25 Scud missile warheads (five anthrax; 16 botulinum toxin; four aflatoxin), 157 aerial bombs, and aerial dispensers—during the Gulf war, although it did not use them. Iraq acknowledged researching the use of 155-mm artillery

² Botulinum toxin, which would most likely be dispensed as an aerosol, can kill in as little as 24 to 36 hours by paralyzing the respiratory muscles.

³ Aflatoxin is a liver carcinogen that can kill years after ingestion.



Destroyed chemical/biological-warfare-agent-filled R-400 aerial bombs.

shells, artillery rockets, a MiG-21 drone, and aerosol generators to deliver BW agents:

- UNSCOM has destroyed a range of BW production equipment, seed stocks, and growth media claimed by Iraq for use in its BW programs.
- UNSCOM believes Iraq has greatly understated its production of biological agents and could be holding back such agents, which are easily concealed.

Iraq resisted dismantling the Al Hakam BW production facility for nearly one year after disclosing in 1995 that it manufactured more than 500,000 liters of BW agents at the facility between 1989 and 1990.

UNSCOM finally pressed Iraq to destroy Al Hakam in the summer of 1996:

- Baghdad claimed that Al Hakam was a legitimate civilian facility designed to produce single-cell proteins and biopesticides.
- Al Hakam's remote location (55 km southwest of Baghdad) and the security involved in its construction suggest that Al Hakam was intended to be a BW production facility from the outset.

Baghdad has provided no hard evidence to support claims that it destroyed all of its BW agents and munitions in 1991. UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler stated that Iraq's most recent BW declaration, submitted in September 1997, "failed to give a remotely credible account of Iraq's biological weapons program":

- In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing of Ricin, but did not provide details on the amount produced. In early 1997, two years later, UNSCOM discovered documents that showed Iraq had produced the biological agent Ricin.⁴
- Iraq has the expertise to quickly resume a small-scale BW program at known facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as vaccines and other pharmaceuticals. Without effective UN monitoring Baghdad could probably begin production within a few days. For example, Iraq can convert production of biopesticides to anthrax simply by changing seed material.

Chemical Weapons

Iraq had an advanced chemical warfare (CW) capability that it used extensively against Iran and against its own Kurdish population during the 1980s. Iraqi force

⁴ Ricin can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 500 micrograms

Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Date	Area Used	Type	Approximate Casualties	Target Population
August 1983	Haji Umran	Mustard	fewer than 100	Iranians/Kurds
October to November 1983	Panjwin	Mustard	3,000	Iranians/Kurds
February to March 1984	Majnoon Island	Mustard	2,500	Iranians
March 1984	Al Basrah	Tabun	50 to 100	Iranians
March 1985	Hawizah Marsh	Mustard/Tabun	3,000	Iranians
February 1986	Al Faw	Mustard/Tabun	8,000 to 10,000	Iranians
December 1986	Umm ar Rasas	Mustard	reportedly in the thousands	Iranians
April 1987	Al Basrah	Mustard/Tabun	5,000	Iranians
October 1987	Sumar/Mehran	Mustard/nerve agents	3,000	Iranians
March 1988	Halabjah *	Mustard/nerve agents	reportedly in the hundreds	Iranians/Kurds

* Iran also used chemicals at Halabjah that may have caused some of the casualties.

While precise information is lacking, human rights organizations have received plausible accounts from Kurdish villagers of numerous Iraqi chemical attacks against civilian villages in the 1987 and 1988 time frames—with some attacks as late as October 1988—in areas close to both the Iranian and Turkish borders.

delivered chemical agents (including Mustard⁵ agent and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun⁶) in aerial bombs, aerial spray dispensers, 122-mm rockets, and several types of artillery, both for tactical military purposes and to terrorize rebellious segments of the population. Iraq maintained large stockpiles of chemical munitions and had a major production capacity.

UNSCOM supervised the destruction of more than 40,000 CW munitions (28,000 filled and 12,000 empty), 480,000 liters of CW agents, 1,800,000 liters of chemical precursors, and eight different types of delivery systems—including ballistic missile warheads—in the past seven years. Following Husayn Kamil's defection, Iraq disclosed that it:


- Produced larger amounts of the nerve agent VX⁷ than it previously admitted. Baghdad acknowledged, despite previous claims that it only conducted research, that it had conducted pilot production of about four tons of VX from 1988 to 1990.
- Researched in-flight mixing of binary CW weapons before the Gulf war—an advance in the development of a CW capability that extends the shelf life of chemical agents.
- Perfected techniques for the large-scale production of a VX precursor that is well suited to long-term storage.

UNSCOM believes Iraq continues to conceal a small stockpile of CW agents, munitions, and production

⁵ Mustard is a blister agent used primarily to cause medical casualties by blistering the eyes, lungs, and skin. It is extremely persistent and presents a long-term hazard.

⁶ Sarin and Tabun are G-series nerve agents that act within seconds of exposure and can be absorbed through the skin or respiratory tract. These agents kill by paralyzing the respiratory muscles. Both are relatively nonpersistent and present more of a vapor hazard than a skin hazard.

⁷ VX is a V-series nerve agent that is similar to—but more advanced than—G-series agents, in that it is far more persistent. VX presents a far greater skin hazard and would be used for long-term contamination of territory.



UNSCOM inspector in protective suit opening filling plug for sample-taking inside a Scud/Al-Husayn chemical-agent-filled missile warhead.

equipment. Baghdad has not supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. The destruction of as much as 200 metric tons of chemical precursors, 70 Scud warheads, and tens of thousands of smaller unfilled munitions has not been verified:

- Baghdad retains the expertise to quickly resume CW production. In the absence of UNSCOM inspectors, Iraq could restart limited mustard agent production within a few weeks, full-scale production of sarin within a few months, and pre-Gulf war production levels—including VX—within two or three years.
- Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt two facilities it once used to produce chemical agents and has the capability to shift smaller civilian facilities to CW production.

Ballistic Missiles

Iraq had an active missile force before the Gulf war that included 819 operational Scud-B missiles (300-km range) purchased from the former Soviet Union, an advanced program to extend the Scud's range and modify its warhead (for example, the Al-Husayn with a 650-km range and the Al Abbas with a 950-km range), and an extensive effort to reverse-engineer and indigenously produce complete Scud missiles. Iraq also had programs to indigenously produce long-range missiles (such as the Condor) that never entered the production phase:

- UNSCOM reports that it supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles, 10 mobile launchers,



Handling of leaking 122-mm rockets filled with the chemical nerve agent sarin prior to destruction.


30 chemical and 18 conventional warheads, and related equipment.

UNSCOM has verified Iraq's unilateral destruction of only 83 Scud-type missiles and nine mobile launchers. Iraq has tried to account for the remainder by claiming the missiles were destroyed by being fired in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars or used in static tests and training.

Discrepancies in Iraqi accounting suggest that Baghdad could still have a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of warheads and launchers. UNSCOM believes it has accounted for all but two of the original 819 Scud missiles imported from the former Soviet Union. Iraq has not adequately explained the disposition of important missile

components that it could not produce on its own and may have removed before destruction. There are still many gaps on the scope of Iraq's indigenous missile programs:

- Iraq may have pieced together a small inventory of missiles by integrating guidance and control systems it concealed with indigenously produced parts.
- Iraq admitted producing Scud engines, airframes, and warheads before the war, but UNSCOM has not verified claims that it destroyed all of these components.
- Baghdad probably continues to receive some parts through clandestine procurement networks. In 1995,



UNSCOM supervision of the destruction of Scud/Al-Husayn long-range missiles.


Jordan interdicted missile-guidance equipment (gyroscopes) bound for Iraq. Baghdad admitted under UNSCOM questioning that it received a similar shipment earlier in 1995.

- In November 1995, Iraq turned over a previously undeclared SS-21 short-range ballistic missile launcher it acquired from Yemen before the Gulf war, illustrating Iraq's ability to conceal major elements of missile systems from UNSCOM inspectors.

Baghdad has not given up its plans to build larger, longer range missiles. UNSCOM has uncovered numerous Iraqi design drawings, including multistage systems and clustered engine designs, that theoretically could reach Western Europe. Inspectors have uncovered evidence that Iraq has continued missile

research since the imposition of sanctions. If sanctions were lifted, Iraq could probably acquire enough material to resume full-scale production of Scud-type missiles, perhaps within one year:

- Iraq's Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missile programs—within the UN-allowed 150-km range limit—serve to maintain production expertise within the constraints of sanctions. Iraq has apparently flight-tested the Al-Samoud, which UNSCOM describes as a scaled down Scud, successfully. Iraq probably will begin converting these efforts into long-range missile programs as soon as sanctions are lifted.



Scud/Al-Husayn missile launchers before destruction.

- Iraq continues to expand a missile production facility at Ibn Al Haytham—currently used to support its authorized missile programs. Two new fabrication buildings at the facility are spacious enough to house the construction of large ballistic missiles.
- Baghdad's claim that the buildings at Ibn al Haytham are intended to be computer and administrative facilities is inconsistent with the facility's inherent size and capacity.

Nuclear Weapons

Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf war that was focused on building an implosion-type weapon. The program was

linked to a ballistic missile project that was the intended delivery system. After Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995, Iraq retreated from its longtime claim that its nuclear program was intended only to conduct research:

- Iraq admitted experimenting with seven uranium enrichment techniques and was most actively pursuing electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion.
- Baghdad planned to build a nuclear device in 1991 by using IAEA-safeguarded, highly enriched uranium from its Soviet-supplied reactors.



Calutrons for uranium enrichment secretly destroyed by Iraq.

UNSCOM and IAEA inspections have hindered Iraq's nuclear program, but Baghdad's interest in acquiring or developing nuclear weapons has not diminished:

- Iraq retains a large cadre of nuclear engineers, scientists, and technicians who are the foundation of its nuclear program. We have concerns that scientists may be pursuing theoretical nuclear research that would reduce the time required to produce a weapon should Iraq acquire sufficient fissile material.
- Iraq continues to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining external assistance and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to withhold documentation on the technical achievements of its nuclear program, experimentation data, and accounting.
- Baghdad has not fully explained the interaction between its nuclear program and its ballistic missile program.

The Husayn Kamil Connection



Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, was the preeminent military industries' official and a fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to Jordan in August 1995. A strict and capable manager, Kamil took charge of Iraq's efforts to develop its WMD program around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990, he oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the Al-Husayn missile—an indigenous modification of the Scud. During this time, it is possible that Kamil directed Iraq's testing of its chemical and biological weapons on Iranian prisoners of war:

- After the Gulf war, Kamil—first from his position as Minister of Defense and then as the director of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals and the Organization of Military Industrialization—led Iraq's efforts to conceal its WMD program from international inspectors.
- Husayn Kamil's influence over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program did not end with his defection in 1995. For instance, he is largely responsible for using Saddam's security services—of which he was a member in the early 1980s—to hide proscribed materials and documents from the United Nations.

Despite Kamil's influence, the Iraqi WMD program did not die with his defection and subsequent murder,

as Iraq claims it did. Qusay Husayn—Saddam's second son—has assumed many of the responsibilities for concealing the proscribed programs. In addition, many of the leading scientists in Iraq's WMD programs during Husayn Kamil's tenure are still associated with the regime:

- **Lt. Gen. Amir Hamud Sadi**—who serves officially as a presidential adviser and is a leading official in Iraqi relations with UNSCOM—was one of the principal engineers in the WMD program and essentially served as Husayn Kamil's deputy. With a doctorate in chemical engineering, Sadi has dedicated his entire career to conventional and nonconventional weapons development. In 1987, Sadi received rare public praise from Saddam for his role in the development of the Al-Husayn missile.
- **Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur**—currently Minister of Culture and Information—is Iraq's leading nuclear official and the former head of its nuclear program. Abd al-Ghafur also was a close associate of Husayn Kamil, and he occasionally serves as an interlocutor with the IAEA. He led an Iraqi delegation to the IAEA annual conference in October 1997.
- **Jafar Dia Jafar** is perhaps Iraq's foremost nuclear scientist and served as Abd al-Ghafur's deputy in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization. Jafar now officially serves as a presidential adviser, but his position—unlike that of Sadi—appears to be largely nominal.
- **Dr. Rihab Taha** is the leading official in charge of Iraq's biological weapons program. She has overseen Iraqi efforts to develop anthrax and botulinum toxin and directed testing on animal subjects. Taha is also politically well-connected—she is married to the Minister of Oil, Amir Rashid Ubaydi, who helps direct Iraqi relations with UNSCOM.

Appendix A

Iraqi Biological Warfare Program

BW Agent Production Amounts^a

BW Agent (Organism)	Declared Concentrated Amounts	Declared Total Amounts	Comments
Anthrax (<i>Bacillus anthracis</i>)	8,500 liters (2,245 gallons)	85,000 liters (22,457 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually three to four times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm.
Botulinum toxin (<i>Clostridium botulinum</i>)	19,400 liters (10x and 20x concentrated) (5,125 gallons)	380,000 liters (100,396 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were actually two times more than the declared amounts, but is unable to confirm.
Gas Gangrene (<i>Clostridium perfringens</i>)	340 liters (90 gallons)	3,400 liters (900 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm.
Aflatoxin (<i>Aspergillus flavus</i> and <i>Aspergillus parasiticus</i>)	N/A	2,200 liters (581 gallons)	Production amounts and time frame of production claimed by Iraq do not correlate.
Ricin (Castor Bean plant)	N/A	10 liters (2.7 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm.

BW-Filled and Deployed Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Anthrax	Botulinum Toxin	Aflatoxin	Comments
Missile warheads Al-Husayn (modified Scud B)	5	16	4	UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral destruction of these 25 warheads due to conflicting accounts provided by Iraq.
R-400 aerial bombs	50	100	7	Iraq claimed unilateral destruction of 157 bombs, but UNSCOM is unable to confirm this number. UNSCOM has found the remains of at least 23.
Aircraft aerosol spray tanks F-1 Mirage modified fuel drop tank	4			Iraq claims to have produced four, but may have manufactured others.

BW Agent Growth Media^b

Media	Quantity Imported	Unaccounted For Amounts
BW Agent Growth Media	31,000 kg (68,200 lbs)	3,500 kg (7,700 lbs)

^a *Total* refers to amount of material obtained from the production process, while *concentrated* refers to the amount of concentrated agent obtained after final filtration/purification. The *concentrated* number is the amount used to fill munitions.

^b *Media* refers to the substance used to provide nutrients for the growth and multiplication of micro-organisms.

Appendix B

Iraqi Chemical Warfare Program

CW Agent Stockpiles

CW Agent	Chemical Agents Declared by Iraq	Potential CW Agents Based on Unaccounted Precursors ^a	Comments
VX	at least 4 metric tons	200 metric tons	Iraq denied producing VX until Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995.
G-Agents (Sarin)	100 to 150 metric tons	200 metric tons	Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.
Mustard	500 to 600 metric tons	200 metric tons	Figures include both weaponized and bulk agents.

CW Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Estimated Numbers Before the Gulf War	Munitions Unaccounted For ^b	Comments
Missile Warheads -Al Husayn (modified Scud B)	75 to 100	45 to 70	UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 30 warheads.
Rockets	100,000	15,000 to 25,000	UNSCOM supervised the destruction of nearly 40,000 chemical munitions (including rockets, artillery, and aerial bombs) 28,000 of which were filled.
Aerial Bombs	16,000	2,000	
Artillery Shells	30,000	15,000	
Aerial Spray Tanks	unknown	unknown	

^aThese estimates are very rough. They are derived from reports provided by UNSCOM to the Security Council and to UNSCOM plenary meetings. Gaps in Iraqi disclosures strongly suggest that Baghdad is concealing chemical munitions and precursors. Iraq may also retain a small stockpile of filled munitions. Baghdad has the capability to quickly resume CW production at known dual-use facilities that currently produce legitimate items, such as pharmaceuticals and pesticides. UNSCOM has supervised the destruction of some 45 different types of CW precursors (1,800,000 liters of liquid and 1,000,000 kilograms of solid).

^bAll of these munitions could be used to deliver CW or BW agents. The numbers for missile warheads include 25 that Iraq claims to have unilaterally destroyed after having filled them with biological agents during the Gulf war. UNSCOM has been unable to verify the destruction of these warheads.

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

INFO MEMO

file

I-02/010419

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ISA
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASD/ISA

file
16 JUL 2002

FROM: Deputy Director, ISA/NESA,

(b)(2), (b)(6)

7/1
fax
D

SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition Military Conference Meeting on 12 July 2002

- This memo reports on the opening session of the conference for Iraqi oppositionist military officers held in London on 12 July, a conference that was organized and financed by Iraqis.
- There were three representatives from the US government: myself, (b)(6) (Special Advisor to the VP) and (b)(6) (Political Officer from Amembassy London). (b)(6) also attended, but was not with the USG party.
- The meeting was held at the Kensington Town Hall (like a community center). One press report said the meeting was at a posh hotel--untrue.
- We estimated 200-300 people in attendance, not including 40-50 members of the press. Amembassy London cable (next under) reports that there were 68 actual Iraqi military officers.
- The three-hour meeting was conducted primarily in Arabic with periodic summations in English. It consisted of presentations of papers on the role of the military in the Iraqi opposition and in post-Saddam Iraq (see attached program).
- Predominant theme was the vision of a federal, constitutional, pluralistic, WMD-free Iraq with a professional, high quality military subordinate to civil authority.
- Speakers also addressed the need for U.S. and international support in the liberation of Iraq, but stressed there were key roles for the Iraqi military in exile.
- The highlight (and center of press attention) was the attendance of ^{former} Crown Prince Hassan (Jordan) who spoke to the group in a personal capacity and wished the oppositionists well.

-
- The attached State cable provides additional details of the conference including the follow-on meeting to which no Americans were invited.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by:

(b)(2), (b)(6)



~~SECRET~~
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

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file

INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

I-02/010455

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(2) [redacted]) *jm* 19 JUL 2002

SUBJECT: Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) Training Status


- The training of 20 Iraqi opposition personnel under the ILA is threatened with stoppage because of a lack of funds to pay the per diem and other non-draw-down expenses of the students.
 - In the past these expenses had been paid by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) out of ESF grant funds which the INC accepted from State Department.
 - The most recent ESF grant ran out on May 31 and the INC refuses to sign for a new grant.
- The INC is asking students to proceed at their own expense and plans to pay them back when the ESF grant is signed. However, some students may be unable or unwilling to incur these up-front costs.
- The reason for the INC's refusal to sign for the grant funds is the State Department's decision to cease funding the (b)(1) [redacted]
- State's resistance to continuing this program is supported by the Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittees in both the Senate and House.

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more info.

(b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~



COORDINATION: Next under.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: 

DASD W. J. Luti 7/19 PDASD (ISA) WJ

~~SECRET~~

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[Handwritten initials]



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

INFO MEMO

CHRIS LAMB

POLICY

I-02/010941-R&P to
July 25, 2002 Fra
not
ch.
or

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans

SUBJECT: Timelines for [redacted] Plans

[Handwritten notes: By, Thi, mor, mt, W, Tra]

- J-7 released a message (TAB A) on Tuesday laying out the submission timelines for the [redacted] plans required by the Contingency Planning Guidance.
- Message also identifies windows for combatant commanders' initial in-progress reviews with the Secretary.
- R&P will work the specifics with the command and the Secretary's scheduler.
- IPR and submission dates are staggered for management purposes, both to facilitate their review and ensure access to scarce planning resources/assets.
- Message meets the spirit and intent of both the CPG and the Secretary's implementing letter released on 1 July.
 - Strategic Concepts submitted within 6 months of CPG's publication.
 - Gross-transportation-feasible plans submitted within 6 months of strategic concepts' approval.
 - Secretary reviews progress with combatant commander every month or two.
- CENTCOM Commander, GEN Franks, asked for relief from this requirement in a letter dated 18 July (TAB B). Action ongoing; Secretary has not yet responded.
- TAB C summarizes the IPR and submission dates in a single matrix.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:
As stated

[redacted] (b)(2), (b)(6)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MEMO

13 November 2002

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict *For M.C. [Signature]*

SUBJECT: Journalist Interview - Saddam's Endangerment of Iraqi Civilians ~~(S/NF)~~

~~(S/NF)~~ Previously, we provided you with an action memo regarding Saddam's use of civilians and civilian facilities as shields for military equipment and units. (Copy provided.)

~~(C)~~ You indicated that you wanted to proceed on the basis of historical evidence, lacking compelling current information to make the case.

~~(S/NF)~~ Attached are talking points to be used in an interview with a selected journalist. The journalist would require a one-time read on in order to see the classified photos that make the case for the talking points.

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: (b)(2),(b)(6)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~Classified by: DA [unclear]~~
~~Reason: 1.5 (d)~~
~~Declassify on: 11/~~

*USDP -
would raise at
CapCom.
11/14
VIR C [Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD
POLICY DRT
DATE: JULY 5, 2007

ACTION MEMO

I-02/013481

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

SUBJECT: Info Campaign Regarding Saddam's Use of Civilian Facilities to Shield
Military Units and Equipment ~~(S/NF)~~

~~(S)~~ Recent intelligence reporting (Tab) regarding the location of military equipment
next to civilian institutions should not be misconstrued.

- Saddam has a history of placing military equipment next to mosques, schools, hospitals, hotels/markets, as well as historic cultural and religious sites during periods of perceived threat.
- All indications are that Saddam will continue these actions when he perceives a near term threat, but few recent examples of photographic evidence are available; photo interpreters report no current examples.

~~(S/NF)~~ We have begun to assemble what is available to make the case:

- A Standing Intelligence Collection Report to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was initiated, as was a request for immediate copies of related photos; and the Joint Staff tasked EUCOM to look at photo activity in the northern Iraq no-fly zone.
- New photographic evidence will be provided prior to declassification in order to determine usefulness; note: current policy requires overhead photography to be run through a "fuzzing" algorithm prior to declassified release.
- ~~Clear satellite photography that has not been declassified can be shown to individuals on a one-time use approval, but not released to them.~~
- Clear aircraft photography, e.g., gun camera footage, can also be used to make this point since it often does not require "fuzzing" prior to

declassification in order to protect collection means. A search for the best examples to make the case is underway.

~~(C)~~ At this juncture, the story is that Saddam did this in 1990/91; he's done it since, whenever he feels threatened; we can expect he'll do it again as we get closer to forcing his hand.

~~(S/NF)~~ The shielding issue can be used as part of a larger on-going information campaign directed against Saddam.

~~(S/NF)~~ RECOMMENDATION: That USDP authorize inclusion of this subject matter in the larger information campaign.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Attachments:
As Stated

Prepared by: (b)(2),(b)(6)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~(Unclassified when separated from attachments)~~

TALKING POINTS

SUBJECT: Saddam's Use of Civilians and Civilian Facilities as Shields

Saddam's use of civilians as shields was covered extensively by the world press when he used civilians, whom he had ordered detained, as "human shields" during Operation DESERT SHIELD.

- One of CNN's many reports about Saddam's behavior during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM depicted his habit of surrounding himself with children whenever possible, while in public.
- Saddam's habit of constant moves – at times, even several during each night - has been widely reported in the world press.

Following condemnation by most of the world, Saddam released the "human shields," but continued variations of the practice of shielding in other forms, mostly unreported by the media:

- placing military equipment close to mosques, schools, hospitals, hotels/markets, as well as close to historic cultural and religious sites during periods of perceived threat.
- moving military equipment wherever possible, and parking the equipment near civilian facilities and population centers whenever it stops during the day or overnight.

Examples:

- Photos from Operation DESERT STORM/SHIELD depict the placement of MiGs near an historic Mesopotamian archeological site (Tab A). Other historic sites have had military equipment or units reported near them.
- Saddam dispersed FROG-7 rocket forces from garrisons into historic and civilian areas (Tab B). These sites include historic cemeteries, which often provide trees and other vegetative concealment.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~(Unclassified when separated from attachments)~~

~~Classified by: PDASD-SO/LIC~~

~~Reason: 1.5 (d)~~

~~Declassify on: 11/14/12~~

111

EF-363:

HC

~~SECRET~~

INFO MEMO

I-02/017592

DEC 6 2002

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

12/6/02

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

M. Billingslea

SUBJECT: Iraq PSYOP Update (U)

(U) The attached is a weekly Iraq PSYOP Update, prepared by the Joint Staff.

Attachment: As Stated

Prepared by: (b)(2),(b)(6)

Doug

This reflects some of the collaboration ongoing between us and the Joint Staff in PSYOP. We are getting much more effective. You will see (high) the satellite notices that SO/LIC is arranging to employ in Iraq, and the #2.3 in that I asked USSOC to spend on radios for Afghanistan (they agreed). Not on here is the deal I struck w/ BBG to rebroadcast

~~SECRET~~

EF37/69

I# - 02/017964 SO

DEC 18 2002

INFO MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense For Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Marshall Billingslea
12/18/02

Don - Joe Collins is lead for the Humanitarian planners manage deconflict ensure we strike 1 enter conflict
MF

SUBJECT: Iraq Humanitarian Contingency Planning Trip Report (C)

- (S) (b)(6) represents Policy on an interagency Humanitarian Planning Team, a sub-group of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction PCC. This team developed a Humanitarian Relief Plan for Iraq (Tab A - approved by Deputies on 12 DEC), and recently traveled to (b)(1) for outreach efforts on this topic.
- (S) (b)(1) - Briefed key CENTCOM planners and General Franks on state of interagency planning. General Franks was very pleased with the Humanitarian Relief Plan and relieved to hear of the advanced state of interagency planning.
- (S) (b)(1) - Briefed key CFLCC planners and CFLCC Commander, Lt. General McKiernan. CFLCC Commander was very relieved to hear of interagency commitments and planning. CFLCC is preparing to stand up a Humanitarian Operations Center in conjunction with the (b)(1) and is eager for interagency participation.
- The team also had separate briefings with US Ambassador to (b)(1) National Security Minister, Assistant to Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- (b)(1) officials relayed concerns re potential for large numbers of refugees moving toward (b)(1) will not open its border, but is willing to facilitate UN cross-border operations and partner with USG in a Humanitarian Operations Center in (b)(1)
- (C) (b)(1) - Dialogue with key UN agencies and ICRC re humanitarian contingency planning for Iraq.

Prepared by: (b)(2), (b)(6)

- next page

~~SECRET~~

- US Ambassador to UN Mission – Very pleased with state of interagency planning; he is certain the visit will help spur UN to action and be taken as a signal of USG resolve on Iraq.
- UN Agencies – All expect to withdraw (at least temporarily) in event of hostilities; all expect some kind of advance warning by USG; all are very concerned about potential for WMD use; all need to accelerate their planning, preparation, and funding requests.
- World Food Program – Most advanced of UN agencies in planning/preparation. Anticipates up to 9.6 million ‘vulnerables’. Uncertain how to handle potential disruption of ration distribution component of Oil-For-Food system.
- UNHCR – Slow in planning because senior UN leadership is reluctant to ‘endorse’ Iraq contingency planning. Anticipating up to 1.3M refugees (crossing or stopped at borders); only (b)(1) are likely to open borders. Estimates of refugees and IDPs now line up with USG estimates.
- UNOCHA – Nominally responsible for coordinating UN preparations, but not empowered and hindered by interagency squabbling. Expecting appointment of UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator. UN may establish coordination center at (b)(1) urged to consider (b)(1) (Humanitarian Operations Center) and at least send liaison to (b)(1).
- ICRC – Preparations/planning well advanced compared to UN. Current active presence in Iraq, with plans to increase (no evacuation) in event of hostilities. Seeking special line of communication with DOD/CENTCOM due to historic impartial mandate on humanitarian and POW issues. Expects to be ready to assist up to 100k displaced persons by Day 1 of hostilities.
- Note: In a separate mission, DASD Collins recently met at OEOB with UN Deputy Secretary General Frechette. UN planning may be more substantial than they have let on. USG and UN have exchanged initial “humanitarian mapping” data for Iraq. Stability Operations is preparing a more definitive “humanitarian mapping” effort.

Attachment: As stated

2

~~SECRET~~

EF 4003 CA

He (115)

INFO MEMO

I-03/000741

JAN 22 2003

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

MB 1/22/03

SUBJECT: Update on CENTCOM PSYOP in Iraq (U)

(U) The attached PSYOP update reports that:

- (U) CENTCOM continues to drop leaflets into Iraq advertising Commando Solo and ground-based radio frequencies, and to encourage listenership.
- ~~(S)~~ CENTCOM continues to broadcast radio scripts and drop leaflet messages to deter Iraqi use of WMD. To date, CENTCOM has broadcast 195 hours and dropped four million leaflets.

(b)(1)

- ~~(S)~~ SOLIC and the Joint Staff are coordinating military information activities with the UK, State Department, and the NSC staff.

(U) COORDINATION: Joint Staff DDIO

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared by:

(b)(2), (b)(6)

~~Classified by: Norton A. Schwartz, LtGen, J-3~~
~~Reason: 1.5.(a)~~
~~Declassify on: 3 Jan 2013~~

JAN 23 2003/1441

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

I-03/001042

INFO MEMO

EF-46
Q
To Number 1
not in scope
21
HC

NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: J.D. Croucher, ASD for International Security Policy JAN 30 2003

SUBJECT: Iraqi War Crimes Trials and the International Criminal Court (ICC)

- ~~(C)~~ At a recent staff meeting, you expressed concern over the possibility that Iraqi officials could be tried for war crimes and other offenses in the ICC rather than in a preferred venue such as a special tribunal.
- ~~(C)~~ This possibility is already being considered in ^{(b)(6)} planning efforts, which have identified eventualities in which the ICC could become an issue, such as Iraqi accession to the ICC (in the expectation of greater leniency or less efficient prosecution) or Allied pressure for ICC jurisdiction.
- (U) The prospects for ICC jurisdiction are already limited to some extent. Claimed ICC jurisdiction applies only to acts committed after 1 July 2002, and only to acts committed on the territory of an ICC party. (Iraq is neither a party nor signatory.)
- (U) However, even if Iraqi actions since 1 July 2002 have not so far constituted crimes under ICC jurisdiction, such acts may yet be committed, and could be committed in or against other states. (Of Iraq's immediate neighbors, however, only Jordan is an ICC party.)
- ~~(C)~~ An interagency working group chaired by Amb Prosper (on which ^{(b)(6)} office represents OSD) is developing recommendations for Deputies on Iraqi war crimes trials. Mark Esper will work with ^{(b)(6)} to ensure that the ICC issue is appropriately addressed as U.S. planning on war crimes trials proceeds.

COORDINATION: ^{(b)(6)} 26 Jan 03

Approved by: Mark Esper, ^{(b)(2)} DASD/Negotiations Policy, 27 Jan 03

Prepared by: ^{(b)(2),(b)(6)} 24 Jan 03

CC Sou
^{(b)(6)}
Loti

~~Classified by: Multiple Sources~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD
POLICY DRT
DATE: JULY 5, 2007

~~SECRET~~

EF-4197

MS FEB 12 2003
PDASD SO/LIC
I#03/001771-SO

INFO MEMO

→ Joel 




Thanks.
DJF

Joseph Collins 2/12

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

SUBJECT: Iraq Humanitarian Contingency Planning Trip Report ~~(C)~~

- ~~(C)~~  represents OSD Policy on an interagency Humanitarian Planning Team, a sub-group of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction PCC. This team developed the Humanitarian Relief Plan for Iraq (approved by Principals and briefed to the President) and recently traveled to the region to ensure that the plan is being implemented.
- ~~(S)~~  - Our trip successfully 'broke the ice' on humanitarian planning and coordination (delayed by political sensitivities) and will lead to accelerated efforts in these areas.
 - The team secured agreement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  General Staff for accelerated humanitarian planning/coordination.
 - The US Embassy will support this initially in  leading to further efforts in the field, including a possible Humanitarian Operations Center in .
 -  are planning to establish a military/refugee 'buffer zone' in northern Iraq to .
- ~~(C)~~  -- Humanitarian planning/coordination is well-advanced. A well-resourced Humanitarian Operations Center should open officially this week.
- ~~(S)~~  - Met with Deputy CENTCOM Commander, LTG John Abizaid. He is pleased with progress on interagency approach to humanitarian preparations and recognizes need for accelerated efforts in  He also recognizes need for more attention to 'stability operations/rear-area security'—lawlessness, ethnic reprisals.

~~SECRET~~

- ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) -- As in (b)(1) humanitarian planning/coordination has been hampered by political sensitivities, including a particular sensitivity to US military presence.
 - (b)(1) is a significant hub for UN/international/non-governmental humanitarian presence and capability.
 - (b)(1) is using its Crisis Management Center for humanitarian contingency planning and has made progress in refugee preparations.
 - Progress was made on establishing a (b)(1) Humanitarian Operations Center (H.O.C.), linked to the main H.O.C. in (b)(1) to coordinate and deconflict humanitarian assistance.
 - (b)(1) are concerned about refugee flows and possible (b)(1)
- ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) -- The Humanitarian Planning Team held very detailed, substantive discussions with senior World Food Program planners regarding restart of the Oil For Food (OFF) ration distribution system and with senior UN (b)(1) planners on general relief issues.
 - We achieved an unprecedented level of cooperation (b)(1) with World Food Program/UN agencies (b)(1) to be followed up by detailed logistics deconfliction meetings at the tactical level.
 - A common theme echoed at these meetings and around the region by UN agencies and other relief organizations is the need for funding. State is working a funding package to help UN agencies move quickly.
- ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) EUCOM -- CENTCOM, Joint Staff, and OSD reps traveled to EUCOM to brief J5 on relief plans and to facilitate coordination/deconfliction of DoD efforts in (b)(1) N. Iraq.
 - This was a very productive effort, promoting EUCOM synchronization with national-level humanitarian planning and a road map for EUCOM/CENTCOM cooperation in (b)(1)

Prepared by: (b)(2),(b)(6)

11 FEB

~~SECRET~~

J
MS

PDASD SO/LIC
I#03/001888-SO

INFO MEMO

FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

Joseph Collins 2/12

SUBJECT: Stability Operations Update on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Issues (C)

~~(C)~~ **Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Policy Coordination Committee:** DASD Stability Operations represents USD(P) on this NSC-chaired PCC which coordinates Iraq relief and reconstruction planning.

~~(C)~~ **Humanitarian Planning Team:** [redacted] is Policy representative on this team, which developed the Relief Plan for Iraq (approved by Principals and briefed to the President). The Team has made two trips to the region to oversee implementation.

~~(S)~~ **Humanitarian Mapping:** We have the lead for this integrated effort to collect 'no-strike' humanitarian and cultural information. To date, hundreds of diplomatic, humanitarian, and cultural sites (including 114 UN and 29 ICRC) have been incorporated into the [redacted] Ongoing refinements include provision of select imagery to US Embassy Amman for ICRC reps from Baghdad to identify definitively ICRC facilities.

~~(C)~~ **Humanitarian Daily Rations:** Stability Operations and DSCA have provided for the repositioning of 1.89M HDRs in [redacted] with 1M enroute to Germany for potential movement to [redacted]

~~(C)~~ **Integrated Interagency Relief Planning:** Stability Operations, through the Iraq PCC, has brought State and USAID, with their expertise and resources, into relief planning. State/USAID will deploy a fifty-person Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) based in [redacted] with field offices in [redacted] for early entry into Iraq under CENTCOM security umbrella. Stability Operations has overseen coordination of an MOU to this effect.

~~(C)~~ **Humanitarian Coordination:** We are working with State and USAID to coordinate relief planning within USG, and also with UN/ICRC/NGOs. This includes the establishment of a Humanitarian Operations Center in [redacted] in partnership with the [redacted] The H.O.C. will be a forum for coordination and information-

~~SECRET~~

sharing on relief issues; it is expected to open formally within the week. Similar centers are planned for (b)(1) [redacted]. We are working with CENTCOM to organize logistics deconfliction meetings with UN/ICRC to resolve lingering issues.

~~(C)~~ **Oil-For-Food Ration Distribution System:** We are working with State/USAID and World Food Program to restart the ration distribution system, and recently spearheaded a USG interagency operational planning meeting in (b)(1) [redacted] on this issue.

~~(C)~~ **Humanitarian Mine Action:** Stability Operations is working with State PM on initiatives to provide mine awareness training to NGOs planning to operate in Iraq and to staff the Humanitarian Operations Center with a humanitarian mine action expert.

~~(C)~~ **Reconstruction/Post-War Planning:** Stability Operations is working with and supporting General Garner's efforts. When the Post-War Planning Office deploys, we will be their entryway back into the Pentagon and Interagency.

(U) Briefings: An Interagency team, including DASD Stability Operations, briefed House Appropriations staff on post-conflict planning for Iraq on Monday, 3 Feb and Senate staffers on Friday, 7 Feb.

~~(S)~~ **Way Ahead:**

- Continue leadership role in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction PCC and Humanitarian Planning Team.
- Humanitarian Public Information Strategy – work with PCC to publicize our humanitarian relief and reconstruction planning and preparations.
- Refine Civil-Military Operations/Humanitarian planning for (b)(1) [redacted] to include Humanitarian Operations Center.
- Refine Civil-Military Operations/Humanitarian planning for (b)(1) [redacted] to include Humanitarian Operations Center.
- Work with PCC to deconflict border issues relative to humanitarian relief efforts.
- Continue support to Post-War Planning Office.
- DASD Collins and Asst. Sec. Dewey (State/PRM) will travel to the region early March to make final checks on arrangements.

Prepared by: (b)(2), (b)(6) [redacted]

11 FEB

~~Classified by: DASD Stab One~~

~~SECRET~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

EF-4299

Q

I-03/002210-IA

ACTION MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

MB

FEB 2

SUBJECT: Proposed Leaflets for Iraq (~~FOUO~~)

- (~~FOUO~~) Attached are 17 leaflets we propose to send to US Central Command via the Joint Staff. Each leaflet addresses specific themes we want disseminated to Iraqi targets. Additional designs will be forthcoming periodically for your approval.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve prototypes for leaflet use.

2/25/0

Approved _____ Disapproved _____

Attachments:
As Stated.

Prepared by: (b)(2), (b)(6)

→ MB
 These look very interesting. The key is how Iraqis react to them. We need to run them by folk like (b)(6) and discuss w/ me how this fast. Good work

Doug -

We have been sort of underwhelmed by the quality of the leaflets dropped over Iraq. Some good ones. Most of them are boring. SS will push these w/ CENTCOM as "food for thought" and "why not use these?" ideas, if you

I have additional ones coming to you for review. If you approve, we will then send forward.

MB



SADDAM
HIMSELF IS A
WEAPON OF
MASS
DESTRUCTION


WARNING -- ALL IRAQI
MILITARY OFFICERS
AND SCIENTISTS
SHOULD DISOBEY
ORDERS TO USE BIO-
CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
OR YOU COULD BE
CHARGED WITH WAR
CRIMES.

REWARD FOR
INFORMATION -- GIVE
ALL DATA ON IRAQI
WMD PROGRAMS TO
LIBERATION FORCES
AS SOON AS YOU CAN.

SADDAM WANTS YOU AND
YOUR FAMILIES TO DIE TO
SAVE HIS NECK, HIS POWER,
AND HIS WEALTH.

THE LIBERATION FORCES
WANT YOU AND YOUR
FAMILIES TO LIVE TO ENJOY
A FREE, ECONOMICALLY
STABLE COUNTRY THAT IS
WELCOME BACK INTO THE
COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

RESIST SADDAM. YOU
SHOULD NOT HAVE TO DIE
SO THAT HE CAN LIVE.





SENIOR IRAQI
MILITARY
OFFICERS AND
SCIENTISTS :
WE KNOW
SADDAM HAS
BIOLOGICAL AND
CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. YOU
SHOULD NOT
HELP HIM USE
THESE ILLEGAL
WEAPONS OR
ELSE YOU MAY BE
CHARGED WITH
WAR CRIMES. BE
SMART. DO NOT
HELP SADDAM.


ANY FOOL CAN
SEE I'M NOT
HIDING
ANY WEAPONS.



IRAQI SOLDIERS AND IRAQI PEOPLE.
DO NOT DIE FOR SADDAM. GOD HAS
GIVEN YOU A CHOICE. DO NOT
RESIST THE LIBERATION FORCES
AND YOU WILL NOT BE HARMED. DO
NOT FIGHT FOR SADDAM, AND YOU
WILL NOT DIE. MORE THAN ONE
MILLION MUSLIMS HAVE DIED
BECAUSE OF SADDAM. ENOUGH!




IRAQI SOLDIERS -- You must disobey Saddam's orders to use chemical and biological weapons. The long-term effects on your own families and your own environment will eventually kill Iraqis or cause them lives of pain. Saddam does not care what happens to you or your families. Only you can save them.



Don't let the "explosive Saddam" injure you this time. Since Saddam came to power, he started a war with Iran, attacked the Kurds, invaded Kuwait, murdered his own family members, and cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.

Liberation from Saddam is coming soon. Do not help Saddam and do not resist the Coalition forces. You do not have to die for this man. His time is at an end.



Don't be a "Human Shield" for Saddam.

For Saddam, ordinary citizens are only tools to maintain his power and his safety. When the war of Liberation begins, do everything in your power not to be trapped into protecting Saddam's military targets. Iraqi soldiers and civilians should cooperate to protect lives from Saddam. You can do it.

IRAQI MILITARY-
TAKE NOTICE!!

THE WEST DOES
NOT NEED IRAQI
OIL TO SURVIVE
ECONOMICALLY,
BUT IRAQ DOES.

WHEN THE
LIBERATION
BEGINS, DISOBEY
SADDAM'S
ORDERS TO
BURN YOUR OIL
WELLS. THEY
ARE THE FUTURE
FOR YOUR
FAMILIES





IN 1991, U.S. &
COALITION FORCES
LIBERATED KUWAIT
FROM SADDAM.

NOW THEY ARE
RETURNING TO
LIBERATE IRAQ
FROM THIS SAME
TYRANT

THE WAR IS NOT
AGAINST THE IRAQI
PEOPLE. IT IS FOR
THEIR LIBERTION
DO NOT SUPPORT
SADDAM



IRAQI PEOPLE TO BE LIBERATED FROM SADDAM

In 1991, Coalition Armies, including many Arab and Muslim countries, joined forces to liberate Kuwait from Saddam's unprovoked invasion. The Coalition did not occupy Iraq, but instead negotiated a "Cease Fire" to give Saddam the opportunity to disarm and follow a path of peace. Saddam lied, and now he expects the Iraqi people to once again spill their blood for his treachery.

The Liberation Force coming to Iraq is not the enemy of the Iraqi people. It is their salvation.

Do not fight or oppose the Liberation Armies and you will be safe.



**SOLDIERS
AND
ENGINEERS**

**DO NOT
POLLUTE
YOUR OWN
WATER**

ATTENTION IRAQI ARMY PERSONNEL AND ENGINEERS

Your Arab neighbors and nations of the world ask you to respect your own environment, and disobey all attempts by Saddam to pollute Iraq's rivers, reservoirs, and waterways. Those rivers were Iraq's key to life since civilization there first began.

To pollute those waterways, and the Gulf, as Saddam did in 1991, would not only be an international crime that will be punished, but it would be suicide for the Iraqi nation and millions of Iraqi families.


Disobey Saddam -- Do not pollute your own waterways.

LIBERATE IRAQ

A MESSAGE TO
IRAQI PEOPLE

FROM
LIBERATED
KUWAITI
PEOPLE --

DO NOT BE
AFRAID OF
FREEDOM



IRAQI PEOPLE

TAKE A GOOD LOOK AT THESE SMILES! These happy faces were recorded in the first hour of "Liberation Day" when Coalition Forces entered Kuwait City in 1991 and freed the Kuwaiti people from Saddam's tyranny. Do not resist the Liberation forces that are coming to free Iraq, and these smiles can soon be on your faces.



**IRAQI PEOPLE -- TAKE HEART FROM THE JOY
OF A YOUNG KUWAITI IN 1991**

**LIBERATION FROM SADDAM is not something to
fear, but an event to REJOICE.**

SADDAM'S TIME IS COMING TO AN END.

YOUR TIME IS JUST BEGINNING.

DO NOT RESIST THE LIBERATION FORCES.

**IRAQI SOLDIERS -- DO NOT RESIST THE LIBERATION
FORCES**



**IRAQI SOLDIERS -- DO NOT RESIST THE
LIBERATION FORCES -- YOU WILL BE SAFE.**

DO NOT DIE FOR SADDAM BY FIGHTING.

In 1991, 85,000 Iraqi soldiers displayed common sense by surrendering to the Coalition rather than fight. The soldiers were well-treated and soon released. You are needed by your families to rebuild a new and vibrant Iraq. Do not follow SADDAM'S DEATH PLAN for you.



IRAQI SOLDIERS -- DESERT, DEFECT, OR SURRENDER AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY

Saddam's invasions of Iran (1979) and Kuwait (1991), along with his genocidal attacks on his own countrymen, cost the lives of ONE MILLION people who did not deserve to die for this madman. In the last Gulf War, 85,000 Iraqi soldiers had the good sense to surrender to the SAFETY of the Coalition Forces rather than resist or die. In the coming battle against Saddam, which he is going to lose again, there is no reason why you can't be one of the survivors. DO NOT FIGHT, AND YOU WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO YOUR FAMILIES AND LOVED ONES, AND START A BETTER LIFE WITHOUT SADDAM.



WHY DOES
SADDAM
HATE ME?

IRAQI MOTHERS AND FATHERS --

In 1991, Saddam tried to kill this little Arab girl and thousands of other innocent children. This tiny child was lucky -- she was liberated by the Coalition Forces. But hundreds of others were used by Saddam as "human shields" to protect his weapons facilities. He is already preparing to let Iraqi civilians die again in a repeat of this tactic. We don't want you to die for Saddam. Use every means you can to stay away from military installations and targets.

We want your children to survive and enjoy a new, free, and normal Iraq.



EMBRACE LIBERATION

IRAQI SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS

SADDAM'S TIME IN POWER IS COMING TO AN END.
YOUR TIME AS FREE, INDEPENDENT PEOPLE, WILL
THEN BEGIN. DO NOT FEAR THE LIBERATION, BUT
EMBRACE IT. WELCOME THE LIBERATION FORCES
AND YOU WILL BE FREE FROM TYRANNY.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Discussion Paper for the 20 August 2002 PC Meeting on Iraq
Iraq: Saddam's Options in a Conflict With the U.S.



Analysis

- ^{(b)(1)} [redacted] describes numerous options Iraq might use to deter or minimize a U.S. attack (options summarized next under).
- These options can be divided into five major categories:
 - Diplomatic.
 - Influence operations.
 - Domestic political.
 - Economic.
 - Military.
- Actions range from stoking the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to admitting inspectors into Iraq.

Who is [redacted] trying to do
 Team of [redacted] people to do
 [redacted]

Talking Points

- None of these options are showstoppers.
- State, DOD, ^{(b)(1)} [redacted] should continue to address each of Iraq's options as planning continues.
- U.S. needs an aggressive and consistent diplomatic/economic/military campaign addressing all of these possibilities.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Summary of Iraq's options:

- **Diplomatic options:**
 - Allow return of UN inspectors.
 - Lobby the EU, Arab League, individual countries in Europe, Africa and Asia condemning U.S. attack.
 - Threaten neighbors with retaliation.
 - Seek mutual defense pact with Syria and/or Iran.
 - After hostilities begin: agree to return inspectors for cease-fire.
 - After hostilities begin: seek Arab League boycott of US products.
- **Influence Operations options:**
 - Stoke Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
 - Reinforce to Arab world that U.S. action is "U.S. - Zionist conspiracy."
 - Publicly threaten neighbors with oil cutoffs and commercial contracts.
 - Depict itself as a victim of U.S. aggression.
 - Undermine U.S. alliance support through press releases.
 - Leak use of terrible weapons attempting to influence Coalition morale.
 - Display of civilian casualties for condemnation.
 - Move military assets into civilian sectors to draw out the campaign.
- **Domestic Political options:**
 - Improve morale of key security forces.
 - Increase tribal leader funding.
 - Increase Shia funding.
 - Threaten to withhold oil-for-food purchases from Kurds.
 - Purchase loyalty of Kurdish factors.
 - Saddam may retire and Qusay succeed.
- **Economic Options:**
 - Cutoff oil to Jordon or Turkey.
 - Cutoff all oil exports under the oil-for-food.
 - Offer contracts and oil deals to nations that support their position.
 - Threaten creditor nations with monetary losses if regime falls.
 - Attempt to flood southern Iraq.
 - Once hostilities begin: convince sympathetic (to Iraq) producers to cutoff U.S. oil sales
 - Discharge oil into the gulf.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

- **Military Options:**
 - **Divide country to sections for positive communications.**
 - **Increase arms to loyal tribes.**
 - **Conduct terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.**
 - **Invade Kurdish territory.**
 - **Launch preemptive conventional attacks.**
 - **Attack high value assets in the Persian Gulf.**
 - **Attack U.S. forces in Kuwait with WMD.**
 - **Attack Israel with conventional weapons or WMD.**
 - **Create Arab world demonstrations against U.S.**
 - **Conduct covert WMD attack on U.S. homeland.**
 - **Attack U.S. troops advancing on Baghdad with WMD.**
 - **Attack supporting states with WMD.**
 - **Order the destruction of oil infrastructure in southern Iraq.**
 - **Order scorch the earth tactics as Iraqi troops withdraw to Baghdad.**
 - **Create urban war (Baghdad) where U.S. losses are unbearable.**

Mission Area: Public Order/Administration of Justice

Legal Structure at Change of Regime:

Iraq became an independent kingdom in 1932 and a republic in 1958. Upon coming to power in 1968, the Ba'ath Party in Iraq introduced a new constitution, and introduced changes to the then existing judicial, legal and policing structures. The effect of these changes was to eliminate the concept of the separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial authorities and to make the civil court system subservient to the military court system and to extrajudicial authorities.

The Constitution and Legislation

The Revolutionary Command Council became the highest political authority in Iraq after the Ba'ath Party came to power. It adopted an interim constitution in September 1968 (the fifth such constitution since 1958), which was replaced in July 1970 by a 'provisional constitution', which was further amended in 1974 to reflect, among other things, the Iraqi government's unilateral implementation of the March 11, 1970 Accord between the Iraqi central government and the Kurds.

Laws and legislation in Iraq emanate from a number of bodies. The highest statutory instrument is the Provisional Constitution, which is supported by a number of fundamental laws. These include the Code of Civil Procedures No. 83 of 1969, the Commercial Code of Iraq No. 60 of 1954 (as amended by Commercial Code No. 30 of 1984), the Code of Criminal Procedures No. 23 of 1971 (as amended), the Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 and the Principal Law of the Judiciary No. 160 of 1979 (as amended). Each of the Fundamental Laws is supplemented by a number of laws that address specific aspects of the Fundamental Laws. There are approximately 2,600 laws that either supplement the Fundamental Laws or address subjects not covered by them. These laws represent legislation introduced by the National Assembly (or, with respect to laws enacted prior to 1958, by the parliament) and approved by the Revolutionary Command Council (or, in the case of laws enacted prior to July 1958, by the monarch).

Another form of legislation has been legislation by a decree of the Revolutionary Command Council. On an annual basis, approximately 1,500 such resolutions were passed. They ranged from those amending articles of the Provisional Constitution or provisions of the Fundamental Laws, to those dealing with issues affecting individuals (e.g., tax exemptions). In practice, the more important legislative decisions were made through Revolutionary Command Council Resolution.

Pursuant to Article 57 of the Provisional Constitution

JUSTICE SECTOR "QUICK START" ACTIVITIES AND COSTS

• Office of Justice Affairs -	\$214,273
• Vet existing Iraqi laws; publish and disseminate applicable laws -	\$70,000
• Transitional Judicial Teams Organization (approx 52 U.S.)-	\$4,680,808
• Transitional Police Administration (approx 100 U.S.)-	\$26,973,861
• Vetting of Iraqi personnel -	\$30,900
• Conduct post-conflict justice sector assessment -	\$2,500
• Establish standards; codes of conduct -	\$31,270
• Corrections and court monitoring programs -	\$131,000
• Emergency legal education program -	\$67,905
TOTAL	\$32,181,107

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**IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
POLICE DEVELOPMENT
Sequence I**

ATTACHMENT

	Number	Duration	Unit Cost/ Rate	Sub-Total	Total
PERSONNEL COSTS:					
Headquarters Group					
Director	1	6 Months		\$0	
Deputy Director	1	6 Months		\$138,375	
Assistant Director	3	6 Months	\$8,500 Per month	\$153,000	
Commanders	12	6 Months	\$8,000 Per month	\$576,000	
Supervisors	10	6 Months	\$7,750 Per month	\$465,000	
Technical Assistants					
Headquarters	18	6 Months	\$7,500 Per month	\$810,000	
Regional Advisory Teams	9	6 Months	\$7,500 Per month	\$405,000	
Provincial/Tribal Advisors	18	4 Months	\$7,500 Per month	\$540,000	
Curriculum Developers	1	6 Months	\$7,500 Per month	\$45,000	
Trainers	12	6 Months	\$7,500 Per month	\$540,000	
Per Diem	85	183 Days	\$150 Per day	\$2,333,250	
SAIC Fee (13%)				\$459,420	
				<u>Sub-Total</u>	\$6,465,04
Travel:					
Airfare	95	R/T	\$5,000 Per trip	\$475,000	
Miscellaneous Travel				\$50,000	
SAIC Fee (13%)				\$68,250	
				<u>Sub-Total</u>	\$593,25
Equipment/Supplies:					
Communications				\$500,000	
Computers				\$100,000	
SAIC Fee (13%)				\$78,000	
				<u>Sub-Total</u>	\$678,00
Insurance:					
DBA	83		\$160 Year	\$13,280	
Emergency Evacuation	\$35,340	0.734		\$25,940	
				<u>Sub-Total</u>	\$39,220
ICITAP Indirect Costs (10%)					
					\$773,630
Cost for US Developmental Effort					
					\$8,549,144
iraq police salaries	70,000	4 Months	\$500 Per month	\$140,000,000	
TOTAL COSTS FOR PHASE I					\$148,549,144

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Grand
Total

5 6 months

7,500

225,000

3,534,000

525,000

600,000

7736295

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**IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
POLICE DEVELOPMENT
Sequence I**

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7736295

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DATE: JULY 9, 2007

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ORDER PLAN: PHASE ONE

~~(S)~~ **Overview:** This paper summarizes a proposed plan to maintain public order during combat operations in Iraq. Subsequent efforts will address requirements for the transition to post-hostilities and longer-term reform of the Iraqi Law Enforcement system.

- ~~(S)~~ The plan is a 3 tiered concept that relies heavily on the utilization of non-combat capabilities to maintain minimum disorder as combat operations occur.
 - This is a condition-based approach that gradually steps up the use of force.
 - The intent is to maintain disorder at the Tier 1 level to minimize the impact on combat operations and facilitate the transition to post-hostilities activities.
- ~~(S)~~ Implementation of this plan will require further evaluation of 3 "Red-letter" issues:
 - ~~(S)~~ Can we leverage the National Civil Police as a means to maintain order?
 - ~~(S)~~ Can we develop a Quick Reaction Force capability to minimize the potential escalation of disorder?
 - ~~(S)~~ Will our Information Operations and Public Affairs campaigns adequately address public order issues?

~~(S)~~ **Tier 1: Contain public disorder at minimum levels. Actions include:**

- ~~(S)~~ Immediately seize or destroy (preferably seize) means of mass communication.
- ~~(S)~~ Execute an aggressive information campaign prior to and coincident with combat operations to communicate intent to liberate Iraqis from oppression.
 - ~~(S)~~ Tailor the information campaign for key individuals (tribal leaders, national police leadership), groups and the general public.
 - ~~(S)~~ Emphasize that Iraqi laws necessary for good public order remain in effect until changed by duly reconstituted Iraqi authorities.
- ~~(S)~~ Aggressive Civil Affairs operations immediately establish person-to-person links between US/Coalition operations and local authorities and civil police.
 - Communicate immediately to key individuals that they are known and accountable.
- ~~(S)~~ Use show of force operations to visibly demonstrate US power.
- ~~(S)~~ Empower Iraqi National Civil Police as the primary means of maintaining order.
- ~~(S)~~ Dedicate all-source intelligence assets to subject of plots and disturbances.

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- ~~(S)~~ Apply temporary control measures such as travel restrictions and curfews.
- ~~(S)~~ If possible, assign coalition forces to guard sensitive cultural and religious sites.
- ~~(S)~~ **Tier 2: Disorder that exceeds national police capability. Actions include:**
- ~~(S)~~ Generate a highly mobile Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to respond to and assist civil police with management of civil disturbances. The QRF should contain Civil Affairs, Linguist, PSYOP, Military Police and Non-lethal Weapons capabilities.
- ~~(S)~~ Prepare for quick reaction information campaign to defuse issues capable of generating disturbances (enemy disinformation, food riots, etc.).
 - ~~(S)~~ Stress individual accountability but again, be ready to target key individuals, groups and the general public.
- ~~(S)~~ Increase show of force operations consistent with availability of forces.

~~(S)~~ **Tier 3: Mass disturbances exceeding capabilities of QRF. Actions include:**

- (U) Disorder of this magnitude could become "Win the War" but "Lose the Peace" events. These events could range from unruly crowds to mass consequence events that are either spontaneous or orchestrated by enemies.
- (U) Prepare to draw upon larger force elements from the Theater Reserve, Rear Area Forces, units finished with assigned combat tasks or those of regional partners.
- ~~(S)~~ Special Operation Forces should be prepared to capture key *agent provocateurs*.
- ~~(S)~~ A pool of resources should be prepared for distribution to key leaders to encourage cooperation in quelling mass disturbances.

~~(S)~~ **Recommendations:**

- ~~(S)~~ Indicate to the Vice-Chairman in a CAPCOM that you intend to raise these issues in the scheduled Rear Areas Security briefs to the PC/DC's.
- ~~(S)~~ Request a briefing prior to the PC/DCs from the Joint Staff on plans to maintain law and order during and immediately following combat operations.
- ~~(S)~~ Forward the proposed plan to CENTCOM and the Officer for Post-war Planning for consideration and implementation.
- ~~(S)~~ Continue the planning effort to assist the Office for Post-war Planning in developing the Transition and Long-term plans.

Prepared by:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

POLICE, JUSTICE AND PRISONS IN IRAQ: CONCEPT OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

GOALS

- Provide groundwork for establishment of a fair and transparent system of rule of law for all Iraqis, regardless of political, ethnic or religious considerations.
- Establish interim public security
- Within one year, remove individuals from office, disband units and organizations, and eliminate law and processes that impede development.
- Within one year, transition to legitimate Iraqi authority control of police, judicial and prison functions.

INITIAL POST-CONFLICT ASSUMPTIONS

- Existing Iraqi capabilities responsible for public security and judicial processes likely will be in disarray at the conclusion of an international intervention, and will be the central focus of illegitimate forces attempting to remain in power.
- Hussein political appointees will likely remain in the ranks of the police, judiciary and prison administration.
- Legitimate demands for law enforcement, public safety and rule of law the immediate post-conflict period will likely exceed ability of Iraqi structures to cope.
- Existing police/security forces may lack any legitimacy with Iraqi people, be seen as oppressors, and therefore unable to keep the peace.
- High potential for significant number of Iraqi internal conflicts involving property disputes; vigilante activities by individuals, families, and/or groups; and high potential for large civil disturbances centering on food distribution and other humanitarian efforts.
- Anticipated return of approximately 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and up to 1 million refugees now in neighboring countries.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

- Deploy US-led international teams to provide liaison and technical expertise to the US military force commander to enable effective oversight and guidance of Iraqi actions to:
 - Work jointly with international military to provide public security;
 - Identify and utilize appropriate existing Iraqi resources/personnel as quickly as possible.
 - Vett individual, units, organizations, law and processes imposed by Saddam;
 - protect evidence related to war crimes; and
 - Transition to a post-Saddam justice system that includes reformed police, judicial, and prison organizations.
- Teams will operate under the overall command and control of the US military force, at least in the short term, which will be responsible to ensure the appropriate secure environment.

RECONSTITUTING IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

- US and international military forces must be prepared to provide interim public security and law enforcement until legitimate Iraqi civilian authority can be reconstituted. To assist establishment of such forces, US-led assessment teams of international police, judicial, and corrections experts should be deployed as soon as security conditions permit.
- International criminal justice experts should be recruited from countries with functioning law enforcement systems, to include as much as possible countries from the region (this is an oxymoron). In addition, expatriate Iraqi experts with related background and experience should be considered as team members as appropriate. The teams should focus on the three main areas of the criminal justice system, and implement appropriate sector reform actions to include:

POLICE

Command

- Identify senior political and operational Iraqi police leadership, and units/operations commanded
- Determine skill level of personnel and viability for retaining positions
- Assist identification of appropriate replacements as necessary
- Determine appropriate organizational and effective command structures for Iraqi police forces
- Identify effective methods for communicating with police ranks
- Identify units/functions that should be discontinued
- Collect and retain information related to past abuses if found

Administrative

- Determine legal authorities currently in place to empower police
- Assess existing infrastructure (buildings, office equipment, logistical capabilities, etc.)
- Assess capacity and viability of current police recruiting, selection, and training processes
- Develop vetting process for existing police forces
- Develop an open and transparent recruiting and selection process for new Iraqi police
- Develop training and certification program (basic and command levels) with significant focus on human rights for appropriate existing police and new recruits
- Modify and develop as necessary effective organizational policies and procedures, professional standards, and mechanisms of internal control and police oversight

Operations (patrol, traffic, civil disturbance, etc)

- Identify operational units/functions and command personnel
- Assess functions and capabilities of operational units, including intelligence and "secret police"
- Determine skill level of personnel and viability for retaining units/functions and personnel assigned
- Assess equipment, communications, and transportation capabilities and needs
- Modify and develop as necessary operational policies and procedures
- Disband inappropriate operations and remove/re-assign personnel as necessary

- Identify and modify as need standard operating procedures/rules of engagement

Investigations

- Identify investigative units/functions and command personnel
- Assess functions and capabilities of investigative units
- Determine skill level of personnel and viability for retention
- Assess equipment, transportation and communications capabilities and needs
- Assess evidence collection, retention and processing capabilities
- Assess capabilities to investigate complex problems such as organized crimes, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism
- Modify and develop as necessary operational policies and procedures for investigative functions

JUDICIAL

Legal

- Assess laws currently in force and identify or develop interim legal code to be imposed during transition period
- Assemble team to review work on permanent legal framework for the country
- Educate public about processes
- Facilitate communication and distribution of laws
- Develop training on interim and longer term laws

Administrative

- Determine structure of existing judicial system
- Identify Iraqi judiciary and prosecutors, and defense lawyers and determine suitability to retain positions
- Develop criteria and procedures for vetting current personnel and recruiting/selecting new personnel

Courts

- Assess current physical and material status and needs of court system and offices
- Eliminate "Secret Courts" or other inappropriate entities
- Survey of existing capacities (physical courtrooms, staff, records, etc.) for pre-trial hearings and conducting full trials
- Establish Special Interim Courts for Public Safety to adjudicate pre-trial detention and criminal cases quickly
- Establish Special Interim Courts for Land Disputes

Human Rights

- Develop mechanisms to handle War Crimes and Accountability
- Develop and implement a system of Human Rights Monitoring of judicial proceedings

CORRECTIONS

Command

- Identify senior political and operational leadership of Iraqi corrections/penal system
- Determine organizational structure
- Review operating policies and procedures, and modify as necessary to comply with international standards
- Develop and implement strong internal affairs function to include human rights monitoring
- Identify those involved in human rights abuses and remove immediately

Administrative

- Develop vetting process for existing personnel
- Develop open and transparent recruiting and selection process for new personnel
- Develop training and certification program for new recruits

Operations

- Identify and assess capacity/conditions/needs of all detention facilities currently in use
- Assess sentences and reason for incarceration of current prison population (i.e. identify political prisoners)
- Assess competency of current personnel and suitability to be retained
- Conduct needs assessment for equipping corrections facilities and personnel

IRAQ: POLICY QUESTIONS
USG INVOLVEMENT IN POLICE, JUSTICE & PRISONS

- We need to confirm whether the military concept of operations addresses public security immediately following military action. How will this be addressed in areas not involved in direct military action?
- In the event of Martial Law, who will be responsible for public security? Should we presume existing Iraqi police would be responsible for public security? If so, what role will the coalition military forces play in monitoring Iraqi police actions? What laws will be enforced and what involvement will coalition forces have in detention and judicial processes?
- How will large-scale civil disturbances be addressed? Will we seek international partners to address public security? The involvement of foreign experts or special police or para-military units (e.g., Italian Carabinieri) will require time, diplomatic effort, and US military support to deploy (airlift, equipment) and operate (airlift, force protection).
- Who will provide security for humanitarian activities & NGOs (foreign and US)?
- Any USG action to prepare for involving non-USG or non-US police or justice experts requires lead-time and funds. The current draft concept of operations calls for deploying up to 75 US civilian police, justice and prison experts. INL will need \$25 million for recruitment, preparation, deployment and support.
- The draft concept of operations for police, justice and prisons also contemplates the possibility of deploying 2,500 international police to supervise and monitor Iraqis during the transition to full Iraqi control. Presuming US contributes 10 percent; \$50 million would be needed to recruit, equip, deploy and support 250 Americans for one year. This also requires lead-time and funds to recruit US participants and solicit personnel contributions from other countries.
- Once deployed, who will provide security for the US and non-US civilian experts?
- Will USG take on and fund programs to train and equip Iraqi police, rebuild prisons, and re-establish a court system?
- USAID plans to support for the Iraqi civil service does not include police. Will the USG fund salaries for the estimate 70,000-100,000 police? Estimated @ \$40/month/person = \$48M/yr.

POLICE, JUSTICE AND PRISONS IN IRAQ: CONCEPT OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

GOALS

- Provide groundwork for establishment of a fair and transparent system of rule of law for all Iraqis, regardless of political, ethnic or religious considerations.
- Establish interim public security
- Within one year, remove individuals from office, disband units and organizations, and eliminate law and processes that impede development.
- Within one year, transition to legitimate Iraqi authority control of police, judicial and prison functions.

INITIAL POST-CONFLICT ASSUMPTIONS

- Existing Iraqi capabilities responsible for public security and judicial processes likely will be in disarray at the conclusion of an international intervention, and will be the central focus of illegitimate forces attempting to remain in power.
- Hussein political appointees will likely remain in the ranks of the police, judiciary and prison administration.
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- Anticipated return of approximately 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and up to 1 million refugees now in neighboring countries.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

- Deploy US-led international teams to provide liaison and technical expertise to the US military force commander to enable effective oversight and guidance of Iraqi actions to:
 - Work jointly with international military to provide public security;
 - Identify and utilize appropriate existing Iraqi resources/personnel as quickly as possible.
 - Vett individual, units, organizations, law and processes imposed by Saddam;
 - protect evidence related to war crimes; and
 - Transition to a post-Saddam justice system that includes reformed police, judicial, and prison organizations.
- Teams will operate under the overall command and control of the US military force, which will be responsible to ensure the appropriate secure environment.

RECONSTITUTING IRAQI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

US and international military forces must be prepared to provide interim public security and law enforcement until legitimate Iraqi civilian authority can be reconstituted. To assist establishment of such forces, US-led assessment teams of international police, judicial, and corrections experts should be deployed as soon as security conditions permit.

International criminal justice experts should be recruited from countries with stable criminal justice systems, to include as much as possible countries from the region. In addition, expatriate Iraqi experts with related background and experience should be considered as team members as appropriate. The teams should focus on the three main areas of the criminal justice system, and implement appropriate sector reform actions to include:

POLICE

- **Command**
 - Identify senior political and operational Iraqi police leadership, and units/operations commanded
 - Determine skill level of personnel and viability for retaining positions
 - Assist identification of appropriate replacements as necessary
 - Determine appropriate organizational and effective command structures for Iraqi police forces
 - Identify effective methods for communicating with police ranks
 - Identify units/functions that should be discontinued
 - Collect and retain information related to past abuses if found

- **Administrative**
 - Determine legal authorities currently in place to empower police
 - Assess existing infrastructure (buildings, office equipment, logistical capabilities, etc.)
 - Assess capacity and viability of current police recruiting, selection, and training processes
 - Develop vetting process for existing police forces
 - Develop an open and transparent recruiting and selection process for new Iraqi police
 - Develop training and certification program (basic and command levels) with significant focus on human rights for appropriate existing police and new recruits
 - Modify and develop as necessary effective organizational policies and procedures, professional standards, and mechanisms of internal control and police oversight

- **Operations (patrol, traffic, civil disturbance, etc)**
 - Identify operational units/functions and command personnel
 - Assess functions and capabilities of operational units, including intelligence and "secret police"
 - Determine skill level of personnel and viability for retaining units/functions and personnel assigned
 - Assess equipment, communications, and transportation capabilities and needs
 - Modify and develop as necessary operational policies and procedures
 - Disband inappropriate operations and remove/re-assign personnel as necessary

- **Investigations**

- Identify investigative units/functions and command personnel
- Assess functions and capabilities of investigative units
- Determine skill level of personnel and viability for retention
- Assess equipment, transportation and communications capabilities and needs
- Assess evidence collection, retention and processing capabilities
- Assess capabilities to investigate complex problems such as organized crimes, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism
- Modify and develop as necessary operational policies and procedures for investigative functions

JUDICIAL

Legal

- Assess laws currently in force and identify or develop interim legal code to be imposed during transition period
- Assemble team to review work on permanent legal framework for the country
- Educate public about processes
- Facilitate communication and distribution of laws
- Develop training on interim and longer term laws

Administrative

- Determine structure of existing judicial system
- Identify Iraqi judiciary and prosecutors, and defense lawyers and determine suitability to retain positions
- Develop criteria and procedures for vetting current personnel and recruiting/selecting new personnel

Courts

- Assess current physical and material status and needs of court system and offices
- Eliminate "Secret Courts" or other inappropriate entities
- Survey of existing capacities (physical courtrooms, staff, records, etc.) for pre-trial hearings and conducting full trials
- Establish Special Interim Courts for Public Safety to adjudicate pre-trial detention and criminal cases quickly
- Establish Special Interim Courts for Land Disputes

Human Rights

- Develop mechanisms to handle War Crimes and Accountability
- Develop and implement a system of Human Rights Monitoring of judicial proceedings

CORRECTIONS

▪ **Command**

- Identify senior political and operational leadership of Iraqi corrections/penal system
- Determine organizational structure

- Review operating policies and procedures, and modify as necessary to comply with international standards
- Develop and implement strong internal affairs function to include human rights monitoring

- **Administrative**
 - Develop vetting process for existing personnel
 - Develop open and transparent recruiting and selection process for new personnel
 - Develop training and certification program for new recruits

- **Operations**
 - Identify and assess capacity/conditions/needs of all detention facilities currently in use
 - Assess sentences or reasons for incarceration of current prison population (i.e. identify political prisoners)
 - Assess competency of current personnel and suitability to be retained
 - Conduct needs assessment for equipping corrections facilities and personnel

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IRAQ CORRECTIONS SYSTEM

GOALS

- Identify all facilities used as prisons or jails; Insure appropriate oversight
- Conduct inmate census; Identify and release all persons held without reasonable justification
- Vett correctional system leadership and personnel; Establish internationally acceptable standards for operation
- Within one year, transition full responsibility for corrections operations to Iraqi authority, with continuing international oversight.

INITIAL POST-CONFLICT ASSUMPTIONS

- Prisons/jails potential sites of violence and retribution (Abu Ghraib Prison example)
- Coalition military forces will be needed to help identify an secure prisons/jails
- Unknown, but expected to be large (up to several hundred) number of jails and prisons throughout Iraq, including "secret prisons"
- Uncertain central command structure, but likely that different security agencies maintain separate facilities
- Unknown, but expected to be very large number (many 10's of thousands) of detainees being held for all reasons; Many, if not most, held for political reasons
- Prison/jail conditions will be dire; Quick release of as many detainees as possible necessary to relive conditions and address human rights concerns
- Likely will have to consider closing many facilities and consolidating where possible
- Intensive international oversight and assistance likely necessary to reconstitute an internationally acceptable system.

CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

- Civilian advisors support coalition military forces on corrections issues and requirements;
- Serve as coordinating point of contact for identification of facilities and prisoner census;
- Lead vetting, assessment, reform and development efforts to reconstitute Iraqi corrections system; and
- Guide transition of full responsibility for corrections to legitimate Iraqi civilian control

TIME LINE

- First 30 days:
 - Coalition military forces must be prepared to identify and secure prisons/jails, to include seizing records and assisting with census)
 - Civilian advisors provide guidance to coalition military, serve as coordinators for identification and census process
 - Identify leadership of Iraqi corrections system, facilities, and related Ministries; begin advisory functions
 - Begin assessment of Iraqi corrections capacities and needs
 - Target facilities for closure

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- 31-60 days:
 - Complete identification of corrections leadership and facilities used as prison/jails
 - Complete prisoner census; Insure release of political detainees and other inappropriately held persons; Close unnecessary or inappropriate facilities
 - Complete vetting of corrections leadership and operational personnel; Make provisional appointments of new personnel
 - Complete assessment of correctional system needs and personnel requirements

- 61-90 days:
 - Develop internationally acceptable policies and procedures
 - Develop training curriculum for corrections personnel
 - Identify suitable candidates for "train-the-trainer" instruction
 - Begin delivery of training under guidance of advisors

- 91-180 days:
 - Advisors continue to provide guidance to Iraqi corrections leadership, and develop process for transition of all corrections responsibilities to local control
 - Advisors coordinate efforts to seek contributions from other countries for developmental assistance
 - Continue training process; begin to monitor training delivered by Iraqi trainers
 - Monitor and advise

- 181-545 days:
 - Complete transition of corrections responsibility to Iraqi authority
 - Insure mechanisms for protecting human rights are sustainable.

APPENDIX C-ATTACHMENT 1

**IRAQ TRANSITION
JUDICIAL TEAMS COSTS**
(Day 1 to Day 90)

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Judicial Teams Organization:

Management Element

Management Element	Number	Duration	Unit Cost/ Rate	Sub-Total
Attorney/Director (GS15)	1	3 Months	\$46,487	\$46,487
Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	2	3 Months	\$52,312	\$104,624
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	6	3 Months	\$46,487	\$278,922
Administrator (GS13)	4	3 Months	\$33,899	\$135,596
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500
Lawyer	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800
Interpreter	4	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$1,800
Clerical	4	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$900
Driver	2	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$300
Per Diem	13	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$175,500
				\$747,429

Sub-Total

Judicial Team - Main

Management Element	Number	Duration	Unit Cost/ Rate	Sub-Total
Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	3 Months	\$52,312	\$52,312
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	3 Months	\$92,974	\$185,948
Administrator (GS13)	1	3 Months	\$68,797	\$68,797
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	3 Months	\$81,298	\$81,298
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500
Attorney	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800
Interpreter	5	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$2,250
Clerical	5	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$1,125
Driver	4	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$1,200
Per Diem	5	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$67,500
				\$463,730

Sub-Total

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Judicial Team - North

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	2 Months	\$87,205	\$87,205
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	2 Months	\$77,447	\$154,894
Administrator (GS13)	1	2 Months	\$57,308	\$57,308
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	2 Months	\$67,721	\$67,721
Jurist	1	2 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,000
Attorney	2	2 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,200
Interpreter	5	2 Months	\$150 Per month	\$1,500
Clerical	5	2 Months	\$75 Per month	\$750
Driver	4	2 Months	\$50 Per month	\$400
Per Diem	5	60 Days	\$150 Per day	\$45,000
Sub-Total				\$442,044

Judicial Team - South

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	2 Months	\$87,205	\$87,205
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	2 Months	\$77,447	\$154,894
Administrator (GS13)	1	2 Months	\$57,308	\$57,308
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	2 Months	\$67,721	\$67,721
Jurist	1	2 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,000
Attorney	2	2 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,200
Interpreter	5	2 Months	\$150 Per month	\$1,500
Clerical	5	2 Months	\$75 Per month	\$750
Driver	4	2 Months	\$50 Per month	\$400
Per Diem	5	60 Days	\$150 Per day	\$45,000
Sub-Total				\$442,044

Familiarization Training

Travel and Per diem	28		\$2,000 Per unit	\$56,000
Materials			\$40,000	\$40,000
Sub-Total				\$96,000

Travel

Airfare	28	One Way	\$2,500 Per trip	\$70,000
Travel Prep and Baggage	28	One Way	\$1,000 Per trip	\$28,000
Sub-Total				\$98,000

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Judicial System Monitoring

Consultants	5	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$7,500	
Publications				\$36,000	
Commuting/Subsistance	100	3 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$13,500	\$57,000

Assessments

Consultants	6	1 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$3,000	
Commuting/Subsistance	6	1 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$270	\$3,270

Establish Standards/Codes of Conduct

Consultants	5	2 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$5,000	
Publications				\$104,150	
Commuting/Subsistance	3	2 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$270	\$109,420

TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS

\$680,828

TOTAL JUDICIAL TEAMS COSTS

(Day 1 to Day 90)

\$4,224,009

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**IRAQ TRANSITION
JUDICIAL TEAMS COSTS**
(Day 91 to Day 180)

Judicial Teams Organization:		Number	Duration	Unit Cost/ Rate	Sub-Total	Total
Management Element						
Attorney/Director (GS15)	1	3 Months	\$46,487	\$46,487		
Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	2	3 Months	\$52,312	\$104,624		
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	6	3 Months	\$46,487	\$278,922		
Administrator (GS13)	4	3 Months	\$33,899	\$135,596		
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500		
Lawyer	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800		
Interpreter	4	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$1,800		
Clerical	4	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$900		
Driver	2	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$300		
Per Diem	13	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$175,500		
					\$747,429	
Judicial Team - Main						
Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	3 Months	\$52,312	\$52,312		
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	3 Months	\$92,974	\$185,948		
Administrator (GS13)	1	3 Months	\$68,797	\$68,797		
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	3 Months	\$81,298	\$81,298		
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500		
Attorney	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800		
Interpreter	5	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$2,250		
Clerical	5	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$1,125		
Driver	4	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$1,200		
Per Diem	5	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$67,500		
					\$463,730	

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Judicial Team - North

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	3 Months	\$52,312	\$52,312
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	3 Months	\$92,974	\$185,948
Administrator (GS13)	1	3 Months	\$68,797	\$68,797
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	3 Months	\$81,298	\$81,298
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500
Attorney	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800
Interpreter	5	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$2,250
Clerical	5	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$1,125
Driver	4	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$1,200
Per Diem	5	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$67,500
Sub-Total				\$463,730

Judicial Team - South

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	3 Months	\$52,312	\$52,312
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	3 Months	\$92,974	\$185,948
Administrator (GS13)	1	3 Months	\$68,797	\$68,797
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	3 Months	\$81,298	\$81,298
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500
Attorney	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800
Interpreter	5	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$2,250
Clerical	5	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$1,125
Driver	4	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$1,200
Per Diem	5	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$67,500
Sub-Total				\$463,730

Judicial Team - Central

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Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	3 Months	\$52,312	\$52,312	
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	3 Months	\$92,974	\$185,948	
Administrator (GS13)	1	3 Months	\$68,797	\$68,797	
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	3 Months	\$81,298	\$81,298	
Jurist	1	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$1,500	
Attorney	2	3 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$1,800	
Interpreter	5	3 Months	\$150 Per month	\$2,250	
Clerical	5	3 Months	\$75 Per month	\$1,125	
Driver	4	3 Months	\$50 Per month	\$1,200	
Per Diem	5	90 Days	\$150 Per day	\$67,500	
Sub-Total					\$463,730
Familiarization Training					
Travel and Per diem	5		\$2,000 Per unit	\$10,000	
Materials			\$8,000	\$8,000	\$18,000
Sub-Total					
Travel					
Airfare	5	One Way	\$2,500 Per trip	\$12,500	
Travel Prep and Baggage	5	One Way	\$1,000 Per trip	\$5,000	\$17,500
Sub-Total					
Equipment/Supplies					
Facilities					
Specialized Equipment	22		\$1,000 Per unit	\$160,000	
Communications	114	3 Months	\$400 Per Month	\$22,000	
Transportation	28	3 Months	\$1,200 Per month	\$136,800	
Supplies	5	3 Months	\$250 Per Month	\$100,800	
Computers	18		\$3,000 Each	\$3,750	
Sub-Total					\$477,350
PERSONNEL COSTS SUBTOTAL:					\$3,115,199
Contractor Fee (13%)					\$404,976
U.S. Department Management Costs					\$280,368

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TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS:

\$3,800,543

PROGRAM COSTS:

Emergency Legal Education

Consultants	6	3 Months	\$1,500 Per Month	\$27,000
Publications				\$138,938
Commuting/Subsistence	2000	0.5 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$45,000
Airfare	50	Rd Trip	\$3,000 Per trip	\$150,000
Per Diem	50	14 Days	\$150 Per day	\$105,000
Travel Prep and Baggage	50	Rd Trip	\$250 Per trip	\$12,500

\$478,438

Vetting

Consultants	20	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$30,000
Commuting/Subsistence	20	3 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$2,700

\$32,700

Judicial System Monitoring

Consultants	5	3 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$37,500
Publications				\$36,000
Commuting/Subsistence	100	3 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$67,500

\$141,000

Establish Standards/Codes of Conduct

Consultants	5	2 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$5,000
Publications				\$104,150
Commuting/Subsistence	3	2 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$270

\$109,420

TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS

\$761,558

TOTAL JUDICIAL TEAMS COSTS

\$4,562,101

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**IRAQ TRANSITION
JUDICIAL TEAMS COSTS**
(Day 181 to Day 540)

APPENDIX C-ATTACHMENT 3

Judicial Teams Organization:

Management Element

Management Element	Number	Duration	Unit Cost/ Rate	Sub-Total	Total
Attorney/Director (GS15)	1	12 Months	\$191,251	\$191,251	
Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	2	12 Months	\$209,250	\$418,500	
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	6	12 Months	\$191,251	\$1,147,506	
Administrator (GS13)	4	12 Months	\$137,594	\$550,376	
Jurist	1	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$3,000	
Lawyer	2	12 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$7,200	
Interpreter	4	12 Months	\$150 Per month	\$7,200	
Clerical	4	12 Months	\$75 Per month	\$3,600	
Driver	2	12 Months	\$50 Per month	\$1,200	
Per Diem	13	360 Days	\$150 Per day	\$702,000	
					\$3,031,833

Judicial Teams - Group South (\$ total)

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	12 Months	\$209,250	\$209,250	
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	12 Months	\$191,251	\$382,502	
Administrator (GS13)	1	12 Months	\$137,594	\$137,594	
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	12 Months	\$162,596	\$162,596	
Jurist	1	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$6,000	
Attorney	2	12 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$7,200	
Interpreter	5	12 Months	\$150 Per month	\$9,000	
Clerical	5	12 Months	\$75 Per month	\$4,500	
Driver	4	12 Months	\$50 Per month	\$2,400	
Per Diem	5	360 Days	\$150 Per day	\$270,000	
					\$1,191,042

Total Group South Costs

\$7,146,252

Judicial Teams - Group North (6 total)

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	12 Months	\$209,250	\$209,250
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	12 Months	\$191,251	\$382,502
Administrator (GS13)	1	12 Months	\$137,594	\$137,594
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	12 Months	\$162,596	\$162,596
Jurist	1	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$6,000
Attorney	2	12 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$7,200
Interpreter	5	12 Months	\$150 Per month	\$9,000
Clerical	5	12 Months	\$75 Per month	\$4,500
Driver	4	12 Months	\$50 Per month	\$2,400
Per Diem	5	360 Days	\$150 Per day	\$270,000
Sub-Total				\$1,191,042

Total Group North Costs

\$7,146,252

Judicial Teams - Group Central (6 total)

Legal Advisor-Judge (SES)	1	12 Months	\$209,250	\$209,250
Legal Advisor - Attorney (GS15)	2	12 Months	\$191,251	\$382,502
Administrator (GS13)	1	12 Months	\$137,594	\$137,594
Public Information Specialist (GS14)	1	12 Months	\$162,596	\$162,596
Jurist	1	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$6,000
Attorney	2	12 Months	\$300 Per Month	\$7,200
Interpreter	5	12 Months	\$150 Per month	\$9,000
Clerical	5	12 Months	\$75 Per month	\$4,500
Driver	4	12 Months	\$50 Per month	\$2,400
Per Diem	5	360 Days	\$150 Per day	\$270,000
Sub-Total				\$1,191,042

Total Group Central Costs

\$7,146,252

Travel					
Airfare	173		\$2,500 Per trip	\$432,500	
R&R Travel	206		\$2,500 Per Trip	\$515,000	
Travel Prep and Baggage				\$173,000	
		Sub-Total			\$1,120,500
Familiarization Training					
Travel and Per diem	70		\$2,000 Per unit	\$140,000	
Materials				\$87,000	
		Sub-Total			\$227,000
Equipment/Supplies					
Facilities				\$500,000	
Specialized Equipment	308		\$1,000 Per unit	\$308,000	
Communications	422		\$400 Per Month	\$2,025,600	12 Months
Transportation	88		\$1,200 Per month	\$1,267,200	12 Months
Supplies	19		\$250 Per Month	\$57,000	12 Months
Computers	252		\$3,000 Each	\$756,000	

\$4,913,800

PERSONNEL COSTS SUBTOTAL:

\$30,731,889

Contractor Fee (13%)

\$3,995,146

U.S. Department Management Costs

\$2,765,870

TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS:

\$37,492,905

PROGRAM COSTS:

Judicial System Monitoring

Consultants

Publications

Commuting/Substance

\$500 Per Month

12 Months

5

\$30,000

\$26,000

\$54,000

\$45 Per Month

12 Months

100

\$110,000

**Technical Assistance to
Ministries and Court of Cassation**

Consultants	5	6 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$15,000
Publications				\$352,000
Commuting/Subsistence	3	6 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$810
Contractor Fee (13%)				\$47,815
				\$415,625

Technical Assistance at Local Level

Consultants	20	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$120,000
Publications				\$130,000
Commuting/Subsistence	16	12 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$8,640
				\$258,640

Professional Development

Consultants	20	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$120,000
Publications				\$500,000
Commuting/Subsistence	16	12 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$8,640
Communications				\$235,000
Supplies				\$220,500
Computers				\$187,000
Contractor Fee (13%)				\$165,248
				\$1,436,388

Infrastructure Development

Consultants	20	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$120,000
Commuting/Subsistence	16	12 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$8,640
Equipment				\$1,160,000
Renovation/Construction				\$4,300,000
Contractor Fee (13%)				\$726,523
				\$6,315,163

Technology Enhancement

Consultants	20	12 Months	\$500 Per Month	\$120,000
Publications				\$130,000
Commuting/Subsistence	16	12 Months	\$45 Per Month	\$8,640

TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS


\$14,432,330

TOTAL JUDICIAL TEAMS COSTS
(TOA 181 to TOA 540)

\$51,925,235


**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
JUDICIAL TEAMS
ORGANIZATION**
(International Fill)

Day 1 - 180



**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
JUDICIAL TEAMS
ORGANIZATION**
(International Fill)

Day 181 - 540





Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

Agenda

- Strategic Goals
- Objectives
- Charter
- Organization
- Planning



Strategic Goals

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- One Unified Iraq – foster a national identity that unites ALL Iraqis while preserving tribal, ethnic, and religious heritages
- A broad-based freely elected government which embraces all ethnic groups:
 - Adheres to the rule of law
 - Does not threaten its neighbors
 - Does not pursue or support WMD or terrorism
- Create an environment for a viable free-market based economy



Objectives

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance


- To be in position to help meet the humanitarian, reconstruction and administration challenges in Post Saddam Iraq
- The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is established to conduct the detailed planning across the spectrum of issues facing the international community with respect to the administration of Iraq throughout the transition to an Iraqi-led authority



Charter

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance


- Assist with humanitarian relief
- Protect natural resources and infrastructure
- Facilitate the country's reconstruction, and protection of its infrastructure and economy
- Reestablishment of key civilian services
- Stabilize the justice sector and provide law enforcement services
- Dismantle WMD
- Transition to Iraqi-led authority representing the free will of the Iraqi people



Organization



Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance





Humanitarian Assistance Planning

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Coordinate emergency relief and Humanitarian assistance
- Facilitate access for and assist International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations
- Refugees and displaced persons
- Demining



Reconstruction Planning

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Agriculture
- Electrical engineers and maintenance elements
- Economic and financial specialists, and units
- Communication maintenance and service
- Demining
- Civil engineering
- Environmental engineering
- Petroleum specialist
- Fire fighting specialists and equipment



Civilian Services Planning

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

- Health, Labor, Economic, Education
- Immigration, Border control, and Customs
- Public Administration, and Civil Service Reform
- Public Information
- Role of Civilian police officers
- Constabulary Forces
- Judicial administration
- Corrections officials and experts
- Environmental damage assessment
- Explosive Ordinance Material
- Hazardous material specialists and equipment

OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION

AND HUMANITARIAN


ASSISTANCE

(Post-Conflict Planning Group)

Civil Administration Section

Justice/Law Enforcement

US/Coalition Military-Interagency Activity Sequencing



Potential for US/Coalition Military to function as first line Police



US/COALITION MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE/CONSTABULARY FORCES
 Cross border incursions
 Civil disorders
 Major incidents requiring special weapons tactics, etc.

Transition to Full Iraqi Control

FULL IRAQI CONTROL

IRAQI JUSTICE VISION

TIME

LEGEND:

1. First requirement for civilian justice services (police, prosecutors, courts, corrections);
2. Funding becomes available; resources are procured, trained and deployed;
3. Civilian justice sector operations, management/monitoring commences

IRAQ JUSTICE SYSTEM END STATE¹ Vision

“A system of laws and institutions (police, prosecution, courts and corrections) which operates impartially, without regard for ethnicity, religion, sex, race, political affiliation or other natural characteristic, and provides sufficient public order, levels of human and property rights and objective dispute resolution so as to enable the people of Iraq to enjoy personal freedoms, economic prosperity, inclusive government and domestic tranquility.”

**VISION FOR
THE IRAQ NATIONAL POLICE**

“A de-centralized, community-based law enforcement institution which effectively serves and protects the rights and freedoms of the people of Iraq preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal conduct in strict accordance with the law of the land.”

**VISION FOR THE IRAQ
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND
COURTS**

“Fair and effective administration of justice, together with equal access to justice, so that all may seek and receive redress for their grievances with other private parties and with state officials or organizations.”

VISION FOR THE IRAQ CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM

- “A JUSTICE RESOURCE WHICH FUNCTIONS TO EFFECTIVELY ADMINISTER JUDICIALLY MANDATED SANCTIONS AND WHICH;**
- RESPECTS FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS;**
 - IS GUIDED BY FAIRNESS, EQUALITY UNDER AND BEFORE THE LAW, AND BY THE DIGNITY AND WORTH OF INDIVIDUALS;**
 - IS MANAGED WITH HONESTY, OPENESS AND INTEGRITY.”**

Critical Activities During Phase IVA (Stability):

Military Commander establishes interim legal framework throughout AO (issue set of proclamations, etc.)

Military counterparts stand in for Office of Justice Affairs and prep for arrival of transitional justice teams organization (JTO) and police administration (ITPA).

Military counterparts begin assessment of Iraqi justice sector organizations (identity of senior officials, functions performed, command/control, structure, etc.)

Relevant in-country conditions (community relationships, crime problems, etc.)

Critical Activities During Phase IVB (Recovery) Day 1 - Day180:

Civil Administrator continues to refine and expand interim legal framework throughout AO (amnesty program, protective custody, other proclamations, etc.)

Office of Justice Affairs morphs military predecessor and assumes duties

Review and distribution of legal materials

JTO and ITPA arrive

Comprehensive assessment program

Vetting of indigenous justice sector personnel

Establish standards, codes of conduct

Limited executive policing/civilian police supervision

Court and Corrections monitoring programs

Emergency legal education and training programs

Critical Activities During Phase IVB (Recovery) – Follow-on

Develop/start legal education and training programs based upon assessment outcome

In conjunction with Iraqis, develop police and remaining justice system strategic plans to validate vision

Commence sustainable, institutional development consistent with strategic plans (redesign organizations, policies, recruit training, etc.)

Build/refine Iraqi Legal Aid system

Intensify public education programs


Conduct pre-transition assessments/evaluations in order to:

- Tweak operating strategies


- Plan for post-transition assistance programs

- Prepare for gradual Phase IVC transition to Iraqi leadership


Appendix A
Manning of Office of
Justice Affairs
 (Proposed)



**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL POLICE
ADMINISTRATION
PHASE IVB - Day 1 -180
Table of Organization**




**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
POLICE DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION
Table of Organization
PHASE IVB Day 181 - 540**




**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
JUDICIAL TEAMS
ORGANIZATION**
(International Fill)

Day 1 - 180



**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
JUDICIAL TEAMS
ORGANIZATION**
(International Fill)

Day 181 - 540



Measures of Effectiveness

- Several regional criminal justice training centers have been identified, refurbishment substantially completed and are used to train justice sector personnel
- Justice sector hierarchy:
 - has been vetted, re-certified to positions or removed;
 - has undergone transition training; and
 - are capably functioning, as required.
- An effective vetting system is functioning for all remaining personnel and is substantially completed
- Inappropriate units have been disbanded, procedures/laws eliminated
- Functional working relationships have been developed between Iraq police, prosecutors, courts, Civil Administration and US military forces
- Iraq enjoys reasonable tranquility with only isolated/random and disorganized street crime

SHOW STOPPERS

- US/Coalition military does not provide appropriate security/law enforcement services until relieved by competent indigenous civilian police
- Money is not forthcoming quickly...lead time for ITPA/JTO start up is 5-6 weeks...training materials need to be prepared and contractors procured NOW
- Key policy decisions are not made including
 - Applicable law to be enforced and used in training
 - Size of US "footprint" in justice sector = amount of funding
 - Operations vs. development function of Civil Administration
- Early re-establishment of public order under rule of law is critical to success, but is achievable only if funds and staff are made available now.

Readings re: Scope of Planning

- State/Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
 - Police, Justice, and Prisons in Iraq: Concept of Post-Conflict Operations (2003)
 - Iraq: Policy Questions USG Involvement in Police, Justice & Prisons (2003)
- Appendix 4 – Public Order, PDD 56 Iraq Pol-Mil Plan (updated) (2002)
- CIA Justice Sector Reports (2002/2003)
- Interagency Papers on Iraq
 - Summary of Short-Term Sector Plans, Sector: Justice (2003)
 - Summary of Short-Term Sector Plans, Sector: Police, Justice, Prisons (2003)
- European Parliament resolution on the situation in Iraq eleven years after the Gulf War P5 TAPROV(2002)0248
- Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU, Workshop Report: "Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam's Rule" (2003)
- CSIS/AUSA Joint Project: Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Iraq) (2002)
- US Institute of Peace
 - Establishing Post-Conflict Security and the Rule of Law in Iraq (2003)
 - Controlling sources of political violence and instability (2003)
- State/"Future of Iraq" Project Issue Papers: Transitional Justice (2002/2003)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**Future of Iraq Project - Progress Report
Transitional Justice 3 Working Group**

The third session of the Transitional Justice working group met on January 9-10, 2003, in Washington, D.C., with 17 Iraqi judges, lawyers and human rights experts. Also attending were outside experts from State (DRL), INDICT, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the 352nd U.S. Army Civil Affairs unit. Outstanding Iraqi participants included:

- (b)(6) former Iraqi judge and (b)(6)
- (b)(6) a lawyer from Chicago and (b)(6)
- (b)(6) a lawyer from London and (b)(6)
- (b)(6) a lawyer from Dubai.
- (b)(6) former Iraqi judge (b)(6)
- (b)(6) a lawyer from Los Angeles.
- (b)(6) a retired lawyer and former diplomat

The members of the working group had prepared more than 600 pages of reports, draft laws and supporting materials.

Accountability, Truth and Reconciliation

- The TJ3 WG unanimously wants to see Saddam Hussein and his top associates tried in an Iraqi court. There was no Iraqi support for an international tribunal or a mixed Iraqi-international court. There was a strong consensus (not unanimity) in favor of the Iraqi court having international help -- in investigations, prosecutions, and as legal advisers to the judges.
- As to who should be prosecuted, the TJ3 WG agreed with the (b)(6) draft of the Democratic Principles WG report that Iraqi prosecutors should set up criteria to determine which Iraqis should be prosecuted, even if this eventually resulted in a large number of prosecutions. (The alternative view (b)(6) that there should be a smaller number of prosecutions was rejected.) The TJ3 WG

recognized that US/coalition military forces could not use a set of criteria in deciding whom to detain, and that US/coalition forces would have to work from a list.

- Instead of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the TJ3 WG proposed the idea of an office to receive complaints from victims of the regime. The office would investigate these complaints and decide which cases deserved prosecution. The victims could seek traditional remedies, including compensation from their persecutors, or they could apply for compensation.
- The TJ3 WG was evenly divided in whether there should be an amnesty offered to those Iraqis not prosecuted. Some members called for those not prosecuted to be offered amnesty to promote social peace. Other members said that reconciliation had to be handled on an individual basis between victim and persecutor, and that a broad amnesty would be possible only several years in the future.
- There was broad support for compensation for victims of the regime, but the modalities for awarding compensation were not discussed, nor was the overall cost of a compensation program in a country like Iraq.
- Considerable legal education will be required to train Iraqi jurists in the diaspora and, especially, inside Iraq. Iraqi lawyers are well-versed in Iraqi law, but not in international laws or international humanitarian law. The Iraqis asked that such a training program be initiated at once.

Legal Reform

- The TJ3 WG prepared draft laws revising, among others, the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Administrative Law, the Nationality Law, the Military Penal Code, and the Civil Code.
- The most controversial issue was the Nationality Law. Right now, essentially no external Iraqi oppositionist is eligible to vote or hold office in a future Iraqi government because almost all have been stripped of their Iraqi citizenship. This law will have to be changed before the first Iraqi election can be held. A draft was tabled that proposed revisions to the existing law.
 - Many members of the WG objected that the draft treated men and women differently, and that this had to be redrafted.

(For example, the new draft, based on an earlier 1924 Nationality Law, said that a woman automatically lost Iraqi citizenship if she married a foreigner, however a man marrying a foreigner did not.) The drafting committee immediately agreed that this had to be changed, and an expanded Nationality Law subcommittee was established.

- Because of the technical detail in the proposed laws, TJ3 WG participants will now review the drafts and submit comments in 3 weeks.

Institutional Reform

- The WG participants received reports on the reform of the judiciary, the police, and the prison systems, as well as de-Ba'athification and how to train judges and lawyers.
- Again, because of the technical detail in the proposals, WG participants will review them and submit comments in 3 weeks.

Next Meeting

The group agreed on a schedule to submit comments and redrafts, and wants to meet again on March 4-5.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TEAM

29 January 2003

In response to your request that we comment on the five (5) categories in the Initial SITREP, we offer the following:

- **Guidance/Guiding Principles/Assumptions**
 - **GUIDANCE-** Contained in recently acquired NSC briefing documents...important that we be tied in with the NSC group chaired by Elliot Abrams which is addressing post-conflict civil justice issues
 - **GUIDING PRINCIPLES-** Are set out in the NSPD.
 - The Planning Office (PO) must:
 - Draw on work that has already been accomplished;
 - Maintain close liaison with various groups in the inter-agency community (IAC);
 - Build links to the following groups that can play a role in meeting the needs of the Iraqi people;
 - "Specialized UN agencies"
 - NGOs
 - Counterpart planning offices in the governments of coalition countries
 - In coordination with the President's Special Envoy to Iraq, to Free Iraqi Forces
 - Under policy guidance from the ESG, DC and /or PC, as appropriate, invite representatives of governments of appropriate countries to participate in [planning office] efforts;
 - Deploy to Iraq;
 - Once deployed to Iraq, function as the nucleus of the administrative apparatus that will assist in administering Iraq for a limited period of time;
 - Maximize contributions from other governments, NGOs, international organizations and other members of the international community as appropriate; and
 - Work out a mutually acceptable relationship with the US Charge d'Affaires assigned to Baghdad to avoid infringing on each other's prerogatives
 - The civil administration of Iraq must, within a limited period of time, be turned over to the Iraqis
 - **ASSUMPTIONS-**
 - May not be terribly useful at this point since we have had little interaction with those in the IAC concerning this matter to date and other members of the team have yet to arrive at DOD;

▪ Tentative assumptions include:

- Post-conflict reform/development effort will be either a US-led, multi-national coalition effort or one sponsored and administered by the UN;
- Legal basis (Iraq Constitution, substantive criminal law, law of criminal procedure, organic police law, etc.) for law enforcement reform, development and operations will be resolved early on to provide a basis for functional definition, organizational building and training;
- Costs for reforming the Iraqi criminal justice system will be substantial...magnitude will be directly proportional to scope and depth of effort reform effort decided upon. US will expect substantial financial/in-kind contributions to fund effort from other coalition partners and nations;
- Iraqi civilian police development will take some time thus necessitating presence of military forces, robust constabulary (military police) and/or international civilian police presence to maintain adequate levels of peace and public order pending deployment of fully functional Iraqi National Police in order to facilitate reconstruction and efficient delivery of humanitarian aid;
- Existing structures will need to be carefully examined and reformed in a manner which allows them to function consistent with Principles of Democratic Policing;
- Police leadership will need to be vetted
- Public corruption will be significant problem that should be addressed firmly and effectively be development/reform of Iraqi civil service to include;
 - Legal basis for establishment and leadership of Iraq Corps of Public Service covering all non-elected public employees;
 - Provision for adequate wages and benefits to demotivate those inclined toward corruption;
 - Code of professional conduct for public officials and employees;
 - De-centralized, independent Office of Professional Standards empowered to receive, investigate and take action on citizen complaints of misconduct and corruption;
 - Management training to prepare senior and mid-level managers to operate their organizations effectively with high priority on anti-corruption measures

• **Contingency Planning**

- While we have extensive experience in post-conflict police reform/development (Haiti, El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor,

etc.), to date, the Department for Justice has not been included in any of the post-conflict planning which has been undertaken by others in the IAC.

- **Legal Issues**

- Law of Post-Conflict Occupation must be defined and agreed upon to serve as a basis for foundation and operation of transitional civil administration organizations
- The fundamental law of Iraq (Constitution) and that which;
 - Defines crimes;
 - Specifies procedures which are authorized for the prevention, detection and investigation of suspected criminal activity;
 - Provides guidance for the roles of the police and prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct;
 - Enumerates the rules of evidence;
 - Establishes trial procedures and standards; and
 - Prescribes sanctions for those convicted of criminal conduct...

must be either defined or developed and agreed upon early on to serve as the basis for development and training of police and prosecutors

- **Organization and Management Concerns**

- NSPD must serve as the organic document which describes and defines the mission, priorities and activities of the PO;
- Suggest that each Team (Reconstruction, Civil Administration, Humanitarian Assistance and Expeditionary Support) be required to develop an element (addressing their respective functional area) of an overall PO Implementation Plan to address each tasking set forth in the NSPD (See those listed under GUIDING PRINCIPLES above)
- Task Force Four is stepping off quickly to address many of the areas which, under the NSPD, the PO is responsible. They may be out in front of the role of the PO contemplated by the NSPD

- **Immediate Impacts and Shortfalls**

- Need to address legal issues immediately;
- Need to be integrated with the IAC and NSC-led groups studying/making recommendations regarding post-conflict Iraqi justice sector reforms/development;
- Need to link with TF4 via virtual net to align mutual responsibilities and facilitate communication...this will provide solace to both PO Director and SouthCom that important post-conflict issues are being properly addressed without duplication or, worse, divergent approaches'
- Recommend that all Teams develop informal components for PO Implementation Plan

29 January 2003

MEMO

To: Deputy Director
From: Civil Administration Staff
Subject: Input for Initial SITREP

• **Guidance/Guiding Principles/Assumptions**

- We are engaged in resource unconstrained planning.
- There will be a coalition military operation and a coalition occupation regime.
- Iraqi civilian police development will take some time thus necessitating presence of military forces, robust constabulary (military police) and/or international civilian police presence to maintain security and public order pending operations by fully functional police force.
- Not all Phase IV authority/functions will be administered with Iraqis in an advisory role.
- A set of occupying power "proclamations" will be promulgated which will, on an interim basis, set out basic governing principles, duties and responsibilities for the Iraqi people.
- Public corruption will be significant problem that will need to be dealt with firmly and effectively.
- Sufficient action will be taken/guarantees will be obtained by the U.S. to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq from external and internal threats during the occupation/Phase IV.
- UN Security Council will not establish and undertake a transitional administration.
- Any Security Council resolution will allow for all Phase IV activity planned and undertaken consistent with the Hague Convention as supplemented.
- Sufficient Iraqi infrastructure and acceptable levels of technocratic talent will exist to provide a suitable base for all Phase IV activities.

• **Contingency Planning**

- As soon as possible, JTF-4 and the Planning Group will achieve transparency and coordination during the planning process.
 - Lines of authority and responsibility among JTF-4 and the Planning Group will be established early in the planning process.
 - The decision to establish an advance party for the Planning Group will be made early in the planning process and its functions will be integrated into the coordinated planning with JTF-4.
 - Decisions concerning movement, administration, logistics and operational integration during occupation/Phase IV activities pertaining to any supporting NGOs and IOs will be made during the coordinated planning process with JTF-4.
 - Coordinated planning with JTF-4 will insure that Ba'th Party records, etc. are captured and maintained to foster activities regarding vetting of ministries/institutions and investigations of suspected war crimes/human rights violations.
 - A decision concerning the centralization or decentralization of government-type services will be made during the coordinated planning process with JTF-4 to insure unity of approach.
- **Legal Issues**
 - Does the law of war or any other binding legal precedent require that the ultimate authority on the ground in a post-conflict occupation be a military officer? Can a civilian wield ultimate governing authority?
 - Is there enough flexibility under the Hague Convention as supplemented to allow the Planning Group to determine the body of laws that will govern both during the occupation and all Phase IV stages?
 - Are there sufficient legal precedents and existing arrangements and agreements to insure that non-DoD government agencies, NGOs, IOs, civilians, can receive support from military resources (equipment, systems, personnel) during Phase IV stages.
- **Organization and Management Concerns**
 - Create a virtual work environment on the secure net between JTF-4 and the Planning Group at a minimum to save time and foster unity of effort.
 - Determine whether there is a need for state level expertise to be added to the Planning Group re: governance, relations with federal authorities, etc.

- **Immediate Impacts and Shortfalls**

- Need JTF-4 Liaison here yesterday.
- We must have total access to all products of each of State Department's "Future of Iraq Project" working groups and those at any other interagency level. Copies of briefing slides are insufficient. POCs and products must be provided ASAP to the Planning Group by State/NSC.
- Need to immediately farm out, but control process of, (1) vetting of current Iraqi constitution and law (see legal gazettes) to insure suitability (i.e., utility and consistency with international legal standards - human rights, etc.) during occupation/Phase IV activities.
- Coordinated planning needed to select, from laws found suitable, those that must form the interim body of law to be applied through "proclamation" at the outset of the occupation.

POST-WAR TASKS

31 Jan 03

- CREATE TRANSITIONAL SECURITY FORCE EQUIPPED TO HANDLE POST-CONFLICT SECURITY NEEDS
- SECURE AND ELIMINATE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONDUCT FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT) OPS AS REQUIRED
- RETRAINING OF REGULAR ARMY
- PROTECTION OF OIL INFRASTRUCTURE
- PROTECTION IF IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
- ELIMINATION OF REPUBLICAN GUARDS AND SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARDS
- SECURITY OF BAATH HEADQUARTERS AND SADDAM'S PALACES
- DISMANTLING OF INTERNAL; SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS
- ESTABLISH PROVINCIAL TRANSITION ADMINISTRATION
- IDENTIFY AND BEGIN "QUICK START" RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
- DEVELOP DE-BAATHIFICATION PROCESS FOR VETTING GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES
- ORGANIZE FOR DECENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND PAYING SALARIES AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL
- DEVELOP PROVINCIAL DIALOGUE PROCESS – CREATE ENVIRONMENT TO IDENTIFY LOCAL TALENT AND CAPACITY
- DEPLOY AND ESTABLISH JUSTICE TEAM OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EXPERTS, JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, CORRECTIONS OFFICERS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION EXPERTS
- INTEGRATE AND ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL CONSTABULARY FORCES (I.E. CARABINIERE, GENDARMERIE)
- DEPLOY INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE OFFICERS
- PROMULGATION OF OCCUPATION/PHASE IV "LEGAL REGIME" (TRANSITION LAWS & POLICIES)
- ESTABLISH "CONSTABULARY POLICING CAPABILITY

POST-WAR TASKS

31 Jan 03

- SECURING LEGITIMATE MANDATE FOR US PHASE IV, EITHER THROUGH GENEVA CONVENTIONS IV OR THE UNSC
- BEGIN DEVELOPMENT/SUPPORT OF A THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR IRAQ, SIMILAR TO NUNN-LUGAR FOR RUSSIA. SPECIAL INTEREST PLACED ON HIGH-INTEREST PERSONNEL – SCIENTISTS, ETC.
- IDENTIFY AND SECURE WAREHOUSES CONTAINING GOODS PROCURED UNDER OFF
- RESTORE OFF DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM
- ADMINISTER PORT OPERATIONS
- PREVENT ATROCITIES (GREEN-ON-GREEN)
- FUEL MANAGEMENT (COOKING OIL, GENERATORS, TRANSPORTATION)
- PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

Justice Sector Major Decision Issues


6 February 2003

- 1) Absent four thousand (4,000) or so US/international civilian police or three thousand (3,000) international military/civilian (constabulary forces) police, US military must provide police service as well as manage and monitor indigenous police in Phase IV post-conflict environment. All anecdotal evidence indicates that JTF4 force structure is not adequate to meet this requirement.
- 2) IS USG comfortable with constructing and deploying a sizable CivPol-like US civilian police force throughout Iraq in the absence of UN-furnished CivPol? Such a force does not now exist...cost to recruit, select, train, deploy and operate it approximate \$700M for first year! Are funds of that magnitude available?
- 3) Additionally, there are no funds presently available/earmarked with which to commence preparations for civilian law enforcement and justice sector management, monitoring and/or reformation (preliminary estimates for this work approximate 10\$M):
 - a) Development of training materials
 - b) Recruitment and selection of persons to:
 - i) Vet existing Iraq police
 - ii) Train existing Iraq police
 - c) Build and train transitional police, judicial and correctional administrations

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ATTACHMENT 1

**JUSTICE SECTOR
Management and Reform
Relationships**
(Proposed)
7 February 2003




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**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
POLICE
ADMINISTRATION**

February 7, 2003
Rev.0

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**OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION
AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE**

(Post-Conflict Planning Group)

Civil Administration Section
Justice Sector

POLICE GOALS

- **Provide framework for immediate police “stabilization” by:**
 - Assuming command over indigenous forces
 - Augmenting local police with US police with executive authority to both monitor and execute police functions
 - Identifying and removing/disbanding inappropriate persona and units
- **Reform Iraq police structures and operations consistent with Principles of Policing in free Society to ensure ROL**
- **Provide foundation to transition to legitimate Iraqi control in one year**

ASSUMPTIONS

- **Numbers are impressive;**
 - 3,000,000 IDPs and 1,000,000 refugees from neighboring countries
 - 70,000-100,000 police “in several ministries” require supervision
- **Serious law enforcement problems will be encountered**
 - Police lack legitimacy in eyes of public
 - Real potential for conflicts arising from property disputes, vigilante/retribution activities, civil disturbances fomented by subversives or resulting from humanitarian aid frustrations
- **Post-conflict conditions will overwhelm Iraqi capabilities to maintain public order**

ROLE OF THE US MILITARY

- In the absence of a credible, indigenous police force, the burden of both executive-level law enforcement and oversight of Iraqi police will fall on the US Military occupation forces (MPs and infantry)

PRIORITIES FOR POLICE SERVICE

- Implementation strategy focuses upon secure, major population centers in a rolling, province-by-province approach
- Police operations, management and reform will occur over three sequences...
 - I - Pre-deployment of CA/Staff (Planning, policy development resource identification)
 - II - Six month period following deployment of CA/Staff (Start-up, assessment, preliminary operations, vetting of senior officials, etc.)
 - III- Longer-term transition to Iraqi control

JUSTICE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

- Office of Justice Affairs will be established in-Country to oversee operations, management and reform of;
 - Police Function
 - Prosecutorial Function
 - Courts
 - Corrections Function
- Each function will be managed by a transitional administrator

REQUIRED RESOURCES

- US and coalition partners will furnish resources required for police operations, management and reform during sequences I and II
- In sequence III, international partners will contribute personnel, funds, equipment and/or materiel to reform effort

SEQUENCE I – Pre-Deployment Activities

(Continued)

- **Develop...**
 - *Police Annex to Iraq Transitional Public Administration Plan*
 - *Iraq Transitional Police Management and Development Plan*
 - Operational/oversight duties/techniques of US civilian police
 - Vetting of officials and units of the Iraq Police
 - Recruiting and selecting protocols for new police
 - Standards and policies for Iraq police
 - Public Affairs
 - Organizational re-structuring
 - Facility refurbishment
 - Training
 - Internships
 - Equipment/materiel donations

SEQUENCE I – Pre-Deployment Activities

- Establish/promulgate applicable constitution and law
- Identify functions and senior personnel of all ministries now performing police-like activities
- Establish/refine working inter-agency linkages
- Establish working relationships with and agree upon early roles for coalition countries

SEQUENCE II – Post-deployment Startup Activities

- Establish liaison with US military commander
- Create Office of Justice Affairs and transitional justice sector administrations
- Perform comprehensive assessment of...
 - Iraq police organizations (Identity of senior officials, police functions performed, police command/control structure, etc.)
 - Relevant in-country conditions (police-community relationships, crime problem, etc.)

SEQUENCE II – Post-deployment Startup Activities (Continued)

- Execute plans including
 - *Public Service Administration Plan* to:
 - Vet, assign, promote and compensate all legitimate police personnel
 - Remove unqualified personnel
 - *Iraq Transitional Police Management and Development Plan* to:
 - Deliver and manage police services to the Iraqi populations, first in conjunction with US military, then in conjunction with Iraqis then by Iraqis alone
- Disband inappropriate units

**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
POLICE
ADMINISTRATION**

February 7, 2003

Rev.0

**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
POLICE ADMINISTRATION**
Police Administrator

Deputy Police
Administrator

**OPERATIONS
BUREAU**

Criminal
Investigations
Division

Police Regional
Operations Division
North

Police Regional
Operations Division
Central

Police Regional
Operations Division
South

**OPERATIONS
SUPPORT BUREAU**

Communications
Division

Professional
Standards Division

Training
Division

Planning and
Evaluation Division


**ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPPORT BUREAU**

Budget and Fiscal
Affairs Division

Personnel
Division

Logistics
Division

Information
Management
Division



SEQUENCE I AND II PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

- Police hierarchy...
 - Have been vetted, re-certified to positions or removed
 - Undergone transition training
 - Are functioning in advisory capacity
- Vetting of remaining police personnel has begun
- Four-five regional criminal justice training centers have been identified and refurbishment substantially completed
- Iraq police in secure areas are being regularly compensated
- Inappropriate units have been disbanded
- Functional working relationships have been developed between Iraq police, US Transitional Administration and US military forces

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ACTION MEMO

I# 03/000669-P&R
9 February, 2003

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Chris Lamb, DASD (Resources and Plans)

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Maintaining Public Order during Combat Operations in Iraq

(U) Background.

- ~~(S)~~ This memo has been revised per your instructions to highlight aspects of a plan to maintain order in Iraq that are not obvious and also solutions that assist CENTCOM.
- (U) However, even agreed upon aspects of maintaining order in Iraq may suffer from lack of detailed planning given evolving plans and conflicting priorities.
- ~~(S)~~ The post-war planning office expects that CENTCOM will provide forces for maintaining order from the beginning. CENTCOM believes these forces have other priorities.
- ~~(S)~~ The Principals and Deputies Committees will address Rear Area Operations on 18 and 20 February, respectively, and this issue could be addressed at that time.

(U) Key Planning Assumption. Currently the fundamental planning assumption about maintaining order is that swift combat operations will limit large civil disturbances:

- ~~(S)~~ Winning swiftly, with its component parts of seizing key infrastructure; deterring, disrupting or controlling WMD; defeating or compelling the capitulation of Iraqi forces; and killing, apprehending or marginalizing regime leaders is the primary means of limiting consequences to our forces and the Iraqi populace.
- (U) The same assumption was made in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and proved wrong; massive civil disorder began almost immediately.

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(U) Key Issues. A summary and full version of our recommended Concept for Public Order planning during combat operations is at Tabs A and B, respectively. The central planning issue addressed in the concept is how to leverage our limited force size and the Iraqi civil police to minimize disorder and set the conditions for success in post-combat operations.

- ~~(S)~~ In particular, we raise three key issues that require Policy attention.
- ~~(S)~~ 1. Can we immediately use the existing National Civil Police as a means to maintain order?
 - ~~(S)~~ We assume that the 30-50K National Civil Police force can be of assistance to us if it is properly coopted.
 - ~~(S)~~ This organization is corrupt and incompetent but some individual police are professional. They generally report to the regular army and are not relied upon for regime security. They are able to conduct basic police activities. Otherwise there is scant intelligence on this organization.
 - (U) Given the shortage of our own forces, we think it is worth trying to use the Civil Police and recommend that:
 - ~~(S)~~ we increase intelligence efforts to identify National Civil Police leaders.
 - ~~(S)~~ the IO campaign target local Civil Police leaders with their future is tied to their assistance in maintaining order and assisting post-Saddam authorities;
 - ~~(S)~~ the IO campaign inform the Iraqi populace that Iraqi laws remain in force, Civil Police will enforce them, and that any abuses should be reported to Coalition authorities.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil Affairs officers contact Civil Police and other local leaders to encourage, and even negotiate assistance in maintaining order.
- ~~(S)~~ 2. Can we devote sufficient forces to serve as a Quick Reaction Force to quell disorder in physically unoccupied areas?
 - ~~(S)~~ Given our limited ability to occupy all Iraq and the limited abilities of the National Civil Police, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) capability is required.
 - (U) Specifically we recommend that:
 - ~~(S)~~ options be identified to source the QRF from existing combat units, the Theater Reserve, Rear Area Forces or Coalition partners.

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- ~~(S)~~ the QRF have high priority for scarce Civil Affairs, Linguist, PSYOP, Military Police, Non-lethal Weapons, and mobility capabilities.
- ~~(S)~~ 3. Will our Information Operations and Public Affairs campaigns adequately address public order issues?
 - ~~(S)~~ The current information operations campaign addresses security and safety but lacks specific messages with respect to maintaining public order.
 - (U) The IO campaign should be expanded to include the following messages:
 - ~~(S)~~ All Iraqis should respect the rule of law. Violators will be prosecuted.
 - ~~(S)~~ The civil police will be held accountable for enforcing the law and respecting the rights of all Iraq citizens. Abuses of power will be punished.
 - ~~(S)~~ The IO campaign should also target key tribal leaders and National Civil Police leaders to inform them they are identified and that their future is tied to their assistance in maintaining order during the transition to post-Saddam Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION:

- ~~(S)~~ Indicate to the Vice-Chairman in a CAPCOM that you intend to raise these issues in the scheduled Rear Areas Security briefs to the PC/DC's.
- ~~(S)~~ Request a briefing prior to the PC/DCs from the Joint Staff on plans to maintain law and order during and immediately following combat operations.

Attachments:

As stated.

Prepared by:

(b)(2),(b)(6)

Maintaining Public Order in Iraq during Combat Operations (Phases II and III) Background/Planning Considerations

- ~~(S)~~ Historically, the U.S. has struggled with reestablishing and maintaining public order and safety during and after military operations. Civil disturbances, looting, and ethnic violence have marred operations in the past.
 - (U) Acts of disorder and civil disobedience increase humanitarian assistance requirements, expose U.S. forces to greater risk, and ultimately detract from the success of the operation.
- ~~(S)~~ The visibility of US operations in Iraq and the potential for civil disorder to undermine military successes is a "win the war but lose the peace" scenario.
- ~~(S)~~ The Arab world will certainly look at our treatment of the Iraqi people throughout the operation as a signal of our intentions in the long term. Thus, US/Coalition forces must be effective at maintaining order and safety from the outset of the campaign.
- ~~(S)~~ Some degree of civil disorder—ranging from common lawlessness to ethnic/religious reprisals to regime-generated acts that cause major disorder and harm—could occur.
 - ~~(S)~~ Reprisals are most likely to occur in three situations:
 - ~~(S)~~ Kurdish attempts to expand their control and "de-arabize" the north.
 - ~~(S)~~ Shi'a citizens taking revenge against Sunni government, Ba'th party and security officials in the south.
 - ~~(S)~~ Sunni and Shi'a fighting each other in and around Baghdad as the regime destabilizes.
 - ~~(S)~~ Acts that have the greatest potential for creating major civil disorder and harm are most likely to be regime-generated:
 - ~~(S)~~ Saddam's use of WMD directed at US/Coalition forces, Kurds in the north, or Shi'a in the south.
 - ~~(S)~~ The regime's use of flooding to displace large numbers of civilians and inhibit the advance of US/Coalition forces.
 - ~~(S)~~ Saddam's intentional use of conventional military capabilities against the Iraqi people to create havoc and sway opinion by blaming the casualties on US/Coalition action.
- ~~(S)~~ The limited size of US/Coalition forces will make maintaining public order challenging as they seize or—more likely—bypass population centers in Phases II/III.
- ~~(S)~~ The preponderance of military effort in Phases II and III is focused on:

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- ~~(S)~~ Seizing key infrastructure.
- ~~(S)~~ Deterring, disrupting or controlling WMD systems.
- ~~(S)~~ Defeating or compelling the capitulation of Iraqi forces.
- ~~(S)~~ Apprehending, marginalizing or killing regime leaders.
- ~~(S)~~ At best, maintaining public order will be an ancillary task for most operational forces.
- ~~(S)~~ Maintaining public order in Phases II and III, however, sets the stage for Phase IV (post-war reconstruction), which is designed to improve civil and material conditions rapidly.
- ~~(S)~~ Deterrence and small-scale response are the primary means of maintaining order in Phases II and III
 - ~~(S)~~ Aggressive information operations, public affairs, civil affairs and humanitarian assistance campaigns will play a central role in deterring key leaders or the populace in general in acts of civil disorder
 - ~~(S)~~ Show-of-force and quick-response actions are the primary means of preventing low levels of disorder from escalating into more serious incidents.
- ~~(S)~~ Ensuring Iraq remains a viable state is central to the attainment of U.S. strategic objectives and must be a constant theme throughout the operation. Consequently,
 - ~~(S)~~ Disorder cannot escalate to the point of fracturing Iraq along ethnic, religious or tribal lines.
 - ~~(S)~~ The Iraqi National Civil Police should be supported as the primary means of maintaining public order.
 - ~~(S)~~ Iraqi laws must be upheld in areas occupied or controlled by US/ Coalition forces.
- ~~(S)~~ Surrendering Iraqi military units must be segregated from the populace, disarmed and prevented from engaging in acts that would foment civil unrest or disorder.
- ~~(S)~~ Since 70% of Iraqis were born after the Gulf War and have been inundated with anti-US propaganda, it is reasonable to expect that some non-combatants might perform hostile acts against US/coalition forces or take actions to inhibit U.S. operations.
- ~~(S)~~ No current policy guidance provides US forces with the means to balance maintaining public order with operational requirements.

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PUBLIC ORDER PLAN—OVERVIEW

- ~~(S)~~ We recommend a three-tier approach to maintaining Iraqi civil order. The goal of this approach is to maintain civil order at near-pre-war levels, relying primarily on deterrence and the existing Iraqi civil law enforcement infrastructure.
- Under relatively calm circumstances, US/coalition forces will be used minimally for presence or a show of force.
- Additional forces will be brought in incrementally for physical intervention as the severity of disorder dictates.
- ~~(S)~~ Deterrence under this approach is designed to:
 - ~~(S)~~ Limit civil disorder
 - ~~(S)~~ Limit the siphoning of forces required for combat operations
 - ~~(S)~~ Facilitate the rapid transition to post-war activities.
- **(U) This approach is based upon seven tenets:**
 - ~~(S)~~ Extensive and aggressive information operations, public affairs and civil affairs and humanitarian assistance campaigns are the primary means of maintaining public order.
 - ~~(S)~~ While protecting noncombatants is a priority, military requirements will take precedence.
 - ~~(S)~~ Preventing civilian interference with military operations will require temporary control measures (e.g., travel restrictions and curfews are examples).
 - ~~(S)~~ Some intelligence assets and civil affairs personnel must be devoted to identifying activities that could lead to Iraqi civil disorder.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) should have the responsibility of coordinating with local Iraqi government and be located near the most influential authority in a region.
 - ~~(S)~~ Because the size of the US/Coalition force is limited, the physical occupation and control of all urban areas in Iraq is not possible.
 - ~~(S)~~ The ultimate objective of US/Coalition operations is the creation of an Iraqi state that respects the rule of law and can be held up as a model for the Arab world.
 - ~~(S)~~ The success of this objective rests not only on the successful maintenance of civil order during Phases II and III but also the rapid transition to and successful execution of Phase IV (reconstruction) activities.

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- ~~(S)~~ Therefore, ensuring that public order is maintained during and after operations is a critical, foundational task.
- ~~(S)~~ **Tier 1: Contain public disorder at minimum levels.**
 - ~~(S)~~ Tier 1 activities are designed to deter civil disorder and, if necessary, defuse or contain minor incidents rapidly and effectively
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil order is maintained by remaining local Iraqi civil police who enforce existing Iraqi laws.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil disorder is deterred largely through aggressive information operations, public affairs and civil affairs campaigns.
 - ~~(S)~~ US/Coalition combat forces will help to deter civil disorder by remaining visible to the degree possible.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil affairs units will be the primary link to local governments and the civil police.
- ~~(S)~~ **Tier 2: Containing disorder that exceeds the National Civil Police's capability.**
 - ~~(S)~~ Tier 2 activities are triggered when the scope of disorder exceeds the ability of local police forces to control and eliminate it.
 - ~~(S)~~ Incidents of this sort require the employment of a Quick Reaction Force to support Iraqi civil police.
 - ~~(S)~~ These forces are employed quickly enough to quell disorder before it escalates and requires significantly greater forces.
 - ~~(S)~~ Addressing these incidents rapidly and at the lowest level also serves to mitigate their negative effect on Iraqi, Arab, and world opinion.
 - ~~(S)~~ At a minimum, Quick Reaction Forces should have the following capabilities:
 - (U) Civil Affairs
 - (U) Arabic Language/Translation
 - (U) Psychological Operations
 - (U) Military Police
 - ~~(S)~~ Non-lethal operations/weapons
 - ~~(S)~~ To the maximum degree possible, US/Coalition forces use non-lethal weapons technology to control disorder.
 - ~~(S)~~ Show-of-force operations increase commensurate with the potential for greater disorder or violence.

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- ~~(S)~~ Tier 2 operations are designed to restore order quickly to a Tier 1 level, thus facilitating further military operations and the transition to Phase IV activities.
- ~~(S)~~ Tier 3: Containing mass disturbances that exceed the QRF's capability.
 - ~~(S)~~ Tier 3 response operations are triggered when the scope of disorder overwhelms the Iraqi civil police and results in large-scale mayhem (e.g., rampant killing, rioting, major destruction of property, etc.)
 - ~~(S)~~ Tier 3-level disturbances require significantly more forces to reinstate civil order than the QRF can provide.
 - ~~(S)~~ The requirement for additional forces could detract from the accomplishment of combat missions.
 - ~~(S)~~ These disturbances, if unchecked, threaten the Coalition's rapid transition to post-war reconstruction and the expeditious return of Iraq to civic normalcy.
- ~~(S)~~ Information operations and public affairs themes play a critical role in the success of Tier 3 activities.
 - ~~(S)~~ They should assist in bringing the country back to stability and ensure that those responsible for criminal activities are properly blamed and made known to the world media.

~~(S)~~ TIER 1 ACTIVITIES FOR ADDRESSING DISORDER

- ~~(S)~~ Disorder addressed by Tier 1 activities does not inhibit US/Coalition forces from executing military tasks or create significant additional post-war reconstruction requirements.
- ~~(S)~~ Tier 1 activities are designed to:
 - ~~(S)~~ Convey to the Iraqi populace to remain calm.
 - ~~(S)~~ Limit tensions that could result in civil disorder.
 - ~~(S)~~ Limit the requirement for US/Coalition forces to maintain order.
 - ~~(S)~~ Minimize Phase IV requirements.
- (U) Disorder addressed by Tier 1 operations includes:
 - (U) Minor criminal activity within the capacity of the local civil police to control.
 - (U) Minor demonstrations within the capability of the civil police to control without resort to violence.
 - ~~(S)~~ Property disputes in Kurdish controlled north. —
 - ~~(S)~~ Limited reprisal actions in US/Coalition-controlled areas.
- ~~(S)~~ Impact on US/Coalition Operations:
 - ~~(S)~~ Diplomatic: Will require a steady flow of information and assurance to other governments, particularly those in the region, that US/Coalition actions are aimed at minimizing the impact on Iraqi civilians.
 - ~~(S)~~ Informational: Limited disorder will result in minor international and regional concern, as the focus will be on combat operations. Information themes are directed primarily at the Iraqi people.
 - ~~(S)~~ Military: Minimal impact on combat forces. US/Coalition forces' freedom of movement is not inhibited.
 - ~~(S)~~ Economic: Minimal impact at this point, particularly with respect to post-war requirements.
- (U) Tier 1 US/Coalition activities include:
 - ~~(S)~~ Execution of an aggressive IO campaign with themes/messages aimed at:
 - ~~(S)~~ Stressing that Iraq remains a sovereign state.

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- ~~(S)~~ Emphasizing that US/Coalition forces are liberating Iraq from an illegitimate, repressive dictator.
 - The protection of property, public safety, and the improvement of material conditions for all Iraqi citizens are major goals of US/Coalition forces.
- ~~(S)~~ Reassuring the Iraqis that key infrastructure such as oil fields seized by US/Coalition forces will be returned to Iraq after the war to ensure its economic recovery and long-term viability.
 - ~~(S)~~ This infrastructure will not be exploited for the economic advantage of the US or its coalition partners.
- ~~(S)~~ Requesting that citizens who have witnessed or know of criminal activity by the Ba'th regime provide that information to designated US/Coalition Civil Affairs officers.
- ~~(S)~~ Stating that Iraqi law remains in force, lawbreakers will be held accountable and civil police forces will be held responsible for maintaining law and order.
 - ~~(S)~~ Themes/messages should stress in particular that those who commit human rights abuses will be prosecuted".
- ~~(S)~~ Encouraging all civilians to remain in place so that US/Coalition forces can rapidly and effectively provide humanitarian assistance.
- ~~(S)~~ Warning defeated Iraqi forces to lay down their arms and refrain from attempting to maintain civil order.
- ~~(S)~~ Stressing that ethnic, tribal or religious reprisals are not acceptable and those who engage in reprisals will be held, accountable.
- ~~(S)~~ Promulgating temporary control measures, such as travel restrictions and curfews.
 - ~~(S)~~ Information Operations and Public Affairs campaigns should stress that these measures are designed to protect non-combatants.
- ~~(S)~~ Conducting routine show-of-force to:
 - ~~(S)~~ Deter or limit civil disorder.
 - ~~(S)~~ Deter defeated Iraqi military units from attempting to impose civil control.
 - ~~(S)~~ Complement the public affairs campaign that encourages Iraqi citizens to continue obeying the law.
 - ~~(S)~~ Prevent destruction to sensitive sites (mosques, hospitals, schools etc.).
- ~~(S)~~ Pursuing a public affairs campaign aimed at:

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- ~~(S)~~ Reinforcing the US/Coalition's intent to liberate Iraqi citizens, rapidly improve living conditions, and return the country normalcy as an independent, democratic state.
 - ~~(S)~~ US/Coalition should promote how it is eradicating the desperate conditions imposed by the Ba' thist regime on Iraqi citizens.
 - ~~(S)~~ Exposing how the regime's actions have harmed Iraqi citizens and ensuring regime-generated propaganda is exposed for what it is.
- ~~(S)~~ Implementing a civil affairs campaign aimed at:
 - ~~(S)~~ Limiting Iraqi local civil organizations' interference with US/Coalition operations.
 - ~~(S)~~ To accomplish this task, CMOCs should be located near the most influential civil organizations and individuals.
 - ~~(S)~~ Coordinating and providing humanitarian assistance.
 - ~~(S)~~ Ensuring the expeditious handoff of humanitarian assistance to NGO's.
- ~~(S)~~ Beginning some Phase IV (reconstruction) activities during Phase III aimed at:
 - ~~(S)~~ Providing humanitarian assistance as early as the security situation permits to lesson the potential for civil disorder.
 - ~~(S)~~ Beginning the early vetting and retraining of civil police as the security situation and resources permit.
- ~~(S)~~ Demonstrating US/Coalition intent to rapidly improve the material condition of Iraqis.
- ~~(S)~~ Tripwires to Tier 2.
 - ~~(S)~~ Local civil police forces are unable to regain order by themselves.
 - ~~(S)~~ The degree of violence/disorder is great enough to threaten the security of IO/NGO's providing humanitarian assistance.
 - ~~(S)~~ The amount of civil disorder hinders the transition to Phase IV activities.
 - (U) Civil police forces cannot to stop ethnic, religious or tribal reprisals.
 - (U) Armed action against the civil police and/or US/Coalition forces is anticipated.
 - ~~(S)~~ Lawless elements are about to or have begun to destroy sensitive cultural, ethnic or civil sites, such as mosques or hospitals.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civilians displaced by civil disorder are impairing the successful execution of US/Coalition operations.

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~~(S)~~ **TIER 2 ACTIVITIES FOR ADDRESSING DISORDER**

- (U) Actions at this level are intended to quickly quell disorder that could escalate and impair US/Coalition military operations.
- (U) The objective of Tier 2 actions is the reduction of disorder to levels handled by Tier 1 activities.
- (U) **Tier 2 events include:**
 - (U) Inability of civil policy to control limited ethnic, religious or tribal reprisals.
 - ~~(S)~~ Increased Shi'a activity against government officials (e.g., Ba'th party or security) in the south resulting in increased numbers of displaced civilians and press visibility.
 - ~~(S)~~ Increased number of Kurd reprisals against Arabs in the north (including seizure of property) resulting in increased number of displaced civilians and press visibility.
 - ~~(S)~~ Disorder that destabilizes local security to the point that NGO's are not able to provide humanitarian assistance.
 - ~~(S)~~ Activities that inhibit the transition to Phase IV activities.
 - (U) Armed action against local civil police forces that significantly impedes their ability to maintain public order and displaces in increasing numbers of civilians.
 - ~~(S)~~ Disorder that results in the destruction of sensitive ethnic, religious or civil sites (mosques or hospitals as an example).
 - ~~(S)~~ Religious sites in the Shi'a-dominated cities of Karbala and An Najaf are particularly important to protect within the capabilities of the forces available.
 - ~~(S)~~ Until the regime is removed and Baghdad is secured, US/Coalition forces will have limited ability to control violence there.
 - ~~(S)~~ The information operations campaign will play the main role in influencing Baghdad's citizens to obey existing laws and deter the regime from taking actions that would cause rampant disorder.
- ~~(S)~~ **Impact on US/Coalition Operations:**
 - ~~(S)~~ Diplomatic: Will require immediate reassurance to governments in the region that US/Coalition forces are taking appropriate action. The USG should solicit

both financial and security force contributions from international and regional partners.

- ~~(S)~~ Informational: Increased visibility and focus can be expected as Tier 2 level civil disorder events occur. Will require proactive information operations and public affairs campaigns. These campaigns should stress the US/Coalition's intent to liberate the Iraqi people and materially improve conditions. The media will focus on the amount of force US/Coalition forces use. .
- ~~(S)~~ Military: Will require that some forces be diverted from combat tasks. It is imperative that these forces quell any disorder expeditiously and return to performing their primary military tasks.
- ~~(S)~~ Economic: The cost of reconstruction can be expected to increase as the level of disorder increases, particularly as the nation's infrastructure is damaged or destroyed. Contributions from international and regional partners will help offset the expenses of rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure.
- ~~(S)~~ Tier 2 US/Coalition actions include:
 - ~~(S)~~ Adding new themes/messages to the Information Operations Campaign:
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil disorder inhibits US/Coalition forces from improving conditions in Iraq.
 - ~~(S)~~ Violators of Iraqi civil law will be prosecuted.
 - ~~(S)~~ Expanding the Public Affairs Campaign to highlight the humanitarian intent of US/Coalition intervention efforts and emphasize that civil disorder inhibits the Coalition from helping Iraq recover from the war.
 - ~~(S)~~ Focus the Civil Affairs activities on preventing civic disorder from escalating by reinforcing the viability of existing civil organizations.
 - ~~(S)~~ Increasing "show of force" operations to deter acts that would bring about large scale disorder, the widespread destruction of property, or a large number of civilian deaths.
 - ~~(S)~~ These show-of-force operations should reinforce the authority of local civil police.
 - ~~(S)~~ Deploying Quick Reaction Forces to flash points, which serves several purposes:
 - ~~(S)~~ The quick suppression of disorder before it escalates and requires significantly increased forces.
 - ~~(S)~~ The prevention or reduction of injury to the Iraqi citizenry, whose harm could sway Iraqi/Arab/World opinion against Coalition forces.

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- ~~(S)~~ Non-lethal weapons technology should be used to quell disorder to the extent possible consistent with protecting US/Coalition forces.
- ~~(S)~~ In particular, deploying emerging non-lethal weapons technology, such as area denial weapons, should be considered.
- ~~(S)~~ The protection of sensitive cultural and religious sites.
 - ~~(S)~~ Employing regional partners to protect cultural/religious sites should be explored and encouraged.
- ~~(S)~~ Tripwires to Tier 3.
 - ~~(S)~~ Armed action that prevents the civil police from maintaining public order.
 - ~~(S)~~ Reliable intelligence indicating that mass killings resulting from ethnic, religious or tribal reprisals are imminent.
 - ~~(S)~~ Intelligence indicating that the regime is performing acts that will produce wide-scale non-combatant casualties, rioting or other humanitarian crises.
 - ~~(S)~~ Mass demonstrations beyond the civil police's ability to control are imminent.
 - ~~(S)~~ These demonstrations would undermine the Coalition's humanitarian assistance efforts and its transition to Phase IV reconstruction activities.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil disorder that threatens or inhibits US/Coalition forces from conducting effective military operations.

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~~(S)~~ **TIER 3 ACTIVITIES FOR ADDRESSING DISORDER**

- ~~(S)~~ Actions at this level are required to reinstate public order in the face of mass demonstrations or rioting, widespread harm to non-combatants, or other major interference in the maintenance or restoration of stability and order.
- ~~(S)~~ Disorder of this magnitude:
 - ~~(S)~~ Exceeds the capacity of the civil police and quick reaction forces to control.
 - ~~(S)~~ Diverts US/Coalition forces from military operations and threatens the successful transition to and accomplishment of post-War reconstruction.
- ~~(S)~~ Tier 3 events threaten the accomplishment of the US Strategic Objectives and include:
 - ~~(S)~~ Regime actions that result in mass casualties or major humanitarian crises.
 - ~~(S)~~ This includes not only widespread murder but also scorched-earth tactics.
 - ~~(S)~~ Actions that could lead to the division of the country along ethnic or religious lines (e.g., Kurd attempts to further their autonomy, Shi'a opposition forces conducting mass reprisals, etc).
 - ~~(S)~~ Mass killings resulting from ethnic, religious or tribal reprisals or conflict.
 - ~~(S)~~ These events have the potential to divert considerable forces from military operations to populace control.
 - ~~(S)~~ Mass demonstrations beyond the civil police's ability to control, that dramatically increase humanitarian assistance requirements, and impede the Coalition's ability to transition to and accomplish Phase IV activities.
 - ~~(S)~~ Armed action that prevents the civil police from maintaining public order.
 - ~~(S)~~ Civil disorder that inhibits or prevents US/Coalition military operations.
 - ~~(S)~~ Activities that present a widespread threat to US/Coalition forces.
- ~~(S)~~ **Impact on US/Coalition Operations:**
 - ~~(S)~~ **Diplomatic:** Will require proactive, forceful diplomacy to ensure international support of US/Coalition actions designed to return Iraq rapidly to a state of civil order. Regional partners' participation in security operations is essential.
 - ~~(S)~~ **Informational:** Can expect immediate, highly visible coverage of any disorder requiring a Tier 3 response. Coalitions themes and messages must continue to emphasize the humanitarian aspect of US/Coalition involvement. Equally

important, is the need to stress that US/Coalition forces are not responsible for the disorder. Identification of the real perpetrators—whether they be associated with the regime, other elements inside Iraq, or another nation—should be a priority message to the international community.

- ~~(S)~~ Military: Can expect that the scope of the event will require the diversion of significant combat capability. The assistance of regional partners is essential.
- ~~(S)~~ Economic: The nature and scope of the event will determine the post-hostilities requirement. A significant increase in the resources required for post-war reconstruction should be anticipated. Immediate contributions from international and regional partners are essential to offsetting these increased costs.
- ~~(S)~~ Tier 3 US/Coalition actions include:
 - ~~(S)~~ Deploying significant US/Coalition forces into urban areas to:
 - ~~(S)~~ Reestablish civil order.
 - ~~(S)~~ Maximum participation of regional partners should be considered.
 - ~~(S)~~ The ethnic implications of deploying regional partners (Arabs) to Kurdish areas must be considered.
 - ~~(S)~~ Disarm the Iraqi people, either voluntarily or by force.
 - ~~(S)~~ Conduct humanitarian assistance operations on a large scale.
 - ~~(S)~~ Conduct consequence management activities if required.
 - ~~(S)~~ Reinforcing the Information Operations Campaign with additional themes/messages that emphasize:
 - ~~(S)~~ Cooperation with US/Coalition forces is needed in order to stabilize the situation, restart humanitarian assistance efforts, and assist in improving material conditions.
 - ~~(S)~~ Saddam is the main threat to the Iraqi people; he is not Iraq's legitimate leader.
 - ~~(S)~~ US/Coalition liberation forces are liberating Iraq and returning its governance to its citizens.
 - ~~(S)~~ Employing an expanded Public Affairs Campaign aimed at reinforcing that:
 - ~~(S)~~ The source of the disorder and humanitarian crisis is not US/Coalition action but rather regime activity.
 - ~~(S)~~ Saddam is the reason for Iraq's desperate situation.

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- ~~(S)~~ Pursuing a Civil Affairs Campaign designed to:
 - ~~(S)~~ Assist in rapid humanitarian assistance and reestablish transitional civil authorities capable of maintaining order.
- ~~(S)~~ Maximize the use of regional partners to coordinate and conduct operations.

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**OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION
AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
(POST-CONFLICT PLANNING GROUP)**

Civil Administration

Iraq Justice Sector Plan

1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

A. Management of Responsibilities for Transitional and Indigenous Justice Sector Institutions and assistance. Detailed coalition personnel shall deploy and, as part of their overall responsibilities within the Civil Administration staff, join with their military predecessor organization and function as the senior points of contact regarding the both the operations of and assistance to indigenous and transitional justice sector institutions, including: Justice Ministry; Courts (formerly Justice Ministry); Office of Public Prosecutions (Justice Ministry); Police (Ministry of Interior); and Prisons (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs). See Appendix A for table of organization and additional notional manning requirements.

B. Transitional Organizations.

1. Liaison, advice and assistance to Iraqi law enforcement institutions shall be accomplished by the Iraq Transitional Police Administration (ITPA).
2. Liaison, advice and assistance to Iraqi courts, magistrates, prosecutors, government counsel, defense and respondents counsel, and their organizations shall be accomplished by the Iraq Transitional Judicial Teams Organization (IJTO).
3. Liaison, advice and assistance to Iraqi corrections institutions shall be accomplished by the Iraq Transitional Corrections Administration (ITCA).
4. Missions. These transitional judicial sector organizations will plan for and accomplish the following:
 - a. Reestablish, as required, the indigenous justice sector capacity and infrastructure;
 - b. Provide advice and assistance at the national level and at all levels in the field to law enforcement officials, judges, magistrates, attorneys, and penal officers;
 - c. Engage in public education and raise public awareness; and
 - d. Perform other missions as assigned by the Interim Authority.

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5. Action Plans. The organization chart, preliminary strategic plan, and cost estimates for:

- a. The Iraq Transitional Police Administration (ITPA) are at Appendix B;
- b. The Iraq Transitional Judicial Teams Organization (IJTO) are at Appendix C; and
- c. The Iraq Transitional Corrections Administration (ITPA) are at Appendix D.

2. VISION. The following represents the vision for the Iraq justice system which underlies all planning in this sector:

“A system of laws and governmental institutions which operates impartially, without regard for ethnicity, religion, sex, race, political affiliation or other natural characteristic and provides sufficient public order, levels of human and property rights and objective dispute resolution to enable the people of Iraq to enjoy personal freedoms, economic prosperity, inclusive government and domestic tranquility.”

3. GOALS.

- A. Remove unsuitable and unqualified individuals from office, disband units and organizations, and eliminate law and processes that impede development.
- B. Assist the Iraqis to establish a fair and transparent system of law for all inhabitants of Iraq.
- C. At the earliest possible time, reestablish effective justice sector institutions under Iraqi leadership.

4. ASSUMPTIONS.

- A. Existing Iraqi capabilities responsible for public security and judicial processes likely will be in disarray at the conclusion of an international intervention, and will be the central focus of illegitimate forces attempting to remain in power.
- B. Saddam's political appointees will likely remain in the ranks of the police, judiciary and prison administration.
- C. Legitimate demands for law enforcement, public safety and rule of law in the immediate post-conflict period will likely strain Iraqi capability to respond.
- D. Existing police/security forces may lack any legitimacy with Iraqi people, are seen as oppressors, and therefore will be unable to keep the peace.
- E. Up to 100,000 security personnel in three ministries require supervision and reform.
- F. High potential for significant number of Iraqi internal conflicts involving property disputes; vigilante activities by individuals, families, and/or groups; and high potential for large civil disturbances centering on food distribution and other humanitarian efforts.

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G. Anticipated return of approximately 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and up to 1 million refugees now in neighboring countries.

5. ACTIVITY SEQUENCING.

A. Develop the transitional justice sector capability (Day 1 to Day 180)

1. Conduct Assessments (Legislative, regulatory, operational capabilities and effectiveness, plus personnel, infrastructure, logistics, materiel needs). Under Interim Authority staff control, and with the assistance of the indigenous Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, conduct assessments of the conditions of the indigenous justice sector. A second set of assessments will be conducted close to TOA+500 to determine any need for continuing assistance to Iraqi justice sector authorities beyond the tenure of the Interim Authority.

2. Refine Strategic Plans. Assistance furnished to the Iraqi justice sector shall emphasize, to the extent appropriate, sustainable, institutional development rather than isolated and unrelated training to ensure that all efforts and resources devoted under this Program shall result in permanent, systemic improvements that will continue after the cessation of coalition technical assistance.

Under Interim Authority staff control, guided by the results of the assessment process, and with the assistance of the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, refine the strategic development plans for each institutional component of the Iraqi justice sector.

The strategic development plans for justice sector component institutions shall contain the following elements:

- a. **Vision-** A concise statement which describe the desired end state of the justice sector component.
- b. **Mission Statement-** A statement which articulates the fundamental purpose of the justice sector component.
- c. **Guiding Principles-** Those values and principles which shall serve to guide the management and operation of the justice sector component.
- d. **Strategy-** A recitation of all required actions which must be accomplished in order to achieve the vision. The strategy shall be presented in terms of prioritized goals and objectives. Goals shall be broadly worded statements of intended purpose and shall be subdivided into measurable (in terms of time or quantity) objectives.
- e. **Performance Indicators-** A set of significant conditions or accomplishments which are appropriate to evaluate the extent to which a strategic development plan has or has not been successful.

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- f. Budget- An estimate of all costs of plan implementation.
- g. Time Line- A depiction of the sequence and duration of all activities required to be implemented.

3. **Review of and Access to Legal Materials.** Under Interim Authority staff control, and with the assistance of the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions (a subset of the Iraqi Coordination Council), assist a group composed of Iraqi legal experts to determine which existing Iraqi laws and regulations are consistent with existing proclamations regarding the basic interim law made by the Interim Authority.

Contract for the production of electronic and print media versions of the approved interim legal code(s) and the distribution of sufficient copies down to province level.

4. **Vetting of Indigenous Justice Sector Personnel.** Available Iraqi police, judiciary, government attorneys/prosecutors, respondents counsel and defense lawyers, and prison officials will be vetted to undertake justice sector tasks. In this regard, expatriate Iraqis with relevant background and experience will be considered as appropriate. As a component of the overall vetting regime initiated by the Interim Authority, sector-specific criteria, tied to category and level of importance of the justice sector function to be performed, will be developed.

5. **Standards, Codes of Conduct (fostering anti-corruption, transparency, including public disclosure of finances).** Under Interim Authority staff control and with the assistance of the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions:

- a. Review and re-establish justice sector functional qualification standards and examinations;
- b. Develop and implement a process for moral fitness reviews; and
- c. Develop, implement, and integrate processes of oversight and sanctions (including removal and disbarment) into the overall anti-corruption regime initiated by or with the assistance of the Interim Authority.

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6. **Justice Sector Monitoring.** Using the Interim Authority's re-established qualification standards, the approved legal framework, [and the Amnesty International manual (?)], monitor the justice sector functions in the field. In addition, as coordinated by the Interim Authority staff, the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, will develop trial monitoring training for indigenous ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and public interest groups. After receiving training, these organizations' resources will be added to the monitoring program.

7. **Emergency Legal Education.** As coordinated by the Interim Authority staff, with the assistance of the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, a familiarization/refresher training program for police, judges, lawyers and others, will cover:

- a. The basic law and interim legal code(s);
- b. An overview of police training and an explanation of the responsibilities of the police in a free society;
- c. Substantive refresher training on criminal law and procedure; and
- d. Investigative skills development for judicial investigators, investigating magistrates, and prosecutors; and professional ethics and codes of conduct.

B. Rebuild the justice system (Day 15 to Day 540)

1. **Development/Enhancement of the future legal and regulatory framework.** Under Interim Authority staff control, in coordination with the Interim Iraqi Council, the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, and others, develop effective laws and codes, addressing first matters of common application to the institutions of the justice sector listed below, criminal law and procedure and, thereafter, civil law matters critical to the development of transparent and responsive law enforcement and judicial processes.

- a. Separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches and the concomitant assignment of responsibilities to each;
- b. Recruitment standards (qualification examinations);
- c. Performance standards;
- d. Management and operating procedures; and
- e. Internal control mechanisms (integrity system).

2. **Institutional improvement.** In order to reestablish Iraqi justice sector institutions which will operate in a manner consistent with a free, inclusive government, and to build the capabilities of Iraqi personnel to provide effective management control of those institutions, advice, technical assistance and training (in both the classroom and on the job) will be furnished to assist in the planning for and the re-structuring of

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organizations; the development of policy and procedure; and the creation or improvement of skills of personnel at all levels.

3. Technical assistance at Ministries and Court of Cassation levels.

Under Interim Authority staff control, provide senior advisors and, in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, develop effective justice sector organizational structures, policies and procedures, with initial emphasis on policing in a free society, criminal investigations, prosecutions, and adjudications.

4. Technical assistance at local level.

Under Interim Authority staff control, undertake assistance, in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, Ministers or their senior representatives, the Court of Cassation, and others as appropriate, to refine field operations and management techniques, to include establishing effective methods of assignment of duties and tracking of offenders and cases; implementing efficient and transparent methods for measuring performance; and compiling and using statistical data for reporting and measuring effectiveness.

5. Recruitment and evaluation of personnel.

Under Interim Authority staff control, in coordination with the Iraq Advisory Council, its subordinate Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, indigenous legal associations and ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), and public interest groups, develop career-path specific, objective criteria for the recruitment, evaluation and/or certification of justice sector personnel, and provide technical assistance regarding the methodology of evaluation. Another important component shall be technical assistance regarding the release of those current justice sector personnel deemed to be unsuitable or unqualified.

Enhance participation and develop self-worth and prestige by planning and instituting justice sector civil service remuneration and tenure programs which are either part of or patterned on similar overarching regimes (e.g., Public Service Administration Plan) undertaken by the Interim Authority generally or within other Iraqi public sector institutions.

6. Professional Development (career paths, basic and continuing professional education).

Under Interim Authority staff control, develop function-specific curriculum and undertake assistance, which is integrated to the extent feasible and desirable; is undertaken in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions; and is guided by the results of the assessment process, to sustain a corps of justice sector personnel with highly developed law enforcement, investigative, prosecutorial, defense, general advocacy and judicial skills.

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7. **Infrastructure Development.** Under Interim Authority staff control, guided by the results of the assessment process, and in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, accomplish planning, budgeting and other administrative functions in addition to managing all construction, renovation, and outfitting contracts. This work involves procuring and general oversight of architectural/engineering and construction, renovation and outfitting contracts with an initial focus on the Police College, the Police Preparatory School and other existing justice sector institutional training sites, the Abu Ghurayb prison west of Baghdad; the AlRashidiya prison on the Tigris river north of Taji; the AlShamma'iyah prison located in east Baghdad; and the Radwaniyah detention center, a former prisoner of war facility near Baghdad, the Courts of Appeal and the 18 Courts of First Instance, and the law schools of the universities of Salahuddin and Suleymaniyah.

8. **Technology Enhancement.** Under Interim Authority staff control, guided by the results of the assessment process, undertake assistance, in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, to affect improvements in justice sector capacity through technology enhancement programs, including but not limited to, computer information systems, techniques of forensic analysis, communications equipment, management by objective, performance contracts, and quality controls.

9. **Special Units (with focus on civil disorder management, corruption, organized crime, human rights violations, etc.).** Under Interim Authority staff control, undertake assistance, in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, to develop effective coordination and collaboration among justice sector personnel, particularly between prosecutors, magistrates and police, which is critical for effective criminal investigations and prosecutions in areas of crime likely to be threats to economic and social stability in Iraq.

10. **Access to Justice - Legal Aid System.** Under Interim Authority staff auspices and USAID operational control, in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, indigenous legal associations and ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), and public interest groups, provide assistance which ensures that all individuals within Iraq are able to seek and receive redress for their grievances. Assess the traditional role of women in the society and their potential to contribute to reconstitution of the justice sector and ensure women's rights and influence.

11. **Public Awareness and Education.** Under Interim Authority staff auspices and USAID operational control, in coordination with the Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, indigenous legal associations and ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), and public interest groups, undertake activity which provides individuals within

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Iraq with information concerning on-going activities within the justice sector and with a blueprint for the institutions, processes, and rules by which the justice sector will function and which defines citizens' rights and responsibilities.

C. Inculcate the rule of law (Day 45 to Day 540)

1. Truth and Reconciliation. Under Interim Authority staff auspices, in coordination with USAID, the Iraq Advisory Council, its subordinate Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, indigenous legal associations and ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), and public interest groups, determine the need for a commission to foster reconciliation.

If found necessary or desirable, under USAID operational control, establish the mandate, mission, size, duration, and powers of the commission. Ensure indigenous involvement and "ownership" of the process. Train international and indigenous staff; provide infrastructure and technical assistance; and ensure compatibility with and coordination of the commission's work with other national and international mechanisms. Establish a public information program to promote efforts for reconciliation which is coordinated with overall justice sector public awareness and education programs. Prepare capabilities through which to evaluate reconciliation mechanisms.

If anticipated, determine the appropriate means and levels of reparations; identify classes of eligible persons; and implement reparations measures.

2. Alternative Dispute Resolution (rebuilding communities). Under Interim Authority staff auspices, in coordination with USAID, the Iraq Advisory Council, its subordinate Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, indigenous legal associations and ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), and public interest groups, foster informal, indigenous mechanisms for dispute resolution. Under USAID operational control, identify and use third-party advisors and mediators to build trust and cooperation. Provide alternative dispute resolution training and resources. Identify and provide neutral meeting places for discussions and activities; and bring adversaries together wherever possible. Enhance participation and incorporate a wide range of stakeholders through public outreach and information programs which are coordinated with overall justice sector public awareness and education programs.

3. Traditional Justice Processes. Under Interim Authority staff auspices, in coordination with USAID, the Iraq Advisory Council, its subordinate Commission for the Reform of Iraqi Laws and Legal Institutions, indigenous legal associations and ombudsmen institutions, international and local non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs), and public interest groups, identify religious and tribal institutions and leaders on

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
national and local levels. Under USAID operational control, design community-based programs to support reconstitution of justice sector services and reconciliation based on religious and traditional practices.

02/10/03
Rev 1


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
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**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL POLICE
ADMINISTRATION**
Sequence II
Table of Organization
February 10, 2003
Rev.4



**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL POLICE
ADMINISTRATION**
Table of Organization
 Sequence III
 February 10, 2003
 Rev. 4





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The United States Department of Defense

OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION
AND MAINTENANCE
ASSISTANCE

(Post-Conflict Planning Group)

Civil Administration Section
Justice Sector

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GOALS OF POLICE COMPONENT OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

- **Provide framework for immediate police “stabilization” by:**
 - Assuming command over indigenous forces
 - Augmenting local police with US police with executive authority to manage, monitor and execute police functions
 - Identifying and removing/disbanding inappropriate persons and units
- **Reform Iraq police structures and operations consistent with Principles of Policing in free Society to ensure ROL**
- **Provide foundation to transition to legitimate Iraqi control in one year**

ASSUMPTIONS

- **Numbers requiring work are impressive;**
 - 3,000,000 IDPs and 1,000,000 refugees from neighboring countries
 - 70,000-100,000 police in three ministries require supervision and reform
- **Serious law enforcement problems will be encountered**
 - Police lack legitimacy in eyes of public
 - Real potential for conflicts arising from property disputes, vigilante/retribution activities, civil disturbances fomented by subversives or resulting from humanitarian aid frustrations
- **Post-conflict conditions will overwhelm Iraqi capabilities to maintain public order**

ROLE OF THE US MILITARY

These are the facts...

In the absence of a credible, reasonably effective indigenous police force, the burden of both executive-level law enforcement and oversight of Iraqi police will fall on the US Military occupation forces (MPs and infantry)


PRIORITIES FOR POLICE PLAN

- Police management and development implementation strategy focuses upon secure, major population centers in a rolling, province-by-province approach
- Police operations, management and reform will occur over three sequences...
 - I - Pre-deployment of CA/Staff (Planning, policy development resource identification)
 - II - Six month period following deployment of CA/Staff (Start-up, assessment, preliminary operations, vetting of senior officials, etc.)
 - III- Longer-term transition to Iraqi control

JUSTICE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

- Office of Justice Affairs will be established in-Country to oversee operations, management and reform of;
 - Police Function
 - Prosecutorial Function
 - Courts
 - Correctional Function
- Each function will be managed by a transitional administrator

**JUSTICE SECTOR
Management and Reform
Relationships**
(Proposed)
7 February 2003



REQUIRED RESOURCES

- US and coalition partners will furnish resources required for police operations, management and reform during sequences I and II
- Amount of money/numbers and types of personnel required will depend upon yet-to-be-made policy decisions
 - Form of police to replace military
 - Functions to be performed
 - Degree to which indigenous police can do the job
 - Numbers of personnel to be attached to such unit(s)
- In sequence III, international partners will contribute personnel, funds, equipment and/or materiel to reform effort

CIVILIAN POLICE ALTERNATIVES IN THE RELIEF OF US MILITARY

- International "Constabulary Forces"
- US "CivPol-like" civilian police force... estimated at 4,000 personnel
- UN CivPol mission of same magnitude
- Smaller US footprint in the form of a 50 person start-up team followed by a 2,500 person, coalition-comprised, civilian police force to support/reform salvageable indigenous police in conducting law enforcement operations

SEQUENCE I – Pre-Deployment Activities

- Establish/promulgate applicable constitution and law
- Identify functions and senior personnel of all ministries now performing police-like activities
- Establish/refine working inter-agency linkages
- Establish working relationships with and agree upon early roles for coalition countries

SEQUENCE I – Pre-Deployment Activities (Continued)

- **Develop...**
 - Police Annex to *Iraq Transitional Public Administration Plan*
 - *The Iraq Transitional Police Management and Development Plan*
 - Operational/oversight duties/techniques for US civilian police
 - Vetting of officials and units of the Iraq Police
 - Recruiting and selecting protocols for new police personnel
 - Standards and policies for Iraq police operations
 - Public affairs (Information operations)
 - Organizational re-structuring
 - Facility refurbishment
 - Training
 - Internships
 - Equipment/materiel donations

SEQUENCE II – Post-deployment Startup Activities

- Establish liaison with US military commander
- Create Office of Justice Affairs and transitional justice sector administrations
- Perform comprehensive assessment of...
 - Iraq police organizations (Identity of senior officials, police functions performed, police command/control structure, etc.)
 - Relevant in-country conditions (police-community relationships, crime problem, etc.)

SEQUENCE II – Post-deployment Startup Activities (Continued)

- Execute plans including
 - *Iraq Transitional Public Service Administration Plan to:*
 - Vet, assign, promote and compensate all legitimate police personnel
 - Remove unqualified personnel
 - *Iraq Transitional Police Management and Development Plan to:*
 - Deliver and manage police services to the Iraqi populations, first in conjunction with US military, then in conjunction with Iraqis then by Iraqis alone
 - Disband inappropriate units


**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
POLICE
ADMINISTRATION**

February 7, 2003

Rev.0

**IRAQ TRANSITIONAL
POLICE ADMINISTRATION**
Police Administrator

Deputy Police
Administrator



SEQUENCE I AND II PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

- Iraq enjoys reasonable tranquility with only isolated and disorganized street crime
- Police hierarchy...
 - Have been vetted, re-certified to positions or removed
 - Undergone transition training
 - Are functioning in advisory capacity
- Vetting of remaining police personnel has begun
- Four-five regional criminal justice training centers have been identified and refurbishment substantially completed
- Iraq police in secure areas are being regularly compensated
- Inappropriate units have been disbanded
- Functional working relationships have been developed between Iraq police, US Transitional Administration and US military forces

CONCERNS

- Every day that goes by without money is a day we fall further and further behind.
Without funds, we cannot now:
 - Recruit/select/qualify/prepare anyone for our in-country mission
 - Procure any materiel/supplies/equipment
 - Develop/customize any training materials

CONCERNS

- Transition from Phase II to Phase IV of the Ops plan, specifically, if all armed Iraqis are perceived as “enemy forces” and disarmed during Phases I, II and III, we have effectively destroyed the indigenous civilian police capacity... Query;
 - Who is going to provide police service during Phase III?
 - Do they know it?

PRINCIPLES OF POLICING IN A FREE SOCIETY

A police organization functioning in a free society is one which:

1. Considers *the individual citizen* as the *client of the police* rather than the state;
2. Develops, maintains and encourages *adherence to organizational values* which, *without regard to race, religion, national origin, ethnicity, sex, age, social status or other non-behavioral human traits*:
 - Honor human rights and human dignity of its members and the general population;
 - Support the free exercise of available legal rights of all persons; and
 - Encourage the *fair and impartial enforcement* of those laws within its purview;
3. In all functional aspects *operates in strict conformance with legal requirements* contained in the nation's constitution, police act, criminal code and other applicable laws;
4. Establishes and maintains an *organizational culture* in which *public service* rather than *public repression* is the *end product* of police activities;
5. Maintains a proactive focus on *crime prevention* as a means to *foster public order, domestic tranquility and an acceptable quality of life for all persons within the country*;
6. Where reasonably possible, enters into *partnerships* with community and other governmental organizations to *identify and solve community problems* which provide *opportunities for criminal conduct*;
7. *Actively and effectively investigates* reports of criminal conduct with the objective of *identifying and apprehending the perpetrator(s) so that guilt or innocence may be properly adjudicated*;
8. Forms *functional relationships* with other *key components of the country's criminal justice system* to ensure that persons introduced to that system are processed *lawfully, effectively and fairly*;
9. Approves and encourages the use of *non-deadly physical force* by its members only under carefully defined circumstances to further a legitimate and lawful, societal objective, and the use of *deadly force* by its members *only to save the life of any person, including a member of the police, from a perceived threat of imminent death or serious injury, or under other circumstances articulated in a local, public law*;
10. Develops, maintains and operates under a *code of conduct, rules, policies and procedures* which provide *reasonable guidance* to police personnel in their behavior and the discharge of their assigned functions while holding them *accountable* for the manner in which they perform their duties;

11. Manages the institution in a manner which *rewards* adherence to organizational values, effective performance and personal growth of its members, and *discourages* non-conforming behavior;
12. *Readily accepts and thoroughly investigates complaints of misconduct against police personnel;* and
13. *Appropriately disciplines* police personnel who are *fairly determined* to have violated the established police code of conduct, rules, policies and/or procedures.

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~~(S)~~ 08 NOVEMBER 2002
(as updated 17 Jan 03)

STATEMENT OF WORK
LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN
FOR
REPAIR AND CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
OF THE
IRAQI ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ~~(S)~~

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1.0. ~~(S)~~ Scope of Work. The contractor shall develop a plan for a contractor to provide phased support to the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), if USCENTCOM becomes responsible for the repair, maintenance, and resumption and/or continuity of operations of the energy infrastructure of Iraq. This "Contingency Support Plan for Repair and Continuity of Operations of the Iraqi Energy Infrastructure" shall be prepared in accordance with Section 4, below.

~~(S)~~ This SOW requires delivery of a contingency plan. If the plan has to be executed, the Government may choose to contract with the LOGCAP contractor, who produced the plan, to execute the plan from Notice to Proceed until 90 days after the government notifies the contractor of the Government's intent to compete. The Government intends to solicit competitive proposals for providing continuity of operations beyond that point. If the incumbent contractor is not selected to perform the follow-on work, the incumbent will be required to provide continuity of operations through the transition until hand-off to the successor contractor.

2.0. (U) Period of Performance. The contractor shall complete all work required by the SOW, except distribution of the plan as required by 2.6, below, within 30 days of receipt of written Notice to Proceed. The contractor shall accomplish start-up activity within the 30-day period. Interim delivery requirements are:

2.1 (U) Within 72 hours after NTP, deliver the project schedule for completing work required by this SOW.

2.2 (U) Within 7 days after NTP, participate in an initial coordination meeting at the Pentagon with OUSD(P).

2.3 (U) Within 21 days after NTP, deliver the Final Draft Plan to agencies listed in Paragraph 10 below.

2.4 (U) No later than 28 days after NTP, participate in a Review of the Final Draft Plan at the Pentagon.

2.5 (U) Within 30 days after NTP, deliver the Final Draft Plan for OUSD(P) review.

2.6 (U) Within 7 days after receiving direction to do so from OUSD(P), the contractor shall distribute the final

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deliverable plan by classified means to addressees designated by the EIPG.

3.0. (U) Background.

3.1. ~~(S)~~ USCENTCOM is developing a plan to provide for a full range of contingencies for securing, safeguarding, repairing, and maintaining continuity of operations of the oil and energy infrastructure of Iraq, should the United States (U.S.) become an occupying power after the cessation of hostilities in any future military campaign in Iraq. Until relieved by another entity, Commander, USCENTCOM will retain overall responsibility for the repairing and maintaining the continuity of operations of the Iraqi energy infrastructure, and the production and sale of its energy products. It is anticipated that at an appropriate time, the Commander, USCENTCOM, will turn over direct operations of the infrastructure to an appropriate civilian authority and will retain supervisory authority over the civilian authority given the Commander, USCENTCOM's military government responsibilities in Iraq.

3.2. ~~(S)~~ The securing and safeguarding of the Iraqi energy infrastructure is a significant objective of the USCENTCOM plan. The rapid availability for sale on the world market of Iraqi energy products is important for the well-being of the Iraqi people, the Iraq economy, the funding of the administration of Iraqi territory, and the stability of the world oil market.

3.3. ~~(FOUO)~~ The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the proponent for development, review, implementation, and execution of the plan required by this SOW. OUSD(P) formed and leads an Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG). EIPG shall assist OUSD(P) to ensure that this plan is fully integrated with related contingency plans for which the military commands have lead responsibility.

3.4. ~~(S)~~ Working closely with USCENTCOM, the EIPG is responsible for the prompt planning of the production, refining, distribution, and sale of Iraqi energy products (including but not limited to petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products such as natural gas liquids, gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and fuel oil), both within the country and without, during a possible U.S. or coalition military occupation. The EIPG functions include planning for the eventual transfer of responsibility for the tasks described herein from Commander,

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USCENTCOM to a designated successor authority; and providing advice and assistance through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander, U.S. Central Command on these aforementioned matters.

3.5. ~~(S)~~ Commander, USCENTCOM is planning to secure and safeguard the entire Iraqi energy infrastructure with the intent of contracting as soon as possible for all necessary repair of the infrastructure, and for the resumption and/or continuation of operations, including the production and sale of energy products. While such repair work, and operation and management of the Iraqi energy infrastructure will be conducted under the policy guidance and oversight of designated USG authority, the operational execution of such activities will be guided by the contingency support plan required by this Statement of Work.

4.0. (U) Requirements.

4.1 ~~(S)~~ The plan shall describe the providing of contractor support to USCENTCOM, as necessary to deal with the following situations and to achieve the stated goals and objectives.

4.1.1 ~~(S)~~ USCENTCOM may require contractor support to effect repairs to, and maintain continuity of operations of, the Iraqi energy infrastructure and all related systems and facilities, including but not limited to: all oil and natural gas fields; refineries; storage; motor transport, water, and pipeline distribution systems; and supporting electricity grids. It is expected that:

4.1.1.1 ~~(S)~~ The initial priority will be for the contractor to effect repair of the infrastructure to a safe, manageable, and operational condition.

4.1.1.2 ~~(S)~~ The contractor must be ready and able to initiate contractor operation of production and distribution operations, in accordance with established policy and in close coordination with USCENTCOM. The long term objective is to restore and repair all Iraqi facilities to at least their pre-hostility condition and capacities. In this context, priority shall be given to restoring production output and capacity to pre-hostility levels. Intelligence indicates existing production output is 2.4 million U.S. barrels of crude oil per day and capacity is 3.1 million U.S. barrels of crude oil per day, assuming the U.S. controls the entire country, and therefore all oil fields. To the extent this is not the

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case, the production output and capacity targets would be adjusted based on the output and capacity associated with the fields that are under U.S. control. Any production output beyond 2.4 million U.S. barrels per day would require prior approval by appropriate authority.

4.1.1.3 ~~(S)~~ The contractor must be ready and able to provide for sustaining production and distribution for 90 days from the date of initial production capability, or until otherwise relieved by competent authority.

4.2. ~~(S)~~ The plan shall address a full range of hypothetical contingencies (heavy to no damage to infrastructure, and full to little or no availability of Iraqi management and labor force) that could arise in various locations and circumstances. The plan should provide specific details as to the resources and operational steps that would be required to effect necessary repairs and ensure continuity of operations in the production, refining, sale, and delivery of energy products under circumstances, and in specific locations, in which pre-hostility organizational structures, management, labor force, and other necessary resources may not be available. The plan shall be based on repair and restoration at all of Iraq's oilfields, assuming priorities are based on cost-benefit analyses. This shall be done on a modular, field-by-field basis, to maximize flexibility and utility of the plan for execution once actual conditions are known. Although it is recognized that flaring/burning of gas is a normal cost of operations, especially during equipment maintenance, plans should address persistent burning of gas as undesirable and develop options to harvest gas as a product, if existing plant and equipment will support doing so.

4.3. ~~(FOUO)~~ The plan shall include a diagram and description of contractor organizational structures, management resources, and labor requirements, which would be needed to effect such repairs and maintain such continuity of operations, and how such needs would be met upon plan implementation and execution.

4.4. ~~(S)~~ The following phases of contractor support are contemplated. The plan shall be structured to address each of these phases.

4.4.1. ~~(S)~~ Phase 1: Planning and Operational Interface with EIPG, USCENTCOM, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and other applicable or concerned agencies.

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4.4.2. ~~(S)~~ Phase 2: Transition to Contractor Support. How contractor support would be initiated and built up (e.g., pre-positioning of equipment) to provide all support required.

4.4.3. ~~(S)~~ Phase 3: Damage Control and Repairs; Production and Storage; Distribution Systems; Marketing and Sales; and other functions necessary to maintain continuity of operations. Control and Repairs shall include a requirements estimate and solution for "capping" yet burning oil fires, and for oil spill containment/cleanup in waterways and the North Arabian Gulf, and similar environmental remediation that may be required on land.

4.4.4. ~~(S)~~ Phase 4: Hand Off to another operating entity after 90 days, or when otherwise relieved by competent authority.

4.5. ~~(S)~~ The following information must be considered in planning for each Phase, but this information is not a comprehensive description of the considerations applicable to each Phase.

4.5.1 ~~(S)~~ During Phase 1 (Planning and Operational Interface), the contractor will be required to coordinate with USCENTCOM about the USACE supporting effort during and after hostilities. See Paragraph 6.0, Special Provisions.

4.5.2 ~~(S)~~ During Phase 2, the contractor will be required to develop a Triage Capability which maximizes the use of the preceding USACE support to USCENTCOM; initiates quick reaction site surveys and other analytical data-gathering procedures that identify a spectrum of total damage from none to incapacitating a site or system. The contractor may be required to start new facilities. If so, such areas as will be identified to the contractor by USACE (e.g., Kirkuk and Rumaila).

4.6. ~~(S)~~ The plan shall satisfy the LOGCAP contract requirements for CINC/ASCC Support Plans, including requirements for plan content and format. This plan shall include all essential elements, which are included in the LOGCAP WMSF (Paragraph 9.1.). These elements should include and are not limited to Vendor List, Bill of Materials, Project Management Organization, Labor Categories and Rough Orders of Magnitude with other costing data. OUSD(P) considers the adequacy and efficiency of the Vendor List a key element of government decisions as to plan acceptance, validation, and use. It is imperative that "Stand Alone" Rough Orders of Magnitude have

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clear descriptive narratives about the methodology and other instructions for facilitating the understanding, appreciation and use of these cost estimates.

4.7. ~~(S)~~ Any maps developed by the contractor as part of the planning process shall be delivered with the Final Draft Plan.

4.8. ~~(S)~~ As required by the LOGCAP contract, the plan shall be prepared to enable the USG to use it for any necessary purpose. Consistent with the LOGCAP Contract (Statement of Work 2.1), plan content shall not contain restrictions, formats, or limitations that would hinder, delay, or otherwise prevent functional use of the content. Only content that specifically requires restrictions (e.g., proprietary staffing and cost information) may be marked with restrictive labels or legends.

5.0. (U) Deliverables. Deliverables within this effort are:

5.1. ~~(S)~~ Final "LOGCAP Contingency Support Plan for Repair and Continuity of Operations of the Iraq Energy Infrastructure".

5.1.1. (U) Format. Contractor shall deliver the plan in hard and electronic version copies. Compact Disk shall be suitable to OUSD(P) automation systems for data lifts. Contractor should contact OUSD(P) directly for desired formats and graphic displays.

5.2. (U) Project Schedule. Contractor shall develop a project schedule for the development, submission of the Final Draft Plan, and subsequent publication and distribution within seventy-two hours after receipt of a written NTP. This schedule shall include, but is not limited to, the initial planning preparations; site visit planning and operation; plan reviews; and, the distribution of the final deliverable.

5.3. (U) In coordination with the LOGCAP PM, OUSD(P) will arrange the following reviews with the appropriate attendance. Contractor shall attend and assist OUSD(P) with review preparations and implementation as part of the efforts herein.

5.3.1. (U) OUSD(P) shall arrange an initial coordination meeting at the Pentagon within seven (7) days of contractor receipt of the NTP. Review will discuss Project Schedule, planning progress, and the upcoming Final Draft Plan Review. The provision of any remaining references, contact coordination, and plan development guidance will be completed at this initial meeting. The contractor shall be prepared to discuss, at a

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minimum, the following: how the planning team will be organized; how many members of the team are on board, identified but not yet on board, and not yet identified; security clearance status of all members of the team; qualifications of the senior people identified for the project down to and including lead engineers; and how the contractor will manage this planning effort vis-a-vis related planning efforts with which the contractor is involved (e.g., to avoid duplication of effort).

5.3.2. (U) In coordination with the LOGCAP PM, OUSD(P) will arrange a Final Draft Plan Review at the Pentagon no later than 28 days after contractor receipt of a written NTP. Contractor shall bring the following support items to the review: six (6) additional hard copies of the plan; all necessary references; and, any other data or items the contractor may deem necessary for the successful conduct of the review. The contractor shall plan to conduct a stand up briefing presentation at the review about plan content, procedures and implementation concept. The briefing shall be given at the beginning of the review. The contractor shall provide one hard copy of the briefing to all in attendance and will produce an attendance roster with name, rank, position, organization and contact information.

5.4. (U) Contractor shall send one hard copy of the Final Draft Plan to agencies listed in Paragraph 10 below within 21 days of contractor receipt of NTP. The contractor will consider this plan as the contractor's best, most complete and final effort to include the Vendor's Lists, Rough Orders of Magnitude, and other costing data. The SOW objective is that this document will satisfy all requirements and warrant a recommendation, at the Final Draft Plan Review, to OUSD(P) and PM, LOGCAP, that the plan be accepted as final once any non-substantive changes or corrections have been made.

6.0. (U) Special Provisions. Special provisions are:

6.1. ~~(FOUO)~~ These efforts may include the acquisition and safeguarding of classified information up to and exceeding SECRET. The contractor will coordinate directly with the appropriate custodian to obtain classified material. Minimally, all contractor personnel participating in this effort must have a current and valid SECRET clearance. Contractor must have select and readily available personnel, who have a current and valid TOP SECRET clearance and can be quickly read into compartmentalized data (e.g. SCI).

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
6.2. (U) The Executive Summary in the front of the plan shall be a brief stand alone document, which contains the most essential elements for senior leadership decision briefings about plan capabilities, and use for timely and adequate support, as requested herein. The plan shall include a comprehensive alphabetical glossary and index at the end of the plan for readily locating and cross-referencing of significant terms and other information within the plan.

6.3. ~~(FOUO)~~ Time is of the essence due to current operations exigencies. Contractor is required to present the Final Draft Plan for OUSD(P) review not later than thirty (30) days after a written Notice To Proceed (NTP) is received by the contractor. To this end, the LOGCAP Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) is requested to provide the contractor, within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt of an approved Statement Of Work (SOW), direction to provide a Task Execution Plan (TEP) with Cost Proposal to the PCO for evaluation and review within seventy-two (72) hours of NTP receipt.

6.4. ~~(FOUO)~~ Once OUSD(P) has accepted the contractor TEP, the contractor will be available to assist OUSD(P) in coordinating plan development with relevant commands and other agencies to insure adequate plan integration and consistency with other military planning and supported contingency operations.

6.5. (U) Pertinent contacts for TEP and overall plan development with coordination recommendations are:

(b)(2), (b)(6)



~~SECRET~~

6.5.5. ~~(FOUO)~~ OUSD(P) will conduct any necessary reviews for plan development and use with activities, which are external to PM, LOGCAP and the LOGCAP contractor.

7.0. ~~(S)~~ Outsourcing. Outsourcing for this effort is defined as any asset, capability or other resource, which is requested or acquired by the contractor from any source other than U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Iraq sources or capabilities. The contractor shall, to the extent feasible, maximize the use of Iraqi personnel, materials, equipment, and energy infrastructure to accomplish the effort herein. If still experiencing support shortfalls, the contractor will then draw resources and capabilities from other countries based on achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as possible, with due regard for reasonable efficiency, to accomplish the necessary provision of support. Contractor will coordinate directly with OUSD(P) to capitalize on any agreements or other arrangements for support acquisition that the government may have established with any with any foreign nations, multi-national organizations or civil sector entities.

8.0. ~~(S)~~ U.S. Government Furnished Support. No dedicated U.S. Government personnel, facilities, services or materials will be provided for plan development and execution. During plan development and execution, inherent government responsibilities will be executed adequately and in a timely manner in support of contractor efforts herein. Inherent government responsibilities include, but are not limited to, political-military matters; force protection; maintenance of contractor non-combatant status; relief from foreign nation taxation, union arrangements and other inhibiting expense and performance conditions; clearance for entry, movement within, and exiting within the Area of Operations and other supporting locations; identification cards or other procedures for government accountability of contractor personnel; and, protection and other rights or benefits under Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or other agreements or arrangements with foreign nations.

9.0 ~~(S)~~ Government Furnished Information (GFI). The U.S. Government will provide the contractor with pertinent information on the Iraqi energy infrastructure to enable the contractor to prepare a plan that reflects the latest USG knowledge of the existing infrastructure and potential post-hostility situations. The contractor shall contact the EIPG within 48 hours after receiving NTP for instructions on obtaining access to the information, subject to strict compliance with security requirements.

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10.0. (U) Applicable Documents. Contractor is responsible for the acquisition of all currently updated references or other applicable documents necessary for the satisfactory completion of this effort herein. Government is not responsible for the comprehensive listing of all applicable or necessary references for this effort. Initial documents and sources for initiating this effort are (See also Paragraph 5.0., Special Provisions below.):

10.1. (U) LOGCAP Worldwide Management and Staffing Plan (WMSP) with Annex N (Contractor Internal Operations Procedures).

10.2. (U) Army Regulation (AR) 570-9, Host Nation Support.


10.3. (U) AR 700-137, LOGCAP

10.4. (U) AR 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force.

10.5. (U) Army Field Manual (FM) 100-21, Contractors on the Battlefield.


10.6. (U) Department of the Army (DA) Pam 690-80, Use and Administration of Local Civilians in Foreign Areas During Hostilities.

(b)(2),(b)(6)



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(b)(2), (b)(6)



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23 Apr 02
1700

Scenarios for the "End Game"


This note presents some preliminary thoughts (and many questions) concerning two possible scenarios for the Iraqi end game.

"Mayor of Baghdad"

Scenario: After initial US success in southern Iraq, Saddam withdraws his most loyal Republican Guard units to the vicinity of Baghdad, and hunkers down in the city, daring us to come after him. He believes that we will not have the stomach for urban combat.

Issues and questions:

- Key question: Will it be necessary for us to come after Saddam, or can we defeat him without fighting our way into the city?
- If a provisional government had not already been established, we could foster the creation of one to take control of the rest of Iraq.
- A provisional government could be given control of the oil revenues (and of the frozen Iraqi assets) – would that be sufficient to cause the collapse of Saddam's rule in Baghdad?
- Saddam's ability to reward those loyal to him would be reduced.
- The provisional government could begin the reconstruction of the rest of Iraq – news of this could be broadcast into Baghdad.
- How long would it take Saddam's rule to collapse? How much military force would we have to leave in place until that happened? When could our troops be replaced by the forces of the new government?
- Should we train the opposition in urban combat to deal with this scenario?



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23 Apr 02
1700

- How would we prevent Saddam from using the population of Baghdad as hostages?
 - We could presumably not blockade the city, i.e., not prevent provisioning.
 - In fact, it might become necessary for us to provide food to the besieged city.
 - Should we encourage the population to flee the city? Should this be done early in the war? What would be the psychological effect of such an announcement? How would we care for evacuated Baghdadis? Should our training program include civil affairs instruction, so that opposition group members could run refugee camps, etc?
 - Should we encourage the predominantly Shi'a neighborhoods to revolt? Would they revolt in any case?
- What would be the effect on international (and especially Arab) public opinion? Would Saddam be romanticized into a hero? Would it matter?

Exit Strategy

Scenario: U.S. military operations go as planned, and Saddam's regime collapses.

- If a provisional government hasn't yet been established, we will need to start a "Bonn process" immediately. (State)
- We will need a plan for transitioning from military-supplied humanitarian aid to an aid system run by the provisional government. "Oil for food" (OFF) funds should be available to finance the civilian aid system (and to reimburse DoD for humanitarian aid?) (DoD, State, USAID)
- This should be coordinated with the opposition groups. In particular, we should ensure that the Kurdish groups do not lose their share of OFF money in the period following the collapse of Saddam's regime. We should be prepared to introduce the necessary UNSC resolutions immediately. (State)

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23 Apr 02
1700

- Disposition of POWs? We should train opposition groups to run the POW camps – the provision government should establish tribunals for deciding which POWs should be held for possible war crimes proceedings, and which can safely be released. (DoD, State)
- Opposition group members must be ready either to take command of defecting military units, or to work with their commanders (assuming the commander led the defection and is not otherwise disqualified by past conduct.) (DoD)
- The opposition groups should review the military officers currently in command of units in Iraq (down to the brigade level?) and decide which ones might be acceptable and which ones would have to be replaced immediately. (State, DoD, [REDACTED] b1
- Disagreements with respect to individual officers between the opposition groups and departments and agencies of the USG should be worked out as soon as possible.
 - How effectively these tasks can be completed depends in part on how soon an actual provisional government can be established. The earlier a provisional government can be established, the easier it should be to turn over tasks to it, thus allowing the U.S. military to leave.
- The various “working groups” of opposition personnel established at the State political conference should be encouraged to draft plans to establish a governmental apparatus to deal with their area of concern (e.g., transportation, irrigation, etc.)
- In particular, a working group should deal with the question of the release of political prisoners and the arrest of those guilty of atrocities.
- Members of the security apparatus may prefer arrest by the provisional government to being left to the mercy of the population at large.

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file Iraq

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH AFFAIRS

October 18, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
FROM: (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Vetting Report

You asked if I had seen the report next under.

I am in daily contact with DHS on the vetting and I know their numbers but had not previously seen this report.

I receive new names from the opposition at the rate of 250-300 per week.

The slowest vetting has been (b)(1) but DHS believes (b)(1) is fixing the problem and will soon catch up.

DASD *[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED
BY OSD POLICY DFT
DATE JUNE 29, 2007

file: Iraq Contingency

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD Policy
15 Jan 03

Coup Scenario - Contingency Planning

Scenario

- We should plan to deal with the following scenario:
 - Either before a conflict begins, or in its early stages, a senior military or security officer stages a *coup d'état* against Saddam.
 - Alternatively, a senior military or security officer could take power after Saddam dies or leaves the country, for whatever reason.
 - *The new ruler announces his intention to abide by all UN Security Council resolutions; he denounces the invasion of Kuwait and all of Saddam's other "sins."*
 - He argues that no possible grounds for war exist any longer; if the conflict has already begun, he calls for an immediate cease-fire.
- There is intense international pressure on us to drop our regime change policy and not commence (or cease) hostilities.
 - However, we face the threat of "Saddamism without Saddam," i.e., *a new regime that pursues the same policies as the current one, but without the international opprobrium.*

Key Principles

- Any senior military or security official in a position to grab power is likely to be similar to Saddam in ambition, political attitudes and methods of operation.
- We can't have confidence in any inspection regime unless the government is cooperative and acts in good faith.
- Ultimately, a broad-based, representative government will be necessary to resolve all of our problems with Iraq: not only development of WMD, but support for terrorism, threatening behavior directed at neighbors, and tyrannical repression at home.

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~~Classified by USDP, Douglas J. Foith~~
~~Reason 1.5(e)~~
~~Declassify on 28 Dec 2012~~

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ACORD-2617-05

~~TOP SECRET~~

Proposed Policy

- Our policy would depend to some extent on when the new ruler took power – either before or during hostilities.
 - If hostilities had already commenced (and especially if U.S. ground troops had already entered Iraq), we could demand, as the price of a cease-fire, that the new ruler accept the presence of U.S. troops in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq to oversee the transition process.
 - If hostilities had not yet begun, we could propose a UN-mandated, US-led stability force to oversee the transition process.
- In any case, we would have to be ready with a series of demands that would seem reasonable and would test the good faith of the new ruler. These would be demands that he could satisfy in a matter of days.
 - Some new rulers would be unacceptable no matter how they reacted to these demands – e.g., Qusay or Uday.
 - U.S. would need to take advantage of any turmoil surrounding the change of leader to weaken new ruler's hold on power, promote other contenders.

Demands on the new ruler:

- Agree to turn over power to a civilian, broad-based, representative government within a short period of time, e.g., two weeks.
 - As part of the transition process, immediately enter into negotiations with all segments of Iraqi society, including the opposition groups.
 - Accept international observers at such negotiations.
- Send the key scientists in the WMD program, together with their families, outside Iraq, to be interviewed by the inspectors.
- Dismantle the Himaya (Saddam's bodyguards) and the Special Security Organization, placing their members in protective custody.
 - Allow human rights NGOs access to all prisons.
- Recognize the no fly zones and cease firing at coalition aircraft.
 - Permit overflight by U-2s and Predators.
- Extradite Yasin, and other named terrorists being harbored in Iraq.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- End all restrictions on media, especially foreign media.
- Broadcast and publish, in Arabic, through domestic media, all statements, assurances, etc. made to the international community.

Other policy elements:

- Work with opposition groups to engage new ruler in internationally-monitored negotiations.
 - Pressure Kurds to remain committed to Iraqi territorial integrity.

Possible Alternative Approach:

- **Premise for this approach:** The new ruler is unwilling to accede to our demands or is too tainted for us to deal with (e.g., Qusay).
 - The coup might be a charade carried out at Saddam's behest and in his interest.
- In this case, we could encourage the Free Iraqis to:
 - Convene in northern Iraq and declare a provisional government.
 - Invite the U.S. to assist it in asserting its control of Iraq.
- Feasibility of this approach would depend in part on the situation inside Iraq – it would be more plausible if the new ruler was unable to assert complete control quickly.
 - Depends also on how much progress the Free Iraqis had made toward consensus and unity, e.g., whether they could rapidly agree on a leadership structure.

Military requirements:

- Assuming a permissive environment, be prepared to for ground troops to enter Iraq rapidly:
 - Establish presence in Baghdad, other major cities (such as Basra and Mosul.)
 - Secure known WMD sites – if necessary, facilitate immediate re-entry of UNMOVIC/IAEA inspectors.

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- Assist in humanitarian relief efforts – if necessary, facilitate immediate re-entry of NGOs.
- Assuming a non-permissive environment, be prepared to launch 1003V.
 - Take advantage of unsettled conditions within Iraq to encourage local rebellions where we are in a position to support them.
 - Help the provisional government, if one had been created, rally Regular Army troops and others to its side.

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~~TOP SECRET WITH ATTACHMENT~~

Free
@ Khormal 1/22

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

January 22, 2003

DOUG:
UPDATED
VERSION
FOR YOUR
REVIEW
Bill

MEMORANDUM FOR DUSD/NESA/SP WILLIAM J. LUTI

SUBJECT: Khormal Options Briefing

Attached is the revised briefing on options for Khormal incorporating Mr. Feith's comments and additional slides providing more detail on direct action options.

We recommend that we forward this to Mr. Feith for final review.



b6

DECLASSIFIED
BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE JULY 11, 2007

~~classified by DUSD/NESA/SP, William J. Luti~~
~~on 1-5-03~~
~~declassify 31 January 2013~~

~~TOP SECRET WITH ATTACHMENT~~

DOC/DFOISR
~~TOP SECRET CONTROL~~
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Case No. 01F-1325
No. _____
Document No. 16

Khormal: Danger and Opportunity in Northern Iraq

- Possible U.S. goals with respect to the CBW facility at Khormal:
 - Eliminate threats to U.S. and PUK, including:
 - Ansar al-Islam's CBW capability in Kurdish Iraq
 - Al Qaida presence and safe haven in northern Iraq
 - Conventional military threat to PUK
 - Denying Iraq and Iran an instrument for destabilizing the Kurdish region
 - Establish staging area for U.S. troops in Iraq
 - Apply pressure to Saddam's regime

Opportunity Created By Iraq's Denial of Control Over Northern Iraq

- Exploit Iraq's public statements that they are not in control of northern Iraq:
 - Tariq Aziz publicly states on August 20, 2002 that al-Qaida elements are "*operating in Iraq, but in a location governed by an ally of Mr. Rumsfeld...it is under the control of Jalal Talabani, it is not under the control of the government.*"

Summary of Options

- Option One: Do Nothing
- Option Two: Request Blix to Inspect Site-Leads to Multiple Scenarios
 - Scenario A-Blix Agrees to Inspect and Iraq Agrees to Assist
 - Scenario B-Blix Agrees to Inspect without Seeking Iraqi Assistance
 - Scenario C-Blix Agrees to Inspect and Iraq Refuses to Assist
 - Scenario D-Blix Refuses to Inspect and US does nothing
 - Scenario E-Blix Refuses to Inspect and US conducts coercive inspections
- Option Three: US Direct Action Without Requesting Inspections

Option One: Do Nothing


PRO

- Avoid dangers associated with other options (see following slides)

CON

- Does not eliminate any of the threats posed by Ansar al-Islam and al Qaida operating in northern Iraq

**Decision Flow Chart For Scenarios Under Option Two:
Request Inspections**



Option Two: Request Inspections

Scenario A: Blix and Iraq agree to inspect Khurmal under Iraqi protection

PRO

- If UNMOVIC finds CBW material identical to that found inside the regime-controlled Iraq, Saddam and al Qaida are linked, and Iraq is in material breach of UNSCR 1441
- Could justify U.S. action against Khurmal and regime
- Under pressure, Ansar begins to communicate with its al Qaida allies outside Iraq, providing intelligence collection opportunity

CON

- Provides Iraq excuse to cross PUK's territory, heightening tension with PUK
- Undermines U.S. policy that Iraq be kept out of Kurdish area
- Iraq able to assert greater control over conduct of inspections
- Iraq appears to be cooperating with UNMOVIC

Option Two: Request Inspections

Scenario B: Blix agrees to inspect site without seeking Iraqi protection

PRO

- Could provide U.S. with justification for using force against Ansar enclave in support of UNMOVIC
- If inspection successful, could lead to elimination of CBW potential, with or without U.S. forces

CON

- Inspection team's safety is jeopardized
- PUK could attack site to clear way for inspectors, triggering broader clashes with PUK

Option Two: Request Inspections

Scenario C: Blix expresses willingness to inspect site, but demurs when Iraq says it can't guarantee access

PRO

- Could justify direct U.S. action while precluding Iraqi charges we are infringing upon their sovereignty
- Potential Iraqi communications with Ansar over the issue create intelligence collection opportunity for U.S./coalition

CON

- Provides advanced warning, Ansar moves facility elsewhere

Option Two: Request Inspections

Scenario D: Blix refuses the request as outside his mandate-U.S. does nothing

PRO

- Avoids dangers associated with other options

CON

- Does not eliminate any of the threats posed by Ansar-al-Islam and al Qaida operating in northern Iraq
- Public diplomacy cost in requesting action of UNMOVIC and then doing nothing in response
- Shows lack of resolve to Iraq

Option Two: Request Inspections

Scenario E: Blix refuses and U.S. inspects site unilaterally - - calls Iraq's hand

PRO

- Eliminates the CBW threat from site
- Iraq would be in a weak position to protest after public statements denying control of Kurdish region
- Direct U.S. action against Ansar in support of inspectors
- Possible discovery of evidence of Iraqi complicity in al Qaida CBW production leads to direct U.S. action against Saddam

CON

- Iraq claims any CBW found at Khurmal has no association with regime--blames Talabani
- Iran protests actions, becomes less cooperative with respect to regime change

Option Three: U.S. Takes Direct Action

Without Inspections

PRO

- Elimination of terrorist CBW facility
- Removal of terrorist enclave in PUK territory--denial of safe have for al Qaida
- Provides PUK opportunity to control borders and terrorist transit routes
- Provides the U.S./coalition a base of operations in Iraq
- Puts enormous pressure on Saddam's regime
- Demonstrates U.S. resolve in the region
- Could cause mass defections in Iraqi military
- Could cause regime change with relatively low costs
- Gives U.S. presence to forestall unilateral Turkish moves into northern Iraq
- Reduces Iranian influence in region

CON

- Could precipitate unanticipated Iraqi WMD attack
- Iran protests actions, becomes less cooperative with respect to regime change

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Options for Direct Action

- Option One - Cruise missile attack
- Option Two - Air strikes only
- Option Three - Air and ground attack

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OSD Policy
15 Nov 02

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UNM

USG Organization with Respect to UNMOVIC/IAEA

• Current USG Organization:

- [REDACTED] - NSC-led interagency group (PCC) on support to UNMOVIC/IAEA.
- [REDACTED]
- Assistant Secretary of State Wolf - Executive agent of PCC for liaison with UNMOVIC/IAEA.
- DTRA - Executive Agent of DoD for support (logistics, technological, etc.) to UNMOVIC/IAEA.

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• Key point: Current organizational structure is focused primarily on support for UNMOVIC/IAEA.

- [REDACTED]
- E.g., [REDACTED] paper on "early tests"; OSD paper on interviews outside Iraq.
- [REDACTED]

b1

• Possible New Group (OSD Policy proposal - under development):

- [REDACTED]

• Tasks:

b1

- Oversee monitoring of UNMOVIC/IAEA to make sure we understand how they are operating.
- Develop list of stratagems Iraq may adopt to thwart inspections.
- Develop counters UNMOVIC/IAEA could adopt to deal with these Iraqi stratagems.
- Shape support to UNMOVIC/IAEA [REDACTED]
- Develop IO themes to enhance effectiveness of operations.

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- [REDACTED]

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- **Some Questions and Issues**
- How can we tailor intelligence support to create "early test" of Iraq's willingness to comply with inspection regime?
 - Policy guidance to WINPAC on when and how to provide UNMOVIC/IAEA information on a site where we are highly confident incriminating material is to be found.

• [REDACTED]

b1

- How can we monitor and enhance UNMOVIC/IAEA operational security?

- [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

OSD/ISA/NESA
7 October 2002

SecDef Directive to Military Governor of Iraq

- You are the ultimate authority in liberated Iraq
 - Your responsibility is to maintain security in Iraq so that infrastructure can be rebuilt and daily administration resume.
 - Our goal is to stabilize Iraq and help ensure the emergence of a stable, representative Iraqi government free from the tyranny of dictators.
- You must initially assume command of the Iraqi government.
 - You will appoint U.S. commanders in each province, district, sub-district, and municipality.
 - You will ensure that reformed and "de-Ba'athified" ministries and their satellite offices remain functioning.
 - This mandates that you assign American personnel to direct ministries and their satellite offices.
- You are entrusted with safe-guarding the life of the Iraqi people.
 - You are ultimately responsible for the distribution of food, medicine, and supplies until the humanitarian situation stabilizes.
- You are the supreme judicial authority until the formation of an Iraqi government.
 - You must police cities, towns, and the countryside to discourage and prevent blood revenge and vigilante justice.
 - You must establish tribunals to address crime.
 - You must establish detention facilities to host those suspected of war crimes until they can be interviewed.
- You are to lay the groundwork for a transition to a civil administration.
 - In each geographic and bureaucratic division, you should identify Iraqi notables, tribal leaders, and experienced bureaucrats to aid in transition.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JULY 11, 2007

~~Classified by: DASH William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason: 1.3 (a) (b)~~
~~Authority: 1.3 (a) (b)~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

OSD/ISA/NESA
7 October 2002

Structure, Organization, and Staffing of the US Military administration

- Ultimate authority in Iraq will rest with a military governor who will report to the Secretary of Defense through Commander, CENTCOM.
- A Joint Task Force [JTF] will be established to deal with security issues.
 - The Commander, JTF will report to Commander, CENTCOM and will serve as security advisor to the military governor.
- The U.S. will respect existing geographic divisions.
 - The military governor will appoint a chief administrator for each province, district, sub-district, and municipality.
 - The military governor, his administrators, and Free Iraqi coalition figures will work to identify local notables, tribal leaders, and experienced bureaucrats to facilitate transition to future stages at each level.
 - Free Iraqi Coalition figures will identify local liaisons from each *mahalla* (neighborhood) in municipal areas.
- The U.S. will utilize existing bureaucratic structures when possible.
 - The military governor will appoint U.S. specialists to assume responsibility in each ministry in order to replace Ba'ath party officials.
 - Low and mid-level workers will initially continue in their jobs.
 - Arabic or Kurdish-speaking U.S. specialists will serve as liaisons between transitional Iraqi government workers and U.S. specialists in their ministries.
- The JTF Commander and the military governor will rely on U.S.-cleared Arabic (and Kurdish) translators.
 - Governors and sub-district liaisons will hire translators as needed.
 - For each subdistrict, the Free Iraqi coalition of opposition figures will nominate Arabic-English and/or Kurdish-English translators upon request.
 - Translators and Iraqi liaisons should be residents of any subdistrict in which they work.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED BY OSD POLICY DRT
DATE: JULY 11, 2007

~~Classified by: DASE William J. Lutz~~
~~Reason: 1.5 (a) (1)~~
~~Declassify on: 7 Oct 2002~~

FEB -7 2003

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SPECIAL PLANS - NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

February 7, 2003

I-03/001561

ASD/ISA
Has Seen
JWC

FEB -7 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR ASD and USDP

SUBJECT: February 15, 60-Day Report to Congress

NOTE SEE ASD/ISA
COMMENT 07 FEB-2003

- NSC requested OSD edit the draft 60-day report to Congress as required by Public Law 107-243, "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002." (next under)
- The OSD edited version is at tab A.
 - Coordinated by Principal Deputy GC Dell'Orto on Feb 6.
- NSC staff plans to forward this report on 15 Feb to Congress.

White House is screaming for this, & wants it today!

Recommendation: please approve draft report (tab A) and sign USDP letter to Mr. Hadley (tab 3).

DASD

✓

[Handwritten signature]



& Iraq
Comps

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100



MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR (STEVE HADLEY)

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *DFP 2/7/03*

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Iraq

We have finalized our review of the draft 60-day "Report to Congress." Suggested changes in the following areas are annotated on the attachment (in addition to other minor edits):

- **Iraqi Opposition Conferences** -- need to update the status of the upcoming conference as of 15 February (the report closeout date).
- **Free Iraqi Forces** - revised this section to emphasize the FIF mission in assisting coalition forces and the mission of the U.S. Army Training Task Force (TTF).
- **ESF Funding of Iraqi Opposition** -- wording requires an update referencing the State Department's FY03 funds since we are currently in FY03.
- **Relief and Reconstruction Planning** -- added sentences discussing the stand-up and mission of the interagency Post War Planning team under Lieutenant General (ret) Garner.
- **Status of UN Inspections** -- added a sentence stating UNMOVIC turned down the U.S. offer to provide Predator aircraft for surveillance operations.
 - Added a recent statement by the President on the issue.
- **Other Developments** -- added a paragraph discussing allied support for the conflict (if necessary).
- **Other Developments** - Suggest paragraph C be expanded to include a summary of Secretary Powell's Feb 5 UN address.

Policy Guidance Number 11 – Implementing guidance related to controlling weapons in post-Saddam Iraq (u)

~~(s/rel)~~ This message provides SecDef guidance to Commander, UNCENCOM to assist in the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

2. ~~(s/rel)~~ Background: Iraq is a militarized and heavily armed society. the special republican guard, republican guard, regular army and paramilitary organizations possess the bulk of the country's heavy weapons. intelligence indicates some Ba'ath party members, SRG, Kurds, Sunni and Shi'a tribes may possess some heavy weapons capabilities. In addition, it is likely that military personnel, who abandon their units, could take heavy weapons with them when they return to their tribal homes.

a. ~~(s/rel)~~ Many Iraqis may not trust the security situation in the immediate aftermath of a liberated Iraq with some viewing this as a time to settle old scores.

b. ~~(s/rel)~~ In a post regime Iraq, many Iraqis will consider their tribe as the best security guarantee.

3. ~~(s/rel)~~ In a post regime environment, locating and securing access to heavy weapons will be necessary. The intent is not to disarm the population of small arms, but to negate a force protection threat to us/coalition forces in Iraq caused by the presence of heavy weapons.

4. ~~(s/rel)~~ Heavy weapons are defined as:

- a. ~~(s/rel)~~ crew-served weapons 7.62mm or larger
- b. ~~(s/rel)~~ anti-tank weapons (e.g. rpg -7)
- c. ~~(s/rel)~~ anti-aircraft weapons (e.g. sa-7)
- d. ~~(s/rel)~~ all weapons of 12.7mm or larger
- e. ~~(s/rel)~~ all indirect-fire weapons
- f. ~~(s/rel)~~ all armored vehicles or self propelled weapons

5. ~~(s/rel)~~ Post-regime: The following organizations will be disarmed and dismantled: the regime security apparatus, SRG, intelligence services, paramilitary forces, and the ba'ath party. The regular army's weapons must be secured in the near term; however, rebuilding Iraq's army into an army that provides for the defense of Iraq but does not pose a threat to its neighbors will require appropriate weapons, to include heavy

weapons. (Note: after vetting, some regular army personnel may be re-integrated into a new army force).

6. ~~(s/rel)~~ With regard to Iraqi tribes and Peshmerga:

- a. ~~(s/rel)~~ Iraqi tribes and Peshmerga should not be forcibly disarmed as tribes will interpret forcible disarmament as an effort to weaken them.
- b. ~~(s/rel)~~ Making a declaration that specific weapons types will be illegal after a set time along with offering a weapons buy back program may offer the best method to disarm these groups of their heavy weapons without provoking a reaction against coalition forces.
- c. ~~(s/rel)~~ After encouraging tribal chiefs to resolve inter-tribal disputes peacefully, e.g., majlis, issue warnings to tribal sheiks that any organized act of armed aggression against other Iraqis will not be tolerated and could result in a forcible response by coalition forces. Neutrality is encouraged so as not to appear to take sides or represent former means of persuasion. Enforce idea that coalition authority is temporary and managed best by their helpful behavior.
- d. ~~(s/rel)~~ Attempt to integrate the Peshmerga into Iraq's new military force over time.

7. ~~(s/rel)~~ Individual Iraqi citizens:

- a. ~~(s/rel)~~ Law-abiding Iraqi citizens should not be forcibly disarmed of their small arms, except as may be necessary to ensure force protection or for legitimate law enforcement purposes.
- b. ~~(s/rel)~~ Establish weapons-free zones. places should include government facilities, schools, holy sites, and public gatherings such as sporting events.