




# USCENTAF

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES



PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
LESSONS LEARNED  
REPORT

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/  
DESERT STORM  
AUG 90 - FEB 91 #403



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
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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
OPERATION DESERT STORM, APO NY 09852



CCPA

4 March 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

SUBJECT: Media Division After-action Report

Attached for inclusion in the overall public affairs after-action report is input from the media division.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Michael R. Gallagher".

MICHAEL R. GALLAGHER  
Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Media Division

## **MEDIA SECTION AREAS OF CONCERN:**

### **Senior Leadership Involvement**

- News media from around the world had representatives reporting on the successes, failures and status of USCENTCOM.
  - The timeliness and accuracy of this process were wholly dependent on the support received from USCENTCOM leadership.
- -The process worked best when the highest levels of command were involved. This was especially true when senior-ranking officers assisted in the release of information, the approval of statements and responses to queries, participated in news briefings, backgrounders and interviews, and occasionally met with press representatives to discuss their concerns.
- Future deployments must include plans for senior officer participation in all phases of news media relations. At a minimum, a general officer from J-3 must be trained and ready to provide daily news briefings. The deployed PA staff should include PAOs with experience in news media training. Lights, sound equipment, camera and VCRs should be deployed to immediately establish training sessions within the theater.
  - A system must be established to ensure the prompt approval for the release of information by the highest levels of the command.
  - Leadership must recognize that news media coverage serves as the basis for current and future public perceptions of the command. This coverage will affect decisions by DoD leadership, the White House and Congress and will influence the historical reporting of the deployment.
- The PAO must be located in close proximity to the command section.
  - Because the PA was a city block from the commander, valuable time was

lost in the coordination of the release of information and other public affairs actions.

-The media division continually experienced difficulty clearing information through the Joint Operations Center

--Situation improved when PA JOC reps were appointed and physically located at the JOC, allowing constant access and personal interface with JOC personnel.

--May want to consider using PAOs with operations background for this position, but primary need was aggressive, young PAs who fully understand time sensitivity of media and how to coordinate possible answers to questions even before they are asked.

### Component Community

-Components need to agree on common language, terms, procedures for releasing information.

--Terms and descriptions for medical conditions should be standardized.

--Terms for missing status should be standardized.

--Types of releasable information (i.e. age, unit, hometown) should be standardized.

### Host Nation Interface

-Strong effort must be made to immediately establish close working relationships with host nation counterparts.

-Lists of host nation and coalition PA contacts must be collected as soon as possible.

-Periodic meetings with PA counterparts must be established.

-Common release procedures with host nation and coalition PAOs must be

established.

-Establish host nation/CENTCOM common credentialing process.

--Hold meetings to determine responsibility for ordering equipment, taking photographs, handling paperwork, etc.

--Establish division of labor, equipment requirements, room layout, etc. for media center.

--Establish briefing schedule.

### **DoD Liaison**

-The OASD(PA) Desert Shield/Storm Cell was established to support the deployed public affairs operations. Often, however, this function was reversed in order to "feed" updates to support daily OASD news briefs. This, in effect, meant doubling the workload of those detailed to support the briefs in Riyadh.

-Often times, also, DoD would release information or provide new information in Washington that would undercut media in theater.

### **Equipment/Office Support/Personnel**

-The media division experienced a lack of proper equipment to efficiently do the job, including computers, typewriters, telephones, telefax capability, reproduction capability, graphics capability, answering machine, and equipment specific to the media center.

--Suggest PAOs coming into theater be issued lap top computers from their home station to bring with them or that USCENCOM maintain a significant supply of deployable computers.

--Suggest three fax machines -- one for transmission and two for receive.

--Need one telephone per PAO; multi-line capability would be a big plus.

Much valuable time was wasted traveling from desk to desk answering phones.

--Suggest procurement of a field press for reproduction of Early Bird and other media products. Office copiers are inadequate for the excessive usage such reproductions required, and resulted in breakdowns of xerox machine.

--Although computers have taken over much of the administrative job, there is still a need for typewriters. One typewriter to serve 30-plus people is woefully inadequate. Recommend at least a 10:1 ratio.

--Need to find a means for reducing large charts to 8 1/2 x 11 size for reproduction and faxing, as well as equipment to make posters, decals, overhead slides and other graphics.

--Need an answering machine for conveying routine information, such as press briefing times.

--Equipment needed for a well-equipped media center includes the following: microphones (stationary, lavalier, wireless and shotgun - three each); microphone stands (table and stand-up), mult box (minimum of 24 inputs), slide mixer, sufficient microphone cable (50-foot length) with XLR connectors, headphones (two sets), tape recorders, batteries, network telephone, sound curtains, professional backdrop (including curtains, flags, podium shields), audio and video tapes in ample supply. This equipment is in addition to that required for spokespersons' training sessions (see "Senior Leadership Involvement" section)

--Need more enlisted and company grade officer personnel assigned. Grade structure was too heavy on field grade officers. Company grade officers ended up with little responsibility and NCOs were misutilized.

-Need for dedicated transportation for media personnel. Media section was dependent on transportation support from plans/admin section, and many times it was not available.

## **Administrative Support**

-The media division experienced a lack of full-time administrative support. PA personnel performed admin function in addition to regular duties

-Whenever possible, a local transcript contract should be awarded. Telephone comm problems with Washington, D.C. sometimes caused problems in obtaining transcripts.

-Need for newcomers' program:

--Some incoming people were not met at the airport, had to find their way to the JIB, and were not immediately assigned specific duties.

--Billeting needs were not taken care of expeditiously; several people slept on couches for weeks.

--A welcome sheet faxed to projected people with information on what to expect and what to bring would be beneficial.

-Need for better crossfeed which would have engendered esprit de corps among all sections of public affairs -- media, internal, plans and administration. A PAO "commanders call" held at three-week intervals would be helpful.

## **Component Interface**

-The media division experienced difficulty reaching component PAOs for information. ARCENT was staffed only during the day; NAVCENT was sometimes difficult to reach when at sea, particularly during the day; CENTAF was understaffed and had to use answering machines even during some key day hours.

-More queries should have been handled through the service components rather than through the JOC; caused appearance of unresponsiveness because JOC did not have the necessary information at its level.

## Research

-The media division experienced a lack of resource material.

--CENTCOM/PA should deploy original fact sheets and unclassified handouts on all U.S., allied and enemy service equipment. Resource materials were faxed only as the need arose, but it all should have been brought in with first PA deployment.

--Need for a research section to maintain statistics, write daily major events log, gather research materials on U.S., coalition and enemy military equipment, maintain biographies and fact sheets.

--Research section should immediately compile biographies of senior officers, local area information, phone and hotel listings, etc.

-CENTCOM/PA should maintain PA regulations for each service. These publications are essential in determining what information can be released.

-Style guides should be deployed for each section.

## Pools

- PA personnel are not trained in how to escort a pool. At a minimum, this subject should be thoroughly examined and then taught at DINFOS.

-Need to better communicate to component commands and their field PAOs sensitivities which should be safeguarded when talking to pool reporters. Too many reports contained information which was classified or in violation of established ground rules.

-Even with media pools in effect, there will always be a need for unilateral media interviews or specific coverage of units or events. Planning should take this into account to decide what unilateral coverage will and will not be allowed. -Disparate needs of TV, radio and print journalists should be considered in the formation of media pools, official briefings and other planned media events. The media are not all the same, and treating them as if they are only ends up not giving any of them

what they need.

--OSD/PA may wish to consider assigning print journalists to specific units for the duration of the campaign and to handle electronic media only on a rotational pool basis.

### Miscellaneous

-The command must develop a policy for handling entertainment media (e.g. Geraldo Rivera, Entertainment Tonight) which are not legitimate news media representatives.

--Should they be allowed in theater?

--Should they be credentialed?

--Should they be allowed on pools?

--Should they be permitted unilateral coverage?

## MEDIA CENTER SUCCESS STORIES

- Initiation of periodic meetings with media to air concerns, find solutions
- Institution of background briefings on key subject areas --i.e. EPW handling, battle damage assessment, Geneva Convention, sea and land mines, Republican Guards, AirLand Battle Doctrine, C3I, Tactical Air Control of aircraft sortie planning.
- Initiation of morning update briefing in which senior military officials provided background information on overnight activities
- Institution of "slot director" and "slot NCO" positions to assign and monitor day-to-day queries, interview requests, and administrative matters
- Institution of multiple interview concept in which several reporters interviewed key CENTCOM staff at one time. Allowed key people to meet the needs of the media with minimal cost to their busy schedules.
- Decision to elect one reporter as senior point of contact on all media matters. Also elected a key representative for newspaper, magazine, TV and radio to work with him to iron out problems, establish pools.
- Establishment of "tours" section to get media to Riyadh area bases. Included KC-135 and AWACs flights, Patriot battery tours, PX trips, hospital visits.
- Establishment of morning and evening change-over meetings to update each shift on past 12 hours activities. Side effect: built strong esprit de corps.
- Physically separating media section from the media center made it easier for PAOs in work areas to conduct sensitive discussions without reporters' interference.
- Having operators from both air and ground specialties in the briefing section proved invaluable as a quick reference for media queries. Also established vital J-2 link by designating an intelligence officer to assist with briefings and queries, and his attendance at office briefs helped him understand PA needs.

- Developed strong working relationship with French, British, Saudi Ministry of Information and Saudi defense PAOs, resulting, for the most part, in an international media center that spoke with "one voice."
- Worked with networks to establish a television pool, feeding live broadcasts to the world.
- Coordinated consistent press conference and background audio feeds to the Dhahran JIB and Pentagon.

## MAJOR TOPICS OF MEDIA QUERIES:

### DESERT SHIELD:

Saudi sensitivities and: women, religion, American flag  
Medical readiness  
Medevac system  
Morale issues --USO celebrity visits, cruise ship, donations, mail  
Ibn Khaldoon intercept, Dimitry Fermanov intercept  
Iraqi pre-hostility SCUD launches  
Iraqi helicopter defection  
Logistics -- water supply, uniform items, ammo shortages  
Aircraft accidents  
Casualties  
Imminent Thunder and Sea Soldier Amphibious Landing Exercises  
Telephones on front lines and free faxes  
Maritime intercept operations  
Mines in the northern Arabian Gulf  
Eastern Exit - Mogadishu, Somalia

### DESERT STORM:

Battle damage assessment  
C3I effectiveness  
Casualty counts  
women in combat  
SCUD launches  
NBC warfare immunizations  
Pregnant soldiers  
Battle of Khafji  
Targeting of civilian, archeological and religious facilities  
Patriot system information  
Republican Guard  
Oil spill and environmental terrorism  
War crimes trials  
Friendly fire  
POWs  
EPWs  
Sea mine explosions  
Theater logistics - fuel, mail, all facets of battlefield support  
SCUD hit in Dhahran  
Naval gunfire support - battleships  
PSYOPS  
CBS crew disappearance  
Landmine planting  
Ordnance by type and amount  
Aircraft combat losses  
KIAs, MIAs and WIAs  
Individual armor battles and offensives

## After Action Report - Desert Shield

### LESSONS LEARNED:

#### - Training:

-- All people on mobility should be given buddy care/first aid and chemical warfare training.

-- Training: A shortfall of mine that I noticed was that, if I did have a lap-top computer, I didn't know how to use it. If I had been tasked to use page maker in order to put out a newsletter, I would have to learn on the job. Unified software and training would fix these concerns.

- TAC/PA may want to send their deploying PAs to the field once in a while. I've been deployed to bare bases before and know how to work under deployed conditions, and not to expect too much. We might be able to do this by sending our PAs with units who are exercising in the field. When there is a Reforger or Team Spirit we could send more HQ PAOs to get the experience.

- Equipment: The first PA team to deploy had no equipment. Everything, including pens and paper had to be borrowed from other agencies.

-- PAs should not deploy without the bare essentials to work with. A lap-top computer and printer would have made life much easier.

- People: I think it was a mistake to only send junior officers in to arrange the way for the DoD press pool. We were two captains fighting for telephone lines and equipment with O-5s, 6s and in some cases general officers. If we had had our own equipment it might have been different.

-- Deploying augmented troops first to set up and make arrangements for the DoD pool was not a good call. No one in the Central Command knew us. People are more inclined to help people they know, who have a track record. Not knowing the command structure or even who we could depend on for help handcuffed us.

SOLUTION: The owning command should send their own people first, making sure the OIC is senior enough to deal with the other agencies on a one-to-one level, and use a hammer to get what they need if necessary. Using their own people will ensure recognition by other agencies, and that they have a working relationship with the rest of the command.

#### Communications:

- One point of contact: Because I had a telephone in my hotel room, it became the PA office. From there I received calls from Mr Williams, DoD/PA, CENTCOM/PA and others. Everyone asked for the same information separately. We needed one point of contact. I felt that people back in the states were not talking to each other and messages got mixed up. (Example - CENTCOM/PA was not talking to Washington).

- Clear Orders: I did not have a clear understanding of what we (the first PAs in country), were sent in to do. This may have been due to my lack of experience in this type of joint operation and the uniqueness of the situation.

- Know what the media want and their capabilities: We spent a large portion of our time during the first week arranging satellite feed for the press pool. When the pool arrived, we found that they didn't need it. We received mixed information on the media's capabilities and needs (possibly due to not having one point of contact).

**SUGGESTIONS:**

- When sending people to these situations, choose people who are versatile, self-starters, willing to do things that are not in the PA job description. What I'm getting at is the person should make themselves open to communication, be pro-active, and willing to be a bus driver or horse trader if that is what it takes to get the job done.

**OBSERVATION:**

- In my view, the only reason that the DoD Press Pool was a success, and the rest of the world's media received as much assistance as they did in the first few months of Desert Shield, was due to the personal efforts of the people assigned to the JIB-Dhahran and the PAOs of the two units cleared for media visits. (1TFW/PA and 354 TFW/PA).

KEVIN D. BAGGETT, Capt, USAF  
CENTCOM JIB/Dhahran

Dover:

Deployed: SSgt Harold G. Jones, 2 Sept to 2 Dec.

Unit: JIB, Riyadh

Comments:

- Early PA staffing limited
- Admin support lacking
- Equipment level was minimal

Homestation:

- Mortuary resulted in intense media interest; should have been a joint PA operation
- Local and regional media demanded timely information almost daily
- Keen interest in Dover's airlift mission
- PA guidance for mortuary established by DOD yet wing PA handled queries
- Media airlift approval process was cumbersome
- Internal operation suffered due to staff shortfall

## CENTAF FORWARD

### OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

#### AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. ORGANIZATION: During the first two weeks of Operation Desert Shield as CENTAF Forward was forming up, there were no public affairs people deployed or planned for. When CENTCOM/CC deployed to the AOR on 24 Aug 90, and Lt Gen Horner relocated to CENTAF headquarters located at the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) headquarters, it was decided a CENTAF/PA function was necessary. Maj Lou Tiedemann (HQ TAC/PAI) and Maj Oscar Seara (836 AD/PA) were selected as the initial PA staff and were in place on 25 Aug 90. Due to the late start in establishing an office, the PA function had no place to locate during the first two weeks of operation. After scouting around, office space was located in the old GCC building on King Abdul Aziz Blvd approximately one mile from the RSAF building. Another several weeks were used to obtain office furniture and supplies as well as a rental vehicle. An administrative slot was also established and subsequently filled by Sgt Donovan Preston (USAFTAWC). The PA office functioned as a three person shop, 12 hour days, 7 days a week, for the majority of Desert Shield. In December, as war loomed on the horizon, it was determined that more manpower was necessary and three more slots were established and filled by Capt Lance Jay (100 AD/PA), SSgt Andrew Glaze (5 Space Wing/PA) and SSgt Steve Smith (410 BMW/PA). A seven person internal team headed by Capt Earl Shellner (AFNEWS) was also deployed to the AOR under CENTAF Forward PA at this time. This resulted in a total of 13 people working the PA function throughout the war period during two 12-hour shifts. An additional PA office was established on the RSAF compound during Desert Storm. Shortly after the war ended, Maj Seara was redeployed to CONUS and the PA function gradually cut back to one 16, 14 and eventually 12-hour shift. The internal team, SSgt Glaze and Sgt Preston were the next ones to redeploy in Mar 91. Sgt Preston was replaced by another administrative specialist. Shortly after CENTAF Forward Headquarters was disestablished, Maj Tiedemann and Capt Jay redeployed (Apr/May 91). SSgt Smith was left behind to work CENTAF/PA issues.

2. ROLES AND MISSIONS: CENTAF Forward/PA was originally established as a staff agency for CENTAF/CC whose mission was to advise of public affairs implications of Desert Shield/Storm and be the one official outlet for CENTAF information. Since CENTAF/CC was the one official CENTAF spokesperson, the office was responsible for setting up news media interviews with Lt Gen Horner and eventually Air Division commanders and staff agency chiefs after the war. Other roles were:

a. Staff and coordinate all information released public ly with proper staff agency chief and CC.

b. Ensure news media got to available CENTAF deployed locations to provide effective media coverage.

c. Supply cleared information to CENTCOM for daily press conferences.

- d. Clear and coordinate deploying stateside local/regional media into CENTAF deployed locations.
- e. Generate and clear internal releases for use in Desert Defender, CENTCOM/CENTAF/Air Force news services, AIRMAN Magazine and other internal outlets.
- f. Determine and modify CENTAF distribution requirements for Stars & Stripes, Desert Defender and other internal products.
- g. Generate and forward PA guidance to field units.
- h. Clear and coordinate media pools at field units.
- i. Arrange for transportation of media pools and media pool products.
- j. Host Hometown news teams, AF Radio, AIRMAN Magazine and other visitors to the AOR.
- k. Coordinate PA operations with CENTCOM/PA and CENTAF Rear/PA.
  - l. Escort news media, as required.
  - m. Provide aircraft accident releases to CENTCOM for approval.
  - n. Keep CENTAF staff informed of significant Air Force information through CENTAF staff meetings.
  - o. Review unit newsletters.
  - p. Assist in editing gun camera/cockpit video for public release.
  - q. Assist in setting up press conferences for CENTAF personnel.
  - r. Work direct with CONUS media in setting up telephone interviews.

3. INTERFACE/NETWORK: Almost daily interface between CENTAF/PA and CC occurred through staff meetings and open door policy. Interface with other CENTAF staff agencies was lacking, mostly attributed PA being physically located in another area. Daily contact was maintained with CENTCOM/PA by phone and several trips a week to the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) to coordinate and collect distribution. More frequent personal contact with JIB would have been possible with more people assigned to CENTAF/PA. Contact with CENTAF Rear/PA by phone and fax was on an as needed basis. Contact with Saudi counterparts was nonexistent due to no PA counterpart position in the RSAF. Such a position would have aided in the coordination and approval process. Contact with CENTAF deployed units ran from excellent (almost daily) to unacceptable (almost nonexistent). Commercial and TAC phones as well as fax, computer networks and messages were used. CENTAF/PA had good communication resources, however, some units were lacking adequate communications including phones and computer interface.

4. OUTPUT: The primary product of Public Affairs was the Desert Defender. The convenience of publishing at Langley vs delays in obtaining inputs and distribution, have to be weighed. If the paper could have been published in the AOR, the delays could have been overcome. The CENTAF established AIG was used to distribute guidance and info messages to field units but only CENTAF (forward and rear) could use the AIG.

5. ISSUES:

a. There was a problem in getting all CENTAF locations open to the press. In the end we managed to get all locations except Oman. In addition, Jeddah closed up again precluding B-52 coverage.

b. Public affairs was not included in planning and initial deployment for CENTAF headquarters.

c. Public affairs was not initially collocated with the rest of HQ CENTAF. An additional PA office was collocated with Combat Camera during Desert Storm. This was more convenient for conducting interviews and shift changes.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Plan for a full contingent of PA personnel to deploy with initial cadre of CENTAF headquarters.

b. Deploy enough computers and trained personnel to form a computer network.

  
LOUIS J. TIEDEMANN JR., Major, USAF

## 4TH TFW (P)/PA

### AL KHARJ AFTER-ACTION REPORT

1. **Reporting Officer:** Major Jereon M. Brown, Public Affairs Officer, 4th Tactical Fighter Wing Provisional, Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia.

2. **Inclusive Dates:** 21 Dec 90 - 17 March 91.

3. **Manning:** Deputy PAO: Capt Gary Carruthers,  
7241st ABG, Iraklion, Crete (Dec. 16 - )  
**NCOIC:** CMSgt James Chumley, 169th TFG, South Carolina

**Media:** TSgt Mike Otis, 138th TFG, New York  
Sgt Al Nall

**Internal:** Sgt Dee Ann Heiderscheidt, 4th TFW,  
Seymour Johnson, N.C. (Dec 19 - )

Sgt Heiderscheidt had been previously stationed in Thumrait, Oman for 48 days.

#### **Narrative:**

I'm extremely proud of the performance of the 4th TFW (P) public affairs office. I believe our staff did the best job of telling the Air Force story during the war. I base this on numerous comments received from press members and the amount of television coverage and ink garnered by the unit. Edie Lederer, an AP correspondent, and David Evans of the Chicago Tribune, noted ours was the only Air Force pool that worked. Dave Montgomery, a long-time White House correspondent went as far as to say it was the most competent staff he'd ever seen. I agree! A diversified, hustling staff overcame numerous obstacles to live up to the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing motto "Fourth but First."

While an extremely talented staff contributed greatly to our success, there were several other major factors -- our commander, location, flexibility and luck.

Col. Hal Hornburg, 4th TFW(P) commander was one of the most sensitive public affairs commanders I've seen. You couldn't go to war with a better wing commander.

Al Kharj was a public affairs dream as far as story ideas go. To name a few:

- The largest base in Saudi Arabia (the size of Dallas-Fort Worth airport)
- Home of the newest AF fighter/bomber (F-15E)
- The largest bare base buildup since Vietnam
- Instant air base (built in less than 30 days)
- One of the most diversified wings in the AOR (FA-16's, F-15C's, F-15E's, F-16A's, C-130's -- capable of delivering one million pounds of ordnance daily).
- Home of the only FA-16 squadron in the AF (close air support role)

- Home of the only reserve wing to win Gunsmoke
- Home of the largest munitions dump in Saudi

These stories and having a wartime media pool in place for the first two weeks of the war earned the 4th TFW a solid lock on television coverage during the first two weeks of the war. Thanks to some great shots by CBS "shooter" Chris Everson and his soundman, Tim Dickey, nearly every tail seen was from Seymour Johnson, New York, South Carolina or Bitburg.

#### PA

PA, prior to and during war still stands for "practically anything." The 4th TFW staff worked everything from numerous congressional visits to getting the Super Bowl to camp. The protocol tasking was particularly demanding. Captain Carruthers admirably served as the wing protocol officer. Anyone who has ever worked a congressional visit knows the countless hours involved in making an hour long visit a success.

#### Office Equipment

Scrounging and trading are valuable skills during war. Our skilled staff utilized these skills to put together one of the most complete offices in the AOR. Our office was outfitted with:

- Five VCRs
- Four televisions
- Four lap-top computers
- Zenith 248
- HP Laser Printer
- JVC video editing system
- television camera
- desktop copier
- double cassette boom box
- portable fax

Anything you have in a regular PA office we had. That was quite a feat since upon arrival, I built the desk I sat behind.

#### Manning

The reserve/active mix worked extremely well. In fact, all three reservist had been backgrounds which greatly enhanced office operations. CMSgt Chumley is a former radio broadcaster. Sgt Nall is a cameraman for a CBS affiliate and TSgt Otis, a weatherman for an ABC affiliate. They helped us to better understand media needs and helped explain our mode of operation to the media.

TSgt Otis can be credited for a good portion of the spectacular air footage which came out of the 4th TFW. He escorted the CBS crew each time they came. TSgt Otis knew where to get the best shots and he worked to get them for the crews. During the last visit by CBS, Dan Rather sought him out and thanked him for all the hard work.

Having a deputy was invaluable. Halfway through the war, the hours got to both of us so we began doing 12-hour shifts. The staff felt comfortable always having a PAO on duty. (Even when you slept, you slept with a radio.)

Everyone on the staff functioned as a media escort. At times we could have used more people. Eighteen hour days were not unusual, in fact they were quite common at the beginning of the war. Because the days were so long we eventually set up a "crash cot" in the office. It received plenty of use from media and staff members.

Having a representative from each squadron was an excellent idea. Each PA had numerous points of contact and was able to make things happen -- and happen fast. Each PA staffer was responsible for keeping the people back home informed. This meant generating stories (radio/print) and shooting accompanying photos.

It should be noted that during war, none of the staffers except the internal person, had time to write stories for the newspapers or newsletters back home. Escorting, telling the Air Force story, was the first priority. Everyone in the office except our internal person escorted journalists to the front and into Kuwait.

### **Opening Day**

We opened the base to a group of twenty-one media people. The visit was arranged by the JIB at Riyadh in coordination with CENTAF/PA. CENTAF and the JIB both sent escorts however we quickly learned the ratio (escort to media) simply wasn't enough. The first group had everyone from the Wall Street Journal to Bob Simon and a CBS crew. They were cordial and extremely grateful for being included in the first group. Their questions focused on how the war would be fought, how many aircraft did we expect to lose, aircraft maintenance in the desert, morale, chemical preparation, readiness.

**Lessons Learned:** Twenty-one people is too big of a group to handle with eight escorts. Everyone wants different angles unhindered by other members of their party (tough to do with a party of twenty). When the press is excited about something, you've got a bunch of loose cannons on your hand and the best way to move them from point-to-point is through the sheep herding method. Skip the precise itinerary. The press wasn't on time anywhere despite encouragement. We found it worked best simply to alert the key players via "brick."

Early on, we found that television (crews) dictated what the other mediums were doing. This ranged from things as simple as photogs flashing lights during filming to the positioning of subjects. This was the opening clash between the need for visuals versus briefings or outdoors versus indoors.

**Things That Went Well:** Prior to the media visit we put all the key staff members through a media training session.

They were very receptive and the training paid off. We also informed the base population of media do's and don'ts via the Desert Digest, our bi-weekly newsletter. We instituted a policy of taping all Lt Col and above interviews. We hoped this would give us a better idea of the types of questions the media would be asking and we could add to our staff media briefing. The initial questions we threw at the staff were generated by brainstorming among the staff. While some were on the money, we weren't nearly as aggressive as the media.

Another reason for recording the interviews was to reassure the colonels. All seemed more relaxed knowing we would have unedited transcripts in the event they were misquoted.

Publicity generated by the media day was comprehensive. We made every major nightly news, USA Today, Newsweek, Stars and Stripes.

#### **CORNERING THE MEDIA MARKET:**

Once initial reports started getting out about "The Super Base" and "The Instant Air Base" the media were beating the doors down. We initially thought we'd host two groups of seven twice weekly but that never came to pass. CENTAF/PA wanted to test the wartime media pool concept.

Jan 10, CENTAF/PA arranged for the group to fly from Dhahran to our site via dedicated aircraft. The idea was to stray overnight and return the next day. CENTAF wanted to test our ability to produce at the site, our ability to review the products and get them to Riyadh in a timely manner. The group wasn't quite ready for an evening in the middle of the desert so they elected to return (with approved product) to Dhahran via limousene service (a four hour drive).

It should be noted that while dedicated airlift for media pools works prior to the war, it is tough during the war. Media pools should be afforded dedicated vehicles, suitable to the environment.

The visit however, was extremely fruitful. First, they generated some good publicity and spent most of the day touring the base. Secondly the same crew would be returning to spend the first two weeks of the war living with us. The visit allowed us a preview of what was to come. At this point we realized 170 mile daily round trips to Riyadh would be a reality if the war started. The trips were the only way to get media products to the JIB in a timely manner. They also served as a tape run, ensuring the base had the latest CNN news tapes.

The media pool was composed of seven people, two pencils, one photograpaher, one news crew, and one radio person. Their materials were pool products (available to everyone).

I mentioned luck earlier. The 4th TFW had its share. Each time we had pilots returning from a MiG kill, we just happened to have a media pool or an out-n-back there. Every major event -- the FA-16s strapping on their cannons, and

FA-16 returning with battle damage, switching to Mavericks, C-130s refueling tanks on the front...every major shift, we were fortunate enough to have someone there covering it.

We had several reporters who stayed with us cumulatively for one month.

#### **SPREADING THE WEALTH**

One of the most difficult things to do is to spread the wealth. It was very sensitive since we had one host wing (4th TFW) with two squadrons and everyone else with one squadron each.

The wing commander was very sensitive to this fact and he made it clear everyone was part of the 4th TFW and everyone would receive coverage.

When we talked hardware, the media wanted to focus on the F-15E and the FA-16, the wing's most unique assets. That left the C-130s, F-15Cs and F-16s out.

The F-16s gained publicity because of the Gunsmoke title and their Reserve status. The F-15Cs earned their share of the publicity during their MiG kills. The C-130s received very little coverage even though we were constantly trying to sell their story. Just prior to the ground war, we were able to sell the story of them refueling tanks and helicopters at the front. CBS did a short piece and several local papers and Aviation Weekly covered them.

People-wise, we were able to sell the unusual as well as the normal maintenance story. Some of the different sells were:

- weather
- munitions builders
- EOD
- flight surgeon
- AA
- military justice
- golf course
- stress management
- frisbee golf

Some of the tough sells were:

- PMEL
- hot pits
- SG
- MWR
- Communications
- C-130s
- tank buildup

#### **LIVING WITH THE MEDIA**

When Edie Lederer, AP, mentioned ours being the only AF media pool which worked, I could understand why. Other than myself, the rest of the staff were extremely patient. Having the media visit for a couple hours or a day simply doesn't wear on you like having them live with you. You work until you close your eyes and even then someone is

subject to wake you up to confirm how much ordnance an F-15 can carry or the exact dimensions of the base.

We had very few obnoxious media members. Most were courteous professionals. The most outlandish media member we had was a photographer (a friend of Ollie North's). He seemed to think the Air Force worked for him. We persuaded him to leave.

Our "nerve test" showed even the most patient members of the public affairs staff started getting testy after 3 days of living with the media. It should be noted that at Al Kharj, media had to be escorted everywhere except to the base exchange, bathroom, dining hall and our living quarters.

The media worked some extremely long days. I've witnessed 22-hour days. They seemed to thrive on coffee and thoughts of breaking the big story (a.k.a. the big raise). Their stamina was truly amazing.

The most annoying part of living/working with the media is their lack of consideration for anyone including their fellow journalist. As an example, if one person was ready to file and another journalist was 30 minutes or so behind, the person who was ready wanted to go file now. It was imperative! They couldn't wait for the other person nor could they wait for you to finish your phone conversation, eat, or whatever.

Overall, the press was more than fair to us. Because they were living with us, they learned of several stories we would rather not have aired. Because of the friendly relationship we established with them, those stories, as far as we know, never will be aired.

#### **MEDIA ACCREDITATION**

Media accreditation in was accomplished by the JIB in Riyadh. Each media member wore a badge with name/agency in Arabic/English. We chose to issue wing press badges also. The white photo badges were highly visible and a alot easier to reay than the Saudi badges. It also helped the security police track visiting individuals. We had one incident with wandering media. A CBS crew looking for a quiet place to do a standup, wandered off to behind the aircrew area. The aircrew area happened to be one of the most secure on base. It wasn't long before we were called to rescue them.

#### **FRUSTRATED MEDIA**

We had several reporters show up at our door who were totally frustrated with the JIB. Most of the time they cited lack of attention to their needs and timeliness as the reasons for their frustrations. Some simply wanted to get out of the hotel to write on anything.

We chose to accommodate all of them (after checking certification with the JIB) simply because they had driven too far not to get simething. We weren't able to host all of them as long as they would have liked because of billeting/escort obligations but most went away happy. Unbelievably several of the journalists/photographers who

turned up on our doorstep, proved to be the best to work with.

#### **MEDIA REQUESTS**

Media requests, aside from one photographer, weren't out of line. They liked spending a lot of time around the flightline with the pilots and ground crews (the closer you got them to a plane, the better). They never got enough footage or verbiage.

The pilots were the most interviewed people, closely followed by the munitions specialists, then maintenance people.

The media liked talking to pilots before they went up and immediately after they came down. Partially this was an attempt to detect targeting shifts and gain BDA. Once the media found a good interview, they clung to that individual for the entire war. This proved annoying for many of the media darlings and their commanders.

We found that pilots like to have an hour or so of personal time after a mission. We also found that we had to curtail many of the interviews for crew rest. The media doesn't know when to stop -- they never get enough.

For the most part they steered clear of the support side operations unless things were really at a lull. If things were slow, they would do fluff pieces like camp construction, mail call and MWR activities.

#### **PROBLEM AREAS:**

- Billeting which allowed us to keep an eye on the media was a problem. Originally the assigned PA people were residing with their units. We decided that resididng in a dedicated PA tent would allow us to better track the media. The tent allowed us to billet nine male press members with assigned PA people. Women reporters were assigned to two reserved cot spaces in Sgt Heidersheidt's tent.

- The media sent their best to cover the war. It's a shame some of our commands didn't follow suit when choosing public affairs people. The escort officer from Dhahran was so bad, we had to attach an escort to him. He was counseled for leaving media unescorted on several occasions. The individual seemed more concerned about keeping his boots shined and taking a shower than getting the job done. When the wartime media pool sent the PA office a thank you note, they noted they would like to return with a different escort. Unfortunately we were stuck with this individual throughout the war.

- Commercial telephone access to Al Kharj was non-existent. We relied solely on one tactical telephone for all communication. Our MA helped us resolve this problem the first night of the war. He showed us a contractor site a short distance from the base which had to commercial phones which the media was allowed to use with credit cards. These phones enabled Edie Ledder (AP) to break the story of the war and an ABC radio correspondent to have the first broadcast. The phone situation improved with the installation of the AT&T phones. While the telephone

problem was resolved for the press, one tactical line still presented problems for the office. In the future, PA war planners may want to look at issuing controlled AT&T cards or purchasing satellite phones.

- We had to raise getting appropriate vehicles to the wing commander level before getting any transportation. The RM hated the prior PAO and let me know immediately that PA was low on the priority pole. With wing commander involvement, we received a new Nissan Patrol and a nine-passenger van. The Patrol was primarily used for daily Riyadh runs, while the van was used for media/equipment transport. If it is not mentioned in mobility plans, perhaps vehicle requirements should be.

**HARDEST QUESTIONS BY THE MEDIA:**

- Why don't the dining facility workers have gas masks? Couldn't the U.S. government issue them some? Does the wing commander know about this?

- Is it true some pilots are taking drugs while flying missions?

- How many aircraft do you expect to lose?

- How many casualties do you expect? What type casualties?

- How is the Air Force better now than it was in Vietnam?

- How did you feel when seeing the women and children killed in the bunker?

- What do you say to other people in the wing when their comrades don't return?

- How did you feel when you blew the other plane out of the air? Did you think of the other pilot?

**LESSON LEARNED:**

Each pool member had their own equipment. The only resource we had to look at providing was a telephone mouthpiece/earpiece for a broadcaster. All other media members had all their own computer equipment and etc. Our only problem was securing the equipment and storing it. Other considerations were additional power outlets and working space. The ideal secure place to store media equipment would have been a CONEX (a tent storage box) located closely behind the PA tent.

**PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS:**

**Problem:** The only form of communication to the base other than tactical phones was BBC on the shortwave radio. Closing the communication link was a top priority. With war pending, people wanted timely news.

**Solution:** Desert Digest, our two-page paper began production Dec. 22. It featured international news notes and local directives/guidance. The information for the paper was received via AV phone calls to other PA shops in the AOR and other shops stateside. Daily trips to Riyadh also gave us access to fresh news via the Early Bird. Desert Digest is published three times weekly and distributed to units via BITS. One hundred, one-sided copies are run off. The paper was designed for placement on unit bulletin boards.

## PRIORITY PROJECTS

- Bringing radio to the site was another priority. After three visits to AFRTS, we secured an AFSTRS dish, receiver and transmitting equipment. The communications squadron helped site the dish and hook up the equipment on Dec. 27. Initially everything worked fine and we were able to receive the signal and broadcast for a five to seven mile radius. On the morning of Dec. 28 we lost the signal and despite several dish shifts, were unable to retrieve it. The AFRTS people informed us this was a common occurrence since the satellite orbit was deteriorating. The fix was bypassing the dish and bringing the signal priority phone line from Riyadh. That worked, providing the base with FM radio approximately 22 hours daily.

- Television was the biggest headache. We submitted a request to AFRTS for a TVRO Dec. 28. Because of the price of the units (\$60,000) and the number of sites involved it never looked very promising. Everyone wanted a dish and as of Jan. 8, there were 52 people on the waiting list. In the meantime we went to work with a 3.5 meter dish donated by the city of Goldsboro. With the help of ABC's Riyadh satellite expert we were able to bring down Arab Sat (Channel 3) which gave us five hour delayed/edited CNN. We were also able to pull down two Russian channels, but no AFN or SEB.

- To keep the camp informed we worked a deal with the AFSINC/AIRMAN people in Riyadh and the AFRTS people. Both provided us with daily news tapes which we dubbed and passed throughout the camp. We hooked up five VCRs in our office and dubbing was on a 24 hour basis. The AFRTS news dubs were in beta format so we gave them to MWR to show on a daily basis in the movie tent.

To supplement the tapes with entertainment, we ordered two mini cable television systems.

AFRTS was able to bring the Southern European Broadcasting signal to th camp when AT&T installed a gigantic dish to bring commercial phones to the camp. That was the problem with the 3.5 meter dish we had from the city of Goldsboro. It was simply too small. Once the AT&T dish was in place, approx Jan 15, the camp had SEB.

Would have been nice to have:

- A dedicated photographer. Combat camera places a secret tag on everything they shoot. For all practical purposes they could only provide limited developing (slides) capability at our site.

- During the war, there wasn't much time for anyone to do anything but eat, sleep and work. However, there was paperwork to be done and no 702 present. It would be nice to attach a 702 to each deployed PA element.

- Televisions/VCRs were part of the reserve PA deployment package. They should be a part of ours as well. The reservists were also equipped with a valuable copier.

- A box of VCR tapes.

- A portable fax should be part of the mobility package.
  - Computer/keyboard covers are a must in the desert environment. Canned air/video headcleaners are also essential.
  - Several boxes of ear protectors.
  - Radios should be a part of every PA office. I've never understood how we can be expected to execute during MAREs when the on-scene PA person has to borrow a radio to talk with the PA rep in the command post who also hopefully has borrowed a radio.
  - A radio scanner.
  - Micro cassette players/tapes.
- Nice to know:**
- Fax machines don't work well on tactical lines unless you have a priority line.
  - An American phone with redial is a priceless commodity when you have a tactical line.
  - Bring extra surge protectors for a bare base environment. They blow easily.

**Kudos:**

- Capt Gary Carruthers, 7241st ABG, Araklion -- I can't say enough about Gary. Writing, protocol visits, you name it and he does it better than most. You simply can't find anyone more dedicated to doing the job right.
- The 4th TFW/PA (P) owes Capt Jeff Whitted, AFRTS, Riyadh for his patience, technical expertise and unending assistance in closing our communication gap. Jeff is a true professional, a class act all the way.
- TSgt Fernando Serna (AIRMAN), Sgt Charles Price (AFSINC), SSgt Sarah Hood (AFNEWS), Sgts Adrain Jones and Tony Hearst (AF broadcasting). This team ensured that the 4th TFW had daily video news tapes no matter what. They also did an outstanding job covering the mission of the 4th TFW (P) and numerous other units throughout the AOR. My compliments to the individual(s) who put this team together. They were motivated, flexible and enterprising -- my type people.
- Capt Lance "the big guy" Jay, CENTAF/PA -- What a sense of humor. Lance was our bridge with the JIBs and the media. He brought a calming sense to CENTAF/PA. Lance was extremely thorough and believed in followup.
- SSgt Jim Frost, European Broadcast Squadron -- Jim compares with any of the civilian broadcast specialists I've seen. Thorough, patient and flexible, he's the reason for all the great U.S. Air Forces in Europe coverage on AFN. Jim is a pleasure to work with.
- Sgt Andrew Glaze, CENTAF/PA. Sgt Glaze worked hard at coordinating media visits between the JIB and the 4th TFW. He is a sharp troop who showed he could operate under conditions and get the job done. He rates high in my book because he ventured out into the field to see what it was like.

- Sgt Dee Ann Heidersheidt (newspaper editor) -- as pig-headed as they come. No obstacle could stop her from getting the Desert Digest out. She gets the job done! I'd work with her any day.

- Thanks to the TAC public affairs staff for the Christmas goodies. Perfect gift...perfect timing.

**In retrospect:** We could have done a much better job in documentation/paperwork. Ideally we should have had each media person write down their requests daily instead of simply having the escort officer execute upon verbal request.

I used bad judgement in accepting a wartime media pool only hours after another had departed. I was looking at the news value and not my people. Monitoring stress is extremely important. Some people have to be forced to take time off. I would almost say it is more important during war because everyone has to be sharp.

**PAO Note:** You could not have put together an odder couple than Gary and I to run the PA shop ("the book" versus "let's get it done"). Add to that three Reservists with limited public affairs experience (maybe two years total) and one hard-headed editor and you got quite a cast. You would be hard pressed to find better. I can't say enough for the hours this group put in, their flexibility, their scrounging missions and their patience. "Loose cannons," but pointed in the right direction and blowing the others away.

(Certified Copy)

Memo for Record

24 April 91

TO: HQ MAC/PA

FROM: 314th TAW/PA

SUBJECT: After Action Report/Lessons Learned for Public Affairs Support at Deployed Location (1620 TAWP) During Operation Desert Shield/Storm

1. The following is the after-action report/lessons learned for the 314 TAW/PA deployed, or the 1620th TAWP/PA:

a. Report completed by 1st Lt Michele Madden, deputy chief of PA (chief at the deployed base).

b. Capt Rick Reibelng-deployed 20 August 90 to 22 Oct 90  
1st Lt Michele Madden-deployed 20 Oct 90 to 22 March 91

c. Situation: Elements of the 314th TAW were deployed in support of Desert Shield/Storm from 12 August 90 through 25 March 91. PA support existed at this base from about 25 August until operations ended. I personally was here from 22 October 90 until 25 March 91. My predecessor did not leave an after action report, so 22 Oct 90 - 25 March 91 are the inclusive dates of this report. I was deployed as a one-man PA shop for the entire deployment. One person was sufficient to do this job, except on the occasions when news media were here. Communication links with PA counterparts were sufficient, but limited at times by poor telephone lines in-country and limited use of message traffic. Communication with CENTAF was good, but also limited by poor phone service. TAC lines were virtually useless as connections were terrible and you usually got cut off in a short time, but commercial lines were plentiful until the war started. Again, message traffic use was very limited by mission requirements. I generally had no reason to call MAC, and the MAC fax machine would usually not take my faxes, unlike other fax machines in the states. This made it very difficult to send releases to MAC News Service.

d. 1. INTERNAL INFORMATION. At the commander's direction and by necessity, Internal Information was the main focus of the Public Affairs program at this deployed base. The program supported over 1,300 people for much of the deployment. It consisted mainly of the camp newsletter, the "Desert Scoop," a two-page publication written and distributed three times a week, except a few occasions when the commander directed more frequent publication. The "Desert Scoop" was a highly-read and very effective publication, judging from feedback from camp members. A total of 97 editions of the "Desert Scoop" were published in all. Copies of each edition were forwarded to 314 TAW/PA and

CENTCOM/PA on a weekly basis starting in January. Additionally, I solicited and distributed copies of home station base newspapers, including the "Air Scoop," "Capitol Flyer" and "Desert Airman," and local newspapers from the Little rock area. A number of Commander's Calls were held during the deployment at the discretion of the Wing CC.

2. EXTERNAL INFORMATION. This program consisted mainly of news releases to other internal products back in the States, as well as several media events. A total of 20 releases were sent out during the deployment. Most went to the "Air Scoop," our home base paper, MAC News Service, Air Force News Service, CENTAF/PA and CENTCOM/PA and News Service, and CENTAF/Rear/PA, "Desert Defender." AFNS picked up at least five of my stories, and to date, the "Desert Defender" has used six. Others went to the "Capitol Flyer" at Andrews AFB and the "Desert Airman" at Davis-Monthan, as we had tenant units deployed from these bases.

As far as media activity goes, this location was not allowed to have media coverage until November, as it was discouraged by the host nation. We had some initial problems with the JIB at Dubai in getting media pools started. They had some trouble keeping their pools going, etc., but we had an initial visit from the media in November. The visit went beautifully on our end, however, only three reporters showed up. We then had some "hometown media" interest as an Arkansas Gazette reporter spent five days with us Christmas week. The visit also went off flawlessly. She spent time with nearly every unit on base, flew a mission and spent time with Arkansas Guard members from another base, and covered holiday activities here. The result was powerful coverage in Arkansas' biggest newspaper. She faxed back articles nightly with logistics support from us, all of which received front-page coverage. Then after she went home, we got a four-page pull-out insert complete with pictures. All VERY positive!!!

e. Local community relations activities largely consisted of the "adoption" of the base by the large expatriate population of Abu Dhabi, a nearby city. British and American families organized a "home dinner" program to host GIs at dinners, which worked great until we were restricted to base just before Christmas. The American Ambassador attended several events at our base, as did the host base commanders. The host base even gave us a banquet after the war was over. Overall, community relations were excellent considering our limitations and the circumstances.

e. LESSONS LEARNED.

a) Problem: OASD/PA policy on clearance of information, especially photography, made publication of photos of the deployed base difficult to impossible. Security Review insisted on

clearing all film in Washington, creating a tremendous backlog of film and photos and a long list of people waiting for their stuff to be cleared (some were just pictures of people). However, media could get their material cleared by JIB people in theater. Result: media were taking and publishing photos of our bases while we ourselves could not!! It makes absolutely no sense to pay a PAO to work in theater while giving them no release authority whatsoever. Months into the deployment, OASD did decide to delegate release authority for STORIES to base CCs and PAOs, but not photos. Solution: OASD should publish guidance for security review of pictures and stories as soon as possible after a deployment begins. Update guidance as necessary, but TRUST your PAOs in the field. Timely release is IMPERATIVE to good coverage of the deployment. And maybe we won't be months behind the news media!

b) Problem: Information getting to the units was old news by the time it reached us. It was December before I started getting Air Force News Service, and February before we got current news feeds from UPI and AP. We did have CNN here, but current news feeds could still have been very useful for the "Desert Scoop." "News and Notes" from CENTCOM/PA had very limited use for us. The "Desert Defender" was the same story. Because it was mailed out, and mail service in theater was extremely poor, it was all old news by the time I received it. Recommendation: Mailed materials such as "News and Notes" type products be faxed out or not published at all. Send information via message traffic DIRECT to PA. Don't produce products such as the "Desert Defender" that must be mailed. Most copies of the "Defender" ended being thrown out anyway.

c) Problem: We received very limited support from AFRTS in theater. It took two months to get our AFSTARS dish, and longer to get updated programming schedules, despite repeated phone calls and message traffic to AFRTS representatives in theater. Mini-TV was also of very limited use. Solution: AFRTS needs to work out a system to better support field units during long deployments. Send more field representatives into the theater, and let PAs know how to reach you. On Mini-TV, recommend AFRTS change over to VHS tapes and VCRs or discontinue the program.

d) Problem: Hometown media coverage was limited by no MAC travel support and lack of support from MAC/PA and CENTAF/PA in obtaining approval, country clearance, etc. Solution: If the unit agrees to support it, HQ should also support and assist as much as possible. MAC space available travel should be made available for hometown media. A lot of very positive coverage was missed because MAC wouldn't support media travel to the Arabian Peninsula. Also, home base units need to understand that if they want to send media over here, THEY need to do the paperwork first. Deployed units are responsible only for hosting/billetting/escorting media while they are here, not

obtaining approval for the visit, waivers, country clearance, etc.

e) Problem: Media pool coverage could have been more active. We only had six pool visits; two were cancelled because the media cancelled out at the last minute. Solution: Deployed PA needs to work more closely with the JIBs to ensure better media coverage. JIBs can help with this by keeping media pools together and kicking media out when they don't show up, are late, etc. Field units get burned out or discouraged by having wasted their time when media suddenly cancel or skip the country.

2. I have copies of all news releases, "Desert Scoops," and itineraries for media visits on file. They are available on request. My number in the States is (501) 988-3601.

MICHELE A. MADDEN, 1Lt, USAF  
Public Affairs Officer

(certified copy)

Rhein-Main:

Deployed: SMSgt Basil Kuzyszyn, 17 Oct to 15 Dec

Unit: MAC ALCE, Dhahran

Comments:

- JIB support made job a lot easier; but to some extent they thought we belonged to them which was not the case
- There was some friction between JIB and MAC/PA forward
- JIB referred all questions pertaining to MAC to us

Homestation:

- Media contact at Rhein-Main was extensive
- DV visits proved to be the most time-consuming and demanding activities over the holidays
- Staffing shortage impact on productivity; augmentee support would have helped
- Media representatives arrived without prior notice which was frustrating and embarrassing
- A centralized media travel center should have been established to coordinate all media travel

21 MAR 1991

11 Mar 91

TO: HQ SAC/PA  
INFO 15TH AF/PA  
8TH AF/PA

SUBJECT: Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report

FROM: 4300 PBW/PA (Attn: 1Lt Moreillon)

1. I deployed with the ADVON team on 10 Aug 90 and arrived at the forward operating location on 12 Aug 90. From the moment of arrival, I helped unload and set up operations for three consecutive days in the SAC Operations building. Office space was limited, but the Public Affairs office was given a small section shared with the Operations administrative specialists. The first public affairs tasking was the videotaping of the B-52 arrivals on station.

2. The first three weeks were quite busy trying to build and develop a good public affairs program. I created the Island Info and handled all video and still photography requirements to include troop and aircraft arrival, cargo unloading, tent city buildup and various significant activities during the initial stages of the deployment. A one-person shop was not an ideal situation as it was impossible to handle all taskings, attend meetings and be around at all activities for documentation via photography (without transportation!).

3. Much-needed help arrived on the third week of the deployment. Sgt. Smith, an administrative specialist in the Public Affairs office at Loring, arrived in late August. Luckily, Sgt. Smith is quite knowledgeable in the field of photography and was able to take on the position as wing photographer. Sgt. Walke, a public affairs specialist from Wurtsmith AFB, did not arrive until mid September and took on the position of editor for the Island Info. Not until this moment did Lt. Moreillon and Sgt. Smith have the opportunity to take a breather as the demands on the shop were more than they could handle.

4. With additional manning, the public affairs office was able to implement new programs and expand. Each program was developed from scratch as I deployed to the 4300th equipped with only a personal camera, Camcorder, typewriter and a few office supplies. (Note: At this point the public affairs office had moved a total of four times. Three moves were made in the SAC Operations building with a final move to the Combat Support Group building at Tent City.)

5. Our first development was our newspaper library. Civil Engineering was able to build us shelves to display our wares. The library included Air Force Times, Desert Defender, our Island Info, and home base newspapers, along with miscellaneous magazines, letters addressed to "any service member" and morale letters from kids in the states. When large shipments of reading material were sent to our office, we made it easier for the troops to obtain copies by distributing it to three different areas. They were available in Tent City (the Combat Support Group building), in a large magazine rack for those who worked in the SAC Operations building and at the Aircraft Readiness Center so that maintainers had access as well.

6. Our video program started with one Camcorder and four videotapes. It was a shame to find out everyone honestly believes that public affairs does all the videotaping, photography and graphics back at the home base. They didn't realize that we have separate shops to help us accomplish those taskings. In our case, however, it didn't matter: We were elected to do all of these jobs. Therefore, I pushed to get equipment we desperately needed. Almost like pulling teeth, we were able to acquire most of the equipment we needed to meet the demands of the wing. The results of our efforts are quite impressive. They include:

- a. Morale videotapes -- We gave everyone in the wing the opportunity to send messages back home to friends and loved ones.
- b. Christmas greetings -- Every unit was videotaped in early December to send Christmas messages to their home base, including a two-minute segment from each of the Deputy Commanders and the Wing commander. A total of 11 different bases were given a copy. Units that represented only a small number of personnel were given the opportunity to send their own personal messages to their home base due to their group size.
- c. Documentation -- Virtually every significant activity has been captured on video. Some examples include tent city buildup, flightline activity, B-52 launches during Operation Desert Storm, VIP visits, briefings and wing functions. The Public Affairs office boasts a library of 32 videotapes.
- d. History video -- Our office was initially tasked to provide a history video for the CINCSAC's visit during Operation Desert Shield. Since then, our wing commander has asked us to update the video and possibly improve its quality now that we've had a few more months to shoot better quality footage. We now have every unit in the 4300th recorded on videotape and plan to complete this project using professional equipment at the home base.

7. Our deployment newspaper, the Island Info, was an incredible success. The newspaper had definitely come a long way since its first issue was published on 14 Aug 90. Copies rose from 50 in the first few weeks to 600 copies in the last two months. Troops knew where and when to find a copy and we never had a decline in readership. Sgt. Walke did an outstanding job with this newspaper, given the equipment and facilities she had to work with. She gave the troops current events, News Service articles pertinent to our wing, island activities, MWR highlights, sports, the chow hall menu, information on the wing and much more! The public affairs office published a total of 103 issues during this deployment. In 1990, Vol. I, a total of 56 issues were published. In 1991, Vol. II, a total of 47 issues were published. From the start of Operation Desert Storm, NEWSFLASH issues were developed to give the troops the latest news of the day, every day, six days a week. (Reprographics was closed on Sundays.) Sgt. Walke transcribed news from the television for her NEWSFLASH issues--a total of 34 copies, due to the lack of televised news available to the troops in tent city. Distribution was also a part of our duties as there was no BITC crew available, and we made it a point to disseminate our product as widely as possible.

8. Photography was a large part of our office duties. Photos were shot for a number of reasons. They include:

- a. Documentation / briefings
- b. History slide presentation
- c. Reenlistments, awards presentations, promotions and ceremonies
- d. VIP visits
- e. Crew board pictures
- f. Home base newspapers, Desert Defender submissions, Airman Magazine submissions, etc.
- g. Casualty and wreckage photography
- h. Squadron / unit group shots
- i. VIP photo mementos of the flightline/first Desert Storm launch

There was a large demand for photography in the wing and we tried to support it to the best of our abilities. Unfortunately, we had two 35mm cameras and both were personal cameras. We shouldn't have had to use personal equipment to do our job. When Sgt. Smith returned to his home base in January, that left us very vulnerable with only one personal camera. We pushed on numerous occasions to get a government camera or purchase a new one through the supply system. Local purchase was not available and supply had ordered one for us, months ago -- still no camera. Despite our limitations, however, we still ran an excellent photography program. Though the demands were many, we met all of our requests. Our inventory now consists of hundreds of black and white, color slide and color print photos. Slides are broken down in black binders by subject, with a table of contents for easy selection. To mimic our video footage, there are also slides and photos of every unit in the 4300th, and significant events and activities. Fortunately for us, through contract we were able to get the support we needed from the Naval photo lab. They provided us with film and processing.

9. Although there was no local media on island, the Navy Broadcasting Service (NBS) was still very interested in our activities, so we set up a number of interviews and opportunities for them to broadcast our story locally. They include:

- a. An interview with the wing commander and introduction of the 4300th Provisional Bomb Wing
- b. A feature story on the new Air Force dining facility, highlighting Services operations.
- c. A story on the erection of the expandable and temper tents which replaced the torn tents (during the tropical depression), which gave Civil Engineering the spotlight.
- d. A feature story on the fishing pier built by CE, plus many of the activities MWR put together for tent city residents to enjoy.
- e. A story and interview with members of the Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAMS) during a "warm seat swap" of a B-52.
- f. A story focused on a training launch of five B-52s and three tankers in a cell simulating wartime operations. The bomber ops commander was interviewed.
- g. A human interest story involving a tech sergeant who teaches woodcrafts to tent city residents.
- h. A mission story highlighting operations in the 4300th PBW clinic in tent city.

- i. A feature story on the Island Info, highlighting the first successful newspaper in the history of this island. (The Navy decided to publish a newspaper of their own when they saw how popular ours was!)
- j. An extended interview was broadcast for three consecutive days on B-52 missions during Operation Desert Storm. B-52 crews were interviewed after being briefed on releasable information.

All of these broadcasts were interviews NBS requested and we set up. There were also a number of occasions when they asked for our assistance to get the "scoop" on new stories. Relations with NBS couldn't have been better. They gave us the recognition we needed to give our people and even offered to accommodate us with the AP news wire and VHS formatted copies of our broadcasts.

10. Public Affairs handled all wing graphics projects throughout the entire deployment. Since I know calligraphy, I was elected to handle all such projects as well. The majority of these projects were mementos, awards or gifts to visiting VIPs or "in appreciation" gifts. It was usually in the form of a framed photo with matting. At least a dozen calligraphy projects were produced from this office.

11. Public Affairs tried to give the wing as much internal recognition as possible. Externally, it was a bit of a disappointment due to the classification of our location. We still, however, tried to submit articles for publication and helped others in the wing do so by reviewing their material and approving it for publication. Were able to get some public recognition for our wing by doing the following:

- a. I wrote a feature story on incoming mail and the support we received from friends and loved ones back at the home base. The story was picked up by SAC News Service and, in turn, was run in at least eight SAC base newspapers. It was also submitted to the Desert Defender.
- b. I wrote a news story on General Chain's visit with the 4300th. It ran in the Loring Limelite and was submitted to the Desert Defender.
- c. We asked the wing commander on a number of occasions if he would write articles, including a Thanksgiving message, "thanks for your support" and Christmas message. He did, and each was printed in the Loring Limelite.
- d. Public Affairs set up a Stars and Stripes interview with Colonel Burke by Sgt. Rob Jagodzinski. The feature on the 4300th PBW ran in a late-February issue of Stars and Stripes.
- e. Public Affairs also set up an interview between Sergeant Jagodzinski and Chief Kahkonen from munitions maintenance. The article ran in an early-March issue of Stars and Stripes.
- f. We worked a visit with Airman Magazine's director of photojournalism, CMSgt. Don Sutherland. We set up an interview with the wing commander, along with a number of photo shoots. The chief had to depart the 4300th before all of his photo shoots were completed, so Sgt. Smith wrapped up the project for him. I accompanied the photos with a four-page feature on the 4300th. Although the article was written during Desert Shield and is now outdated, Chief Sutherland assured us that it and photos would run in April's issue.

This area of our program was the most disappointing for our office. We would have liked to see our wing operations televised and have media visits to get the exposure and recognition our people deserved. Wing personnel couldn't understand why our presence remained classified, especially when our location was continually broadcast on CNN and printed in Newsweek. I wrote an article for the Island Info to explain why we were still classified and hopefully ease frustration among the wing (along with ours!). The efforts of HQ SAC/PA and 15th AF/PA to help our situation were very much appreciated, but the folks at CENTAF seemed to forget about us. What made it especially difficult was the confusing chain of command. Who did we really belong to? Why did we end up sending five videotapes of the same footage, each to a different command, just so somebody (one command) could tell us. "Yeah, that portion is OK for public broadcast"? We found it hard to believe that CENTAF could be an approving authority for articles or footage on provisional wings which were not in Saudi Arabia, or for that matter, "in the AOR."

\*

12. Manning was another bit of a problem almost throughout the entire deployment. Tasked to handle public affairs programs, a video program, photography requests and graphics projects, two public affairs people, Sgt. Walke and I, were not enough. Sgt. Smith, an administrative specialist by trade, handled all photography projects, fortunately for us. SrA. Wedemeyer was a big help when he arrived, but by then we were five months into the deployment and the war had already started. Sgt. Smith had to return to the home base so SrA. Wedemeyer arrived in the nick of time. Shortly after Airman Wedemeyer arrived, Sgt. Perez, an audiovisual specialist, arrived on station. He stayed with the 4300th only by request of the Combat Support Group commander as he was supposed to go forward in theater. It was a nice buffer to have someone work the video program, but again, it was late in the game -- our second week into the war.

13. Overall, keeping in mind the equipment, facilities and manning, the 4300th Provisional Bomb Wing's public affairs program was a success. The staff was a motivated, hard-working group of individuals looking out for the best interests of the wing. Because we knew media relations would be minimal, we focused on a strong internal program. This office underwent a number of changes; developing, growing and continually improving. There were many challenges and we did our best to take each one on. This has been quite an experience and I think I speak for all of us when I say we're glad we got the chance to support not only the mission for this wing but the interests of the United States as part of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

14. If there are any questions regarding this report, please feel free to contact me at DSN 920-2170/3179. Attached are "Lessons Learned" and recommended actions to avoid problems for those who may encounter similar operations in the future.



MARIE T. MOREILHON, 1Lt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs  
4300th Provisional Bomb Wing

#### LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreilhon

4300th Public Affairs

#### Photographic equipment

Through the use of a video camera and a 35 mm camera, we were able to document nearly all aspects of the deployment.

A much broader range of photographic equipment was needed, including a tripod, zoom lens, wide-angle lens, flash unit, a stock of batteries and a backup camera outfit.

Coverage/documentation of events would have been more thorough and of better quality. A second camera outfit would also be beneficial in the event that the camera should break, if there are two events that need to be covered at the same time or when an event being covered warrants documentation in both black and white and color/color slide film.

#### LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreilhon

4300th Public Affairs

#### Computer needs

Our section possessed a lap top computer and an electric typewriter.

The need for a full computer setup became obvious in the initial weeks of the deployment.

Use of PERSCO's computer system was instrumental in accomplishing the newspaper. Although we had the laptop, hooking up to PERSCO's printer was a chore and the only program on the laptop was Enable. PERSCO's system offered WordPerfect, which sets up newspaper columns. Had we had our own system, along with a desktop publishing program, production of the newspaper would have been more simple, and the final product would have been more attractive to readers.

#### LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreilhon

4300th Public Affairs

#### Transportation

Our shop was "on the go" since day one of the deployment, traveling to and from reprographics to have the newspaper printed, and responding to photographic deocumentation support requests. We shared a vehicle with several other departments of combat support group, not to mention other units who needed transportation when their vehicle(s) was already in use.

We needed our own source of transportation.

Rather than using the CSG truck when it's available or depending on the shuttle bus to get us where we need to go, our own vehicle, or to share it with one other section, would have been very helpful.

LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreilhon

4300th Public Affairs

Manning

Our shop had a staff of three for the majority of the deployment. Toward the last month, the administrative specialist left and a public affairs specialist and audiovisual specialist arrived.

A staff of four or five should have been established at the onset of the deployment.

The shop needed an NCOIC to assist in battle staff operations and handle plans and programs. While the Island Info proved to be a valuable asset to 4300th members, a second person on the newspaper staff could have helped in putting together a larger, better quality product. The audiovisual specialist came through in a knick of time (he arrived in January) to film, edit and organize our video library.

LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreilhon

4300th Public Affairs

Mailing list

Our office was popular for being the newspaper headquarters, having been mailed a number of military and civilian newspapers.

We needed to receive more base newspapers from every base whose people were deployed with the 4300th.

Although we received a steady shipment of the Loring Limelite and the Desert Defender, those not assigned to Loring wanted to know what was going on at their home base. Some bases sent newspapers, but not all of them and not all the time.

LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreilhon

4300th Public Affairs

Hometown News Release Program

The Public Affairs office turned in at least 100 "Operation Desert Shield" Hometown News Releases to AFSINC.

Every deployed member of the 4300th, all 2,000 people, could have submitted a Hometown News Release.

Public Affairs got off to a late start in initiating a Hometown News Release Program. Although publicized in the Island Info, response was weak. The Hometown News Release Program may have been much stronger had supervisors and managers gotten involved by explaining the program to their troops and encouraging participation. Given the manpower to devote more time to the program, public affairs could very well have taken the ball and run with it, soliciting participation from at least the majority of those deployed.

LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreillon

4300th Public Affairs

Office location

Public Affairs shared a combat support group headquarters location with seven other sections.

Accomplishing the Public Affairs mission would have been simpler and gone smoother if PA operated out of a private location in closer proximity to the wing commander.

Public Affairs shared a telephone line with MWR, and "ended up" sharing equipment and supplies with anyone who felt they had the need for them. Because the shop was not enclosed and couldn't be secured, people who worked in the CSG building as well as others who visited the office, often used PA desks, the phone, TV, VCR, typewriter, laptop computer, and anything else they could get their hands on. It wasn't unusual for PA property to turn up missing. PA staff members had to take regular trips, often twice or more daily, to SAC Operations to take care of business. The shop's location hampered operations, aborting at least 30 minutes from our schedule each time a trip was made.

LESSON LEARNED

1st Lt. Marie T. Moreillon

4300th Public Affairs

News Services


Much of the Island Info consisted of Air Force and CENTCOM News Services. These messages were invaluable in providing information pertaining to Air Force, SAC and Operation Desert Shield/Storm policies, changes and events.

We were limited in our selection of news and line art.

Receipt of SAC News Service, Armed Forces Press Pack, and Art and Features would be helpful in providing a wider variety of news and a more appealing layout.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 401ST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (USAFE)  
APO NEW YORK 09283-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA (DSN 723-5051)

March 22, 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action

TO: HQ USAFE/PAR

1. Kenneth E. Fidler, Sgt, Chief of Public Affairs for the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional) deployed to Doha, Qatar; only PA person deployed; individual deployment dates: 29 Aug 90 to 26 Feb 91; replaced by TSgt. Louis Arana-Barradas on 26 Feb 91. Report covers activities during individual deployment dates.

2. In keeping with the motto "First to Go, Last to Know," I deployed with the first group from our wing to a destination unknown, oblivious to the fact that I had to start a PA operation from scratch at a base void of U.S. Air Force resources.

3. I didn't deploy with a field kit (it was sent later and lost in the supply jam) so I had no equipment until a typewriter was purchased a few weeks later. Second day there, contacts were immediately made with CENTCOM and CENTAF Public Affairs and ground rules were established. Communication support to anywhere in the world was always available, thanks to combat comm know-how. Forms 9 bought desk, chair, typewriter and filing cabinet for PA's corner-of-a-trailer office. In December, PA and Combat Camera shared an office in the operations area.

4. Within a month, a PA shop was operating. Internal, media, and community relations programs were established. A two- to four-page newsletter was produced, focusing on the work accomplished by deployed forces and publicizing special events, i.e., unit features, building a base, MWR, chapel, and special entertainment. The newsletter was produced on a typewriter until January when desktop publishing was established. DTP tremendously increased PA productivity. PA also provided photo support for deployed members (documentation, internal support, awards presentations, etc.). A contract was established with a host nation lab for processing/printing of photos. Additionally, PA produced a special spouses orientation video to keep those left behind informed of life at "AN AIR BASE IN QATAR." PA also hosted Airman Magazine photojournalist CMSgt. Don Sutherland whose story and photos appeared in the January issue of Airman. PA coordinated two visits from two combat cameramen who were later assigned to the 401st.

5. Upon initial deployment, host nation media were present to cover arrival of "friendly forces" to Qatar. That was the extent

of media coverage until December. At that time, CNN, New York Times and Los Angeles Times visited our location and produced positive coverage of our unit. A reporter from European Stars and Stripes paid a two-day visit in January, resulting in three stories with supporting photos on our operation. A week before Desert Storm began, PA hosted 22 British journalists for a brief "media day." Four weeks after the war started, PA hosted representatives from Canadian Broadcasting Company and Canadian Press. Our unit enjoyed positive media coverage. All media worked with us and understood the ground rules presented to them. PA made 15 news releases to home base, CENTAF Fwd/PA and Desert Defender. Some of these ran in the news services and were sent to Airman Magazine. PA also sent out more than 150 Hometown News Releases.

6. Community relations activities showed that deployed forces were not only warriors but also diplomatic ambassadors. The first three months gave our people numerous chances to integrate with local citizens and show pride in our mission. Daily, deployed forces were invited to private residences under the home visitation program. Local citizens would invite four or five people to their homes for dinner and light conversation. Some took deployed members on tours of the local area. Others went to camel races, museums, or shopping areas. As well, the American Ambassador to Qatar held special barbeque and swimming parties for our deployed members. Three nights a week, the Ambassador hosted 50 people at his private residence. In all this, the wing commander made more than 30 (reported) community contacts. These included special Embassy functions, visits to British and U.S. Navy ships docked at the local harbor, functions at other embassies (North Korean and German), and visits with host nation military commanders. As well, PA established a conversational Arabic/host nation customs and courtesies course for deployed members. This enhanced not only their knowledge of the country in which they were living, but increased their ability to interact with local citizens which improved their ability to act in their second roles as ambassadors. PA also presented host nation sensitivities at weekly newcomer's orientation briefings. In a nutshell, we received excellent host nation acceptance and support. This made for very positive community relations that will not be forgotten too soon.

7. Problems areas: 1) I still find it frustrating that all photos were centrally controlled for the first few months of Desert Shield. I feel that local DOs and commanders could have been given the authority to release photos to home base. To me, this hindered a totally effective internal information program. Fortunately, these restrictions were lifted later, aiding PAs in not only telling but showing the work accomplished at their deployed locations. Since no Air Force AVS support was assigned to our location, this may prove that all PAs should be educated in the art of photography. It's nice to tell, but having the ability to show just makes it better. Combat Camera wasn't assigned to the unit until the last week of December and turned out excellent visual information on the 401st. 2) Another

problem I found frustrating was the coverage the Desert Defender gave to deployed units. It seemed that they gave most of their space to the major units involved in Desert Shield/Storm. I sent the Desert Defender info copies of all my stories. (an average of five a month for publication, yet didn't see any in print until after the war started. Even then I wasn't too happy with the editing I saw. I voiced my concerns, yet never received an answer on the "why" it was happening. 3) One problem I found frustrating at first was that it seemed American Embassy officials tried to keep the press away from us. It seemed they weren't keen on the idea of putting the 401st in the spotlight. Because of that we had few opportunities during the build-up months. A message from USCENTAF/CC Lt Gen Horner, asked why certain bases were closed to the media. The Ambassador's response "opened" our location. If it's any time to preach the Air Force word, it's during a war (or build-up for, as in the case), and the fact that an American military unit is operating on Qatar soil and we have excellent relations with host nation citizens. During the last three months, I gave an info call to USIS on any media inquiries. I provided the media were cleared through the Qatar Ministry of Information and the wing commander agreed to the visit. It was made for a better relationship with the media. Some members on tour of the local area. Others went to

9. Lessons learned: Always have an effective deployment package ready to go. In the computer age, I feel all PA shops should have some sort of desktop publishing system ready for mobilization. Computers increase capability and productivity. This was not the case in my situation. Lots of time was lost typing correspondence, news release, newsletters, etc. 2) Throw away the union card. Even PA pitched tents and filled sandbags. 3) Past training proved its worth. This is something I articulated in my stories. If it's one thing that prepared us for Desert Shield/Storm, it was training. The 401st is known for its mobility mission. The wing's job is to pack up and go forward. PA always accompanies the wing on these deployments. That training helped improve which improved local citizens' ability to do in their second roles as ambassadors.

10. As the only PA assigned to the 401st, I learned more about public affairs during those six months than any training class, book or war game could teach. Mistakes were made, but that's how you solidify your operation. It was a growing experience of great importance. The knowledge will never be forgotten and will be passed on to the next PA generation.

photos were centrally controlled for the first few months of Desert Shield. I feel that local DOS and commanders could have been given the authority to release photos to home base. To me, this hindered a totally effective internal information system. Fortunately, these restrictions were lifted later, and PAs in not only telling but showing the work accomplished at their deployed locations. Since no Air Force AFS support was assigned to our location, this may prove that all PAs should be educated in the art of photography. It's nice to tell, but having the ability to show just makes it better. Combat Camera wasn't assigned to the unit until the last week of December and turned out excellent visual information on the 401st. 2) Another

KENNETH E. FIDDIK, USAF

PA

Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report

TAC/PA

A. Rebecca S. Colaw, Capt, USAF  
354th and 23rd TFW (P) Chief, Public Affairs Division

1. Responsible for deployed public affairs for more than 8,000 people assigned to the following units:

- (a) 354th TFW (P)
- (b) 23rd TFW (P)
- (c) 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 926th Tactical Fighter Group, NAS New Orleans (reserve A-10 unit)
- (d) 511th TFS, 10th TFW, RAF Alconbury UK (A-10 unit)
- (e) 23rd Tactical Support Squadron, 836 Air Division, Davis-Monthan
- (f) 1690th Tactical Airlift Wing (Provisional C-130 wing)
- (g) 1682nd Airlift Control Squadron (Provisional MAC ALCE unit)
- (h) 37th Air Evacuation Group (Hub for casualty evacuation)
- (i) 69th TFW, attached to the 388th TFW (Provisional F-16 Squadron)

B. Capt Rebecca S. Colaw: 18 Aug 90 - 21 Mar 91  
TSgt Linda L. Mitchell: 25 Dec 90 - still in theater  
SSgt Lloyd W. Tilmon: 2 Sep 90 - 11 Mar 91  
SSgt Robert V. Pease: 22 Nov 90 - 25 Mar 91  
SSgt Joel T. Ridenour: 13 Jan 91 - still in theater  
ALC James Roth: 16 Sep 90 - 23 Nov 90

C. Establishment of operations in the AOR: Capt Colaw got in theater on the second aircraft -- five hours prior to the arrival of the A-10 aircraft. The majority work done during the first few days involved getting settled in -- setting up tents, establishing office space, taking photos of the arriving aircraft and completing arrival stories. We started out with an office in a hallway due to the severe lack of space. We later moved to a garage and finally, after several months, to an actual office.

1. Availability of manpower/equipment: We had everything in our deployment kits that we needed to do our basic job. We obtained some "nice to haves" while in country on the local economy.

Deployment listing:

Two Z184 computers with 5 1/4 disk drive and printer  
Office supplies and paper  
Camera and video camera  
Tons of film and video tapes

Obtained on the local economy:

Two VCR USA/EURO standard  
One 25-inch TV USA/Euro standard  
Telefax machine  
35mm camera  
HiS Videro Camera  
Black and white enlarger  
Tons of film and video tapes

Obtained through bargaining:

Motorola base station and two radios  
Two 4-door pickup trucks  
One command channel radio  
Two vehicles

2. The items obtained on the economy were items we have had on order for over two years back home but have not been able to get through the normal supply channels (I guess war is good for something). These items proved invaluable in our operation. It's also important to note that we could have not done our job if we had not obtained the items through bargaining.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish the requirement in the actual war plans for any deployed PA office to have dedicated vehicle and communication support. You can not haul media or get around to write stories if you have no wheels. Luckily transportation liked us! (Or at least the way we begged). Also it is important to have dedicated radios for deployment kits. Communication here was almost nonexistent for the first four months. We did not "obtain" the radios until December and they greatly streamlined the operation -- before we got the radios we had to do every message through pony express and this took time and cause problems.

3. Wartime Equipment:

We were not issued the proper equipment to go to war with. Kevlar helmets, flak jackets, desert parkas, backpacks, etc. I thought this was particularly interesting since the media was issued all this equipment and we weren't. We had to escort media into areas of northern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait -- the media was better outfitted than us. I really think it was a

crime that the military gave better equipment to the media than it did to its own people.

4. Availability of communication links in-country/to CONUS with higher headquarters/PA counterparts.

Easily accomplished via commercial phone and computer modem. Message center was also available, however, it took headquarters several months to begin sending us information and guidance via the message center.

5. Brief Narrative on amount of media contact: (See attached)

A. Visits 100

Media representatives: 650

Stories written: 160

Base newspapers printed 25 (See attached for example)

6. Problem areas:

A. Inability to send home stories or photographs for publication.

I have thought since the beginning of this deployment that it really is a shame the Air Force has trained us to do our job during wartime and then when it comes -- they handcuff us because of lack of trust or bureaucracy -- whichever. Here we were in the field, approving daily visits by national media representatives while controlling what they could and could not say or photograph -- but we were not given the authority by our own people to do the same for our home bases. It really is a shame that the media had better access to information about our deployed assets than our own resources. Just to give the system designed for photo clearance a chance, we tested the approval process on clearance of photographs with three very generic shots of a dentist working on a patient in one of our ATH hospitals. It took over 40 days to get it approved. Needless to say the story was too old to run when it reached the home bases. NBC, CBS, Newsweek, and many others ran the story when it happened over a month earlier. On the issue of stories, CENTAF FWD did a good job clearing them and usually approved them within a few days. HOWEVER: The whole business was over controlled (especially considering the presence of media and the amount of civilian coverage the same events were getting.) Deployed PAOs know what is and is not photographable or releaseable at their respective installations. Trust them -- if you can't...don't let them go. Clearance procedures must be done at the deployed location -- you can't run a war from a windowless ivory tower -- you have to run it from the mud pits -- or in this case sand traps.

#### B. Photographic support:

There needs to be provisions for deployed photographic developing capabilities for public affairs purposes. Combat camera marches to its own tune and was not a help until the very end. If you allowed them to develop your film they would keep what they wanted (the best of the photographs). I never did figure out who they work for but I know who I worked for and My boss wanted all the pictures we took -- not just the left overs. Therefore we sent our film home when we could with a courier and we held the rest until we returned home ourselves. Think of the news that was wasted all because we couldn't get the film developed and could not get approval to release it.

#### C. Higher headquarters.

CENTAF FWD arrived in theater two months after the units had deployed and started setting up operations. Needless to say two months put them way behind the power curve. There needs to be a rapid deployment HQ type organization that can deploy to meet these type of situations.

#### D. Joint Information Bureau

The Joint Information Bureau (Dhahran) was a shit-hot organization for the first four months of the war. Then two weeks prior to the start of the hostilities the entire JIB rotated and new personnel came in. (The Air Force desk was the only desk that still had someone who knew what was going on). The other desks (which we dealt with frequently) became clueless and did not catch up until the ground war. RECOMMENDATION: Leave headquarters people in place for the duration or if you must rotate -- do so on an individual basis and stagger the individuals so that some corporate knowledge is retained. Also hand pick individuals to fill headquarters positions. While many of the people were shit-hot, but, there were a few -- that obviously were sent because people wanted to get rid of them -- and then there were others who were highly motivated but did not have the experience to deal with the situations. Like the young lieutenant on the Air Force desk. She had never been in a unit that had airplanes and here she was managing a war. Her heart was good, she did a good job -- but she lacked experience. I can't believe that there were not more experienced individuals out there.

#### E. Homefront:

We needed our IMA deployed to our location. We have trained her for years to replace me here and we were not allowed to have her. Instead she has been retained by HQ TAC and not allowed to return to us for training or during the situation we have trained her for. It does me no good to have her when I can't

get her. More attention needs to be placed on home base operations. I had two people here who worked their tails off. It should have never gotten to that situation. I have an OPR on my desk that needs to be written on my IMA. I'm returning it because of insufficient supervision.

REBECCA S. COLAW, Capt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

(certified copy)

A. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 4410TH OPERATIONAL SUPPORT WING,  
APO NEW YORK 09734)

B. AINSLEY, JOHNNIE D., MAJ, 15 JAN-7 MAR 91

WOOD, RON, TSGT, 15 JAN-8 MAR 91

DOWELL, BILL, SSGT, 15 JAN-7 MAR 91

C. AT THE REQUEST OF HQ TAC/PA DIRECTOR COLONEL RON SCONYERS, I DEPLOYED TO THE FORWARD-MOST OPERATING LOCATION IN SAUDI ARABIA TO ESCORT NEWS MEDIA POOLS AT THE REQUEST OF THE USCENTAF COMMANDER, REPORTING TO THE DUTY LOCATION 15 JAN. THE TWO NCOS WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY MOBILIZED. I IMMEDIATELY PREPARED MY PA STAFF TO HANDLE THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES I WAS COMMITTED TO AND SET ABOUT OUT-PROCESSING. ANTICIPATING THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYMENT, I HAD PREVIOUSLY UNDERGONE CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING, SMALL ARMS FIRING AND FITTED FOR GAS MASK SPECTACLES. MY NCOIC SET ABOUT COORDINATING MY DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS WITH LGX AND BEGAN PACKING MY PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTINGENCY KIT. BECAUSE THE AIRLINE WOULD NOT SHIP THE PACK AS CONFIGURED (IN A STANDUP TOOL BOX ON WHEELS), MY NCOIC PACKED EVERYTHING IN BOXES AND SHIPPED THE BOXES THE DAY PRIOR TO MY DEPLOYMENT. WHEN I ARRIVED IN PHILADELPHIA THE NEXT DAY, ALL THE BOXES WERE WAITING FOR ME THERE AND I HANDCARRIED ALL 20+ BOXES WITH ME TO DOVER AFB WHERE THEY WERE LOADED ON A C-5 FOR

THE AOR.

WHEN I ARRIVED IN THE AOR I IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED THE WING COMMANDER'S ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING A NEWS MEDIA CENTER. HE FURNISHED ME WITH AN EXPANDABLE SHELTER WHICH I QUICKLY CONFIGURED INTO A MEDIA CENTER, COVERED IT WITH CAMOUFLAGE NETTING, AND DISPLAYED A SIGN IN FRONT. TO ENSURE THE MEDIA CENTER WAS CAPABLE OF OPERATING 24 HOURS A DAY IF NEED BE, THE COMMANDER ALLOWED THE THREE OF US TO LOCATE OUR SLEEPING COTS IN THE MEDIA CENTER.

BECAUSE OF ALL THE DUST, THE HARD DRIVE ON OUR SINGLE LAP TOP COMPUTER CRASHED BUT WAS PROMPTLY REPAIRED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT. SSGT DOWELL WAS ABLE TO ACQUIRE AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT WHICH FURNISHED HEAT IN THE COLD ENVIRONMENT, AIR CONDITIONING WHEN NECESSARY, AND DID A MARVELOUS JOB OF RIDDING THE MEDIA CENTER OF DUST PARTICLES. MEANWHILE, CENTAF/PA PROVIDED US WITH A SECOND LAP TOP COMPUTER LOADED WITH WORDSTAR. WE WERE THUS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE NEWS MEDIA WITH THE MEANS TO PREPARE THEIR STORIES.

USING PROCOMM SOFTWARE, WE EVENTUALLY ACCESSED DEFENSE DATA NETWORK CIRCUITS AND DOWNLOADED CURRENT NEWS WHICH WE PROVIDED TO THE WING COMMANDER WHO HAD IT POSTED ON THE BULLETIN BOARD. THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT COPY CAPABILITY WAS A LIMITING FACTOR IN DISSEMINATING CURRENT NEWS. HOWEVER, DDN ACCESS ALLOWED ME TO LEAVE MESSAGES TO PRACTICALLY ANYONE IN

THE WORLD FROM THE AOR AND TRANSMIT NEWS STORIES TO HOME BASES. THIS CAPABILITY WAS CRUCIAL.

AFRTS EVENTUALLY SET UP LIVE AFRTS TV IN THE MWR TENT WHICH WAS ADEQUATE FOR OUR NEEDS. SSGT DOWELL ALSO ACQUIRED A DISH TO PICK UP WHAT WE EXPECTED TO BE AFRTS TV BUT WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A RECEIVER FOR ARMED FORCES RADIO INSTEAD, SO WE TURNED IT BACK IN TO AFRTS. THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES RADIO WAS A GODSEND. THAT WAS OUR MAIN SOURCE OF NEWS AND CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

WHEN THE ARMY HOST UNIT TOLD AFRTS PERSONNEL THEY WOULD HAVE TO RELOCATE DUE TO LIMITED SPACE, THE AIR FORCE WING COMMANDER AGREED TO LET THEM LIVE IN AIR FORCE TENT CITY. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS GREETED WITH GREAT SATISFACTION BY AFRTS PERSONNEL AND INCREASED AIR FORCE ACCESS TO ARMED FORCES RADIO.

THE LACK OF PRINTED NEWS WAS A PROBLEM. DESPITE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS THROUGH CENTCOM CHANNELS TO GET "STARS AND STRIPES" DELIVERED TO OUR LOCATION, IT NEVER BEGAN UNTIL THE WAR ENDED. THE FEW "STARS AND STRIPES" WE RECEIVED WERE "BORROWED" COPIES FROM THE U.S. ARMY'S 7TH CORPS WHO, I WAS TOLD, HAD A GENERAL OFFICER WHO "ORDERED" THEY BE DELIVERED DAILY. WORKING THROUGH CHANNELS TO ACQUIRE THIS MUCH-NEEDED PRODUCT PROVED FRUSTRATING.

MEANWHILE, PA INTERVIEWED PEOPLE AND SUBMITTED NEWS ARTICLES TO THE ALREADY EXISTING "BUFORD TALKS" NEWSLETTER

WHICH WAS BEING PRODUCED BY THE WING COMMANDER'S EXECUTIVE OFFICER. BECAUSE THE EXEC ASKED TO CONTINUE BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PUBLICATION BECAUSE HE "HAD NOTHING TO DO," WE OBLIGED HIM. THE ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT VERY WELL AND FREED PA PERSONNEL TO ESCORT NEWS MEDIA POOLS. IN BETWEEN MEDIA POOLS, WE AGAIN SUBMITTED ARTICLES AND ASSISTED WITH PROOFING THE PUBLICATION. PUBLISHING THE NEWSLETTER WAS DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF A LACK OF REPRODUCTION CAPABILITY. THE ONE COPIER AVAILABLE WAS CONSTANTLY OUT OF INK AND THE WAR WAS OVER BEFORE THE SITUATION WAS RECTIFIED. THUS, LIMITED COPIES OF THE NEWSLETTER WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNAL AUDIENCE. POSTING THEM IN HIGH VISIBILITY AREAS WAS OUR ONLY ALTERNATIVE.

TRANSPORTATION WAS A NIGHTMARE FROM DAY ONE. THE ATTITUDE OF THE RM WAS IF GENERAL HORNER SENT US UP THERE TO ESCORT MEDIA POOLS, THEN GENERAL HORNER SHOULD HAVE ALSO SENT US TRANSPORTATION TO DO THE JOB. DESPITE REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCING THE RM CENTCOM AND CENTAF EXPECTED SUCH SUPPORT TO COME FROM THE WING, I WAS NEVER ABLE TO OVERCOME THAT MINDSET. WHEN PA OUTLINED THE URGENCY OF OUR TRANSPORTATION NEEDS TO THE RM IN A FORMAL LETTER OF REQUEST, THE LETTER CAME BACK NOT ONLY DENIED, BUT WITH THE LETTERS "BS" WRITTEN ON IT.

PA WAS ALWAYS OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF UNCERTAINTY WHEN IT CAME TO TRANSPORTATION. PA WAS ALWAYS AT THE MERCY OF HIGHER PRIORITIES, SUCH AS BOMB LOAD FUNCTIONS AND VARIOUS

LOGISTICAL CONCERNS. THE MOST COMMON ANSWER WE RECEIVED WAS THAT THERE IS A SHUTTLE BUS RUNNING EVERY HOUR. HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT A PRACTICAL SOLUTION GIVEN THE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT A POOL CARRIES AROUND. TOO, THE SHUTTLE BUS DID NOT ALWAYS GO TO THE AREAS THE POOLS WANTED TO GO TO. ON RARE OCCASIONS WE WERE ABLE TO CHECK OUT TWO VEHICLES WHICH SERVED OUR NEEDS QUITE NICELY, BUT MOST OF THE TIME WE WERE CONFINED TO ONLY ONE VEHICLE WHICH MEANT WE HAD TO MAKE TWO TRIPS TO TRANSPORT POOL MEMBERS FROM THE MEDIA CENTER TO THE LOCATION OF INTEREST. AT TIMES, THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ROOM TO TAKE ALL THE PA ESCORTS AND ONLY ONE OR TWO ESCORTS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROLLING A "MOB" OF MEDIA WANTING TO GO IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS ON THE FLIGHT LINE WHERE TACTICAL FIGHTERS WERE BEING REARMED WITH BOMBS AND MISSILES AT A FRANTIC PACE.

DESPITE THE COST, FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS ABSOLUTELY MUST HAVE GUARANTEED TRANSPORTATION. OTHERWISE, THE AIR FORCE LOOKS RIDICULOUS TO THE NEWS MEDIA, AND THE MEDIA'S FRUSTRATION MAY BE MANIFESTED IN CRITICAL REPORTING OF AIR FORCE SUPPORT.

I MIGHT ADD THAT THE WING COMMANDER ALWAYS OFFERED TO HELP OUT WHEN TRANSPORTATION WAS A PROBLEM BY PERSONALLY TRANSPORTING POOL MEMBERS HIMSELF. AND HE ALWAYS SAID TO GIVE HIM A CALL WHENEVER I RAN INTO A PROBLEM -- WHICH WAS GREAT -- BUT HE WAS NOT ALWAYS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. HOURS MIGHT GO

BY BEFORE HE WAS FREE OF CRITICAL WARTIME TASKINGS AND BE AVAILABLE TO ACT AS A "TAXI SERVICE."

ONE OF THE GREAT SUCCESS STORIES WAS THE EVENTUAL AVAILABILITY OF TACTICAL AND COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE COMM UNIT DID A SPLENDID JOB GETTING OUR MEDIA CENTER WIRED AND IN COMMUNICATION WITH OTHER AOR UNITS. THIS IS ANOTHER "MUST" WHEN IT COMES TO PROVIDING THE MEDIA WITH QUICK OUTLETS TO THEIR HOME OFFICES.

ANOTHER SUCCESS STORY WAS THE USE OF THE WING COMMANDER'S TELEFAX MACHINE WHICH HE EVENTUALLY RELOCATED IN THE COMM OFFICER'S FACILITY NEXT TO THE MEDIA CENTER FOR 24-HOUR AVAILABILITY. NEWS MEDIA COULD FAX THEIR STORIES DIRECTLY TO THE JIB FOR QUICK PROCESSING.

D. ALTHOUGH WE WERE RUSHED TO THE AOR WITH GREAT URGENCY WITH PREDICTIONS WE WOULD BE ESCORTING UPWARDS OF 400 NEWS MEDIA, IT WAS TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE FIRST MEDIA POOL ACTUALLY ARRIVED. ALL THE WHILE, NEWS MEDIA MEMBERS WERE BEGGING TO BE SENT UP. OUR FIRST MEDIA POOL, COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL 4, CONSISTED OF JUAN M. VASQUEZ OF CBS NEWS AND PHOTOGRAPHER CHRISTOPHER D. EVERSON AND SOUNDMAN TIMOTHY W. DICKEY, ABC

RADIO'S CHARLES TAYLOR (WHO WAS THE FIRST TO ACTUALLY INTERVIEW "BUFORD THE CHICKEN"), USA TODAY REPORTER PORTER BINKS, ALEXANDER HIGGINS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AND THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S BOB ROWLEY.

ON THE INITIAL VISIT CAPT BECKY COLAW AND SSGT LLOYD W. TILMON OF THE 354 TFW/PA ESCORTED THE GROUP UP WITH THEM TO DEMONSTRATE HOW TO HANDLE THEM. CAPT MARK BROWN OF THE JIB ALSO ESCORTED.

CCP #14 CAME UP TWO WEEKS LATER. THIS POOL CONSISTED OF JULIE BIRD OF AIR FORCE TIMES, DAVE FULGHUM OF AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, JAY LEVINE OF CBS NEWS AND HIS CAMERAMAN TOM RAPIER AND SOUNDMAN JOHN K. BERGMAN, DEBRA AMOS OF NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (WIFE OF NBC CORRESPONDENT RICK DAVIS), TIME MAGAZINE PHOTOGRAPHER ANTHONY SUAU AND UPI REPORTER DAVID ALEXANDER. CAPT MARK BROWN OF THE JIB ESCORTED THE GROUP UP FROM DHAHRAN.

SHORTLY AFTER CCP #14 DEPARTED, A SINGLE CBS TEAM, CONSISTING OF REPORTER WILLIAM GASPERINI, CAMERAMAN WILLEM DEVOS AND SOUNDMAN ARMANDO GARCIA, ARRIVED WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS ISSUING HIS ARTIFICIAL PEACE OVERTURES. CAPT BECKY COLAW ESCORTED THIS GROUP UP TO DO A STORY ON MUSICIANS IN THE AOR WHICH INVOLVED THREE FROM HER UNIT. CBS NOT ONLY GOT THAT

STORY BUT THE EXCITEMENT OF A SCUD ALERT WHEN AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED OUTSIDE THE DINING HALL WHILE TAPING INTERVIEWS. SSGT DOWELL DID A SPLENDID JOB GETTING THE VIDEOTAPES ON THE PLANE AND TO DHAHRAN WITH SHORT NOTICE.

A BRITISH POOL WAS CLEARED IN SHORTLY THEREAFTER. IT CONSISTED OF BBC TV CORRESPONDENT MARTIN BELL, CAMERAMAN NIGEL BATISON AND SOUNDMAN ALAN DOUGHTY; BBC RADIO CORRESPONDENT JOE PALEY; PHILLIP JACOBSON FROM TIRES; COLIN WILLS FROM THE MIRROR GROUP (DAILY MIRROR, SUNDAY MIRROR & PEOPLE); AND JOHN FULLERTON FROM REUTERS (MIDDLE EAST BUREAU CAIRO). BRITISH PA ESCORTS WERE MAJOR MYLOS OF THE QUEENS MRT 7TH ARMORED BRIGADE; CAPT WINTHROP OF REME, CAPT BOWYES OF QO HLDERS, CAPT SHELFORD OF 5 INNIS DG PSO BRIGADE, FLT LT ROD TREVAUSKUS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AND SGT ANDY MASON, STILL PHOTOGRAPHER. UNFORTUNATELY, ON THE DAY THEY ARRIVED ALL SORTIES WERE WEATHER CANCELLED AND ALL AIRCRAFT EXCEPT ONE HAD RETURNED TO THEIR HOME BASES. NEVERTHELESS, THE POOL WAS VERY COMPLIMENTARY OF THE GROUND CREWS AND PILOTS WHO GAVE THEM ENTHUSIASTIC INTERVIEWS AND A PRACTICE BOMB LOAD OF THE REMAINING AIRCRAFT FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC NEEDS.

POOL #14, RECONFIGURED WITH SOME OLD AND SOME NEW

MEMBERS, RETURNED SEVERAL DAYS LATER AND PROVED TO BE THE MOST REWARDING, YET THE MOST CHALLENGING AND FRUSTRATING OF THEM ALL -- AND BECAME THE LAST AIR FORCE COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL OF THE WAR. IT CONSISTED OF DAVE FULGHUM OF AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, DEBRA AMOS OF NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, LINDA VESTER OF NBC NEWS AND HER CAMERAMAN/SOUNDMAN BRYAN PUCHATY, TIME MAGAZINE PHOTOGRAPHER DENNIS BRACK AND TIMES JOURNAL PHOTOGRAPHER STEVE VOGEL. AGAIN, CAPT MARK BROWN OF THE JIB ESCORTED THE GROUP UP. CCP #14 DID ALL THE USUAL THINGS INVOLVED IN COVERING THE AIR CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER, WHILE IN A BRITISH CAMP LOOKING AT DEBRIS FOLLOWING A SCUD ATTACK, THE BRITISH INVITED THEM TO FLY IN THEIR HELICOPTERS. THE FLIGHT WENT WELL ENOUGH BUT WHILE SKIMMING THE DESERT SURFACE AT 20 FEET AND 200 KNOTS, POOL MEMBERS SAW THE TREMENDOUS MASSING OF TANKS AND EQUIPMENT ON THE NORTHERN BORDER. THEY SUDDENLY BECAME INTERESTED IN THE GROUND WAR AND WERE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE AIR CAMPAIGN WHICH THEY HAD "MILKED DRY." AFTER ALL, THEY CONTENTED, ALL THEY COULD GET WAS MORE LOADINGS, TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS AND INTERVIEWS ABOUT TARGETS IN GENERAL -- NOTHING SPECIFIC. WITH THAT PHILOSOPHY IN MIND, NBC DISPATCHED ITS LIVE TV TRUCK TO KUWAIT CITY AND INSTRUCTED LINDA VESTER AND BRYAN PUCHATY TO GO TO KUWAIT CITY WITH THE TV TRUCK AND NOT TO RETURN TO THE JIB. THE JIB DID NOT CARE FOR UNILATERALS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY WERE NOT PROPERLY

CREDENTIALLED FOR KUWAIT, NOT TO MENTION THEIR CONCERN ABOUT GETTING BACK LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WHICH POOL MEMBERS HAD CHECKED OUT FROM THE JIB. NOT LONG AFTER THAT, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO AND AVIATION WEEK DEPARTED FOR KUWAIT CITY UNDER THE COVER OF DARKNESS WITHOUT JIB AUTHORIZATION. TIME MAGAZINE WAS ESCORTED BACK TO DHAHRAN WHERE HE JOINED THE 40-VEHICLE CARAVAN TO KUWAIT CITY. ONLY TIMES JOURNAL CORRESPONDENT STEVE VOGEL REMAINED AND THE ARMY AGREED TO TAKE HIM INTO IRAQ WITH THEM. JIB ESCORT CAPT MARK BROWN RETURNED TO DHAHRAN EMPTY-HANDED, HIS POOL DISBANDED. WHEN DAVE FULGHUM RETURNED TO OUR LOCATION FROM KUWAIT CITY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT ASKING FOR TRANSPORTATION BACK TO DHAHRAN, I PERSONALLY ESCORTED HIM ON A C-141 BACK TO THE JIB.

SEE THE ATTACHED SUGGESTED NEWS STORIES AND GROUND RULES WE PROVIDED THE NEWS MEDIA, AS WELL AS COPIES OF THEIR FILED STORIES, PLUS THE BRIEFINGS WE PROVIDED INTERVIEWEES.

DUE TO OUR LOCATION, THERE WAS NO COMMUNITY RELATIONS CONTACT WITH THE HOST NATION, OTHER THAN IN THE FORWARD BATTLEFIELD AREAS WITH COALITION FORCES, WHERE WE ENGAGED IN CONVERSATION AT ALL HOURS OF THE DAY AND NIGHT, AND SHARED MEALS WITH ONE ANOTHER.

E. WHEN DEPLOYING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, A POWERFUL VACUUM CLEANER AND PLENTY OF EXTRA BAGS AND FILTERS ARE A MUST, ESPECIALLY WHEN OPERATING COMPUTER SYSTEMS. THESE ITEMS

SHOULD BE STOCKED IN THE PACK. ACQUIRING THE STARS & STRIPES SHOULD NOT BE SO BOGGED DOWN IN BUREAUCRACY. PA MUST HAVE 24-HOUR ACCESS TO RELIABLE TRANSPORTATION, AND GENUINE COMMAND SUPPORT TO ASSURE IT.

OVERDEMANDING MEDIA EXPECTING THE IMPOSSIBLE WAS A SOURCE OF IRRITATION. EVEN THOUGH WE GAVE EACH MEMBER A COPY OF THE GROUND RULES AND THEY KNEW THEY WERE THERE TO COVER AN AIR FORCE AGENDA, WHEN THEY SAW SOMETHING ON THE ARMY SIDE THAT WAS MORE INTERESTING, THEY WOULD BEG AND PLEAD FOR US TO HELP THEM COVER THAT STORY. THEY WOULD THEN BECOME DISGRUNTLED IF WE COULD NOT SECURE THE STORY FOR THEM INSTANTLY -- WITH NO ADVANCE PLANNING OR COORDINATION. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS WAS CCP #14'S INSISTENCE THAT THEY RIDE IN AN ARMY HELICOPTER. WHEN REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE UNIT BY PHONE FAILED BECAUSE OF INOPERATIVE PHONE LINES, I AGREED TO TAKE THEM TO THE SITE JUST TO PROVE TO THEM THEY JUST CAN'T SHOW UP AND EXPECT TO BE FLOWN. ONLY WHEN I SHOWED UP AND ASKED FOR A FLIGHT WOULD THEY BELIEVE ME. WE ADVISED THEM IF THEY WANTED TO COVER ARMY STORIES THEY MUST JOIN ARMY POOLS. THEY WERE NEVER TOO HAPPY WITH THAT PROSPECT FOR THEY CONSIDERED OUR MEDIA CENTER SET UP THE BEST THEY HAD SEEN IN THE FIELD.

FINALLY, QUICK COORDINATION WITH THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF INFORMATION THROUGH CENTAF/PA ON A REQUESTED NEWS STORY WHICH INVOLVED SAUDI OR COALITION FORCES PROVED TO BE NEXT TO

IMPOSSIBLE. THE SAUDIS WOULD NOT RESPOND IN A PROMPT MANNER, AND BY THE TIME THEY DID RESPOND THE REQUESTING POOL HAD DEPARTED. IN ANOTHER CASE, WHEN CBS CORRESPONDENT JAY LEVINE WANTED TO DO A STORY ON HOW TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTIES ORCHESTRATE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, THE REQUEST WAS FORWARDED THROUGH CENTAF/PA THROUGH THE SAUDI MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO THE SAUDI GENERAL IN CHARGE WHO DEMANDED THAT GENERAL SCHWARTZKHOPF ASK HIM PERSONALLY BEFORE HE WOULD RESPOND TO THE REQUEST. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE REQUEST DIED ON THE VINE.

THE MEDIA SHOULD HAVE HAD MORE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND ALLOWED GREATER MOVEMENT. BUT WITH SAUDI CULTURAL SENSITIVITY TO THEIR PRESENCE, IT WAS REMARKABLE THEY WERE ALLOWED AS MUCH ACCESS AS THEY RECEIVED.

DURING FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS I RECOMMEND THE PA STAFF TAKE AMPLE UNIFORM ITEMS AS THESE WERE IN EXTREMELY SHORT SUPPLY, AS WELL AS A COUPLE SETS OF UNIFORMS SMALLER THAN THE ONES THEY NOW WEAR. THAT WAY, AFTER THEY LOSE 20 POUNDS OR MORE AS I DID, THEY WILL HAVE PROPER FITTING UNIFORMS.

ALSO, I STRONGLY SUGGEST PAOS TAKE A MICROWAVE, SMALL REFRIGERATOR, SPACE HEATER AND COOKING UTENSILS AS THESE ITEMS WILL ALLOW NEWS MEDIA TO OPERATE FROM THE MEDIA CENTER WITH GREATER FLEXIBILITY.

AN ABUNDANCE OF PERSONAL HYGIENE ITEMS IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAINING ONE'S SANITY, AS THESE ITEMS, TOO, ROUTINELY RAN OUT AT THE MAKE-SHIFT BX FACILITY.

FINALLY, I RECOMMEND THE USE OF POLAROID CAMERAS AND AN ABUNDANCE OF FILM. NORMAL 35MM FILM COULD NOT BE PROCESSED WHILE IN THE AOR AND I WAS UNABLE TO USE SUCH FILM UNTIL I RETURNED TO CONUS. POLAROID OFFERS INSTANT GRATIFICATION.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1640th TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING, PROVISIONAL  
APO NY 09617

FROM: 2Lt Jim Knotts, PAO (Deployed)

20 MAR 91

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: USCENTAF REAR/PAS

1. PA Personnel:

1Lt Stephen E. Turner (PAO 14 Aug 90 - 12 Jan 91) from Travis AFB, now at Undergraduate Pilot Training.

2Lt Christopher J. Knotts (PAO 12 Jan 91 - 20 MAR 91) from Pope AFB, NC.

TSgt Gordon D. Honeycutt (PANCO 14 Aug 90 - 16 Mar 91) from Kirtland AFB, NM.

2. Since I was not here when the PA office was established, I cannot comment on its establishment. However, I can offer my observations of the situation when I arrived. Communication links in-country were almost non-existent. It was three weeks before I got in touch with CENTAF and two weeks until I spoke with CENTCOM. Neither got in touch with me, so I had to rely on my NCO for all guidance. Lt. Turner handled all dealings with higher headquarters, so again, I was at a loss. Even after talking with higher headquarters, they could not give me any direction for my particular classified location. In most cases, the guidelines they had established were not applicable to me because of host nation restrictions against media.

I needed clear guidance on the classification of our location, but neither CENTAF nor CENTCOM could tell me anything. Three different calls were made to the US Embassy in Muscat before we got a response. Better coordination between agencies has to be established for future operations.

I was able to make contact with the Public Affairs officer at Thumrait, who turned out to be a god-send. With my vast lack of experience, Lt. Dinning was able to offer suggestions to keep my programs on track. The regular correspondence between our two offices made life much easier. We wished we could be in touch with other PAs in theater on a regular basis to share ideas, but we could not even get a list of who all was in-country. I finally got a faxed copy of a PA directory in-country from Chief Conner at CENTCOM, but even my number was wrong on the listing. In the future, communications definitely have to be better through centralized coordination at the MAJCOM level.

Similarly, the flow of current information needs to be better.

While it was highly advertised that troops in Saudi Arabia were getting live CNN reports, the only news source we had was the BBC on short-wave radio. There is no comparison. Some of the more remote cites NEED to be included in the information loop.

3. Lt. Turner had gained a laptop computer from Pope and had a printer on loan from the Communications Squadron here. After much scrounging, we had a functional office. Equipment limitations drove the nomadic existence of PA for four months at the beginning of the deployment. Without the right equipment, our products cannot be of acceptable quality. Equipment concerns are the first thing each PA office should address now, before the next contingency (See Lessons Learned at Atch 1).

From a manpower standpoint, I think this office was poorly assembled. TSgt Honeycutt had virtually no experience editing a publication, which ended up being his primary job here. He did well for his lack of journalism training, but someone with more background should have been sent. The problem was compounded by my lack of experience. Being out of DINFOS only three months, I was certainly at a loss for professional knowledge. The two of us managed to hold our own and even do some very good things, but I feel a better team could have been chosen.

4. Media relations for this site were non-existent. The host nation would not allow media to come into the country, so I had no direct contact with media representatives. Community relations were, for the most part, non-existent also. We were not allowed to leave the base, except on official business and the wing commander handled all discussions with the local Station Commander. Besides getting to know some of the British expatriots working on the base, we had no community relations programs.

Internal information is where we excelled. We were delegated Information Management function of publishing a daily bulletin, a policy that was started before I arrived and was impossible to escape. We published a two-page newsletter Mondays through Saturdays, with a one-page bulletin on Sundays. Our original stories were published in our newsletter and then rewritten to be used as external releases to base papers. With 51 bases and seven major commands represented at this site, I think we did an outstanding job of coming up with something for everyone. Our newsletters were the direct outlet of information from the commander to the camp. Our stories sent to home stations also kept the internal audiences in the States informed of what was happening to their deployed family members.

5. As background information, I will describe some of the major projects where we concentrated our efforts. Public affairs prepared notes used by the commander to address the camp at an Open Forum every other week. These forums were primarily used for rumor control. We established a Commander's Action Line system, addressing over 60 inputs. One of our programs resulted in letters to the editor being sent to major papers in over 55 cities nationwide, signed by camp members from those cities, to

thank the American people for their support (See Atch 2). Lt. Turner and TSgt Honeycutt developed their own hometown news release format before the Operation Desert Storm forms ever came out. They produced over 300 stories that were sent directly to hometown newspapers. I made video postcards that were sent to ten bases with large groups represented for public release. We started a program for people to send 3-4 line personal messages back to their home station base newspapers for publication, called Sand Mail. And Lt. Turner organized the "Any Servicemember Store" to handle packages addressed to "Any Servicemember." Volunteers put the items on shelves for anybody to take what they needed. The cost of the item was to answer a letter sent to "Any Servicemember." This was a highly successful program that distributed items fairly and insured the letters received answers. Our last major project was making squadron videos that were sent back to home units and shown at spouse support meetings.

6. The three areas where the most improvement needs to take place for future operations are equipment concerns, communications across and up the chain and distribution of current information.

*Jim Knotts*

JIM KNOTTS, 2Lt, USAF  
PAO (Deployed)

3 Atchs  
1. Lessons Learned  
2. Letter to the Editor  
3. Newsletters

20 Apr 91

LESSONS LEARNED -- PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OBSERVATION: Communication and coordination between all deployed Public Affairs offices, up and across the chain, was extremely limited.

- A current chain of command and phone listing are essential
- Duplication of efforts by deployed units could be avoided with better exchange of information

RECOMMENDATION:

-- Provide an in-theater Public Affairs chain of command with commercial and TAC phone numbers to all Air Force public affairs units, with updates as necessary.

-- Hold periodic PA conferences in-theater to exchange ideas and information OR CENTAF public affairs reps could travel in theater periodically, passing along and gathering information.

-- Provide a monthly bullet paper for deployed public affairs units with inputs and ideas from the MAJCOM and other deployed PAOs.

OPR: MAJCOM/Deployed Base level PA

OBSERVATION: Public affairs guidance covered only those units in Saudi Arabia. The rules were completely different for this location in Oman. We never got clear classification guidance in writing from the MAJCOM. It took almost seven months to get any written classification guidance from the US Embassy.

RECOMMENDATION: Public affairs guidance needs to be provided to deployed and home station public affairs offices, in writing at the beginning of the deployment. The guidance needs to be coordinated through the appropriate embassies to be tailored to each public affairs location.

OPR: OASD/PA, US Embassies (State Department), MAJCOM

OBSERVATION: Equipment limitations drove a nomadic existence of public affairs for four months. The required PA equipment list found in the CENTAF Public Affairs Annex (Appendix B) was very helpful in packing the routine office supplies needed for a contingency. However, large equipment such as computers and fax machines are not usually available for deployment purposes and were difficult, if not impossible, to acquire prior to arrival in theater.

-- No provision was made for equipment needs when a wing is split and sent to two or more locations. It was never clear

where the PA equipment kit should be sent.

-- Local purchases by contracting officers in the AOR is no cheaper or more timely than purchasing them prior to arrival and being ready to go.

RECOMMENDATION: Computers and fax machines should be required items for PA deployment kits. For this to be possible, the public affairs office will need a fund site to purchase the equipment. Also, the possibility of one unit being in two locations should be addressed from an equipment standpoint. If all public affairs offices had deployment kits, even those without a personnel mobility tasking, then kits from units not tasked for personnel could be tasked for equipment.

OPR: OASD/PA, SAF/PA, MAJCOM/Base level PA

OBSERVATION: In the absence of an information management function, this public affairs office was tasked with the function of producing a Daily Bulletin under the guise of a PA publication. This took manpower that should have been used for other primary public affairs tasks. With only two public affairs personnel, a seven day a week publication can cause early burn-out.

RECOMMENDATION: An information management specialist should be deployed with a unit. Also, public affairs officers should insure that PA assets are used only for PA tasks, not IM or executive functions.

OPR: MAJCOM and Base level PA

OBSERVATION: Units without a mobility commitment were still tasked by the MAJCOM to provide personnel for the deployment. As a result, the deploying person did not have the necessary personal or professional equipment ready to deploy.

RECOMMENDATION: Make it clear that all public affairs assets are available for mobility requirements. This way, PA personnel will have the appropriate personal and professional equipment ready to be deployed when the need arises.

OPR: OASD/PA, SAF/PA, MAJCOM

OBSERVATION: Remote sites weren't included in HQ MAC hometown (civilian) news media visits to theater.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

-- The MAC representative or Joint Information Bureau (JIB) should arrange for people at remote, media-restricted sites to travel aboard scheduled missions for media interviews. Deployed PAOs couldn't escort all trips due to other mission requirements, but could still arrange for members to be met by PA reps at interview locations. This could be done for HQ MAC hometown (civilian) news media visits as well as for national media outlets.

-- Long term commercial phone access would facilitate smooth organization of hometown media projects by deployed public affairs officers. Base people could call hometown radio stations and newspapers from the public affairs office and provide interviews, generating positive coverage of the Air Force and boosting morale. This would be especially effective at media-restricted sites.

OPR: OASD/PA (JIB), SAF/PA, HQ MAC

**OBSERVATION:** Dispatch of information on unit activities through news releases and photos was not quick or efficient with minimize imposed on all electronic message traffic. All releases were either faxed or sent by regular mail. This location finally got a fax machine donated by a civilian organization near Pope Air Force Base. Before this machine arrived, public affairs had to use the one in the maintenance complex. This was time consuming in terms of manpower and tied up the machine for others' use.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Include a PA facsimile machines as an essential item on the PA equipment kit list.

OPR: MAJCOM/Base level PA

**OBSERVATION:** Home base Public Affairs support varied from base to base. Many bases gave no support at all. We requested home base public affairs units (with personnel represented at this location) provide a minimum of one copy of their base papers for distribution or check out. The request was sent through message traffic, letters, and faxed notes, and was ignored by almost every public affairs office. However, several bases requested stories from deployed locations about their people here.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The importance of their publications to troop morale must be stressed from the highest level to all base public affairs offices. Providing weekly copies of the base newspaper to deployed members should be the minimum requirement for home base unit support, especially if bases expect to publish articles from deployed locations. It's as easy as putting an address on the publisher's mailing list. All MAJCOMs should add this requirement of home stations PA offices to the Public Affairs

Annex.

OPR: MAJCOM/Base level PA

OBSERVATION: Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) mini-TV system did not work:

-- The shows were on Beta tapes, which were unusable in our MWR tent that used VHS. Specialized equipment, which could be counted on to break down, was needed to show the tapes.

-- Tapes that were supposed to arrive on circuit weekly arrived only twice.

-- Material -- TV shows, features and movies -- was dated when it did arrive.

RECOMMENDATION: AFRTS should arrange for programs to be re-taped onto VHS tapes prior to distribution. This would make the programs more easily used by bases and would save the hassle and cost of using Beta equipment. A quicker distribution system, such as regularly scheduled MAC cargo aircraft in theater, should be found.

OPR: AFRTS Headquarters, Los Angeles, Calif.

OBSERVATION: People deployed to Oman did not receive any timely radio or television news from AFRTS. Radio signal from the BBC World Service was the only news source available. AFRTS service in Saudi Arabia was highly publicized.

RECOMMENDATION: AFRTS should include all countries in an AOR in its satellite service.

OPR: AFRTS Headquarters, Los Angeles, Calif.

OBSERVATION: In the absence of timely and reliable radio or television news, Public Affairs needs a news source to serve the base populace with a daily news summary. Once the AFRTS news summaries started arriving, the situation improved immensely.

RECOMMENDATION: SAF/PA should establish a system for deployed PAs to receive AP or UPI wire service news at least daily via electronic message or fax if minimize is imposed. PAs could then reproduce the information for bulletin boards.

OPR: SAF/PA, AFRTS, and MAJCOM

OBSERVATION: Bases were not receiving photos from deployed PA shops after being sent for security review at CENTAF. Clearance authority for internal public affairs photos was at the MAJCOM

level.

RECOMMENDATION: Photo clearance/security review authority should be delegated to deployed PAOs and wing commanders, as it is for base newspaper stories.

OPR: OASD/PA, SAF/PA, and HQ TAC/PA

OBSERVATION: Public affairs acted as AAVS base photo lab by being tasked with shooting re-enlistments, promotions, group photos and contingency slides/photos, taking time from primary PA tasks.

RECOMMENDATION: AAVS support should be deployed with PA. AAVS could also take photos for unit historical documentation.

OPR: MAJCOM

OBSERVATION: The CENTCOM news service worked well after it finally became operational. It took a long while for this location to get on the distribution list. Some of the stories were useful for our local publication, yet many weren't.

RECOMMENDATION: MAJCOMs, SAF/PA, AFNEWS and AFIS should insure all deployed wing PAs are included as addressees for message and mail traffic. To make the stories more useable, the news service needs to make the stories more applicable to people from a wide variety of bases and commands. Stories about Air Force policy changes were most often used. Also, the news service and other internal publications should include more stories about what is happening at home stations. Stories about what a particular unit in theater is doing are of interest to only a few people at a location. Publications such as The Desert Defender need to include more about what's happening on the home front from base level public affairs offices.

OPR: SAF/PA, MAJCOM, AFIS (Armed Forces Information Service) and Base level PA

OBSERVATION: Remote sites weren't included in AFNEWS hometown video team visits throughout the theater. Although open media visits were not allowed, AFNEWS teams could have coordinated with deployed PAOs to visit remote sites on a low-key basis.

RECOMMENDATION: AFNEWS teams from Kelly AFB, Texas, should visit all sites in the AOR, with prior coordination with PAOs.

OPR: AFNEWS, Kelly AFB, Texas

OBSERVATION: The few issues Stars and Stripes we received were

an average of 7-10 days late. In the absence of a better news source, the sports updates especially were useful.

RECOMMENDATION: A more reliable and timely delivery source, such as regular MAC routes, should be pursued.

OPR: MAJCOM

*Jim Knotts*

JIM KNOTTS, 2Lt, USAF  
PAO (Deployed)

The 806th Bombardment Wing Provisional, Strategic Air Command, began operations out of RAF Fairford on 1 Feb 1991. During this period, the wing's performance directly advanced U.S. national interests as part of a United Nations coalition force brought together to liberate the country of Kuwait from Iraqi aggression as part of Operation Desert Storm. Flying B-52G aircraft from Royal Air Force (RAF) Fairford, United Kingdom, the wing accomplished 60 highly effective combat sorties dropping 1158 tons of munitions against strategic and tactical targets in Iraq and the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO).

The success of the 806th Bombardment Wing Provisional began with an 8th Air Force warning order dated 1 Feb 1991 tasking the 97th Bombardment Wing, Eaker AFB, Arkansas to deploy to RAF Fairford, England. Wing personnel formed the core of the new provisional bombardment wing with a mission to conduct conventional bombing operations. A total of eight B-52G aircraft were sourced and ferried from Griffiss AFB, New York; Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; Castle AFB, California, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana to RAF Fairford. Additionally, 26 KC-135, 8 KC-10, 15 C-9 and 2 C-130 aircraft plus one Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) L-1011 transported 370 tons of equipment and over 1100 personnel from 20 different bases throughout the CONUS and Europe. The task of finding a home for all equipment and personnel moved quickly and smoothly. Equipment was downloaded and sorted among the various shops and arriving personnel found billeting in such unlikely places as the gymnasium, maintenance hangars, and work stations. To provide longer term housing, seventy-five portable cabins were setup along with 16 bathroom and shower units. The diverse staff quickly became an operational team to integrate efforts towards mission accomplishment.

Daily target tasking was received from CENTAF in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The entire staff worked extensive hours to provide the aircrews with a quality product (i.e. target weaponeering, target routes, axis of attack, flight plans, bomb forms, bombing coordinates, etc). Maintenance hustled to provide the aircrews with the same high quality airframes and weapons. Munitions began arriving on day two and 2,500 tons of CBUs, MK-82s, and M-117s were stockpiled and ready to go. After much hard work, long hours, superb coordination and teamwork, the 806th was ready to fight on 8 Feb 1991, only four days after arrival on station. The first sorties were launched on 9 Feb 1991. Over the next 19 days, 60 combat sorties were successfully completed for 975.7 hours of total flying time, an average of 16.3 hours per sortie. 806th BMW (P) pilots unloaded 13.2 million pounds of fuel during approximately 120 hours of air refueling with KC-135 tankers from the 807th AREFS (P), Monte de Marson, France and the 803rd AREFS (P), Helenikon, Greece. The fuel enabled the crews to deliver over 1158 tons of munitions on assigned targets. Battle

portrayed a high degree of success for missions flown by the 806th. Strong maintenance support was crucial to achieving these exceptional results. Using the concept of Integrated Combat Turns (ICT), the 806th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (CAMS) significantly reduced aircraft "turn around" times from an average of five and one-half hours to a record time of one hour and twenty-eight minutes. Overall, the 806 BMW(P) accomplished the extraordinary task of moving 1,157 people and 370 tons of equipment into a base in caretaker status and then rapidly molding personnel and material into a cohesive, well-disciplined and highly effective combat unit. The actions taken to successfully initiate and conduct offensive bombing operations directly contributed to the swift conclusion of the campaign against Iraqi.

The reception received from the local British people has been overwhelming. The outpouring of support and hospitality have helped to make our long days much more bearable. Many people have welcomed us into their homes, and treated us as if we were one of the family. The super reception we received from the British people and the Ministry of Defence helped us greatly in achieving the combat readiness we needed to accomplish our mission. We cannot thank the British people enough for the outstanding support they have shown us.

Major Cochran, 806 BMW(P)/PA, 8 Mar 91

FROM: PA

12 Mar 91

SUBJ: Lessons Learned

Name: SSgt Randy L. Mitchell  
SSN 574-54-0667

TO: CENTAF (REAR)/PA

Title: Chief, Media Relations, 62MAW/PA  
Deployed: 18 Jan 91-12 Apr 91

1. In reference to your request for lessons learned, message dtg 072200Z Mar 91, I submit the following observations for the Public Affairs office:

OBSERVATION 1: The Public Affairs Office is currently staffed by one Public Affairs Specialist (79150) and one Information Management Specialist (70250).

RECOMMENDATION 1: Two Public Affairs personnel are needed to properly cover the mission. One could accomplish the daily newsletter and the other could write stories about the mission (i.e., fly on missions, devote entire days to different work sections, etc.) to better tell the story. Suggest one E-5/E-6 and one E-3/E-4. A lot of the "real story" went untold, due to no way for PA to cover the "complete" mission first hand. Another PA rep had been requested, but never acted on.

OBSERVATION 2: Non-availability of required equipment (photographic equipment) and inadequate equipment (copier).

RECOMMENDATION 2: No photographic equipment was available for Public Affairs use. The original PA person had brought his personal equipment, no government supplied equipment was available. Photos are needed to enhance news release value and support historical archives of the unit mission.

The copier locally purchased for PA was inadequate. The copier was not built to handle the number of copies normally produced daily (approximately 600) and, therefore, spent more time being repaired than working to complete the job it was intended for. A heavy duty copier should be bought in the future.

OBSERVATION 3: Availability of Combat Camera crews and length of time to get photos/video back was too long.

RECOMMENDATION 3: A deployed photo lab with proper equipment was needed for the Combat Camera crews use to expedite return of photos. The lab could be used to process black and white negs also taken by deployed PA personnel. This would enable us to send back timely stories, with photo support, to home stations of deployed units. Also, coverage by Combat Camera could be returned to wing commanders on a more timely basis.

OBSERVATION 4: PA had no communications equipment and went without a working phone for more than two weeks.

RECOMMENDATION 4: On numerous occasions the wing or base commander could not contact the PA representative. A beeper or radio would have sufficed for this purpose. When PA moved locations it took over two weeks to have a working phone installed in the office, this caused considerable havoc. We talk to the Joint Information Bureau on a daily basis and could not be reached by them.

OBSERVATION 5: Contact with CENTCOM/PA and CENTAF/PA was non-existent and I could never get through to them by phone/FAX.

RECOMMENDATION 5: I'm sure this had to be a major concern of all deployed personnel. There should be a better system to get in touch with our headquarters personnel. It looked bad being the only PA person on site, whose job is communicating with people, and you can't get in contact with your own people. This was most important when I was trying to FAX news releases for clearance and could never get through.

OBSERVATION 6: Complete coverage of mission by JIB personnel and media. Stories were one dimensional, incomplete, or not covered at all.

RECOMMENDATION 6: A major concern at my location was the coverage of the mission by the Dubai JIB personnel. The coverage sought by the JIB was always the "Reserve" story. The active-duty members at the base felt neglected. Even on major stories throughout the theater, the media catered to the reserves and not active duty. The media coverage of the war reflected the entire war was fought by reserves, not active duty. Support people such as Services, Security Police, Civil Engineers, etc. were not given the credit they deserved. This issue could have been presented by JIB personnel in an interesting manner to entice the media in covering these people who played an important role throughout the war.

2. If there are any questions on the above observations or recommendations please contact me at my home station address or number listed below, thank you.

SSgt Randy L. Mitchell  
62 MAW/PA (MAC)  
McChord AFB, Wash. 98438-5000  
Comm. (206) 984-5637  
DSN 976-5637

RANDY L. MITCHELL, SSgt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

(certified copy)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Headquarters 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing (P)  
APO NEW YORK 09691

From: PA

2 Apr 91

Subj: Desert Storm PA After-Action

To: Hq CENTAF(Rear)/PAS

1. Per your request, here is my after-action report. Prepared by SSgt. Robert M. Sexton, NOOIC, Public Affairs. I was in theater 11 Jan 91 to 12 Apr 91. There was a SSgt. Beaulieu from the 33rd TFW public affairs office here before me, but I don't know the dates. He left about 2.5 months before I arrived.

2. NARRATIVE:

a. I was notified that Hq TAC/PA had by-name directed me to Desert Shield on 4 Jan 91. I was told that TAC/PA turned down the volunteer from my base (same rank and AFSC) and insisted I must go.

b. Because I was the second PA person deployed to Tabuk, I can not describe the original PA set-up. I departed from Luke AFB on 9 Jan and arrived at Tabuk, Saudi Arabia on 13 Jan 91. Upon arrival I reported to Col. Rick N. Parsons, commander, 33rd TFW(P). Since there had been a 2.5-month hiatus since my predecessor's departure, there was no equipment or facility available. I had to start from scratch to eke out a place to work and the things I needed to begin. The laptop computer was gone, the video camera was gone, the field desk was gone, the camera was gone, etc. Within three days I had located and retrieved the equipment and found a desk. With the exception of the video camera, which had been fatally damaged, everything else was useable. Anticipating finding only Enable or Wordstar word processing software available, I had brought my own program from home. Within six days I had begun publishing a local two-page news sheet, which would continue three days per week for my entire stay. I want to state for the record that throughout my TDY, Colonel Parsons and the senior leaders of the 33rd TFW(P) supported me strongly. We enjoyed an excellent working relationship. The commanders sought my advice and heeded it.

c. The equipment I had consisted of the above-mentioned items, plus a second (Ricoh) camera, strobe and small cassette recorder. The TV camera was inop. The Nikon 35mm camera and lenses were so old and beaten up as to be almost useless. There were no lens caps or UV filters, so the lenses were filthy. The strobe did not fire when it should with any camera. The Ricoh camera was unreliable and often produced unuseable pictures. There was no transformer for my computer as other, operations and maintenance related, offices had taken the two PA transformers and would not release them. The only communication device I had was a tactical field phone with no DSN or commercial access. I could not send or receive E-mail or use the built-in modem in the computer. The JIBs

did not have tactical phones, only commercial, so I could not communicate directly with them.

d. Transportation and communication became my major obstacles. In spite of authorization in the TAC deployment plan, the local officials refused to grant me permanently assigned transportation, although it was available. That made it extremely difficult to reach and coordinate with people around the very large base we were using. It also made it impossible to cover quick-breaking events. Limited communication meant it was very difficult to exchange information with the home base public affairs office, and with higher headquarters. I was not able to overcome either of these obstacles due to the resistance of higher authorities at the deployment site.

3. MEDIA CONTACT: Tabuk's remote location and the commander's resistance to overnight or longer media visits prevented us from having media pool visits. Two journalists visited between 13 Jan and 12 Apr: TSgt. Fernando Serna from AIRMAN Magazine and a reporter from AFRTS "Desert Update." Besides them, we did have a media pool "drop in" on a C-130 medivac flight, and no warning from the PA escort with the pool. The last group deplaned and began shooting pictures and video tape immediately, evoking a knee-jerk response from the security police, who showed up and threatened to take cameras and film. I was able to save that situation and the reporters left with the same film and video tape they came in with. Although the 33rd TFW(P) set many records during the war and led the allied coalition in total kills of Iraqi aircraft, our accomplishments went unnoticed by the media because of our location and the restrictions on releasing information.

4. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION: As mentioned in 2.b. I began and continued a thrice-weekly, two-page local news sheet. It was a blend of local news and war news, fed by CENT NEWS and AFNS messages. When I first took over the publication, it was suffering from infrequent publication and lack of reader appeal. A reader survey in Nov 1990 had revealed widespread negative attitudes toward the publication among its readers. I used the negative responses to show me what to do to make it better and concentrated on improving the quality, timeliness, relevance and newsworthiness of the contents, as well as the quality of writing and physical aspects. Within a month, the readers were responding with enthusiasm. An underground newspaper lampooning the official paper disappeared as my newspaper's acceptance and credibility increased. By February, people were going out of their way to pick up copies, and demand had exceeded supply. I enjoyed excellent support from all commanders and agency heads in matters relating to the news sheet. The other major internal program was commanders calls. By early March, morale in the unit was falling as people's expectation of an early return to the States was dashed. I talked to the wing commander and advised him to have more frequent face-to-face contact with people. He agreed and immediately started up a weekly commanders call program. There were two meetings to accommodate people regardless of their shift, and the meetings were well-attended. We were on the circuit for AFRTS mini-TV, but lack of local interest led us to cancel that and return the equipment. Saudi TV carried CNN news excerpts, and we had a TV in the dining hall. People watched that alot. Finally, although we received AFRTS radio, it

originated in Riyadh and was not very well accepted here. I tried to raise support from local leaders to begin a daily news program, since we did have local override capability. However, lack of support killed that effort.

5. COMMUNITY RELATIONS: Except for frequent, cordial contact between 33 TFW(P) leaders and Saudi and British leaders, and the working-level relations between U.S. and Saudi airmen and NCOs, there was no community relations program possible. Many Saudis invited Americans to their homes for meals or social visits. In March, the Saudi base commander offered our commander a going-away party for up to 500 people. Probably almost that many attended. The Saudis presented plaques to our leaders and made speeches which we reciprocated. Then the Saudis fed everyone a traditional dinner. After that, we adjourned to a theater where the Saudis presented several hours of folks dancing and singing. Contact with locals in the nearby town of Tabuk was always cordial, with no problems noted. The prince who oversees this district complimented our people profusely for our sensitivity to their culture and religion, and said that problems they feared had not materialized due to our consideration.

#### 6. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Deployed site transportation. OBSERVATION: Waiting until reaching the deployed site may be too late to arrange transportation for PA. DISCUSSION: Because my orders didn't specify that I was authorized rental or government transportation at the deployment location, I was forced to rely on shuttle bus service most of the time. U-drive vehicles are not always available, and are temporary. Lack of transportation hampered information gathering and coordination. RECOMMENDATION: Make sure the deploying unit includes a transportation authorization statement on the PA person's orders. Make sure all TAC public affairs offices know to request such a statement.

b. Headquarters orientation for newly deployed staff. OBSERVATION: When new PA staff deploy to a contingency location, they should visit the field headquarters PA office before continuing on to their deployed unit. DISCUSSION: As I passed through Riyadh, I called CENTAF/PA and asked if I needed to come by their office for an orientation. They told me not to. As it turned out, I was hindered in many ways by not getting the CENTAF/PA perspective before going to my unit. Everything in a field situation is different from business as usual at home base. Mail, phones, rules, guidance, methods, everything is different. LESSONS LEARNED: I talked to them often by phone. RECOMMENDATION: It would be worth the extra day to bring people in to the headquarters PA office for an orientation. A helpful substitute would be printed info and rules for newly-arrived PA people.

c. Photo needs. OBSERVATION: Typical wing PA photo equipment is not ideal for deployment field use. DISCUSSION: Everyone in the organization expected the PA person to be the photographer. However, the equipment was not up to the demands of the situation. There was no way to process and print black and white pictures and slides --the two most-needed photo products. Also, the deployment kit was inadequately stocked with film.

LESSONS LEARNED: Fortunately, I brought my own camera. RECOMMENDATION: The 33TFW/PA office needs to buy a fully-automatic 35mm camera with a built-in telephoto zoom lens and flash and a case for deployment use. Cameras like the Olympus Infinity Superzoom 330, Chinon "Genesis III" reflex zoom, or Minolta Maxxum 5000i would be ideal, as they are fully self-contained and allow both normal and telephoto shooting. Stock extra camera batteries and lens cleaning tissue in the deployment kit. The kit also needs an insulated container with six months worth of Ektachrome 200 and 64 and Tri-X film in it. An insulated container would help keep the film from being heat-damaged.

d. **Electrical problems.** OBSERVATION: Every country in the world uses different electricity and broadcast systems. DISCUSSION: The voltage and electrical plug problem can render portable electrical equipment such as laptop computers and printers unuseable. LESSONS LEARNED: Local sources may have temporary solutions, but in many locations would not be able to help. It may take weeks for supply channels to provide the necessary transformers. RECOMMENDATION: TAC/PA should direct all subordinate PA offices to obtain and permanently stock universal voltage transformers (constant power sources) in their deployment kits. PA people should also put British, German and European plugs, wire cutters and strippers, screwdrivers and pliers in their deployment kits.

e. **Fax and E-mail problems.** OBSERVATION: In the field, the host unit may not have a fax machine, or it may not be available to the PA person. There may not be an E-mail terminal. DISCUSSION: Filing news releases and corresponding with home base from an overseas location can be difficult to impossible without electronic communication. A computer with a built-in fax board and software, a phone line jack and E-mail software with "burst" mode can prevent those problems. All the computer would need is a commercial or DSN line when either is available. LESSONS LEARNED: Don't count on being able to fax or mail releases home. Both methods may be unavailable or unreliable. Don't rely on an unknown fax machine to let you know if the other end actually received your message. RECOMMENDATION: TAC/PA should publicize this problem and the proposed solution and require all subordinate PA offices to update their portable computers ASAP.

f. **Manning.** OBSERVATION: Units should bring public affairs staff from the home base. DISCUSSION: Bringing in a stranger from a unit on the other side of the country is not the optimum approach to providing a public affairs program. In a deployed environment people are highly suspicious of strangers, commanders have little time to work at building a relationship with a newcomer, and midway through a contingency situation is not the time to try to figure out a new unit, new location, new rules, new communication system, etc. LESSON LEARNED: If you've got to bring someone in from another unit, make sure the person is mature and widely experienced. RECOMMENDED ACTION: Make sure deployable units have agreements with host-base public affairs offices to draw from their staff in the event of a lengthy deployment.

g. **Briefing slide needs.** OBSERVATION: Deploying units will need slides for briefings when they get home. PA should anticipate this and be prepared to begin shooting slides upon arrival. DISCUSSION: There was no

plan to record activities and facilities on slides. Nor did anyone shoot slides -- only prints. Early activities of the wing (actually everything prior to mid-February) went unrecorded. RECOMMENDATION: Make sure someone starts shooting slides when the first aircraft land. Shoot slides of everything throughout the deployment. TAC/PA and other majcoms subject to deployments should add this requirement to the PA annex of all applicable OPLANS and checklists.

h. PA guidance. OBSERVATION: PA people deploying late need all applicable guidance as soon as they arrive. DISCUSSION: Intermediate level headquarters need to provide all relevant guidance to new PA people so there is no situation uncovered. RECOMMENDATION: Intermediate headquarters should copy all guidance and send immediately to new PA people, or provide it during the headquarters orientation. LESSONS LEARNED: It's hard to function without guidance. It also results in much wheel-spinning. It's also not likely that one can "catch up" on guidance during a contingency situation.

i. **Computer software.** OBSERVATION: There is still a dreadful level of software illiteracy out there. DISCUSSION: As I feared, the laptop computer I inherited at the deployed site contained a minimum of programs: Enable and Wordstar word processing, Print Master (not an electronic publisher), Procomm, and Dbase. The two word processors are among the worst, least-user-friendly on the market. What do we need Dbase for in the desert? A list of community leaders? Procomm is potentially useful. Print Master makes cute cards and posters. RECOMMENDATION: Get new, user-friendly software such as (word processor) PFS: Professional Write; (electronic publisher) Publish It! or PFS: First Publisher. Either of those would enable us to put out quality newsletters in the field. We also need a graphics clipfile to use with our products. It should contain scanned-in line art of all the common aircraft, weapons, (several perspectives) MAJCOM emblems, symbols for AF career fields, other services' emblems, etc. and a simple drawing such as COREL-Draw. We also need a mouse and a hand-scanner packed with our computers to support the publisher. Provide the AP style guide on disk (it's available). Finally, send us current copies of AFR 190-1 to store on the hard disks so we have it for easy reference.

7. If you need information on any of these points, please call me.



ROBERT M. SEXTON, SSgt, USAF  
NOOIC, Public Affairs



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
**HEADQUARTERS 443D MILITARY AIRLIFT WING, TRAINING (MAC)**  
**ALTUS AIR FORCE BASE, OKLAHOMA 73523 - 5000**

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PA

10 May 1991

SUBJECT:

After Action Report -- Desert Shield/Storm

TO:

HQ MAC/PA

Our after action report on Operation Desert Shield/Storm in the format you prescribed follows:

- a. Name, rank, duty title of person preparing report: Donald L. Johnson, GS-12, 443 MAW/PA
- b. Names, rank, and inclusive dates in-theater of deployed office personnel: Thomas A. Cocchiaro, MSgt, 12 November 1990 to 31 March 1991.
- c. A copy of MSgt Cocchiaro's after action report is attached.
- d. Media contacts, escorts and releases:

At the onset of Operation Desert Shield, we followed the Air Force guidance of not commenting on our activities. This caused us to turn away numerous requests for information or refer them to Washington. We had no problem following the "no comment" policy until we started deploying soldiers from Fort Sill. The Fort Sill Public Affairs Office was releasing information on some Army troop movements which caused problems for us with the media. The media started calling us requesting flight departure times and names of units. At the time, we were moving National Guard and reserves from Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas which generated a lot of media interest from all three states. Of course, we continued to follow the "no comment" policy. Finally, I worked out a procedure with the Fort Sill PAO that we would refer all media queries on Army movements to them night or day. If Fort Sill was going to authorize any media to film departures or conduct interviews, they would notify us in advance and provide a representative to talk with the media. Using this procedure, we had no further problems. Altus serves as the aerial port of embarkation for Fort Sill and during this period nearly 11,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve soldiers went through Altus using 101 dedicated military and civilian airplanes. Adding over 3,180 tons of baggage and cargo, we were extremely busy during this time. And, we're not done yet -- these same troops are coming back through Altus.

As of the date of this report, we prepared and distributed 114 news releases on Operation Desert Shield/Storm to outlets in three states. These releases range from news service articles to locally generated stories. During this same time, we had 38 media visits and conducted some 61 interviews.

I'm sure we were no different from any other base on being hounded by the media requesting information on what we were doing. One thing we did immediately was to contact all the media we work with on a routine basis and discussed the ground rules we had to follow on releasing information. At the same time, we promised to provide them information just as soon as the restrictions were lifted -- a promise, we kept! In the weeks following, we enjoyed an excellent relationship with our media friends.

e. Community relations:

With the superb relationship we already had with the local community, we had no problem with them wanting to support our troops -- in fact, we were swamped with requests. Almost immediately, we had local groups wanting to do anything for "our Altus men and women." Colonel Walter S. Hogle Jr., commander, 443rd Military Airlift Wing appointed me as the base project officer and liaison officer to coordinate community activities. One of the first community projects started was Operation Hope, a project in which cookies, toilet articles, letters, magazines, posters and other similar items were collected and mailed to our deployed people. Every person we had deployed received a package from the city. Additionally, local schools conducted several letter writing and poster campaigns -- which I'm sure kept the Post Office and APO folks busy.

Another major project under Operation Hope, was a picnic for the families of those deployed. The citizens of Altus raised the money, bought and cooked the food, organized games for the kids and in general hosted the families to an outstanding afternoon of fun and activities. Jan Hogle, wife of the wing commander, assisted in the organization of all the activities with the help of the Officer's and Enlisted Wives Club. The picnic was well attended and everyone seemed to have a great time. The event was covered by two television stations and by the local radio station and newspaper. We also had AAVS tape the activities and copies were mailed to the deployed troops.

With the help of a local television production company, we borrowed equipment and used their studio facilities to produce a Christmas video tape that the wing commander and senior enlisted advisor delivered during their Christmas visit with our troops. In filming the video, we went around to every unit or agency that had people deployed and filmed skits, family members, people and groups singing songs, telling jokes -- anything to take a "little of Altus" to our deployed people. SSgt Susan Kyle did a great job putting it all together. And, from the comments we received, the tapes were well received.

Another morale booster were the weekly video tapes and newspapers we mailed every Friday. During the week AAVS taped popular TV shows, football and basketball games (I know it wasn't legal), dubbed them and we mailed them along with copies of the base newspaper to every location we had people at. We received many calls from people, after they got home, to say they really appreciated the tapes and several said the Galaxy was the only base newspaper received at their location.


I can't say enough about the local VFW! They helped with everything - nothing was too big or small for them to get involved in. They organized a Sunday dinner for deployed families, helped set up a patriotic rally in the local high school football stadium that several thousand people attended including Congressman Dave McCurdy. And, when the troops started coming home, they met every returning airplane. For those airplanes carrying Altus people, they served champagne to each person as they got off the aircraft. Regardless of the arrival time, the VFW was there, rain or shine.

Remember that relationship we established with the area media -- it sure came in handy when the troops started coming home. They made arrival announcements for us that helped draw people out to our welcome home ceremonies. In fact with their help, people often lined the road from here to Fort Sill (60 miles away) with flags and banners to welcome the Army home. Regardless of the arrival time or weather we had people on the ramp with flags, music and banners welcoming our folks home.

In addition to those support activities listed above, Post News-Week Cable, the local television cable company and Southwestern Bell implemented a policy where they would reconnect telephones and TV cables free of charge to those who deployed on Operation Desert Storm.

As you can see, the local community certainly has continued to live up to its reputation for being supportive of Altus AFB in the performance of its mission.

f. Problem areas: None.

  
DONALD L. JOHNSON  
Chief, Public Affairs

1 Attachment  
MSgt Cocchiaro's Report

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 443D MILITARY AIRLIFT WING, TRAINING (MAC)

ALTUS AIR FORCE BASE, OKLAHOMA 73523-5000

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PA, MSgt Cocchiaro

29 Apr 91

SUBJ: After Action Report

TO: HQ MAC/PA  
443 MAW/CC

1. The following is an after action report concerning public affairs activities at Al Ain Air Base, United Arab Emirates.

a. Report written by: Thomas A. Cocchiaro, MSgt, NCOIC, 443 MAW/PA.

b. List of all deployed officer personnel: Thomas A. Cocchiaro, MSgt, 12 Nov 90 to 31 Mar 91.

c. Report Narrative: Establishment of public affairs operations in the AOR started nearly a month before I deployed. Since I was going to a bare base with no established public affairs program, I had to purchase a large number of office equipment items and supplies (the list of equipment is attached to this report). I also had to arrange for packing and crating to build a nesting box to fit all equipment. Luckily, they built it a little bigger than my original specifications. By the time we finished loading it, you couldn't have slipped an extra pencil inside (the dimensions were 3X5X4 and it weighed 700 pounds).

I left Altus AFB 12 Nov 90 and arrived at Al Ain AFB, U.A.E. on 17 Nov 90. The reason for the long delay was that I was waiting for my equipment box to join me at Dover AFB, Del. The supply people recommended that I accompany the box to the AOR so it wouldn't get hijacked enroute (the box contained computers, typewriters, software and other high-value items). After waiting three days at Dover AFB, I found out that the box left Tinker AFB on 14 Nov 91 headed for RAF Mildenhall, UK on a CRAF cargo flight, so I abandoned the idea of trying to keep track of it. One of the problems I ran into at Dover was that the box had never been input in the system according to the cargo folks there. That made it impossible to track the equipment. Even when I arrived at Dhahran on 17 Nov 90, the ATOC people said it still hadn't been entered in the system. Another problem they were having at Dover, that made it exasperating to try and find out the status on the box, was that their computer went down about every 30 minutes and then stayed down for more than an

hour at times. The people at the cargo terminal said it was a regular inconvenience. They blamed the large amount of information going into the computer and seemed to believe that the computers weren't made to handle such a large surge of cargo information. Although they weren't able to tell me anything about my box before I left Dover, the ATOC and cargo terminal people were great. They did everything within their power to help me out.

I arrived at Al Ain AB on 17 Nov 91 at about 1730 in the afternoon. Having been awake for more than 44 hours, the billeting people there guided me to my new home (a tent in the furthest row from everything) where I promptly crashed on my cot and slept for a day and-a-half. After getting some rest, I reported to the wing commander, Col John R. Wingfield III, on 20 Nov 90 and talked about the kind of public affairs program he wanted to put together. The wing executive officer, Maj Walter Ross, had been handling some public affairs activities as an additional duty, but there were no internal information products or media activities. The wing commander basically left everything up to me and said to do what I could.

Since the IM people already had an established daily bulletin (published three times a week), I decided to supplement the bulletin rather than start an entirely different publication. The administration staff handled all the distribution and copying so all I had to do is provide them with a "copier-ready" product and they just stapled it at the back of the bulletin -- it saved me an incredible amount of time (samples of the bulletin are attached to this report). As a one-man shop for a base population of more than 1,800 people (we had 46 C-130s and five diverse flying units made up of Air National Guard, active duty and Republic of Korean Air Force members) I needed every spare moment I could save. We published news service stories, pay information and a number of camp features which were also released to the Air Force News Service.

Office space was almost non-existent when I got to Al Ain. For about two months I shared a field desk with the combat support group and wing executive officers. Needless to say I didn't get to use it very much. Because I was giving the IM phone number out, I didn't feel like I could stray too far away so I ended up on a field stool typing my work out on a laptop on -- you guessed it -- my lap. Just after New Years, the Legal Office staff invited me to move into their new office tent. By the end of January I had a desk, file cabinet, chair, and a drawing table. Before I moved in with legal I had to keep all my files in mailing envelopes which were stacked in a corner behind my shared field desk. I had a 7X12-foot office area which worked out just about right.

Getting current news was a real problem when I first arrived. By the time we got the Desert Defender, Stars and

Stripes or the message news releases everything had become ancient history. When we got the Stars and Stripes it was anywhere from seven to 14 days old and that's the way it stayed right through March 1991. Brig. Gen. Edward Tenoso, COMALF, came through one time and said he was working on the problem. It got better for about two weeks (it took only five to seven days to arrive), but the deliveries quickly slipped back to the two-week old-mark. To solve the problem of stale news, and to fill the gap left by the daily bulletin (it was only published three times a week), I started a series of news broadcasts which I read live over the base Giant Voice public address system every evening at 1800. The broadcasts averaged 10 minutes and were essentially news summaries from BBC Radio shortwave broadcasts, CNN (we had access to CNN through a satellite dish starting about the second week in January), news service messages, and local camp announcements. It wasn't long before the broadcast became an institution. I never saw it because I was always behind the microphones in the SRC, but many people told me that when broadcasts started at 1800, everyone came out of their tents and gathered around the 31 speakers scattered around the camp to hear the news. Not everyone had a chance to read the bulletin -- but everyone heard the broadcasts. According to the people on the "outside," and base organizations that needed internal information support, the broadcasts were noticeably more effective than any other method of communication -- except for face-to-face. I read the last Giant Voice broadcast the day I left the AOR to return home after nearly 140 editions. Several copies of the Giant Voice broadcast scripts are attached to this report.

We were also in the process of setting up a camp-wide cable TV system when the war ended. The West Virginia Air National Guard set up a limited cable system in one of the main tent city areas and had 28 tents hooked up. The equipment and cable was donated to the WVANG by businesses in the U.S. The plan was to patch the public relations tent into their system, expand the cable system to link the other tent city area and major work areas, and add AFRTS mini-TV programming and locally produced feature videos to the WVANG program menu. The material for the video features could have been provided by the Combat Camera Videographers, and if we could have gotten an NTSC video camera, we could set up a studio for news. The programming was originally run through a single channel, but before the war ended the WVANG had added two more channels, a scrolling bulletin board screen and a music channel. We used the bulletin board to run some camp news and announcements. However, it only reached the original 28 subscribers. I think this type of system would work well in any future bare base situation. It's a closed system (avoiding host nation broadcasting restrictions), it's relatively easy to maintain, and it can provide almost instant dissemination of news to a large audience.

d. Media coverage of our unit's activities were restricted until mid December because of the U.A.E.'s reluctance to publicize direct support of U.S. Forces in the AOR. When the host nation did decide to allow media in-country we immediately took advantage of the situation. All the media we hosted came from the Media Pool at Dubai. The first visit I coordinated came on Christmas Day. We invited five media members to fly with us in a three-ship formation to deliver some Christmas cheer to troops on the front line. It was probably the first low-level tactical airdrop in theater covered by the media. Although many of the news media filled at least two baggies, they were thoroughly impressed -- and it showed in the newspaper articles that appeared in local English-speaking newspapers. They even came back for more on several occasions. We got great support from the PA people at the Dubai JIB, and I got great support from the wing and squadron commanders on down. For newspaper clippings and a full chronology of media visits and contacts, see the attachments at the end of this report.

Media activities were probably the easiest activities to coordinate. The Dubai JIB did all the reporting to CENTAF and I handled all the coordination, escort and security review at my end. We had five actual media visits to the base and 44 interviews. Eleven of the interviews were conducted with stateside media via cellular telephone. One of those involved a member of our civil engineering squadron whose wife was heading a support group at Scott AFB, Il. The interview was with WIBV Radio in Belleville and lasted about 10 minutes. The technical sergeant being interviewed got the chance to talk to his wife on the radio and he reported on how well the support effort was serving the needs of other members of his squadron. The other 10 cellular phone interviews were conducted at the same time, the day after Christmas, between members of the 130th Tactical Airlift Group, West Virginia Air National Guard and Hoppy Kercheval of the West Virginia Media Group. The interviews were the focus of a one-hour live talk show which was distributed in real time to radio stations throughout the state. I also coordinated with the stations to have spouses of some members on hand in the studio to talk with their loved ones out in the desert. It was a very emotional hour -- one well worth the effort. I think it gave everyone involved an incredible boost. We also made arrangements for the father of a professional football player to fly with ESPN on a routine mission -- the dad met up with ESPN in Dhahran.

Two of the media visits involved media flights covering our Christmas airdrop and the flight of the ancient aeronauts. The other three were set up to cover the Koreans joining the airlift effort, general interviews with aircrew members and others on the experiences after the start of the war, and our Christmas show and dinner.

e. You may not expect that there would be much opportunity for community relations on a bare base, but that didn't stop the senior staff from inviting local nationals, American and British citizens and others to the base on a number of occasions. We had more than 30 guests for Thanksgiving Dinner, a variety show and a base tour, nearly 200 people for our Christmas Dinner and show, and several visits by members of ruling host nation families. I worked closely with our host nation liaison officer/wing executive officer, Maj Ross, to process requests for base passes, design and print programs, produce table place cards and name tags, and helped to compile several lists of visitors. The wing also has a successful visitation program with local American and British and host country nationals. Every week, an average of 10 people were invited to share an evening and dinner with a family downtown. The camp chapel also ran an ongoing assistance program for several hospitals in the city. Volunteers from the camp helped with facility maintenance, child care activities and general administrative tasks. A member of the civil engineering squadron also started a program to collect unwanted "any service member items" and distribute them to the needy downtown and Kuwait City. In fact, we flew nearly 10,000 pounds of food, clothing and toys to Kuwait City where it was given to a hospital/orphanage complex. We had tremendous support from the people in the local community and bent over backwards to do what they could for us. It was a pleasure for everyone to be able to give something back.

f. Problem Areas/Lessons Learned: Communication, before the cellular phones, was nearly impossible. The AUTOVON lines to Riyadh and Dhahran were nearly always busy, the voice quality was bad (not to mention a noticeable two-second delay), and there was no good way to hook a cellular telephone to a computer to transmit data or send a FAX. The contracting people managed to locate an acoustic FAX coupler that worked with their mobile cellular phones, but they got it from the nephew of the ruler of Sharjah who had the only one in the country. There were many times I needed to use a FAX to pass on information. But it wasn't until March that our communications people had the capability to patch in to the commercial cellular telephone system without having to use a cellular telephone. I think a FAX machine and an appropriate acoustic coupler should be standard public affairs equipment in the future. Someone should also put something in the regulations to give public affairs a high priority when it comes to communications. Whenever I needed to make a phone call, or someone needed to call me, I had to chase the phone all over the base -- most of the calls were to the Dubai JIB (which didn't have an AUTOVON number) or CENTAF (I used commercial voice and FAX numbers whenever I could -- I had bad luck staying connected with them on AUTOVON). Several functional areas were allotted cellular phones, but my written requests were turned down because the communications people were making arrangements for a commercial number to be installed at

the switchboard. The time for the installation kept slipping, so I ended up chasing the phone until early March. There was never a really good fix to this problem except to send regular messages. But even that became hard to justify when the communications people imposed a moratorium on all but critical message traffic when the war started. Along the same lines, there were no established procedures to connect public affairs activities in theater to an electronic computer mail/bulletin board network. Although many people wanted to make it happen, there were no previously worked out procedures or guidance to set up a workable system -- network schematics, modem parameters, reliable telephone system to transmit data, guidelines for type of information that could be transmitted, etc. I think CENTAF would have been able to work more efficiently if we had been able to transmit information onto a bulletin board (similar to the MAC Bulletin Board) on a set schedule. They could read or answer material at their leisure and we wouldn't have to spend all day trying to get them on a telephone. News stories from publications like Desert Defender and the news services could also be made immediately available to public affairs offices in theater -- through a central point at CENTAF -- eliminating the time lag cause by slow mail.

Another frustration was that there was no good way to take, develop and print photographs in time to accompany the stories. In some cases, the photos made the story as in "Flight of the Ancient Aeronauts." I tried to speed up the process by setting up a dedicated darkroom, but other priorities kept CE from providing the materials I needed for the self-help project. By the time I did get the materials and finish the darkroom, the war was over, so we never used it. While I was waiting to build the darkroom, I worked with the contracting folks to have the film developed and printed in downtown Al Ain. We primarily used color film to document the camp and flight operations and a limited amount of black and white for historical documentation purposes. I had extra copies of pictures made for stories I knew I'd be releasing to the Desert Defender or the news services and extras were turned back to the units for awards packages and histories. The trouble with that system is that it took too long for the photographs to get back to the states (2-3 weeks) and you couldn't have classified photography developed. Now that the Combat Camera people are going to electronic digital photography, it may be a good time to acquire digital printers, transceivers, and portable satellite communication systems for deployed public affairs shops so we can beam photographs and stories directly back to theater headquarters or the states.

At Al Ain, it would have been nice to have another public affairs specialist -- in fact, we really needed another person. There was just too much going on for one person to handle. I worked seven days a week and averaged 14 hours a day reviewing

messages, coordinating media visits, preparing the Giant Voice broadcasts, doing interviews, taking photographs, helping the wing executive officer with general officer visits (briefings and interviews), writing news supplements for the daily bulletin, submitting and resubmitting numerous letters for equipment, working the AFRTS mini-TV program, filling sandbags, building revetments, serving on the Survival Recovery Center staff and chasing telephones and people around the base. I just didn't have enough time to cover all the great stories that were never told. I never felt like I could take time off. On several occasions I was lucky enough to get some people to help with media visits, but you could never count on volunteers to be there consistently -- they had their jobs to do too and could be called away at a moment's notice.

Although there were a few frustrations, there could have been more if it hadn't been for the great help and support I received from several agencies here at Altus. The contracting, budget, supply and communications people went way out of their way to make sure I had all the equipment I needed before I left for Desert Shield -- it made my job a lot easier once I got an office to put it all in that is. I thought three weeks would be enough time to run through the CENTAF shopping list, but we all worked right down to the wire to fill all the requirements. I can't say enough about them. The contracting staff at Al Ain were also incredible. SMSgt George Covelli and his staff were able to provide any service I needed, usually within two days.

THOMAS A. COCCHIARO, MSgt, USAF  
NCOIC, Public Affairs

(certified copy)

FROM: 436th MAW/PA (Dover AFB, Del)

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Desert Shield/Storm

TO: HQ MAC/PAR (CMSgt Lobring)

1. Following is the 436th MAW/PA shop's after action input:

A. Christian G. Geisel, Captain, Chief, 436th MAW/PA.

B. Harold G. Jones, SSgt, 2 Sep - 2 Dec 90

C. SSgt Jones was a MAC asset who was utilized at the main Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh. In the beginning, and even for some time during his deployment, there were not enough PA or administrative support people to fill positions. Enlisted Public Affairs people were used in administrative roles causing them to feel as if their PA training was not utilized. Equipment was minimal initially. The Central Command PA office brought what they could and other PA people carried their own laptop computers but equipment support was still wanting. SSgt Jones was unable to carry a laptop with him and was furthermore untrained on one due to our maintaining a non-state-of-the-art manual typewriter in our contingency kit. Steps have been taken to correct this problem.

D. Activities.

(1) Media contact. Being home of MAC's and DOD's largest cargo port as well as the DOD Port Mortuary brought intense media interest to the base as Operation Desert Shield kicked off then evolved into Operation Desert Storm. Media queries began in early August, four days before our first Bravo alert aircraft took off for the region. Media queries peaked especially during periods when Americans were on the edge of their sofas watching late-developing events on television news. Most notable were 272 logged queries in August (although realistically, redundant routine responses probably would escalate the total); 219 logged in January leading up to and after the air war began; and 126 in February.

From responding directly with initial guidance to gradually being able to tailor common-sense, releasable information while exercising security precautions our media program received a real-world test that stretched nerves and sometimes our patience (on both sides of the fence) but endured when called upon. Our local and regional media kept in close contact with us wanting timely information on almost a daily basis during the crisis. This regular exchange of information on a one-on-one query basis and frequent interviews with key base personnel (especially the wing commander, and the deputy commander for air transportation) made it virtually unnecessary to prepare a significant number of releases concerning our involvement in the gulf situation. The call-up of Reserves kept our Reserve wing PA counterparts and

ourselves busy also. Other stories included: evacuees from the theater; C-5 safety after the Ramstein crash; and CRAF passage to mention a few.

There was keen interest from local through international media concerning our airlift mission at Dover primarily from local ABC and CBS affiliates based in Salisbury, Md., with Dover bureaus and our "big three" regionals including a host of affiliates from Washington, D.C., Baltimore and Philadelphia. Sadly, however, interest was often overshadowed by our most somber mission here -- the Port Mortuary. During crisis times, and especially this time, the PAO is clearly dual-hatted.

Interest in the mortuary ranged from Washington, D.C., and New York bureaus of major networks CBS, ABC, CBS, and CNN to Reuters, Newsweek, People Magazine, the Discovery Channel, 48 Hours, Time Life, America Tonight with Charles Karault, Larry King Live, and John Chancellor. The main influx of interest came after the first national request for an interview with Mr. Charles Carson, Dover Port Mortuary Director, was granted for USA Today. In fact, the request list grew so fast that it was decided it would be almost impossible manpower-wise and considering Mr. Carson's hectic schedule preparing the mortuary for crisis, to conduct the interviews.

On a regular basis it seemed that normal guidelines often didn't fall into place. Public Affairs guidance for the mortuary was established by DOD, however, the wing public affairs office still handled queries and media interaction related to the facility.

Fortunately, the mortuary was not used to its full potential. We were lucky; in a worse scenario it may have been too late. A purple-suit office should probably have been established. Another issue concerns our success with sponsoring media trips. Guidelines set by MAC were very specific, yet it seemed very difficult for us to get trips approved. We were seeing others such as the Guard and Reserves pass through Dover. It seemed like they could go at will. Amiable downrange sponsors seemed to be a key.

(2) Special internal communications efforts. Special emphasis, although with limited manpower because of SSgt Jones' deployment, was given to getting information about local unit support of the conflict, both homestation and deployed. Units featured included our Airlift Control Element (ALCE), Security Police, Aerial Porters, Services, Maintenance troops, and many other agencies while making every effort to inspire morale and esprit de corps in the team effort as well as show inspirational local community support. Support activity schedules were published and programs available highlighted such as the "Weathering the Storm" program to help base children cope with their fears. Photo lab and office staff spot photography often served as eyes and ears for the base to see how the big picture was coming together here. Broader scoped news service downloaded via modem from MAC/PA and AFNEWS greatly assisted a one-member-staff as other office members shifted to shoulder the media burden. Hindsight tells us additional manpower assistance

to strengthen the internal side would have been an asset.

E. Local COMREL activities. Given our role as a major cargo hub and the well-known fact of our C-5 Galaxy's cargo carrying capacity seemed to fuel the overwhelming public requests both far and near to ship donations through our port. After sorting out the various agencies who handled the calls (Defense Logistics Agency, Commissary Support, etc.) we were able to help funnel this actually moving spirit in the right direction.

Our tour schedule, regularly the most active in MAC, had to be scaled down considerably. The community was very supportive of this decision and understood the base was extremely busy.

When the base went into Threatcon Bravo the community registered some alarm. Explaining the decision through local media helped alleviate larger-than-life concerns.

A successful media trip into the AOR allowed the production of a slide presentation which was presented to several local school and civic groups. This was a very useful tool when other COMREL activities were not prudent and was well received by community audiences.

F. With a wartime workload there are just simply some things falling by the wayside. Things that you can't do that you would do otherwise. But, as we all know, war is hell.

signed

CHRISTIAN G. GEISEL, Captain, USAF  
Chief, 436th MAW/PA

(certified copy)

## A. Preview

I first learned of my deployment by phone. I had from 1330 until 1800 the evening of Friday, 10 August to get ready. I was in essence told I would be deployed in spite of the reluctance of the deputy 1606ABW/PA. I had no idea what my job would be. While I am thankful for the opportunities I have had, I could have used more information. I am sure there are other people within MAC who are just as qualified to edit and produce a newsletter. I am also sure there are other people who would have welcomed what turned out to be considered a remote assignment, especially since I was remote from January 85-January 86 and again May 88-May 89. I had been at Kirtland just 14 months since my last remote. As for guidance on the job, the Desert Shield OPORD and PA annex (P022100ZNOV90) was dated a full three months after the start of the operation.

I was told that my co-worker and boss, Lt Turner, was already at Pope. Lt Turner arrived at Pope only a little ahead of me.

1606ABW/PA got the impression from HQ MAC that the deployment should have been anticipated and that the unit should have been making arrangements. Yes, I am assigned to a MAC base, but units or individuals don't arbitrarily make arrangements to deploy personnel without some type of guidance from higher headquarters.

I attended a briefing with other people from Kirtland who were going to deploy. The briefers were unaware I had been tasked to deploy. They also did not know when the people in the briefing were going to leave. I was sent to Pope by commercial aircraft.

No one could tell me exactly how long I would be TDY. My orders simply said "length of TDY classified/location of TDY classified". When I arrived at my final TDY location, people heard rumors of a rotation. Their questions were met with "We don't know yet, but should know something in a while".

Contact and coordination with PA Forward left a lot to be desired. A number of phone calls were met by silence. A message sent to them was unanswered. When they asked for an input as to who was in theater, they listed myself as being from Andrews.

A lot of the organizational arrangements were based on the 317TAW and 40TAS, Pope AFB. Members of the 317TAW made up the majority of people at our location. In actuality, we were little more than a detachment of another location that had a lot of Pope AFB personnel. As personnel from other bases began to arrive, the thinking that we were at "Pope East" began to brew.

The Desert Defender was started as a newspaper "for Operation Desert Shield participants". My main problem with the Desert Defender is that a lot of the material was written by people in the theater. I feel the publication could have better served the people



in Desert Shield by having PAOs from throughout the Air Force send information on local base happenings to the staff of the Desert Defender. As it was, people read about things on this side of the world and didn't hear a lot about their own base unless they made arrangements to get their base newspaper. The slow mail system meant that the information was dated by the time it arrived.

The first problem Lt Turner and I had to deal with when we arrived was lack of equipment. I brought a portable typewriter. Since neither the Kirtland nor Travis PAOs had equipment they could send, that meant the one typewriter was all we had in terms of real equipment. Other units and job sections had deployed with Zenith laptop computers and the like. We asked HQ MAC for equipment. They suggested we contact Pope PAO. We did and Pope said they did not have the equipment. They had sent it to the other location. HQ MAC told us to contact the other location and make arrangements to obtain the computer Pope had sent. Our attempts to obtain the computer were met with resistance from the deployed PAO who said since his commander had not told him to release the equipment, he was not going to give it up.

When we first arrived at our location, we had to "sell" our presence to the commander. I got the impression that the commander at that time (someone from operations at Pope) had had a bad experience with PA in the past. He was unsure he wanted us around. We started working out of our tent with no guidance as to what to do. We developed the combination of items we felt should go in the newsletter and ran with it.

Our only source of news was BBC radio. We put the highlights from the hourly broadcasts into the newsletter. The news stories we received from MAC/TAC news services were a good source of outside news, although the majority of them carried items that had been printed about Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm by PAOs and other sources. A good, reliable, steady source of news about what was going on in the U.S. would have gone a long way to increase our credibility in the early days of the deployment. This would have helped supplement our news program because we did not have access to AFRTS or other American television or radio broadcasts.

#### B. Problems and programs

Once the problems of obtaining equipment were overcome, our next step was the production of the newsletter. Lt Turner and I selected items or topics we thought would apply to everyone here. We felt that a Commander's Corner should be included in any publication we put out because this would show the commander's interest in what his troops were feeling and showed he cared about what was happening to them.

Since the primary charter of Public Affairs is information, we decided to list highlights of what was going on. The best source for obtaining this was radio. The only radio we had access to was



BBC. During the day, they air hourly updates of the top stories. While the reports are repeated each hour, this proved to be the most readily available source of information for the newsletter.

I suggested to Lt Turner that we start a Command Action Line and run the answers in the newsletter since most stateside bases have some way for people to contact the commander. I also felt this was a way to curb any rumors that might crop up along the way. The Command Action Line became a way for people to circumvent supervisors and the chain of command. It was at this point that we suggested a Commander's Open Forum to Col Blake. He agreed, but relied on Col Baily to come and give the presentation at first. He later conducted his own forums. We also processed some 60 inputs and ran the answers in the newsletter. Another 40 or so were the basis for suggestions for improvements that would make things better for everyone.

About a month into the deployment, there was a decision to move the Public Affairs office. The move was based in part, to our lack of equipment. We had been told that we could use the equipment in the PERSCO office, but would have to limit our use to after-hours. I tried to learn the computer system at PERSCO, but the time it would have taken was not worth the effort. We continued to look for other equipment and an area. We finally moved most of the Public Affairs office to the 22nd Combat Communications Squadron Communications Focal Point. There, we had access to a Zenith 184 laptop computer to produce the newsletter. Two of the persons assigned to the Combat Comm were most helpful in assisting this mildly computer-literate person to learn the system. However, this still was not the complete answer. We continued to look for our own equipment while using their facilities. This is when we made the contacts with Pope and HQ MAC concerning a computer system of our own.

We finally were able to get a computer from the other location, but had no printer. We were given a printer by Combat Comm, but were told we had to leave the CFP. We again began looking for an office. At this point, we moved into the Supply warehouse where we worked for almost three months.

After that, we were told that several work centers would be moving into the area where the command section had been. We were given the opportunity to move back into the area where we had started. Civil Engineering came and built an office space. We moved into our "permanent" facility, bringing our borrowed computer, printer and a field desk. CE had also built a desk for the computer system we were using while we were in Supply. This desk fit in the office in only one way, but was quite a bit better than our original arrangement.

With the equipment situation settled, we set about the task of producing stories for release. We had no clear guidance for releasing stories, so we began releasing them directly to base newspapers. Our first stories were sent out by message. We asked



when we first arrived to be allowed to take pictures to accompany the stories and to document the deployment for historical purposes. We were told when we first arrived that no photography was allowed.

(Since our first stories went out, Lt Turner and I were the designated photographers.)

Little by little, our newsletter began to be accepted as one of the leading sources of news (next to the BBC) and people would wait for the latest edition to be posted. Most of the stories run in the newsletter could be rewritten and sent out for releases. This was done by changing the style a little.

When we first arrived, there was talk about producing a hometown news story on everyone here. I advised Lt Turner from having worked at Hometown News Center, that if we used HTNCs method of news releases, we could expect our stories to wait a considerable length of time before being printed. He told me to build a local form with all the information we would need to produce a story.

We advertised the program and were able to produce more than 200 original stories on people. About four months into the deployment, HTNC sent us a set of forms then had produced for the Desert Shield Hometown News Program. We began using these. To date, however, we have only produced 20 stories using these forms.

Lt Turner was designated to conduct an inventory of the first set of MWR equipment received. He did the inventory and gave the results to the commander.

As Col Blake left and Col Quance arrived, Col Quance agreed to a newsletter five days a week and a bulletin two days a week. Much of our operation remained unchanged with the exception we were given a little more freedom with the items we put in the newsletter and received a little more recognition for our programs. Also during this time, we hosted a few DV visitors, and several special functions. At one point, we were the points of contact for the "Any Servicemen Mail that came to our location. Lt Turner developed a program to distribute the items throughout the camp and asked for volunteers.

Col Quance left and the ties to Pope began to dissolve. Col Wax, from Travis AFB, CA arrived and completed the division from our other location. We were no longer a "detachment" of them and "Pope East" became the 1640TAW/PA (Provisional), a separate wing in our own right. Because of his PA background, Col Wax relies on us to carry his message to the people here. Not much of the mission changed, but we were given more responsibility and a little more freedom. During the actual allied offensive, Col Wax agreed with my suggestion that we should have a daily newsletter with the exception of a Sunday bulletin.

Col Wax has us give him inputs for the Commander's Open Forum he conducts every two weeks. He is also a very open, "team" type of person and refers to the "family" here in almost every reference.

C. Real lessons learned

1. Get some type of guidance. I know that some deployments are "secret", but dig beneath the surface. Get more information than people are sometimes willing to give you. (I can't tell you how to do this.)

2. Make sure you have the right equipment before you deploy. Even if higher headquarters thinks you (and they) have all the information, take an extra pen or pencil. There will always be time to drop it some where along the line.

3. I feel, and have said since the beginning, that if people were told to expect to be here eight months and were home in five, things would have gone a little better from a morale standpoint. (AKA: There should be a company line about when people are going home and not leave it up to the individual command, unit, base, or leave people to their own imagination! Also, once the policy is set, don't allow people to "cut corners" unless there is a real problem.)

4. The lead unit in this deployment, 317TAW, had just finished a European rotation to England. They had returned just prior to deployment here, in fact in 1989, they were the lead unit in the Panamanian invasion. My point is that the majority of people came over here with what I call a "rot syndrome". They are used to going somewhere for a short period, staying in contract quarters and have maid service and catered meals. That is not the true picture. A lot of people came here and set to work thinking they would be here 90 days, just like their orders stated. They set about doing their jobs with little problem that the people around them were not from the same base. As time progressed and their hopes of being home for birthdays, graduations, anniversaries and the like dwindled, nerves and patience became thin and began to fray.

5. All in all, this was a challenge. One which I did not volunteer for, but may accept again at a future date if I have more information and a little bit more time to get ready for.

  
GORDON D. HONEYCUTT, TSgt, USAF  
NCOIC, Public Affairs  
1606ABW, Kirtland AFB

Name: TSgt William D. Hamilton

SSN 315-56-3819

Title: Chief, Community Relations, 62MAW/PA

Deployed: 7 Nov 90 - 11 Mar 91

## DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM AFTER-ACTION REPORT

In presenting this after-action I will cover only those issues that apply in my case.

I served as NCOIC, Media Relations Division; U.S. Central Command Joint Information Bureau; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from 7 November 1990 until 11 March 1991. My service equated to a joint service/major command headquarters PA role. The JIB was comprised of PA personnel from the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. A British Forces officer also was assigned.

As NCOIC, I supervised two enlisted personnel (one Navy and one Air Force); coordinated administration; developed media guidance; responded to major US and international media queries and requests; escorted major US and international media; maintained data bases on media accreditation, flag officer interview requests and ground rule violations; supported visits by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; supported the daily/weekly military briefings broadcast worldwide from Riyadh; developed, reproduced and distributed local Early Bird packages to command officers; delivered newspapers to command officers (I was the highest paid paperboy in the AOR!); and supported, coordinated and responded to the PA needs of QASD and provided command PA guidance/support to ARCENT, MARCENT, NAVCENT and CENTAF.

Media contact was extensive. In the four months I served, I can conservatively say I personally handled better than 3,000 phone calls from the media alone. Calls came from all corners of the world, including the soviet bloc. I dealt extensively with US CENTCOM command staff, the American Embassy and the Saudi Ministry of Information.

PA operations were established in-theater at the time of my arrival. I did not deploy with a flyaway package. In fact, the only thing I really could have used would have been a lap-top computer. We had what we needed, but our biggest problem was reproduction capability. We burnt up expensive copiers and spent megabucks in repair because a field press was never set up.

All phone communication was made over commercial lines because military lines could not be installed at my working location (Hyatt Regency). One painful reality was phone instruments in media were single line only, we could not install multiline instruments. We experienced great delay in calling a base switchboard to gain military line access. And much time was lost if we had to use military lines in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation Building across the street.

Overall, the greatest problem I faced was too many chiefs and no indians. Officers assigned were PA deputies and chiefs at their regular bases. Three enlisted in media became shark meat for 20



officers. I will say a supportive division head kept the sharks at bay most of the time. Please don't let that one happen again.

Support from MAC could have been a little better. The system had flaws when it came to ensuring personnel received official levies and orders in a timely manner. MAC/PA could have been more aggressive on our behalf to get those levies down the pipeline and in our hands. I had three weeks notice I was going, but I received my orders after lunch on the day before I left...at oh-dark hundred in the morning!

Base LGX and CBPD couldn't have done more. They were outstanding in trying to resolve my situation. On the other hand, I think it sad when people I needed help from (at MAC) weren't there. I was told by personnel at home base PA to stop calling MAC on this issue.

Overall, MAC people at the Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh were quite prepared to do the job. We walked away much better than we walked in. MAC may consider asking for a copy of the lessons learned and after-action we presented to U.S. CENTCOM.

One final note. I retire in November. Except for a remote in Korea, I've served MAC since 1980. I've served a number of mobility deployments since 1983.

There are some in this field that have yet to process through a mobility line. It's sad that our most experienced people deployed are sometimes those that are most convenient for an office to give up. Quite frankly, we need to think about the real key to mission success...train our people. I recommend that all PA personnel in MAC be trained and fully qualified to deploy.

All PA personnel deserve an equal opportunity to take their turn in the fire. I highly recommend and ask that our command look at these issues seriously and soon. Training and participation must be real and distributed equitably. We owe it to our people, especially to those who have been convenient for too long.

I remain at your service.

  
WILLIAM D. HAMILTON, TSgt, USAF  
Chief, Community Relations

1 OCT 90

From: Major Neil Talbott 440TAW(Assoc)(AFRES) Gen Mitchell IAP, WI  
Subj: Operation Desert Shield PA After-action report

On the morning of 13 September 1990 one Public Affairs officer (Major Neil Talbott) and a training NCO assigned for audio-visual support (MSGT Mark Biedenbender) departed via a 747 to Operation Desert Shield. The following observations written after their return from a 30-day rotation in October 1990 might help future planning of similar operations:

#### COMMUNICATIONS:

- When notified that we were authorized to deploy with the 440th Tactical Airlift Wing I followed AFRES PA guidance #22 and notified 4th AF/PA, AFRES/PA, and Major Chip Compton - CENTAF/PA REAR of our imminent deployment. To my knowledge this information was never transmitted to the JIB (Joint Information Bureau) in the AOR. Also in accordance with guidance given I contacted the JIB in Riyadh and let them know we were in country after our arrival. Major Lou Tiedemann did not know I was coming nor did he have any guidance for me. It took several days to get through to the JIB because of lack of phones and because the phone number to the JIB I had been given in the States did not work.

- When we departed we were led to believe that we were the only PAs that would be stationed at the 440th field location. It appeared that no one knew that an active-duty PA (TSgt Larry Reetz) was on station and had been on station since mid-August. In fact, according to TSgt Reetz, MAC/PA didn't even know he was there (at the field location) until the end of September.

- Telephone communications in theater are extremely limited and are unique to each country. Telephones on station were available for mission essential calls. There were few on-base phones (strictly limited to on-base communication) and even fewer off-base phones. There were three off-base phones, not counting contracting, that could be used to make out of country, in-theater, calls). There were two secure lines set up for the command post and wing commander. When we arrived we created a new phone listing of approximately twenty numbers. These changed initially and caused minor disruption because the host country was attempting to help us by adding more phones. The JIB phone numbers I was given before I left were out-of-country numbers and did not work in-country unless you changed the prefix. The number I was given by the Riyadh JIB for the Dhahran JIB was incorrect and did not work because the in-country prefix had to change to reflect where I was calling from. Several times during normal working hours I attempted

## DESERT SHIELD AFTER-ACTION

to get through to the JIB at Riyadh and became frustrated because no one would answer the phone. Answering machines would have been helpful. At the beginning of the deployment I was given three extensions to the Riyadh JIB. My frustration was magnified when I finally connected with a switchboard operator who told me that two of the three extensions at the JIB were disconnected. To resolve some of this frustration and increase efficiency I recommend PA Admin be assigned to man the phones. One Public Affairs Officer should be on the road traveling from base to base via the C-130 shuttle run building a directory and listing of PA offices in the field. Without a PA organizational approach policy information will never get to the units from the JIBs and effective communication will not take place. I suspect policy info was not being forwarded from the JIB's anyway -- I was notified of only one message transmitted to PA while I was assigned -- and it wasn't addressed to my location and did not pertain to my operation.

- The telephone modem built into the Zenith Laptop could not be used in country because the host country phones were hard-wired with cords without plug-in attachments. There were no adaptors or equipment available to adapt the phone wiring so that it could be plugged into the computer until later when specific phones were rewired to accommodate the Stew-3s. In addition, we were told to limit calls to the States due to cost.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATION

- It is rather embarrassing to find yourself Wing Chief of Public Affairs at a field location per the Wing Commander and still have the active-duty base commander repeatedly ignore the chain-of-command by consulting the active-duty TSgt in the office regarding his PA needs. He continued to do this even after I politely suggested he route his requests through me. This approach does not enhance "Total Quality Management" nor does it speak well of the active-duty attitude toward the "Total" force. There is a reason we have a chain-of-command and it should be used.

## MEDIA COMMUNICATION

- On October 5th I was notified that Mr. Vince Gibbens, Channel 6 Reporter (CBS Affiliate) would be arriving in Dhahran to interview a 440th TAW aircrew. I was told to call Channel 6 and coordinate an interview with one of our crews on the "Star" run. After getting the time of arrival (15:15 Dhahran time, 7 Oct.) crew names, etc., I called the JIB at Riyadh and informed them of the media arrival. Major

## DESERT SHIELD AFTER-ACTION

Tiedemann indicated it was fine and asked me to coordinate with the Dhahran JIB. He gave me a phone number -- it did not work. I did finally connect with the Dhahran JIB (An Army Lt Col) on Friday afternoon prior to the Sunday flight and gave them the information that Channel 6 would be there on Sunday to interview our crew at 15:15. The Lt Col indicated that he had not heard from Channel 6 but that it would be no problem to work with them if they showed up in time. I called Channel 6 (Mr. Gibbens) and told him where we would be and when. On Sunday our plan arrived on time at Dhahran. I went to Base Operations and made a call to the JIB. A 1Lt answered the phone. I asked him if Channel 6 had showed up. He said he hadn't heard of them. After arriving back in the States I called Mr. Gibbens -- he said he was there at the Dhahran JIB when we arrived and he had been told we were not there. A nasty gram will be going to OASD/PA and other agencies from Mr. Gibbens.

## PHOTOGRAPHY

● When I departed the States I left prepared to set up a complete PA office in the field and visually document 440th participation in Operation Desert Shield. At the time of departure I was told that policy guidance on photography and news articles would come from the AOR, specifically the JIB. In country, a PA (Major Olin Saunders) was assigned to the local Consulate at the Hilton Hotel. If he received policy information from the JIB he never passed it on. Major Saunders initially told me photography was prohibited but to use our own judgment. A week later we were told by the Consulate through the Wing Commander that photography was authorized for anyone -- just do not take pictures of host country military equipment or security bunkers. The JIB in Riyadh said that no film processing was available in the AOR and that all film had to be sent to Combat Camera at Langley AFB, Virginia. Major Tiedemann told us the pictures would be returned to our unit in the field, but, he wasn't sure when. Mail delivery in theater was bad, so I elected to hold the film and personally bring it back to the States. Local unit photography remained authorized and considered unclassified throughout the rest of our stay. Upon our arrival back in the States I called AFRES/PA and was told all film was classified and should be locked up. For clarification I was referred to HQ MAC/PAI, who referred me to OASD/PA, who referred me to SAF/PATT. Currently, absolutely clear policy guidance on this subject is not available. This policy guidance needs to be out, in writing, soon.

## DESERT SHIELD AFTER-ACTION

### FIELD EQUIPMENT

● As part of our mobility package we packed a Zenith 124 Laptop computer with a Brother 1109 printer and a manual portable typewriter. Because we had an air-conditioned office/sleeping/storage area the Laptop and printer worked extremely well. A heavy-duty electricity converter was required for extended operation. The Laptop would not have worked well in the direct heat and a backup manual typewriter was handy. Brother 1109 printer ribbons tended to be short-lived. We went through three in less than four weeks. Take at least a dozen or more with you when you deploy. A copier for PA was a must! There was no Base Reproduction function at our site and therefore a small copier in the field gets heavy use. At least 200 copies of the newsletter were run on the copier daily not counting the administrative requirements. The copier was purchased on the local economy. It might be a good idea to include a copy machine in future PA mobility packages as future local economies may not have the equipment.

### INTERNAL INFORMATION

● The PA newsletter was produced daily and became the primary source of local news and command information for the base. For several weeks, until we started receiving mail and newspapers, it was the only source of base information other than staff meetings and an occasional Commander's Call. The Commander used it extensively to get the word out to the troops.


### SUMMARY

PA communications in the AOR was difficult at best. Policy information was limited to non-existent. I suggest that if CENTAF/PA can't learn how to use the phones then generate packets of policy information and put them on the C-130 "Star" runs that stop at Riyadh and Dhahran daily. Get the information out! Then those in the field can follow the guidance or, if required, publish information for the troops in the local newsletters.

Do not send unequipped personnel to the field, and certainly don't dump them in the AOR at a field location and forget where they are as in the case of TSgt Reetz.

DESERT SHIELD AFTER-ACTION

If CENTAF Forward can't handle the sheer volume of media then it's time to reestablish the media pool. Media support and ultimately public support for this operation won't last long if the local media are treated like Mr. Gibbens of Channel 6 (CBS).



NEIL L. TALBOTT, MAJOR, USAFR  
Director, Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 435TH TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING (MAC)  
APO NEW YORK 09087-6000



9 MAY 1991

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - DESERT SHIELD/STORM (Yr 231600Z Apr 91 msg)

TO: HQ MAC/PAR

The following report is submitted per subject message request.

- a. Basil Kuzyszyn, SMSgt, NCOIC Public Affairs
- b. Basil Kuzyszyn, SMSgt was deployed to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, from 17 October to 15 December 1990.
- c. The groundwork for Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was established by Lt Col Mike Cox, HQ MAC/PA. SMSgt Kuzyszyn and Lt Doug Kinneard were sent to conduct the program for MAC local news media travel to Saudi Arabia. We were fortunate to have a close relationship with the JIB. They supported us with telephones, fax machines and anything else we could beg, borrow or steal. However, we did encounter some problems by being the only MAC public affairs people in theater. The personnel at the JIB thought we belonged to them and we did more than was required. They could not understand why we did not belong to the JIB and why we were allowed to use JIB equipment. This caused some friction between MAC/PA FWD and the JIB. We were called upon to answer any and all questions pertaining to MAC by more than 600 news media representatives at Dhahran. We answered questions to the best of our ability. We accomplished our mission. MAC/PA should have all the after-action reports we filed from Saudi Arabia.
- d. Media contact at Rhein-Main and the deployed location was hot and heavy. At Rhein-Main, the office responded to more than 555 queries, had 415 media visits and conducted more than 328 interviews. This happened at all hours of the day and night, including weekends. At the AOR, the MAC team sponsored more than 135 media representatives and their escorts. At times there were more escorts than media, however, we responded to every challenge. In addition to publishing our weekly newspaper, we were also producing a weekly newsletter to better inform the base population of important issues raised during the operation. This included gathering the information, writing stories, paste up, printing and personally placing 5,000 copies of the newsletter into individual post office boxes.
- e. Host nation community relations activities included a press conference in August and a civic leader luncheon in September to help community leaders understand the purpose and impact of the operation on the base and the local communities. Although Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was in full swing, the public affairs office managed to coordinate and execute several traditional holiday functions such as the annual civic leader New Year's reception.



f. The most time-consuming and demanding activities during the holidays were DV visits. Everyone of significant rank, both military and civilian, passed through Rhein-Main to visit "their troops" in the Gulf. Of course every stop here required mission briefings, base tours to the ASF and Tent City, luncheons, dinners, media, newspaper and video coverage--Quayle, Powell, Cheney, Stone to name a few.

g. There were some problems associated with Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

(1) Manpower shortage. This was one of our major problems at Rhein-Main. With the NCOIC deployed, that left the office with four military members to work a 24-hour shift, seven days a week with no days off. This necessitated working military on nights and weekends and civilians during week days. Normally in this situation some peacetime programs would be put on hold and contingency operations conducted with augmentation. Neither happened. We were in a war time mode for six months with no augmentation and no suspension of normal peacetime services. Although we were not in the AOR, we were actively supporting it at the same level of activity as if we were there. But, our dislocation from the AOR meant peacetime activities could also be conducted. Not only did we have our "normal" services to provide, i.e., base tours, social functions, DVs, community relations activity, etc., but we also had contingency support requirements such as increased media, newsletters, DV visits, briefings and 24-hour manning. We did submit a letter to the wing commander asking for augmentees, however, this was put on hold as other requirements for the wing were more pressing.

**SOLUTION:** Automatically provide augmentee support to any organization engaged in contingency operations, especially if they lose one or more people to deployment. This should happen without asking for help. Augmentees to Rhein-Main would have lifted the burden of trying to run a regular program in addition to contingency operations with fewer people than you normally have.

(2) Media representatives arriving at Rhein-Main without prior notice or several groups arriving simultaneously. This was highly frustrating and embarrassing. News media representatives and their escorts just fell from the sky and expected the public affairs office to drop everything and escort them while they were here. There were some unreasonable requests for billeting, transportation and filming. We became cruise directors and travel agents. This was especially hard when the on-call PA, who lives 30 minutes from base, got calls from the command post that there were news media arriving in one hour or at 2 a.m. without prior coordination.

**SOLUTION:** A centralized media travel center to approve and coordinate all media travel. No one should arrive at any base without prior coordination whether they're active duty, reserve or national guard, or whether they're Air Force, Army, Navy or Marines. Centralized coordination would also ensure groups of media do not arrive the same day at the same staging base, thereby overtasking local support capabilities.



h. There were other minor problems besides the ones listed above, however, we were able to cope with them. It seems that any operation of this magnitude will have problems. With proper coordination and more immediate response from the responsible offices they can be quickly resolved. In other words, a sense of urgency and an acceptance of responsibility will go a long way to help. Rhein-Main was the largest staging area and therefore received the most attention from both national and international news sources. The most valuable lesson this office learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM is to use common sense in dealing with problems as they arise.

  
STEPHEN C. KNECHTEL, Major, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 932D AEROMEDICAL AIRLIFT GROUP (ASSOCIATE) (AFRES)  
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-6435

REPLY TO PA  
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After-Action Report

TO: USCENTAF Rear/PA

1. The 932nd Aeromedical Airlift Group (Associate) located at Scott AFB, Ill., consist of six squadrons, a clinic and one contingency hospital with three geographic separated detachments. The group activated 81 percent of its personnel. Twenty-four percent were deployed to the Middle East.

2. The major problem with this public affairs office was not having sufficient help during the height of the war. The PA shop is manned by one full-time Air Reserve Technical (ART), secretary and one part-time reservist.

3. Activating the reservist could have helped with media and handling queries. I feel more attention could have been given to the media. With limited time and resources, I had to share my time with each media interest.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Theodore A. Theopolos".

THEODORE A. THEOPOLOS, 1Lt, USAFR  
Chief, Public Affairs

cc: AFRES/PAM  
14 AF/PA



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE (SAC)  
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA 71110-5002



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PA

1 May 91

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report (IAW SAC/PA 251916Z Mar 91)

TO: HQ SAC/PA

1. Name, rank, and duty title of office personnel:

Lt Col B. E. Ulrich	Director
Maj Roger L. Davis	Deputy Director
Capt Janice M. Mullan	Chief, Internal Information
SMSgt Stephen H. Pivnick	Superintendent
Mrs Mary R. Gallagher	Public Affairs Specialist
Mrs Sue Parker	Secretary

2. There were no manpower difficulties due to deployment of personnel; however, during this period Captain Mullan was on four weeks convalescent leave and Mrs Gallagher was TDY for about 10 weeks to DINFOS to attend the basic officer course. These absences combined with DESERT SHIELD/STORM taskings to cause minor impacts to schedules/work hours. We were heavily involved in identifying 8th Air Force unit public affairs personnel for forward deployment.

3. The internal information program workload increased substantially, primarily in DESERT SHIELD/STORM reporting and base inputs for the Desert Defender. Significant effort was expended at the program's inception, and at periodic intervals, to ensure all 8th Air Force bases understood the importance of Desert Defender inputs and sent quality products in a timely manner. Similarly, the reporting program required an inordinate amount of attention to assure PA staffs provided complete and timely information IAW SAC/PA requirements. When telefaxed stories for base newspapers began appearing in PA shops direct from units in Saudi Arabia, we spent considerable time determining that they were properly cleared in theater before authorizing our units to use them. We continued to transmit 8th AF commander's Year of Reviewing Fundamentals editorials and holiday messages to our units, incorporating DESERT SHIELD/STORM themes in them.

4. The community relations program declined significantly with the cancellation of the Commander's Distinguished Visitor program. However, we still were involved in a number of community relations events involving the 8th Air Force commander and vice commander during this period. Both made a number of speeches and appearances at civic events, as reported on our monthly Public Affairs Report. In addition, we devoted much time to advising units on how to deal with the outpouring of community support and requests to transport items to deployed units.

5. As expected, media relations remained a very active area of operations. We assisted the 2nd Bombardment Wing public affairs office with setup and media escort during several activities, including the initial deployment of a large contingent of security police and Prime BEEF personnel and the homecoming. We were in almost daily contact with our units, reiterating and clarifying media guidance provided by SAC/PA, SAF/PA and DOD. Relatively few DESERT SHIELD/STORM media queries came directly to this office. We also assisted 2nd Bomb Wing and the 68th Air Refueling Wing in arranging local media travel to forward operating locations.

6. Early on, there was some conflicting guidance coming out of various agencies about what could/could not be released. A call to SAC/PA resolved this conflict in favor of the DOD-mandated release guidance, and the problem did not resurface after its initial appearance. A few public affairs offices did not understand the rationale behind some of the guidance and implied it did not apply to their units because of unique circumstances. We were able to explain most of the guidance to show why it was necessary and why it must be applied to all units regardless of circumstances. Suggest each agency providing PAG develop an explanation of how and why guidance is formulated for such an operation to help educate our PA people before they're involved in another operation similar to DESERT STORM.

7. The telefaxed releases which began coming in from Saudi Arabia caused a great deal of consternation here and at unit level because there was no warning this type of activity would occur, and absolutely no indication they had been properly cleared in theater. And, despite our call to one originator--which cleared up our questions--no steps were taken to clearly label the releases as approved by appropriate authority. This alone would have helped. Future plans should include forewarning of this type of release and a means of identifying such material as cleared.

8. Ad hoc deployment of PA personnel caught too many people by surprise. Although we had some time in this instance to warn many people to get ready, it was still a process ripe for confusion and perceptions of unfairness. It would be preferable to integrate SAC PA personnel requirements into OPlans we support in a more considered, deliberate manner. If positions carry an identified mobility commitment, those assigned to them are better prepared for deployment. We could also devote some attention to educating them about the joint environment they would have to operate in. This would help put a qualified person in a potentially deployable position, and alleviate the problems their absence might cause the shop.

*Beehuf*

B. E. Ulrich, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director, Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 2D BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)  
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA 71110-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA (LT Reardon, 3065)

SUBJECT: DESERT STORM After Action Report

15 MAY 1991

TO: HQ SAC/PA  
INFO: 8AF/PA

1. We deployed SSgt Mike Spaits from this office to the Mediterranean in August 90. We were responsible with providing him all the necessary equipment for a long term deployment. We gave him everything that we had including our brand new laptop computer and the office camera. Mike chose to take his own camera instead. We provided him with all his paper supplies and a sufficient amount of film.
2. Sgt Spaits was deployed for over seven months. We had to send him film on a weekly basis. We had to scrounge up a video camera from the DO so that he could document events while deployed. We had to purchase batteries for the video camera and provide the tapes. He was always needing some type of administrative supply that my budget had to suck up.
3. Sgt Spaits called back here regularly, usually to say he needed something, and mostly to request us to send him all the unclassified message traffic. He was not getting it at all. I called 8 AF/PA and HQ/SAC on several occasions to find out why he wasn't getting this stuff and everyone would say, "oh I'll look into it." Meanwhile, he was getting message traffic about two weeks after everyone else.
4. Back at Barksdale we were inundated with phone calls. We've all heard the expression, "if you don't know how to answer it ask PA," well that's what everybody did...give us all the calls. Everything from people wanting to donate flea collars and cookies to mothers wanting to know if their son in the Army was deployed. We got on average a hundred phone calls a day like this throughout the operation. This was very frustrating and made for long days when trying to get our regular work done.
5. We were tasked to send OBSERVERS to our deployed airmen. This was a challenge at first, but soon turned into an absolute nightmare. We had people deployed to over 50 locations, some of which we weren't even aware of, and the newspapers we put on the planes never seemed to get beyond certain locations. The papers that we mailed were often returned because addresses changed so frequently.
6. We were tasked to produce a Christmas video to send to deployed locations. We worked with Combat Camera, but time constraints and lack of funding really hurt this project. I would not hesitate to say that some units did not receive this tape until February. We sent them first class mail.

7. The Family Support Center here was just coming on-line when the crisis started, so we were tasked with alot of things that they eventually took over. People called us daily to ask if a care package could be shipped out on one of our KC-10s. We accepted donations from businesses until the FSC could take over the whole operation. We probably never should have accepted the first care package because for a long time people thought we were the post office.

8. We knew for almost five months that war was inevitable, yet we had no game plan on how we were going to work with local media when the war actually started. All they wanted was a quick daily briefing to say we completed x number of missions from our deployed locations and that all members of the 2nd Bomb Wing were safe. We were not even allowed to tell them that. I think we could have provided this information. The media was then forced to seek this information out elsewhere and believe me they did...from the spouses. What a goldmine of information they were. The result of us not being able to speak to media throughout the conflict was irreversable. The relationships that we had worked for two years to cultivate were for the most part ruined. Now that the war is over, we are rebuilding but it will be a long tough road.

9. When SAC went into treatcon Bravo we were tasked to provide a door guard for the building for six hour shifts. I had a sergeant and two ALC's who were tasked to protect the wing commander, RM and DO. On a base with over 600 security police, I would have thought that these three men would get a little better protection. My guys wouldn't know a terrorist if he approached them. They were successful, however, in confiscating several expired ID cards!

10. We waited patiently for guidance on conducting a media trip into the AOR and other deployed locations, only for it to change and get more complicated each day. When the DOD announced it, they should have made it clear that the media was responsible for getting their own VISAS from the Embassy. We were continually flooded with phone calls from people we had never heard of wanting us to help them get a VISA and they also wanted us to take them to the AOR.

11. When we received the homecoming plan from SAC I was very excited. I wish we could have received more guidance during the war or when it actually started about how we were going to handle things like spouses, the media and perhaps protesters.

12. Overall, I would say that DESERT SHIELD/STORM was a learning experience for all of us, but one that I could go through the rest of my career with out living through again. Taking two people from the biggest and busiest PA shop really hurt us. We didn't get any time off for a long time and we are not even back to normal with Major Turner still deployed. Our shop worked very hard and toughed it out. They are a great bunch of guys with alot of potential, I wouldn't have wanted to go through the war with anybody else.

13. If you have any questions please call me at DSN 781-3065. I am attaching some "Lessons Learned" and recommended actions to avoid the problems that we had this time.



CATHERINE A. REARDON, 1LT, USAF  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs Division

## LESSONS LEARNED

1st Lt Reardon

### Photographic Equipment

We were tasked to provide the 801st with a still camera and then a video camera. We were constantly sending film, video tapes, and batteries for both pieces of equipment.

More equipment is needed for our deployment kits and for our daily use here in the office. We are expected to work very closely with Combat Camera and to pick up the slack when they get too busy. We can't however, when we don't have the proper equipment.

Coverage and documentation of events here and deployed could have been alot better if we had the equipment necessary to do the job. A central supply system should have been established for PA supplies at deployed locations. Our budget suffered, actually it completely depleted my budget for a while, having to stock two PA units.

### Computer Equipment

We sent SSgt Spaits off with our brand new lap top computer. I mean brand new...we gave it to him in the boxes because we got it the day he was leaving. That left us with no lap top for our use.

Deployment kits should come complete with photography equipment and a computer and printer capable of producing newsletters.

Once Sgt Spaits figured out how to program the computer it worked great, but we need more.

### Manning

We were depleted by two for a long time. We have also had one PSC out. Our office was suffering for a while and Major Turner is still deployed. Now it looks like the middle of July if we are lucky.

PSC moves should have been put on hold during this. We had two PA's deployed and they tried to pull my 702. Believe me I fought this one. I won.

The whole picture needs to be looked at when you are going to deploy someone. You can't just assume because there are two officers that you can deploy one. Or that one NCO won't change things much. Our ability to function was stressed by these two deployments. How many shops in ATC had two people deployed.

### Mailing lists

We were tasked to send newspapers to our deployed folks who were at over 50 different locations worldwide. This was almost an impossible task since addresses kept changing. We did however use the list of addresses provided in the news service in early September throughout the entire operation.

SAC could have provided a generic list of all the deployed addresses for all SAC troops. We could have mailed to all these locations on a weekly basis and I would bet that there would be at least one Barksdale person at every location. It would have been a nice touch to send newspapers to all the deployed locations and it would have cut down on people complaining that they were receiving any news.

### Home Town News Release

When we shipped Sgt Spaits off we gave 1,000 HTNR forms. He brought back a lot of forms that no one ever filled out.

The Desert Defender was the way to advertise this program. Better luck next time.

### DESERT DEFENDERS

HQ TAC/PA told us that each week they supplied all the MAJCOM PA's with enough newspapers for each PA shop in the command to receive two papers. We never received our papers from SAC and I personally had a wing commander who wanted to see it every week. I eventually worked out a deal with another TAC unit, but I was really upset when SAC would send these reproduced copies of the paper sometimes six weeks after the publication date. This was ludicrous and probably bordered on fraud, waste and abuse.

A better distribution of the DESERT DEFENDER would have alleviated a lot of problems at the wing level.

### Community Relations Program

We tried to keep our COM REL program up for as long as possible after DESERT SHIELD started. This became quite tedious since we didn't have any aircraft to show people. We did, however, do a booming business at our museum.

We should have discontinued the tour program as soon as deployment started. This program should have been put on hold throughout the crisis.

### Internal Program

The newspaper staff was disappointed that they never really had up to the minute information regarding the situation. The newspaper was just supposed to go on like nothing was happening in the military. Sgt. Spaits couldn't even submit stories for publication because everything he sent back had to be classified.

Provide base newspapers the most current information through the news service. Make people want to read it, because they know that it will have something in it that CNN hasn't shown already.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 14TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)  
BEALE AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 95903-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF PA

SUBJECT Desert Shield/Storm PA After Action Report

TO HQ SAC/PAO

1. The 14th Air Division public affairs office had only a few major events during the course of Desert Shield/Storm. Most of the increased workload came from an increase in existing programs coupled with a loss of manpower.

a. Several of the local media instituted a policy of calling each local military base once a day to find out if anything was going on. Specifically they were looking for major deployments. We got several of these every day and decided not to count them as media queries unless they asked new questions which required some research on our part or if we actually released some information. This is because we were busy and did not want to take the time to fill out a form 39 each time.

b. Our speakers bureau became our busiest program and has not slowed down yet. We decided early on that we would fill as many speaking requests as possible, especially to non-choir audiences. At first only the commanders (and later the public affairs officer when a commander was not available) were able to speak on the subject. Later, as we started rotating crews, we had a few more speakers but it wasn't long before they started to burn out. We had to devote one person almost full time to working the speakers bureau.

c. During the course of Desert Shield/Storm this office lost a lot of people. In November and December we lost four experienced people - one to the desert who has not returned yet. The only replacement, an airman fresh out of DINFOS, came in late April (a couple of days before we lost our fifth person.) We have just lost our sixth person and the only relief we have been told we can expect is a SrA in August and our SSgt who will return someday from Saudi. In spite of the personnel problems we managed to keep our programs running. The biggest problem we have had has been keeping up with the paperwork, witness this late report.

2. **Initial Deployment** The war officially started for the Beale public affairs office August 19, when our KC-135 tankers deployed and dragged the F-117 stealth fighters to the East Coast. We played host to a national media pool put together by SAF and SAC/PA. Media representatives arrived at Beale, received a briefing and spoke with local commanders before being loaded onto two tankers to watch F-117s refueling.

a. The media were escorted by Col Tom Hornung (SAF/PA Western Region) and SSgt. Kelly Godbey. Colonel Hornung arrived too late to be of any assistance to this office in planning the event or its coverage. He rode on one of the aircraft as an escort. We had people here who could have done that. Colonel Hornung's assistance was not really necessary.

b. Because of poor weather enroute and at Plattsburg, several aircraft, including one of our media aircraft, ran low on fuel and had to divert to Griffiss AFB. Because of this, the media reps, who had already made arrangements to uplink their footage from Plattsburg, had to scramble to get their reports out. In spite of this problem those media reps said they were happy with the footage and information they received that day. There was no way we could have anticipated this problem. Lesson re-learned: Be flexible.

c. We also put one of our base photographers and a couple of AAVS photographers on a couple of the tankers that morning. Those tankers also ran low on fuel and one landed at Wright Patterson AFB while the second landed at Griffiss. Their directions were to immediately send their film to the Pentagon for security and policy review. As a result, even though video footage and still photos appeared nationwide as a result of our efforts, no one in SAC or anywhere else in the Air Force got pictures of the event until about a month later. If we allow media to cover an event, we should not censor our own people. Our public affairs offices should have gotten photos more quickly to keep our internal audiences informed.

3. U-2 Participation By the time our tankers deployed, the U-2s were fully operational in the AOR and many people knew it. Although the fact that the U-2 was deployed was declassified, it was considered "not releasable." Our commanders, who wanted to acknowledge that the U-2 had been deployed could not understand how something could be unclassified but not releasable. The problem was compounded when on a national newscast a U-2 was clearly visible taking off in the background while a media rep reported from "outside an air base in Saudi Arabia." Our local community knew the U-2 had been deployed because many U-2 aircrews, maintenance and physiological support division personnel had deployed. It was not until the day before the war was over that we were finally allowed to admit that the U-2 was deployed. This did nothing for our credibility. If DOD is willing to announce the deployment of the F-117s and experimental aircraft such as JSTARS, it should also announce all other weapons systems which have been deployed such as the U-2 and the B-52. Maximum disclosure with minimum delay.

4. PA Personnel Deployment SSgt Kelly Godbey deployed in early November.

a. We received a heads up from SAC/PA a couple of weeks in advance which really helped. It allowed Sergeant Godbey to go through the disaster preparedness and weapons qualifications classes and take care of some personal business before he left. However, when his orders finally came they had a very short suspense. Without the heads up he would have had a tough time getting ready to deploy. Thanks for the heads up. Get the orders out earlier if at all possible.

b. When the notification for Sergeant Godbey's assignment came in, the message said he was being deployed in support of "Palace Blitz." His orders said nothing about Desert Shield and as a result, he had problems when he got to the MAC terminal. We had to amend his orders and fax them to him before he was allowed to board a plane going to Saudi. If we are going to use code names, make sure everyone knows what they are.

c. Sergeant Godbey's short suspense orders had a report not later than date of 13 November (there was no way, even if everything had gone right, that he could have gotten there earlier.) Unfortunately, he became ill a couple of days before he was to

leave and was put on quarters. The first available flight out of Sacramento left on 15 November. The problem at the MAC terminal with his "Palace Blitz" orders, and a broken airplane which took a day to fix resulted in Sergeant Godbey reporting several days late. When he did not arrive as expected, we started getting phone calls trying to find out where he was. **Get the orders out earlier and take into consideration that there may be problems when establishing the "report not later than" date.**

5. Desert Defender We were required to make weekly submissions to the Desert Defender. Our commanders were told, at a commanders conference, that the Desert Defender was being printed weekly and that the public affairs offices were required to make weekly submissions. Our commander wanted to know if any of our stories were getting in. We received some informal feedback, but nothing we could show the commander. Each public affairs office that submitted articles to the Desert Defender should have been put on a mailing list.

6. Weekly Reports Fifteenth Air Force required a weekly report every Wednesday detailing media queries, public events, etc. Much of that same information is compiled monthly for our monthly report. We created extra work for our public affairs offices, most of which were probably already experiencing additional workload.

7. Media deployments Although we didn't get a chance to send any of our media into the AOR we learned that it was almost a Catch-22 trying to get them there. We couldn't promise the media reps a flight until they got their visas. They couldn't get their visas unless they had letter from us inviting them on a specific flight because their visa dates were tied to proposed flight.



ANTONIO RONQUILLO, Capt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

22 April 1991

After Action Report - Operation Desert Shield/Storm

A. MANPOWER:

7th Bombardment Wing, Carswell AFB TX

Name	Rank	Title
Carr, Barbara A.	Capt	Chief, Public Affairs
LaRue-Musgrave, Nori	1Lt	Deputy Chief
Hodgson, John R.	MSGT	NCOIC
Brandon, Linda	TSgt	Chief, Media Relations
Robison, Rebecca	SSgt	Chief, ComRel
Kinkade, Mark D.	SSgt	Editor
Marsh, Jacqueline L.	Sgt	Assistant Editor
Hayes, Donald L.	TSgt	NCOIC, Admin

SSgt Robison deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm. Although the office workload increased considerably during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, SSgt Robison's loss was offset by base's threatcon status causing the suspension of the tour program. Additionally, other programs under her purview were temporarily suspended or curtailed.

B. NARRATIVE:

Media Relations: 7BMW/PA averaged 60 major queries per month for the duration of Desert Shield/Storm (August through March). There were too many call back and follow on queries to keep an accurate count. Additionally, 54 separate media events were attended by 144 media outlets. Most media were local and regional; however, two major events centered on national media. CNN spent a day at Carswell highlighting the B-52 and "In Focus" taped a show concerning children's reactions to a parent deploying. It was aired on the USA Network.

Since 7BMW did not deploy as a wing, media coverage of deployments and homecomings stretched out over months. PA tried to accommodate media and public interest with a couple of representative deployments and returns; however, media interest was insatiable. They showed up in mass to cover as few as six people getting on or off an aircraft. To date, more than 90 percent of Carswell personnel have returned but two TV stations still have standing request to cover any future homecomings, no matter how few people are involved.

7BMW/PA kept media apprised through several means. News releases, media advisories, media conferences and phone notification were primary channels used. Since all three local affiliate stations planned to go "live" at outset of war, PA worked extensively with them first two weeks of January to get local angles in the can. Additionally, local newspapers gathered reams of feature material during the same period.

Relationships with the media throughout Desert Shield/Storm can be likened to a roller coaster ride; however, they remained overall positive with one exception -- the first few days after the start of Desert Storm. Relations at this point were extremely strained since media believed Carswell had "shut them off." Most of the problem can be attributed to frustration at the lack of "local" war news. Requests from this time period ran the gamut from requests to sit on the flightline and monitor aircraft movements to doing man in the street reactions on whether "the U.S. should have started a war."

Once media understood 7BMW/PA's ground rules, relations improved dramatically and remain very positive to date.

Coverage throughout was predominantly positive, fair and accurate. The only negative coverage centered on medical reservists called to active duty and their complaints.

Community Relations: Community support of Carswell was overwhelming. Two off-base community support groups were formed; Cowtown Cares and Morale Boosters. The groups organized numerous letter writing and package campaigns.

During the holiday season and the first two weeks of the war, 7BMW/PA fielded more than 100 calls each day from the general public. Queries ran the gamut from requests concerning the location of specific units to what type of items should be sent in care packages to suggested tactics for "winning the war" to how to fly the U.S. flag.

In an effort to keep local elected officials and DVs current on Carswell's participation in Desert Shield/Storm, 7BMW/PA created a recurring newsletter entitled "Update: Operation Desert Shield/Storm." (See example at Atch 1.) The newsletter was distributed monthly to approximately 75 city officials, business leaders and DVs. It provided a recap of events and the most frequently requested information (e.g., any service-member address, mail restrictions, etc.). Feedback was very positive. Several business leaders made copies for further distribution within their organizations.

7BMW/PA stepped up his public appearances in the local communities, addressing Desert Storm as much as possible under the Public Affairs Guidance. In addition to addressing the subject regularly in day-to-day contacts, he made presentations on Desert Shield/Storm in 12 major forums during the September through February time period.

Since the cease fire requests for speakers and public appearances have quadrupled. 7BMW/PA will be honoring at least two to three such requests per week through the end of July. Additionally, both Dallas and Fort Worth are planning massive homecoming parades in July. Local military leaders worked to get the events combined to no avail.

Internal Information: The Carswell Sentinel was the primary tool for keeping base audiences and deployed personnel informed. Shortly after the start of deployments, the newspaper staff established a Desert Shield/Storm section. In addition to news, the section was used for feature material of interest to waiting spouses. Through the CSG office a copy of each week's paper was mailed to all deployed 7BMW personnel.

The newspaper staff also produced several "special" editions. The "homecoming" edition has become something of a collector's item. (See example at Atch 2.)

In addition to the newspaper, a "Waiting Spouses" newsletter was produced bi-weekly by the Family Support Center. (See example at Atch 3.) 7BMW/PA worked closely with the staff to ensure appropriate material appeared in the newsletter which was mailed to all waiting families. This product served as the ideal vehicle for notifying families of the numerous discounts and freebies offered by the local merchants. The PA staff also attended several of the "waiting spouses" weekly meetings to answer questions and find out concerns. These concerns were subsequently addressed in the base paper, locally produced commander's call topics, and newsletters.

When the Robert L. Thompson Hospital staff deployed services were severely curtailed until reservists were called to back fill positions. PA helped the hospital establish an internal information network to keep beneficiaries informed. A telephone hotline was immediately established and manned by Red Cross volunteers; clinics' status were briefed in staff meetings; update fliers produced as status changed and distributed basewide through BITS; and the base newspaper ran weekly recaps of services available. By playing up the need for patience and understanding, complaints were kept to a minimum.

### C. LESSONS LEARNED/RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Up-to-date equipment is a must. As a minimum PA offices need one or two laptop computer systems and a desk top publishing system with pagemaker software.

- Using a wing to backfill other wings' shortages is a nightmare. 7BMW had personnel in literally all four corners of the world. The only means of getting home base information to deployed personnel was through the mail system. This led to long delays. Additionally, information coming back to the base was piecemeal at best.

- Photographs from the AOR and forward operating locations were nonexistent. Although five audiovisual specialists from Carswell deployed, none of the photos were returned to the base. The only means of obtaining photos was through snapshots taken by deployed personnel. Quality was questionable at best. Understanding the need to review photos for operational security, PA believes some sort of reasonably timely system could have been established to meet the field's need.

- The Reserves, Guard and active duty all need to operate under the same rules/guidelines. For example, when directed to do so, 7BMW would not transport packages from the community on SAC aircraft; however, the Reserves and Guard continued to do so for the duration of Desert Storm. This caused 7BMW some community relations problems. Additionally, on several occasions the Guard and Reserves invited media to a deployment/homecoming on Carswell without 7BMW/PA's knowledge. Although PA was able to support media when they arrived unannounced, this could have been a major embarrassment.

- Homecomings were impossible to track for media coverage. Prior notification was practically nonexistent. Additionally, scheduled flights almost never arrived at the projected times. For example, members of 7BMW/PA ended up working 21 straight hours one day because of slips in arrivals and media interest in covering them. We believe it would have been more workable if MAC had established a "team" to track movements and kept home bases informed on unforeseen delays -- at least for the first couple.

- Anticipate media will want to use "live" trucks at every possible opportunity. Most deployments and homecomings involved at least two trucks no matter what time of the day it was. PA should figure out where trucks will be positioned and measure distance to aircraft arrival position for the media.

- Media will double and even triple team PA for deployments and arrivals. PAs need to be prepared to accommodate the larger numbers.

- When Fort Hood deployed the majority of its personnel, many of the waiting families came "home" to Fort Worth. It appeared the other services do not do a very good job of keeping their families informed. Several media queries concerning "unfair" treatment of waiting families were due to these families not understanding the system. PA recommends making every effort to identify these people and include them as much as possible in base "waiting family" events.

- Finally, although PA recognizes the need to keep higher headquarters informed, with the increased workload and decrease in personnel Desert Shield/Storm reports became a burden. At one point the base was reporting the same information eight times each month.

3 Atch

1. DV Newsletter
2. Homecoming Edition
3. Waiting Newsletter

(Certified Copy)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 93D BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)  
CASTLE AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 95342-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PA

22 APR 1991

SUBJECT:

Desert Storm After Action Report

TO:

HQ SAC/PA (SMSgt Spriggs)

1. The following information is provided from Castle AFB for your use in compiling a SAC Desert Storm after action report.

2. Personnel:

Maj. Linda L. Leong, Chief, Public Affairs (deployed 28 Oct 90-17 Mar 91)

2d Lt Todd M.B. Vician, Deputy Chief, Public Affairs  
TSgt Elaine S. Cvetkovich, NCOIC Public Affairs  
SSgt Susan M. Conard, Chief, Media Relations  
SSgt Armon T. Gaddy, Jr., Chief, Community Relations  
SSgt Michael W. Jordon, NCOIC, Public Affairs Information Manager  
SrA R. Sean Ellis, Editor, Valley Bomber  
AIC Colby C.J. Drouillard, Staff Writer, Valley Bomber

3. The following internal relations strategies were used during Desert Storm.

a. Prepared and distributed a newsletter three times a week at the beginning of Desert Shield to keep military and family members informed of happenings and to keep rumors down. This was continued until operations became routine, and then the newsletter was published on an as-needed basis. The newsletter was distributed in high-traffic areas, such as the base exchange, commissary, post office, dormitories, shopette, dining facility, etc. (Two copies of Castle Update newsletter are attached.)

b. Activated straight talk line using same information as in newsletter. Used as an additional source to control rumors and keep internal public informed. Phone number was advertised in base newspaper, newsletters and signboard. It was activated Aug. 15, 1990, and deactivated March 31, 1991. (One copy of straight talk script is attached.)

c. Held Desert Shield/Storm briefings for family members Aug. 21, 22, 23 and 24, with a total of 950 attendees; two Oct. 2, with total of 250 attendees; one Jan. 8, two Jan. 9, with a total of 135 attendees; and one each Feb. 20 and 21, with a total of 135 attendees. Speakers included: intel, finance, legal, CBPO, MWR, public affairs, housing office, senior enlisted advisor, wing and base commander, family support center, mental health, security police, and OSI.

d. We shipped base and local newspapers (approximately 125 per week) to deployed personnel via Desert Express and U.S. mail. The wing senior enlisted advisor headed this up. Papers were sent via Desert Express to all locations where Castle personnel were deployed. It wasn't until people returned and filled out IG questionnaires that we discovered some people in the FOL weren't receiving papers. We were told by the enlisted advisor that the program set up worked. In the future, more emphasis should be placed on feedback while it's still timely.

4. The following community relations strategies were used. We have included the problem and solution for each situation.

a. Community leaders from Merced, Atwater, Livingston and Turlock were invited to the base at the beginning of Desert Shield. They were briefed on Desert Express by the wing commander, who also solicited their support for the troops and the families left behind. An unclassified intelligence brief was also given. Support generated at that meeting continued throughout the operation.

b. Due to the terrorist threat, the following actions had to be taken to insure proper security and safety for Castle personnel, their families, and civilian visitors:

Problem: The Castle Air Museum was identified as a possible target area for terrorists.

Solution: The museum was closed for the duration of Desert Storm.

Problem: Closure of the museum cut off tourist traffic it normally draws into the local community. This adversely affected the local economy.

Solution: Local civic leaders and businessmen were briefed through the base community council as to why the decision was made to close the museum. Afterward, many of them publicly supported the decision through statements to the local media.

Problem: Letting tour groups on base opened the possibility for terrorists to gain access to the base with relative ease.

Solution: All tours on the schedule (10 total) were cancelled. The leaders of each tour group were contacted by phone. We explained that security reasons made it impossible to accommodate their requests. These calls were followed up with letters. These groups were put on a waiting list and the leaders were told they would be the first contacted once we resumed normal operations. Their reactions to the cancellations were very positive.

Problem: Status of base security didn't allow local civilians enrolled in base education services to have access to the base.

Solution: The classes were held at Atwater High School.

c. Once Desert Storm deployees returned, the community was anxious to hear about their experiences.

After three B-52s were on the ground, the media reps interviewed family members. Media were also able to cover a KC-135 which arrived later that night.

Media representatives from seven organizations returned the following day for more homecomings. Three stations broadcast live from the base. One news station broke into their normally scheduled morning broadcast to broadcast the homecoming.

5. When, the air war started, PA was flooded with calls from the media. Since our involvement hadn't changed, we faxed out a release stating we were ready to respond to further taskings, see attachment. This worked well to stop the flood of queries.

c. Documentation of public affairs activities:

We need better means of recording newscasts involving Castle; only one VCR is available for PA use. Although combat camera has additional VCRs, they do not have cable access.

d. Working with higher headquarters:

1. Public Affairs Guidance from higher headquarters, including OASD/PA, sometimes came down to our level too slowly. For instance, names of B-52 casualties were already in the newspaper before we had authority to release names.

2. Requiring bases to submit weekly releases to the Desert Defender publication seemed to be a waste of manpower, particularly since releases were sent through SAC for screening. Out of the submissions released to SAC for review and submission to the DD, only one was forwarded. Since SAC receives the base paper for screening, SAC/PAI could have gleaned articles through that avenue.

3. Upon return from the FOL, troops were bombarded by media. Aircrews and support personnel weren't briefed on releasable information before they left the FOL, and some told reporters classified locations. In future operations, deployers should receive an outbrief by the deployed PA representative. This would prevent the release of classified information.

6. Guidance Questions:

a. During Desert Shield, conflicting guidance was distributed about releasable information. Security police guidance contradicted public affairs guidance about the release of troop deployments and specific locations. This confusion took much too long to clear up and could have been damaging.

b. Immediately after Desert Shield began, guidance came down saying the use of names was discouraged when dealing with the media. This was not feasible for a number of reasons:

Problem: Castle people returning from Desert Storm were quick to hit the speaking circuit upon their return. However, they were doing this without a security briefing from public affairs and not reporting their speaking engagements to PA.

Solution: Through briefs in the base newspaper and base bulletin, we started a Desert Storm Speakers Bureau and asked for volunteers. We explained that PA needed to know about these engagements to include them in the monthly PA report, and to provide security briefings prior to the speech. These briefs will run until all Castle deployed personnel have returned.

The new Desert Storm Speakers Bureau has become extremely helpful in filling requests for more than just speaking engagements. For instance, the Modesto Athletics baseball team (AA minor league team of the Oakland Athletics) asked for two Desert Storm veterans to throw out the game ball at their season opener. We have filled the request. We are also getting requests for local natives to appear at welcome home/support parades as honorary grand marshals. The popularity of the new DSSB should help in filling those requests.

c. The support for the deployed troops was tremendous. However, occasional problems occurred.

Problem: About a dozen groups in the local community got stuck holding the large amounts of care packages they wanted to send to the deployed troops.

Solution: Many groups were taking for granted that we would ship their care packages without prior coordination. However, we were able to find uses for some of the care package supplies. For example, a local Girl Scout troop had ordered 21 cases of cookies to send to the troops. We told the Scout leader that, although we weren't sending any more care packages on Desert Express, we could use the cookies at our reception center (mobility center) for family members and media reps to snack on while awaiting the arrivals of returning troops. The Scout leader was very receptive to that alternative. When the problem arose, we informed all donors that prior coordination was necessary. We also asked them to deliver the packages in small quantities because of our limited storage area. Additionally, a press release was sent out when we could no longer accept care packages, see attachment. This reduced the number of occurrences substantially.

7. Media relations proved to be difficult but exciting. Various strategies were used to satisfy the local public's desire to know about Castle's participation in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

a. Hometown Media Trips: Nine media people from three television stations and three newspapers in the San Joaquin Valley departed Castle AFB Sept. 10, 1990, to cover 93rd Bomb Wing activities at Andersen AFB, Guam, in support of Operation Desert Shield. Airlift was aboard a KC-135A on a Desert Express mission that returned Sept. 12.

All media representatives stayed very busy, interviewing crew members, deploying passengers and crew chiefs while in flight. Standups were used with Diamond Head for a background during refueling at Hickam AFB.

Significant interviews were done with Lt. Col. Logan Kelly, deputy commander for operations, in the marshalling yard and with several members of the 93rd Avionics Maintenance Squadron in their deployed work centers.

Background work was also done for stories on the impact of the military on the Guam economy.

Guam public affairs people were helpful in setting up lodging and transportation arrangements on very short notice. They also helped locate deployed Castle personnel for interviews.

All media representatives expressed enthusiasm, both during and after the trip, and coverage was positive and extensive. Newspaper stories filed via telephone modem appeared in newspapers before the contingent returned to Castle. The Modesto Bee ran a three-part series on the trip. Television coverage began the evening after take-off from Castle. One station sent out an extra cameraman to cover the departure.

The trip has led to increased coverage from such media as KQVR TV, Sacramento. This is particularly good considering there are two bases in the Sacramento area.

The major problem encountered with the trip involved a lack of coordination. We failed to inform the senior staff at each base the media visited. We did talk to Guam, but not to both major commands located there.

b. Media events at Castle:

1. The first of the media visits to the base on Aug. 16, 1990, was hectic, but no major problems were encountered.

Within a few hours of faxing out a release that Castle troops were supporting Desert Shield operations, media representatives from nine organizations arrived. Public affairs staff members took the media over to the mobility processing center, where they interviewed deploying troops.

Another news release was faxed out that evening inviting media to the first Desert Express take off. Representatives from 13 organizations came for this. Since the flight had a 5 a.m. take-off time, we had media reps meet us at 1 a.m. This gave them a chance to interview the wing commander and deploying people at the mobility center.

Two television stations broadcast live from the base for the morning newscasts. Coverage was very positive.

2. Media coverage of returning members went well, despite short and delayed notices of incoming planes.

Media representatives from 14 organizations covered the first homecoming of five B-52 aircraft and their crewmembers. Because we didn't have exact times initially, we told the media to expect short notice. They were responsive, and most gave a 24-hour phone number so we could easily reach them.

Two television stations broadcast live from the flightline as the B-52s were landing.

1. We were using names in our base paper which, for all practical purposes, is considered public release.

2. National news media were using names of deployed personnel.

3. Many of the airmen wanted their names publicized. A better guidance message would have encouraged PAOs to query potential interviewees and not use people who were hesitant to be identified.

8. Questions concerning this after action report should be directed to myself or 2d Lt Vician at ext. 2997 or DSN 347-2997.

*Linda L. Leong*

LINDA L. LEONG, Major, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

5 Atch

1. Castle Update, dated 16 Aug 91
2. Castle Update, dated 20 Aug 91
3. Straight Talk Line, 18 Sep 91
4. News Release, #91-01-04
5. News Release, #91-02-08



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 96TH BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)  
DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 79607-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: 96BMW/PA

24 April 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PAO (SMSgt Fred Spriggs)

1. Per your message 251916Z MAR 91, same subject. Following is information on Desert Storm as requested:

a. No one from 96 BMW/PA was deployed in support of Operations Desert Shield/ Desert Storm. Reason being was that Capt John Ames, deputy, did not return from his six month TDY to Honduras until December, just a couple of weeks before MSgt Al Dostal's, NCOIC. short notice retirement. After war broke out, Captain Ames was placed on 24-hour standby from 16 Jan-28 Feb. Also, SSgt Steve Bailey, editor, was notified of a possible deployment, however, the war ended before either was called to deploy.

b. Internal Information: During the Desert Shield/Desert Storm actions, the Dyess Peacemaker staff, with the help of other Dyess public affairs staff members, worked diligently to cover preparation, deployment and return of Dyess personnel.

Retired Sergeant Dostal, worked many hours of overtime to put together a special Desert Shield edition a couple of weeks after the deployments began. The edition included maps, charts, information and photos of the countries in Southwest Asia as well as information for spouses left behind.

Once the base's Desert Shield Spouse Support Group meetings were organized, the Peacemaker mentioned upcoming meetings, took photos and then did a photo feature in the Sept. 28 issue to help keep the populace informed. The paper continues the publicity of the support group.

With troops already deployed from Dyess, the Peacemaker published photos and messages of spouses and friends to their loved ones (Oct. 12 issue).

Continued coverage of photos of mobility processing, yellow ribbons being tied on objects both on base and in the community, were being shot at a steady pace and then published in the Peacemaker.

With the return of the first Dyess troop back from the Persian Gulf, a feature and photo was done and published.

The Peacemaker staff, immediately upon receiving addresses of deployed personnel, began mailing the base newspaper to them. In relation to this, many articles were published in the paper concerning mail restrictions and recommended items for mailing.

A special Christmas photo feature of spouses and messages was run in the Dec. 7 and 14 issues. A Valentine's Day feature was also printed consisting of valentine messages for base and deployed personnel. The center attraction was a photo, in the shape of a heart, of all the spouses of deployed personnel.

Among the numerous stand alone photos printed were squadron's sending posters to the deployed, a stars and stripes Christmas tree at the Mall of Abilene, a demonstration in favor of the military deployment, Victory Wall (created for the military by Abilene residents).

The Peacemaker staff, public affairs and photo lab specialists shot returning troops photos and printed returning photo features and stories in the March 15, 22, 29 and April 5 issues.

Feature stories are also being written by the staff on returning folks. Those include stories on the 96th Security Police military working dogs who were deployed, the vice wing commander who was a provisional commander, a maintenance officer and an intelligence officer who worked on General Schwarzkopf's personal staff. These and many others have been published.

Since the beginning of deployment actions until the present, the Peacemaker staff continually published AFNS stories on the war effort to help keep the Dyess populace informed.

MEDIA RELATIONS: From the start of Operation Desert Shield to the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the media relations section has been kept busy. Receiving and responding to media queries day and night, our personnel kept the local media informed on how the the operations were affecting Dyess personnel.

Prior to the beginning of the war, PA had set up 24-hour media center in the temporarily closed correctional custody center. After checking a number of places on base, this was the best choice as it had cable, sleeping rooms, private offices, etc. The only thing we had to do was get additional phone lines installed. We were ready to man the office on a 24-hour basis at a moments notice. Fortunately, that was never necessary as we had no casualties or accidents involving our deployed troops.

All local media were invited to cover any deployment that was not of a sensitive nature. The television stations and the local newspaper also covered the return of both 96th BMW and 463 TAW personnel, whether they landed on Dyess or at the local airport.

We did not send any hometown media to the AOR.

PA worked closely with Chap. (Lt. Col.) Bob Leeds, senior base chaplain and coordinator of the Desert Shield/Storm Spouse Support Group. The media on many occasions interviewed Chaplain Leeds to see how the group was progressing. As a result of these interviews many local residents donated refreshments for the meetings which were held twice a month.

The spouse support group meetings were covered in every Commander's Call Topics letter that was sent out to the squadron commanders.

Several press conferences were held in association with the deployments including one with the wing commanders, mayor and president of the chamber of commerce which announced Abilene's Desert Shield Family Support program. Also, during one of our homecoming events, U.S. Senator Phil Gramm was in attendance and greeted the troops, and at another homecoming, Michaelangelo, one of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, greeted the troops as they stepped off the plane.

On many occasions, PA has received word that someone is coming in at the local airport and inturn calls the local media which meets the returnees when they step off the plane. Just a few days ago, Lt. Cmdr. Fox landed his F-18 at Dyess and was met by the media who had been contacted by PA. Lt. Cmdr. Fox, who is from Abilene, shot down the first MIG in the Gulf war.

From the first deployment, until the last Dyess person returns, PA will work closely with our local media so they can be involved in our activities. Working relationships with the local media could not be better. They were sensitive to all our rules and regulations, i.e., not showing or giving last names or organizations of deploying people, always going through PA when they wanted to interview a spouse, etc. We in turn called them whenever we had something we thought would be of interest and kept them in the loop at all times. Daily contact with all media was our key to success.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS: Community support from Abilene and the surrounding Big Country has been outstanding. At the onset of the deployments, the Military Affairs Committee of the Abilene Chamber of Commerce put together a Desert Shield Family Support program. Within a matter of weeks they had more than 125 businesses in the area offering either free or discounted merchandise and services to spouses of deployed personnel.

The offers from the community to send food, entertainment, personal supplies, letters, and the like was overwhelming. One elementary school took the money they won for a school project and used it to buy things for the people deployed. Banners, some 300 feet long, were signed and shipped overseas. Boxes full of candy, cookies, writing material, etc., were collected by surrounding towns and brought to Dyess for shipment. What we did in these cases was crate the materials and ship them out when we had aircraft going in the right direction.

Several organizations started having fund raisers to help the spouses; however, this was discouraged and any money donated directly to us went to the chaplain who was conducting the support group meetings. With the money he bought refreshments for the spouses. All other monies were directed to the Military Affairs Committee who has been keeping it intending to use it for the 4th of July Celebration. One lady, a Mrs Ho, started making and selling yellow roses. By the time the war was over, she had donated several thousand dollars to the fund.

The support of our troops was continuous from day one of the deployment and continues to this day. Some of the activities include: the Mall of Abilene setting up a Stars and Stripes Christmas Tree which was decorated with the names of people who were deployed from Dyess and the Big Country; a Yellow Ribbon Jamboree was held at the civic center to honor those deployed and those who had returned...four hours of entertainment was donated free by local talent; a Victory Wall was dedicated in honor of the success of our troops abroad; Yellow Ribbon Days were celebrated at local schools; Dyess personnel were constantly called upon to be honored at functions, to give speeches...the 96BMW/CC gave numerous presentations to local civic organizations; a local musician wrote a now nationally known song called "My Daddy" and which was and is sung by Dyess Elementary School children; Sears had a Military Appreciation Night where they provided free child care, gave away free gifts, etc.; Sam's Warehouse has also had a Dyess Appreciation Night; during the homecoming of our 11 KC-135 and crews, a pizza company donated 1,000 free pizzas and the local Coke-a-Cola dealership provided all the refreshments free; radio stations donated money to the spouse fund at the chamber of commerce; one of the local merchants held an ice cream party one Saturday for spouses and children; the list is endless.

You guessed it! Public Affairs was and continues to be the point of contact for all of these activities.

REDEPLOYMENT CEREMONIES: PA was involved in all homecoming activities whether it be on the flight line when a plane arrived or when buses brought back troops from Carswell AFB, Texas, via busses, day or night. Surprisingly, local media would and will come out to the base at midnight, or 1 a.m. or 2 a.m. to cover returnees. One thing that we and fortunately our wing commander stressed was that everyone was to receive a heroes welcome.

When troops arrived, patriotic music was played over the sound system (music was taped and provided by the PA shop), the security police and fire department had their vehicles out with lights and sirens going. Each group arriving on base is greeted by the wing commander, senior staff and other members of their squadron along with their family and friends. When people arrive at the local airport, the squadron commander and members of the person's squadron are encouraged to greet them upon arrival.

Whether people arrive on base or off, the media are contacted.

c. PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS: Very few real problems were encountered during this time. Although we did not have anyone deployed in support of Desert Shield/Storm, we did have people TDY, we were already undermanned, and we had a short notice retirement which left us that much more undermanned. On top of that, the office was short on experience. However, the people that are in the PA shop worked very hard to keep up with the extra suspenses heaped upon them by higher headquarters...one liners, having to get every speech request approved before accepting, reporting on how many media queries we received, etc. This on top of working with the media, working with the support group, being the point of contact for the community who was relentless in their endeavors to give, give, give, making sure we were covering everything possible in the base newspaper, made for some very long days.

PA was advised by the vice wing commander that we were responsible for contacting the photo lab everytime there was a deployment. However, in many cases PA was not contacted by either the command post, the unit which had people deploying or the mobility monitors when there was a deployment. Although PA attended all the COSG meetings, many times notices and deployments were made in between the meetings. We could have possibly gotten more media coverage if we had always been informed of the last minute departures and now, the returnees.


No solutions. Everyone did what had to be done. No one complained, just did their best to help the spouses left behind, and to keep everyone both on base and downtown informed as to what was going on. Since we didn't have any serious injuries or casualties to contend with, we really have no complaints. In relation to other bases, our job was not that complicated.

I was very happy with all higher headquarters staffs who were always so willing to give guidance whether on the telephone or by correspondence. The PA guidance we received really made our job easier and was very helpful when communicating with our base officials. A couple of times it was difficult to determine exactly what guidance the message was trying to get across, but nothing that wasn't worked out in a timely manner.

It did seem odd that many other bases were saying what their deployed units were doing in the Gulf, but we couldn't discuss what our tankers were up to. I would have liked to have given them more publicity while they were in Turkey doing their job.

I admire the professional manner in which all levels of Public Affairs handled the situation. There were never any panic calls and very few immediate suspenses. Everyone always seemed to know exactly what to do and what they were doing.

2. If you have any questions, or require any additional information, give me a call.



MARY E. KILGORE, Major, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

cc: 15AF/PA

AFTER ACTION REPORT -

A. Angela L. Hicks, 2Lt, Deputy Chief, Public Affairs at RAF Fairford, England, home of the 806th BMW(P). Being undermanned prior to Desert Storm preparation, some activities were forced to be cut back on. Tour programs ceased because of no air support. Speaker's Bureau slowed because many members of the bureau were deployed. The requests increased because of a heightened interest in the military. We were concerned with what people could say about our involvement in the war effort, so we were careful to brief them prior to the engagement.

B. Internally, it was difficult to find feature material to write about because so many people were deployed, so some weeks were very 'light' concerning the newspaper. The UPAR program was off to a good start for the 1991 year but stalled because of the absence of the deputy, the POC for the program. Regular meetings of spouses of deployed people as well as several family support groups helping to cope were held. We did speaking engagements about what sort of support programs we were currently running to give other agencies ideas to pursue on their own. We sent Blythe Spirits to all known deployed addresses each week.

Special articles:

1990

- 9 Aug 90
  - SAC units help support Persian Gulf operations (SACNS)
- 16 Aug 90
  - American forces strengthen Middle East presence (AFNS)
- 12 Aug 90
  - Persian Gulf crises affects SAC operations
    - SAC forces support Saudis, SSgt Dave Malakoff, HQ SAC/PA
    - CINSAC cancels competitions, SrA Darlene Mize, Editor
      - Load Comp preparations increased readiness
      - Bomb Comp off as crews support deterrence
      - Chapel offers seminar to help families cope
- 30 Aug 90
  - Libyan strike force deploys to Saudi - Troops continue to deploy to the Middle East for Desert Shield support - Washington, D.C.
    - FSC briefs families of deployed personnel
- 6 Sep 90

- Saudi strengthens defense with American weapons, Bush approves more than \$2.2 billion in arms sales
  - FSC holds support briefings
  - SAC plays key deployment role, by Gen. John T. Chain Jr., SAC Commander in Chief
- 13 Sep 90
  - Reservists help support deployment
  - Support briefings help spouses, by TSgt. Judy Brown, Public Affairs Division
  - SAC crews respond to Operation Desert Shield (SACNS)
- 20 Sep 90
  - Deployed troops' BAS cut, by 1st Lt Kim Sale, SAC Public Affairs
- 27 Sep 90
  - There's hope when BAS is taken away
  - Desert Defender keeps deployed troops informed, by SSgt. John P. Smith, SAC Public Affairs
  - Simple guidelines for dealing with the news media, by Sgt. 1st Class Ronald H. Kuhne, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.
- 12 Oct 90
  - CMSAF visits deployed troops, by TSgt. Dale Warman, 1776th ABW Public Affairs, Deployed with 4th TFW
  - Secretary Cheney approves imminent danger pay, (AFNS)
  - AFSA sends letters to deployed
  - Pregnant women don't deploy
- 18 Oct 90
  - Sending mail to Middle East becomes complicated
- 1 Nov 90
  - More troops heading for gulf, by SSgt. David P. Masko, AFNS
- 15 Nov 90
  - Overseas shipments may be delayed
  - Deployment affects retraining
- 21 Nov 90
  - MAC keeps moving equipment, supplies, mail, by SSgt. David P. Masko, AFNS
  - DoD doesn't plan to rotate deployed troops, by SSgt. David P. Masko, AFNS
  - Desert Shield troops make needs known (AFIS)
  - How, what to send our deployed troops, by F. Peter Wigginton, AFIS

- Military food connoisseur turns up nose to MREs, by MSgt. John Banusiewicz, managing editor, Desert Defender

- 29 Nov 90

- Construction freeze continues (AFNS)

-6 Dec 90

- Fly swatters, coolers top deployed Christmas list  
- Air Force continues current stop loss program, (AFNS)

- 13 Dec 90

- Clancy says: Hussein's no madman, shouldn't be ignored, by SSgt. David Malakoff, SAC/PA

- 20 Dec 90

- Base schedules Desert Shield Variety Show, by Capt. Liz Lane-Johnson, Public Affairs Division  
- U.S. doesn't plan to rotate deployed troops, by SSgt. David P. Masko, AFNS  
- All through Saudi Arabia are American soldiers, by Gloria Bey, Eaker family member

#### 1991

- 10 Jan 91

- Air Force continues stop losses indefinitely, (AFNS)  
- CINCSAC proud of troops after Middle East visit, by Gen. John T. Chain Jr., SAC Commander in Chief  
- A day off in the desert, by Capt. Wes Layton, 347th Tactical Fighter Wing deployed  
- Cheney praises SAC  
- Traveling telegram sends support message to Desert Shield troops, by A1C Joel Langton, Assistant Editor

- 17 Jan 91

- Girl Scouts send cookies to deployed  
- Desert Shield changes promotion testing procedures, (AFNS)  
- Don't let media trap you into talking  
- Family support center helps deployed spouses

- 24 Jan 91

- Allied forces drop bombs on target, (AFNS)  
- Family, friends asked to limit mail, (AFNS)  
- Deployed become tax exempt

- Support for families
- 31 Jan 91
  - MIAs' status change to POW (CENTCOM News Service)
  - Iraqi radio reports attempt to sway U.S., (AFNS)
  - Threat conditions state security awareness, by SSgt. Dave Malakoff, SAC/PA
  - Song of the desert, by TSgt. Rick Corral, CENTAF, Public Affairs
  - A poem for our deployed Eaker warriors, by Patty Clarkson, American wife and mother
  - Local precautions prevent terrorism, by Howard Brower, Berlin Air Force News (AFNS)
- 7 Feb 91
  - MIAs' families continue to receive their pay, (AFNS)
  - Personal computers, modems allow people to send free mail, (AFNS)
  - Bush orders deployment participants tax (AFIS)
  - The B-52 combat experience, by SSgt. Sarah Hood, AFNS
- 14 Feb 91
  - Don't let mail bombs take you by surprise, by Paula J. Dilli, Griffis AFB, N.Y.
  - In memory of...
    - Capt. Jeffrey Olson
    - 1st Lt Jorge Arteaga
    - 1st Lt Eric Hedeem
  - Phone calls take financial tolls on military families, (TAC News Service)
  - Putting rumors to rest
  - Code designed to help warriors, by Sgt. Steve Pierce, Barksdale AFB, La.
  - Television media carries war coverage too far, by MSgt. Charlie Miller, Plattsburgh AFB, N.Y.
- 28 Feb 91
  - Community rally honors Eaker people, by SrA Darlene A. Mize, Editor
  - Mail service due to improve, by SSgt. David P. Masko, (AFNS)
  - Some pay becomes tax exempt, by Capt. Doug Houston, contributing writer
  - Encouraging words hit home front, Col. George I. Conlan, 97 BMW/Commander/806 BMW(P) Commander
  - Daddy: He's doing his job to keep them free, by Thayes Browne, Eaker family member
- 7 Mar 91
  - National Defense Service medal awarded to all, (AFNS)
  - Don't inadvertently bring home foreign pests, by Maj. Robert S. Garten, March AFB, Ca.

- Community, base won't forget 'Gosnell's Day for the USA,' by Capt. Liz Lane-Johnson, Public Affairs Division

- 4 Mar 91

- Homecoming ... by TSgt. Judy Brown, Public Affairs Division
- Eighth AF Commander welcomes back warriors, by Lt Gen E.G. Shuler, 8th AF Commander.

Relations with the base support groups were very good - we gave them as much press as we could in the Blythe Spirit.

Initially media interest was extremely high, but calmed down once they realized we couldn't say much. When the deployment first began, we were given guidance that we could lend information of the B-52's involvement in then Desert Shield. Then, we received another message stating we could say nothing to that effect. In the eyes of the media, we looked very stupid. This also destroyed our credibility in their eyes. We continued to put out news releases of the various stories we published in the Blythe Spirit. Channel 8, a local TV news agency interviewed Jim Hernandez, from Family Support, about what they were doing to help with the deployment. We conducted no hometown media visits.

Community relations: Speaker's request went up dramatically. We were a bit apprehensive about sending people out, because we were not allowed to talk about our involvement. We continued with the Base Community Council as planned.

Our community relations remained very good throughout the war effort, despite a decline in some of our programs. The tour program became non-existent because we were at Threatcon Bravo. Many of our aircraft were involved in the war and were unavailable for use on tours. Orientation flights also ceased to exist because our aircraft was unavailable. Our Speaker's Bureau program picked up considerably because people's curiosity about the military was at an increased level. We continued to have regular Base Community Council meetings to involve the local as much as possible, thus maintaining our history of good community relations.

Concerning ceremonies honoring the redeployment of personnel, we invited media out to talk to aircrews returning from the AOR. We faxed them the release the morning of the specific arrival, which was scheduled for 5 p.m. They were briefed on the reason for their visit and reminded then that all questions should be on the deployment and their return home. No specifics about the operation was given. Instead, the media concentrated on the feelings of returning home after being separated from family and what it was like to actually participate in the day-to-day war happenings.

C. Problems encountered was less time for the chief to supervise the newspaper. In the long run, it was actually good for the newspaper staff

because it gave them a chance to work more on their own. Dispelling rumors was another problem. The best way to solve that problem was through the release of as much factual information as possible. We were very busy because the NCOIC was TDY for the Communications Course, so the chief and deputy picked up duties. Then the deputy deployed leaving the chief with two airmen and a secretary. Some programs and requests received lower priority because of the low manning.

SAC can better support future operations by planning out logistics more thoroughly prior to the deployment. Granted, this deployment was somewhat of a surprise, but someone higher up should have asked the questions concerning BAS and payment of meals. If your people are worried about what they're going to pay bills with at home, they won't be able to concentrate on their job as much. Concerns over sleeping arrangements and showers are two other things that should be better planned prior to shipping everyone to a deployed location. While I know we do not talk about the operations on an Air Force base confirming the obvious would be recommended. Not being allowed to do what we were supposedly sent over to do was frustrating. Prepare PA shops by telling them what to expect before things start to happen, not at the last minute. PAG will go in one ear and other the other over the phone when an individual is concerned with who they are going to have take care of their bills, etc. For future deployments, prepare people for the worst, but don't exaggerate. I would recommend putting together a PA protocol handbook for PAOs and NCOs use on such deployments. We are not Protocol officers, but if you are going to force us to execute action belonging to protocol, give us some sort of guidance.

  
ELIZABETH F. LANE-JOHNSON, Capt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

cc: US REAR/CENTCOM

## 97 BMW/PA EAKER AFB, AR

AFTER ACTION FOR DEPLOYMENT -

- A. Angela L. Hicks, 2Lt, Deputy Chief, Public Affairs at Eaker AFB.
- B. Angela L. Hicks, 2Lt, Deputy Chief, Public Affairs Deployed 2 Feb 91 to RAF Fairford, returned 18 Mar 91.
- C. 806 BMW/PA was manned with a chief, deputy, NCO and a 702. This was ample manpower for the day-to-day happenings, but for special events like distinguished visitors tours and media day, we could have used more bodies. The base had recently closed and was in a caretaker status. We had no problem, through logistics, in procuring equipment for office use. We had two phone lines, which was enough to conduct business. We were unable to get cable connected in our office, so we were unable to view CNN on a regular basis. This left us somewhat in the dark as to the current war happenings. Messages were a problem as far as getting ones applicable to PA. We were somewhat 'in the dark' in this respect also. We received verbal PA guidance from 3AF but nothing from 8AF and SAC until we supplied the information for media day use. SAC then put their blessing on it for release.
- D. We received over 220 queries from media. Granted, some were repeat questions, but answering them was time consuming. We did not submit any news releases. WE used phone correspondence for media day for those agencies with a standing request to cover the B-52 and our deployment. Interviews were conducted with local, regional and national news media. The New York Times and the Washington Post were represented as well as the local T.V. stations like BBC West. These interviews were conducted during media day. People magazine interviewed the last two crews available at RAF Fairford before redeployment back to the states. CC, DO and MA were also interviewed by People. Interviews were informal and lasted approximately 1/2 hour. (People coverage will appear in print sometime in May - 'Heroes of the War').

Special internal communication efforts included the external news letter we printed, The Falcon Flyer. We printed pertinent information to ease the transition into the deployment, i.e. hours of the BX and the bank, information on pay, special activities planned as well as 'From the Top...' a chance for the higher-ups to get their message to the troops.

We had excellent host nation community relations activities. PA was contacted by Myrna Roberts, an individual who had worked com/rel for the base prior to our deployment. She was working out of London, but set up an office on base to accommodate requests. Many local families worked with her to invite deployed people into their homes for dinner or an afternoon of watching the races. She assisted in setting up the first distinguished visitor tour of local civilians. Ms. Roberts was also instrumental in setting up two tours of a local brewery, Arbell's. Mr. Arbell was also a member of the first tour and an avid supporter of base activities.

Lord Kimberly, member of Parliament, was brought to the base to see the B-52. He was definitely in favor of the operation and spoke on our behalf to the local media. CC, DO, MA, PA, CSG/CD and the RAF Fairford Flight Lieutenant in turn lunched with Lord Kimberly at his country cottage.

We answered all letters requesting photography and information on the B-52 as well as the KC-135. We had some special requests for photos signed by crew members or CC, and we were able to support them. We were not, however, able to support requests for patches or rubber stamps on stamped envelopes.

E. Problem areas: We were sent on the premise that we would be handling the mass amorent of British media interested in operations out of Fairford. We were prepared to do that but was given little guidance along with great restrictions on information we could release. This was frustrating for the staff as well as the media.

Lack of on-base reproduction facilities also made it difficult to reproduce the internal newsletter. We had to travel an hour and 15 minutes each way to have it produced. One car was allotted to PA, but many times we had other activities going on which kept us from allowing the automobile out of the area. We published twice a week, but was unable to establish a regular production schedule for the newsletter.

While the number of tours we planned and expected gave us something, we were not versed in proper protocol procedures. This not being a PA requirement, little things slipped through the cracks and made some tours very hectic at the last minute.

Living arrangements should have been thought through - people don't do a very good job when they don't know where they're sleeping at night or if they will be able to take a shower.

DETAILED LESSONS LEARNED:

- Before taking media on to interview crews, provide them with basic military facts, i.e. definitions of certain acronyms and words used often. Explain to them common terms and regular day-to-day activities, which will help them conduct better interviews and get more substantial information.
- When receiving a special request from a member of the media, consider it before accepting it. Just because they want to talk to us does not mean we have the information they're looking for.
- Question what is given to you - reproduce it to suit the terms you want as a reflection on public affairs.

cc: SAC/PA



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC WARFARE CENTER (SAC)  
ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH DAKOTA 57706-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PA

17 April 1991

SUBJECT:

Desert Storm After Action Report

TO:

SAC/PA (SMSgt Spriggs)

1. The following information is submitted as requested.

a. Staffing at the Strategic Warfare Center Public Affairs Office, Ellsworth SD, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm consisted of:

1. Major Dennis Linn, Deputy Chief until 14 February 1991, is now chief of Public Affairs.

2. 1Lt Robert Carver, is serving as the deputy chief of Public Affairs, is assigned to the 44th Strategic Missile Wing. He joined the staff mid-December.

3. SSgt Janet Maddox, NCOIC PA Operations

4. SSgt Janet Polhill, Executive Support

5. Sgt Elizabeth Pooler, NCOIC Media/Com Rel

6. AIC Kerry Fina, Plainsman Editor

7. MSgt Jack Siebold, Superintendent, was deployed 21 August and returned from Saudi Arabia 15 December 1990. He was redeployed 15 January 1991. No firm return date has been set for him as of this date.

8. AIC David Kehrl, served in media until PCSing to Panama in December 1990.

9. Major Alan Freidenrich, Chief Public Affairs through 14 February 1991, is now working in the START office.

b. Manpower difficulties created during the Desert Shield/Desert Storm period are: No management leadership, staff was isolated from incoming headquarters guidance, and cross-flow of information due to previous PAO's management. While the superintendent was at the office in late December through early January management, cross-flow of information within the office and morale had improved slightly due to MSgt Siebold. Situation here was not a result of Desert Shield/Desert Storm manning impact but rather one due to previous PAO's management of the office. We were, however, undermanned during this time. Additional people could have and been used during media events.

c. PA support included Plainsman news coverage, media events, guest speakers, news releases to local media, following up on queries and answering rumor control phone calls. During the past seven months 59 media visits were conducted at Ellsworth by SWC/PA staff. Twenty-seven news releases were faxed or mailed out to media in the area, 78 queries were answered by PA staff and eight rumor control calls were recorded during the seven month time frame. PA and local media relationship during this time was excellent. PA as a good working relationship with the local print and electronic media. The Plainsman newspaper Desert Shield/Desert Storm support was covered in 63 articles. Articles were presented through news, news briefs, features and commentaries. Special departure, welcome, home, memorial and informative features were also published. The newspaper staff mailed newspapers to locations where deployed airmen were stationed. In many cases the newspapers were returned due to the airmen being relocated, insufficient address or no Ellsworth person at the designated location. Since Ellsworth deployees were stationed throughout Saudi Arabia there was no single unit to send the newspapers to. Addresses were made available to us through squadron first sergeants were not always accurate addresses. Papers were mailed to addresses until mid-January when we were notified that mail should be limited to first class mail and packages from family members. The family support center at Ellsworth formed a support group for spouses and children. Local churches, services such as the VFW and schools in the community also formed support groups for spouses and children who had a parent or family member participating in Desert Shield/Storm. Town meetings sponsored by the family support center were held. Guest speakers were brought in to talk to spouses about issues they were concerned about. PA was a participant at the town meetings. Community relations during the Desert Shield/Storm period was basically nonexistent since tours and orientation flights were stopped due to increased threat conditions. The community relations person assisted with media events. One strong area for Com Rel was the request for speakers. During Desert Shield/Storm 18 speaker requests were filled. The community relations staff member is presently working to obtain a list of individuals who were deployed to Saudi Arabia in order to prepare a Desert Shield/Storm speakers list. The Com Rel staff member was active in lining up honor guard for departures, memorial services, return of the deployees and parades honoring the military.

d. SWC/PA complied with weekly requests for Desert Shield/Storm and Desert Defender inputs. Perhaps, if we were briefed on the purpose of the 8th AF weekly inputs we could have had a better understanding why the material was needed so we could have provided further input or just have knowledge of its purpose. As far as Desert Defender inputs we had no idea if the information supplied was worthwhile. Guidance from headquarters was slow - often we were "winging it" as we were advised to do from headquarters personnel. Guidance was wordy, if messages could get straight to the point it would have been helpful. Also guidance seemed to be provided in a fickle manner -- officials were unsure about how things should be covered and how to address situations.

2. Input form MSgt Siebold will be provided upon his return to the office. Again, no firm return date is set.

*Dennis L. Linn*  
DENNIS L. LINN, Major, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

1 Atch  
Outreach Facts/Clippings



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 92D BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)  
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON 99011-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

25 April 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PAO

1. Following is the 92nd Public Affairs office after action report for Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

a. Office Manning

Robin Grantham, Capt, Chief of Public Affairs  
Kim Clow, 2Lt, Deputy Chief  
Ron Pack, MSgt, NCOIC  
Brad Kadrich, SSgt, Chief of Internal  
Jeremy Raab, Sgt, NCOIC Media Relations  
Angela McGuire, Sgt, NCOIC Community Relations  
Kelly Thompson, A1C, Editor

(1) NCOIC was TDY to Guam along with a major portion of the Wing for Giant Warrior until mid-August. Sgt McGuire departed in December to augment Desert Defender staff.

(2) No significant difficulties encountered by these deployments.

b. Internal

(1) 92BMW/PA worked closely with the base chapel and Family Support Center in the formation of a spouse support group. Weekly meetings allowed senior wing leadership to disseminate up-to-date information, as well as providing an excellent avenue for disseminating Public Affairs information concerning community initiatives to help family members (i.e. donations of holiday meals, car repair discounts, income tax assistance, etc.).

(2) Bi-weekly letters to squadron commanders were distributed to keep them abreast of the many and diverse services available to families of deployed members. Letter also contained information for commanders to brief troops scheduled to deploy, such as host country sensitivities, Public Affairs guidance.

(3) Base cable TV channel was used to disseminate information. Commander's weekly "Hot Notes" video program also contained information useful to family members.

(4) Base newspaper kept both family members and deployed personnel informed. LGX provided list of deployed members which was used to determine number of newspapers to mail to each forward operating location. Newspaper

published a "yellow ribbon" issue where every advertiser had a yellow ribbon in their ad. Newspaper also published an "honor roll" of businesses who were supporting deployed troops and family members.

(5) Desert Defender submission offered another avenue for keeping those deployed informed of activities back home.

c. Media

(1) Media relations were significantly strengthened as a result of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. A very proactive attitude marked the Public Affairs staff as well as the wing command structure. Media were kept fully informed of all actions the wing was doing in support of Desert Shield. Requests for interviews were carefully considered and aggressively worked. Media representatives realized they were receiving all available information and that base officials were trying their best to fulfill often "last minute" requests.

(2) Early in Desert Shield, Public Affairs worked closely with all local media outlets to form a pool for potential Desert Express missions. Efforts paid off when four reporters were escorted into the AOR by the Washington Air National Guard. Relationship with the ANG could not have been better throughout the Persian Gulf war.

(3) Special thanks goes to 15AF/PA, especially TSgt Steve Mahnke, for working approval on numerous requests. This office was always assured of receiving a quick, appropriate answer to any guidance questions.

d. Community Relations

(1) The bond between the local communities and base became even firmer during Desert Shield/Storm. With the first deployment of troops from Fairchild, the support given by local citizens continued to grow.

(2) The Armed Services Committee of the Spokane Area Chamber of Commerce spearheaded the following activities:

(a) Arranged for local civilian newspaper to distribute copies of its Sunday edition to each of our deployed operating locations.

(b) Coordinated letter writing campaign for area schools.

(c) Worked with Red Cross Chapter to establish a special banking account to pay postage costs for donated packages being mailed to deployed servicemembers.

(d) Solicited donations from local businesses for deployed troops and families. Donations included games, reading material and sports equipment for troops, and holiday food baskets, discount services or free services for families.

(e) When supplies at the base food bank became low, committee contacted businesses for contributions. Response was outstanding with more than \$5,000 in donations.

(f) Dedication of annual Armed Forces Torchlight Parade on May 18 to men and women of Desert Storm. Special red, white and blue banners will line the streets of America's largest torchlight parade as military members ride special floats to receive grateful thanks from local citizens.

(g) The Armed Services Committee is also coordinating a special welcome home festival for all Desert Storm veterans and families. The festival will be on June 9. This event is an effort to bring all of the previously deployed personnel together for a full day of fun and relaxation - at no cost to the individual. The day's events will include a pizza feed at Riverfront Park, volleyball, entertainment, IMAX movies and carousel rides. A barbecue dinner and dance will be on the agenda for the evening at one of the city's best resorts. The resort is providing 300 complimentary rooms for redeployed personnel for an overnight stay.

(3) The American Red Cross established a Desert Storm Support Center shortly before the war ended. If established earlier, the center would have been invaluable as a referral agency for all the people who wanted to show their support through donations.

**e. Problem Areas**

(1) Some of the problems we experienced during Desert Shield/Storm were:

(a) Desert Express flying schedule were classified in DO channels. We obtained information we needed to prepare required media itineraries only with higher headquarters intervention.

(b) Requirement for OASD/PA approval prior to media notification of deployments during Desert Storm. Public Affairs, and the base, often received last minute tasking which made media notification difficult with this approval process.

(c) Public Affairs Guidance on identifying deployment locations restricted information to countries officially announced by OASD/PA. If OASD/PA ever officially announced specific countries, this office never received the message(s).

2. Please call me at DSN 657-5704 if I can be of further assistance.

*Kimberly L. Clow*

KIMBERLY L. CLOW, 2Lt, USAF  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs

DESERT SHIELD/STORM                      AFTER ACTION                      90 SMW  
F.E. WARREN AFB, WYO.

McCollom, Kathleen T.	Maj., Chief
Sailer, Amy K.	2nd Lt., Deputy Chief
Keith, Mayo E.	SSgt., NCOIC Community Relations
Russo, Margaret E.	SSgt., NCOIC Internal Information
Wallstrum, Margaritte	SSgt., Internal Information Specialist
Rakosky, Dave P.	Sgt., Community Relations Specialist
Davenport, Jackie L.	Sgt., Administrative Specialist
Jennings, Karina A.	SrA., Community Relations Specialist
Slentz, Stacey R.	SrA., Broadcaster

Manpower: SrA. Jennings went TDY to Langley early in March 91 to work with the Desert Defender. There were never any manpower difficulties. The office was stretched a bit in August 90 when we had a large security police group deploy, the first large deployment from the Rocky Mountain region. All regional media responded which stretched our office for a couple of days. Not until the same group returned in mid March 91, did the media activity pick up to that extent again.

Activities: At the onslaught of Operation Desert Shield we prepared an extensive guidance package for the senior staff that included what was releasable, mock interviews, Middle East cultural sensitivities and a list of possible questions and answers in preparation for media queries. We included all Middle East cultural sensitivity material received in commander's call topics. The base newspaper introduced a new section, "On the Storm Front," which included all news service articles concerning Desert Shield/Storm, which was two pages on the average. From the start of the deployment, the office sent base papers to nine different APOs and one FPO, all Warren troop addresses, 150 papers a week. Each week at least four Warren inputs were sent to SAC for the Desert Defender.

From the start of the operation, Col. Richard Farkas, wing commander, was concerned about the security of the families left behind. PA worked closely with the Family Support Center to protect the privacy of all the families left behind and any media interviews with family members were done on a volunteer and case-by-case basis only. Every family interview was very positive. At no time did we ever release last names of troops or their family members during interviews, even after this information was releasable, on the wing commander's request.

We have had 59 media visits pertaining to Desert Shield/Storm. The most recent, March 27, involved nine services personnel who redeployed to Saudi for six to eight months. A Warren homecoming of security police March 9 was on a national network newscast and People magazine covered a Warren human interest story that will appear in a special Memorial Day edition. All other media visits were local or regional.

Community support has been tremendous. Cheyenne businesses and individuals have developed dozen of programs benefiting Warren's Family Support Center or Warren members in general. Presently, from an idea raised by the Military Affairs Committee, a party celebrating every member in the armed forces is being planned. Everyone in the area is invited (they're expecting 7,000 - 10,000) for an afternoon at the Wyoming Air National Guard. There will be a barbecue served by the Kiwanis, five or six live bands and beverages. The money has been put up by 28 corporate sponsors. The date for the event is still contingent on when a Wyoming Guard group returns (about 120 people). Our wing senior enlisted advisor is the base representative for this homecoming event. The wing commander has played an active role in community projects supporting our Desert Shield/Storm troops and families and encourages his staff to do the same.

Warren's security police commander along with two security police who were deployed to Saudi and returned in March are attending a Casper Military Affairs Committee meeting in April. They will be guest speakers and will talk about their Saudi Desert Storm experiences.

The Armed Forces Day banquet will honor our Desert Storm warriors and the Cheyenne Frontier Days Committee is sponsoring the 4th of July fireworks display which will be dedicated to Wyoming service members. Cheyenne Frontier Days in July, the nation's largest rodeo celebration, is designating one of its three parades to our Wyoming service members. All of these activities are supported by the base and involve a base representative on each planning committee.

Problems and Recommendations: There were very few problems encountered at all. Since Warren does not encompass a flying mission, the people deployed from here went in a supportive role and in comparatively small numbers. We never had the occasion to take local media into the AOR because our biggest groups to deploy left before the media were allowed into the AOR. After that, our people left in small groups, usually on commercial airline. Media relations remained very good throughout Desert Shield/Storm with only one occasion in August with a difficult reporter from Denver which was quickly resolved with his news director.

Weekly reports to 15th AF seemed unnecessary and burdensome.

But, overall, all efforts concerning Desert Shield/Storm were positive and received tremendous base-wide and community support.

(Certified Copy)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 42D AIR DIVISION (SAC)

GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA 58205-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN. OF: 42 AD/PA

23 April 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PA

1. As requested, we have completed an after action report for Public Affairs activities at Grand Forks AFB, ND involving Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

A. Assigned Personnel:

NAME	RANK	DUTY TITLE
DEWEY G. FORD	CAPT	Chief, Public Affairs
LINDSEY J. BORG	2D LT	Deputy Chief, Public Affairs
CLIFFORDEAN WASHINGTON	MSGT	Superintendent, Public Affairs
ANNETTE L. SNYDER	SGT	NCOIC, Community Relations
ERIC J. BOOMHOWER	SGT	NCOIC, Internal Information
JAMES E. FENTON	SGT	Staff Writer
STEVEN J. MERRILL	AIC	Editor, Base Newspaper
JOHN F. NEWSOM	AIC	Staff Writer
PERRY L. FABERA	TSGT	Administrative Technician

B. Narrative:

Throughout the war in the Persian Gulf the personnel in the public affairs office were heavily involved with media queries and news releases about Grand Forks AFB's support of operations in the Gulf.

During the initial stages of operations we invited the media to the base to view a mobility processing line, chemical warfare training and small arms training. We answered what questions we could based on the guidelines established for releasable information.

With the recent redeployments our office has invited the media out to the base whenever we have had personnel return. We have also made arrangements to meet the media at Grand Forks International Airport when base personnel have arrived on commercial aircraft. We followed each of these redeployments with a news release for the benefit of media not attending base return ceremonies.

We are now working closely with local media to arrange interviews with personnel returning from the Gulf. The local paper interviewed Brig Gen Caruana recently on his experiences. We also have arranged interviews with a crew of a KC-135R and local security police that were deployed during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We expect interviews of this nature to be of continued interest to the local media.

The local paper is also planning a special section later this month which will honor those that served in the Gulf. We have worked closely with them to obtain the needed information.

Internally, our base newspaper has been our primary communication tool. We have utilized AFNEWS and SACNEWS articles as well as locally developed articles. We worked with organizations on base to develop articles of local interest. This was particularly effective to inform deployed members and their families how their loss of basic allowance for subsistence would be handled locally. We are now switching to feature type stories in our base paper. We are including interviews with people who have recently redeployed.

We have submitted weekly inputs for the "Around the Air Force" section of Desert Defender as well as weekly articles and cartoons we felt were of interest.

We also made sure that deployed personnel would have access to the base paper. Initially, we placed each deployed person on our mailing list for papers. However, as the number of deployed personnel reached several hundred it became cumbersome and costly. We then switched to mailing several copies of the base paper to each of our main operating locations. These were then passed around among the deployed members. We also sent several copies each week to the MWR reading rooms that were established in the Gulf.

Our speakers bureau is now extremely active due to requests for speakers with experience in the Gulf. We have developed a special slide presentation which highlights the base mission and our role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

To assist in our media relations program and in our speakers bureau we have worked closely with our Unit Public Affairs Representatives to establish a list of personnel willing to help with our programs. When we need someone to give an interview or give a speech we call the appropriate UPAR who then helps us find individuals willing to contribute their time and effort.

Media relations throughout the war were good, particularly now that the war is over and redeployments are taking place. There was some feeling among the local media that we were not sharing all we could when the deployments first began. We adhered strictly to the guidelines on releasable information and cooperated to the maximum extent possible and now have established an excellent relationship.


Our role in the recent redeployments has been mainly to coordinate with the local media on returns. We worked as part of the base task force to help devise a plan to organize the returns and it worked well. We are notified of returns by the base command post and then arrange the media coverage. We have also provided coverage of the redeployments in our base paper.

### C. Problems and Solutions:

We deployed one of our staff members, Sgt Eric Boomhower, during Operation Desert Shield. He did not take a computer with him since another public affairs specialist from another base was deploying to the same location with one. When they arrived at their location and attempted to set up shop, their computer broke. We then sent them a lap-top computer but it never arrived and we have yet to recover this computer. Additionally, we did not have the type of desktop publishing software appropriate for this type of operation.

The basic office-variety computer is not designed for operation in a tent, surrounded by a sea of sand in extreme temperature conditions. If we expect public affairs representatives to produce a quality product for future contingencies we should provide each forward operating location with appropriate hardware and software to produce a quality newsletter or paper.

2. If you have any questions please contact us at DSN 362-5017.

  
DEWEY G. FORD, Capt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

cc: 8 AF/PA

## 1713st Air Refueling Wing Public Affairs (PA) After Action Report

### 1713st Air Refueling Wing (AREFW) Public Affairs Structure during Operation Desert Shield/Storm (August 1990 - April 1991)

#### - Public Affairs Office at home station:

-- MSgt William J. Daniel was transferred from his position in the Base Visual Information Support Center to man the office during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He was available during this time to work full time. He is 7 level qualified in the PA AFSC and a DINFOS graduate.

#### - Family Support Group:

-- Major William Palfreyman was put on active duty orders in December 1990 to establish and supervise a Family Support Group Office (FSG) full time.

#### - Public Affairs Deployed:

-- Captain Sandi Slaven, 171st AREFW Chief of Public Affairs, was activated on January 16, 1991 and deployed to the Middle East. Assigned to the 1713th Air Refueling Wing (provisional), made up of the 171st AREFW, Pittsburgh; 134th AREFG, Tennessee; 160th AREFG, Ohio.

#### Public Affairs Office at Home Unit:

- MSgt William J. Daniel and Capt. Sandra L. Slaven served additional active duty days at the onset of Desert Shield. Media interest was high because the 171AREFW was actively involved in the Persian Gulf since 7 Aug 1990.

- Following appropriate NGB guidance, the media was notified via official release on 9 August 90, of 171AREFW voluntary participation in ODS. MSgt Daniel manned the office nearly continuously from August until the outbreak of hostilities in January. Capt. Slaven served full time during August.

- Capt. Slaven and MSgt Daniel provided PA briefings and guidance to all base personnel. Advice was given to spouses who needed it regarding response to media inquiries. MSgt Daniel coordinated PA guidance with wing intelligence officers, and personally briefed all personnel who were scheduled for media interviews. MSgt Daniel and Capt. Slaven advised wing and deputy commanders on PA guidance updates as required.

- MSgt Daniel coordinated two hometown media trips to Saudi Arabia that were both aborted at the last minute due to Saudi local sensitivities. He secured state, National Guard Bureau, CENTAF and CENTCOM approvals for the trips on both occasions. He also coordinated the trips with USAFE and MAC public affairs officials, and the Saudi Embassy, Washington.

- MSgt Daniel released information to the media on the wing's notification of recall and activation on 14 December 1990 and 18 December 1990, respectively. The releases were prepared in both print and broadcast format, the latter being read nearly verbatim on most Pittsburgh broadcast media. He remained on active duty through mid-February and served as official spokesperson for the wing commander.

Internally, our base newspaper has been our primary communication tool. We have utilized AFNEWS and SACNEWS articles as well as locally developed articles. We worked with organizations on base to develop articles of local interest. This was particularly effective to inform deployed members and their families how their loss of basic allowance for subsistence would be handled locally. We are now switching to feature type stories in our base paper. We are including interviews with people who have recently redeployed.

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Chief, Public Affairs

cc: 8 AF/PA

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- Capt. Slaven and MSgt Daniel provided PA briefings and guidance to all base personnel. Advice was given to spouses who needed it regarding response to media inquiries. MSgt Daniel coordinated PA guidance with wing intelligence officers, and personally briefed all personnel who were scheduled for media interviews. MSgt Daniel and Capt. Slaven advised wing and deputy commanders on PA guidance updates as required.

- MSgt Daniel coordinated two hometown media trips to Saudi Arabia that were both aborted at the last minute due to Saudi local sensitivities. He secured state, National Guard Bureau, CENTAF and CENTCOM approvals for the trips on both occasions. He also coordinated the trips with USAFE and MAC public affairs officials, and the Saudi Embassy, Washington.

- MSgt Daniel released information to the media on the wing's notification of recall and activation on 14 December 1990 and 18 December 1990, respectively. The releases were prepared in both print and broadcast format, the latter being read nearly verbatim on most Pittsburgh broadcast media. He remained on active duty through mid-February and served as official spokesperson for the wing commander.

- MSgt Daniel assisted the Family Support Group with numerous functions. He also contributed much time to layout and design of the FSG semi-monthly newsletter, In Touch, and designed a certificate of appreciation that was sent to those organizations and individuals who contributed support to the FSG.

#### Family Support Group (FSG)

- **Internal Relations** (Communication with families of deployed personnel)

-- Family Support information booklet which consisted of information on financial and legal matters, CHAMPUS, Red Cross and names/numbers of base personnel who were available to help the families.

-- Semi-monthly newsletter, "In touch", sent to the family members. The newsletter kept the families informed of tax information, pay status, information sent home from the deployed areas, dates and times of FSG functions, etc.

-- Monthly "dinners" or gatherings for all family members. The FSG provided "volunteer" entertainment such as a USO show sponsored by 3-W-S (a local radio station), Chuck E. Cheese and Cookie Monster for the children, a live band, and Jared Williams, a Pittsburgh Steeler signing autographs.

-- Support meetings were held twice a month (the 2nd and 4th of every month). This gave the dependents an opportunity to discuss feelings and problems.

-- "Specific" unit dinners: there were dinners set up for only dependents of a specific section, i.e., the dependents of deployed OPS personnel, dependents of deployed maintenance personnel, etc.

-- Phone Tree: Phone trees were developed to pass on information to all the dependents. (Six different phone trees for six different groups deployed).

- **External Relations** (Communication)

-- The "In Touch" newsletter was faxed to deployed location and made available to deployed troops.

-- Correspondence between FSG coordinator and deployed Public Affairs Officer was done through faxed messages.

-- Care packages, letters, equipment, etc. were sent to deployed location via KC-135 aircraft during "plane swaps". Coordination through operations office.

- **Media Relations**

-- WWSW (3-W-S), a local radio station, provided tremendous support.

--- Operation Greeting Card: In January 1991, 3-W-S Radio initiated "3-W-S/Operation Greeting Card. The goal was to acquire Valentines Day and other greeting cards...then get the unused cards to the Pittsburgh military

personnel in the Middle East...they in turn would send the cards home to family members and friends in the USA. \* 15,000 greeting cards were sent to our deployed location.

--- 3-W-S Radio also dedicated 4 hour shows to our deployed troops -- the shows were recorded and sent to our deployed location.

--- Provided live entertainment during FSG dinner.

--- Broadcast live during our three days of "Homecoming".

-- Local media was informed of any events, i.e., dinners, homecoming, etc., via news releases being faxed to them.

#### - **Homecoming**

-- Local media coverage

-- Provided the following for the families:

--- Refreshments were donated for the families as they waited for the airplanes.

--- Champaign provided for each family

--- Roses donated to give to each deployed person

--- Flags to all families

--- High School Bands provided live music

--- Coordination of busses, security, parking for the "Homecoming".

#### - **Problems / Lessons Learned:**

-- There are no Air Force or Air National Guard directives or guidelines for establishing a Family Support Group office.

-- There was no State guidance until the office was already established.

-- There was no government funding for the FSG.

-- Confusion on where the FSG fit into the structure or chain of command.

-- It was difficult establishing a valid phone tree -- because of deployed personnel it was difficult to use the Alert Recall Roster.

-- Lack of communication between other Air National Guard Units with deployed personnel.

-- One person was activated to coordinate the FSG (Maj Bill Palfraymen). Full time staff was needed. Officer, NCO, and administrative assistance.

#### Public Affairs Deployed:

##### - **Communications**

-- **External** (communications with home unit)

--- Tanker Talk from the Gulf: a weekly newsletter in Support of units deployed to Operation Desert Storm. Its purpose was to inform family members of the 1713 Air Refueling Wing (provisional), (171st AREFW, PA; 160th AREFG, OH; 134th AREFG, TN), via the unit Family Support Groups. The newsletter was composed of mission orientated stories, articles highlighting individuals and jobs, and messages home. Distribution: Faxed to the three home units and copies distributed throughout trailers (work areas).

--- Video tapes: various video tapes, made by the deployed Public Affairs Officer and Combat Camera Crew, depicting mission and people, were sent home to the home units via federal express, "swap out" airplanes, and/or mail service. The video tapes sent consisted of an orientation to base facilities; shots of mid-air refueling various aircraft; messages home to family members, etc.

--- Photography: The deployed PAO was responsible for taking slides, black/white and color shots of people and mission for all three units. Prints of all pictures taken were given to all three units. The negatives are at 171st AREFW/PA.

-- **Internal** (communications with deployed personnel)

--- Newsletter was distributed to the work areas..

--- Bulletin Board: The deployed PAO established a centralized bulletin board which was set up at the Airport (work area) near the "chow" line. Information was posted on a daily bases, i.e., information from home units; news articles and newsletters from home; information regarding base and airport activities, such as, USO visits, Chaplin services, pizza parties, film developing procedures, etc.

- **Media Relations**: An International media "pool" (about 150 people) were located near our deployed location. A Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was formed to coordinate and escort the media to various military location in the area.

-- Media pools visited the operating location of the 1713th AREFW and accompanied aircrew on combat missions: 3 Feb 92 and 5 Feb 91. Deployed PAO coordinated the media flights with the JIBs, 1713 ARW/CC, and 1713 operations. Mission and safety briefings were conducted prior to the flights.

-- Deployed PAO also assisted the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing Public Affairs Officer during media visits to the -- F-16 location in the U.A.E.

- **Community Relations**

-- In celebration of victory in war, on Tuesday, March 6th, female officers assigned to the 1713th AREFW and 388th TFW, participated in a luncheon at the U.S. Consul - General residence in Jumeireh, Dubia. The female officers joined the wives of Consul - Generals of Britain, U.S., Kuwait, Egypt, France, and other countries.

-- USO: The USO in Dubai provided the 1713th AREFW personnel with telephones to call home; Federal Express services, film developing, pizza parties, and errand service. The USO visited the 1713th once a week. The deployed PAO coordinated all visits and activities.


- Lessons learned

-- There was no equipment at work place for Public Affairs use. For the newsletter the 388th TFW's Public Affairs computer was used. Borrowed 388th TFW's MWR Video Camera for PA use. Used privately owned 35mm camera for PA purposes.

-- There was no way to develop film. Combat Camera Crew did not have capability, PAO was restricted to base facilities, no finances to get developed off base. Finally, in March, contracting did provide capability to go off base.

-- Not knowing what the taskings would be -- deployed PAO did not have "crash kit". However, the crash kit was sent on a "swap out" airplane coming from home unit.

-- Only one person on staff -- because of 24 hour operations, and a multitude of demands put upon PA i.e., photography, videography, writing, media flights, etc., it would have been helpful to have another Public Affairs person on staff. Possibly an officer and NCO on staff.



SANDRA L. SLAVEN, Capt, PaANG  
Public Affairs Office



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 416TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) (SAC)  
GRIFFISS AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK 13441-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: 416 BMW/PA (587-3057)

24 April 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: SAC/PA

1. Name, rank, and duty title of office personnel:

Capt. Barney Welch	Chief
2Lt. Mary Beth Munhall	Deputy Chief
MSgt. Larry Clavette	NCOIC
TSgt. Janie Blaney	Managing Editor
Sgt. Jerry Lawson	Staff Writer
A1C Kym Keravuori	Staff Writer
Carl Sahre, GS-9	Media Relations Officer
Charles Hayes, GS-6	Editor
Barbara Newey, GS-5	Secretary

2. The office experienced severe manning difficulty because of the deployment. Although our mission never suffered, we certainly had to prioritize and work extra hours to maintain an effective PA program. The chief and managing editor both deployed. The deputy chief PCS'd. This left the NCOIC, the media relations officer, the editor, two staff writers, and the secretary. The biggest obstacle was inexperience on the newspaper staff. Neither staff writer has had much time in PA: the sergeant is a cross-trainee and the airman joined the Air Force in Aug 90. As one would expect, the biggest result from manpower deployments was that some programs had to be eliminated or scaled down because there weren't enough people to work them all.

3. Our internal information program was a top priority throughout the deployment. We realized early what an important role it would play, both at the forward operating location and back at Griffiss.

a. The Camp Nacerima Flyer: We deployed our managing editor with the wing's ADVON team to set up shop at our FOL. The Nacerima Flyer began as a daily newsletter and developed into a weekly newspaper to keep our deployed troops informed. This newspaper continued, in an expanded form utilizing desktop publishing, until 1 April when our primary forward-deployed location was closed.

b. The Mohawk Flyer: Early in the deployment, we decided to devote at least one page per week in the base newspaper to Letters to Deployed. This proved quite popular with both the families here and the deployed members. We also had additional pages devoted to stories about the deployment and from the deployed location. We wrote several special articles dealing with Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Coverage of the redeployment and homecoming activities is ongoing.

c. Interaction: Our publisher mailed copies of the Mohawk Flyer to our troops at five major deployed locations. The units/squadrons mailed copies to their people deployed at other locations. We also mailed 60 copies of local newspapers, both daily's and weekly's, to the troops at our major FOL's. Towards the beginning of the deployment, these papers arrived in country with a two to three-week delay, but this improved as quicker means of shipping these were explored.

d. Support Groups: We were critically interlinked with Griffiss' Family Services for providing information. We also established excellent working relationships with base support groups and were included in all meetings. Our Family Support Center, ironically, opened 1 Aug, and many people took advantage of their programs. We worked very closely with support group and Support Center officials and provided extensive publicity for their meetings and programs.

e. Special Meetings: Special town hall meetings were hosted by the wing commander and a public affairs representative attended each to answer questions and provide input. One example was when we invited IRS representatives to attend and speak at a meeting. The IRS was very receptive and sent four or five officials who explained every possible tax situation to the spouses. This was a very well-received, extremely credible means of addressing an important topic.

f. Base Cable Television: We used Channel 19, our cable access channel, extensively to support Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Announcements and special programs were aired throughout the war to keep the base informed.

g. Desert Defender: We submitted 39 stories, many with photos, to Desert Defender to get our story to our deployed troops.

4. Our media relations program was most profoundly affected by three factors: our inability to deploy or escort local media to our FOL for political reasons, the lack of information being released by the deployed command, and our adherence to the "rules" and release of very few specifics (while a local Air National Guard unit got national attention for their comprehensive releases).

a. Because our media couldn't go to the deployed site, we decided early in the operation to get them to focus on our people left behind, on family programs, and on community support provided. They responded well and we got excellent coverage in the local media. We provided orientation flights to two TV stations and escorted many media representatives on the base for stories. The biggest single media event during the deployment was a visit from Barbara Bush in February. More than 60 local, regional, and national media, along with White House press corps, covered the visit. Other events which commanded much media attention were the deployments and returns of the 10th Mountain Division's aviation brigade, our air refueling squadrons and the B-52 squadron, and the nearly 1000 Griffiss troops that participated in the operations. We worked 300 media queries in March alone. Throughout Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, local and regional media interest was very high. This meant numerous calls, at all hours, to PA people.

b. Quelling rumors in the local media was difficult due to the lock on information by the operations' deployed commands. After four months of the deployment this situation began to improve.

c. The biggest obstacle to a better-than-satisfactory relationship with the local media during the deployment was the disparity between our release policies and those followed by the local air guard unit. They went as far as a full disclosure of their story, from numbers of daily bombing missions their people were flying to specific bombing targets. After they were featured on CNN and we asked for HQ assistance in silencing them, they began to adhere to the rules. We had taken, and continued to receive, bitter criticism from our media for being unable to disclose our deployed location or our mission information.

5. Despite the fact that some of our routine community relations programs, like the base tours, took a back seat to more pressing concerns during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, our relationship with the surrounding communities thrived.

a. Speaker's Bureau: With help from our wing commander, who accepted numerous speaking engagements himself and encouraged the unit commanders to support the program, we were able to keep the program going despite the large numbers of deployed personnel. As our people return, the demand for speakers has increased dramatically, because community interest in "thanking the troops" is very high. Our numbers for March were very high and our appearances in April have been even more frequent. Some of the best appearances have been trips to schools and groups by airmen who corresponded with certain classes, scout troops, church youth organizations, etc. throughout the deployment.

b. Tours: Within the last month we have begun to conduct tours again. Our focus is on non-choir audiences, and we are not lacking for requests to fill. "Mom and Pop" tours by individual airmen are frequent.

c. Demonstrations: We did have two anti-war/anti-nuclear demonstrations by local peace groups during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They received much coverage, both local and national.

d. Commanders' Day: We expect record crowds at our Commanders' Day open house and air show scheduled for 2 June because of our support of the war and because the Thunderbirds will be here. The event has been dubbed "Our Salute to the Mohawk Valley for your Support During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm" to show our appreciation to the local communities.

e. Community Support: Our community relations program's most prominent responsibilities during the deployment were the necessary actions we took to keep the communities informed and to deal with the outpouring of support from

the local people. We processed countless gifts donated by vendors and private citizens to the deployed troops. We worked with civil and business groups from Buffalo to Albany, Binghamton to Watertown to provide goods for our airmen. As the troops return, the Griffiss Military Affairs Committee and the general public are there to welcome them home. Each aircraft carrying returning personnel has been met by members of the community, with crowds in the hundreds when we opened up the base for welcoming celebrations. Overall, the area has been behind the operation and very enthusiastic in their support of the base.

6. The problems we encountered with manpower, internal efforts at the FOL, information getting back to Griffiss, and consistency with local releases should be addressed.

a. There was too much confusion deciding who was deploying where and when from the public affairs office. In the future, HQ 8AF and SAC should have a plan to support operations like this and task certain bases to provide needed manpower. With this tasking, we can develop a local plan to provide the necessary support for our deployed unit. Our people could be ready and equipped to deploy.

b. Because our chief deployed and our deputy PCS'd, we were left with no officers in the public affairs division. We recommend that the deployment manpower demands allow for retaining at least one officer at the installation. Our NCO's conducted the public affairs programs with the utmost professionalism, but we lacked officer representation at wing meetings and for base functions. The NCOIC had to fill all roles: supervisor, expert, disciplinarian, morale-booster, leader, manager, PA representative to everything and paper-shuffler, even when those roles were in conflict.

c. The office lacks the equipment needed to deploy and produce a quality newsletter or newspaper. In the future, funding should be provided to purchase a portable computer, software and the other items needed to have in our mobility box.

d. Our people worked extra hours to meet the added requirement of submitting articles to the Desert Defender. However, our office received a copy of only two issues through the entire deployment. Desert Defenders should have been distributed to all units who were required to submit stories so the contributors could have seen the finished product and what was printed.

e. Our deployed personnel faced an extra large amount of bureaucracy trying to get releases and photos cleared. We recommend planning now to allow the deployed commander, with PA guidance, release authority during contingencies. This would be consistent with the policy of allowing the wing commander to approve releases that affect his/her installation.

f. The inconsistency between release "rules" followed by the local Air National Guard unit and those adhered to by the active duty units could be eliminated by ensuring that when a unit is called to active duty, the members

understand what the rules are and that they must follow them.

7. Overall, the public affairs division overcame the initial confusion surrounding the deployment, compensated for the manpower shortages, and fulfilled the missions of informing the internal audience--both local and deployed, facilitating good media relations, and cultivating a positive relationship with the surrounding communities.

8. If there are any questions regarding this Desert Shield/Desert Storm after-action report, please direct them to me at AV 587-3057.

*Mary Beth Munhall*

MARY BETH MUNHALL, 2Lt., USAF  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs Division

cc: 8AF/PA

#### MANNING:

The 416th BMW Public Affairs Representative, TSgt Janie C. Blaney, 79170, deployed as a member of the initial advance team to Seeb, Oman in support of Operation Desert Shield on 26 Aug 90.

#### EQUIPMENT:

Public Affairs deployed with administrative supplies and a typewriter. However, the typewriter was damaged in transit, requiring PA to borrow a typewriter on a space available basis for nearly two weeks. A request was submitted to purchase a computer with pagemaker capability for PA use, but the equipment did not arrive until after TSgt Blaney's departure. The PA camera had accompanied the Public Affairs Officer on his deployment to the Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

#### OBSERVATION:

All photography at the deployment location was initially forbidden. After the deployment commander requested PA photography authorization through the Royal Omani Air Force Liaison, photography was permitted for PA only within the camp compound limits.

#### OBSERVATION:

After photography was authorized, the deployment commander notified the 416th BMW commander of the lack of a camera for deployment documentation. A 35mm camera was procured by the host wing and sent to the Forward Operating Location on the next available aircraft.

#### OBSERVATION:

Film was processed in Muscat, Oman through contracting, usually with a 7-10 day turnaround. A copy machine was eventually procured and placed in base operations, requiring shuttle bus transportation to and from the geographically separated work areas.

#### PA IMPACT ON DEPLOYMENT:

Upon arrival, deployment members were occupied with living arrangements, determining work space requirements, locating equipment and establishing communications. Public Affairs requirements were very low on the priority list. No work space was initially allotted to PA.

For the first ten (10) days, TSgt Blaney made rounds on foot and by shuttle bus to the various organizations for information to print in a daily newsletter. Once information was compiled, the PERSCO staff allowed use of their typewriter on an as available basis. Host nation authorities restricted our movements and requested the deployment force remain low profile. Therefore, only one copy of the newsletter was published and posted on the camp bulletin board after review by the deployment commander for security and host nation sensitivities.

After the second week, a tent was allotted to PA for work space, but electrical hook-up was not available until three days later. The day after electricity was connected, PA was moved to a pre-fab building (6'X20') shared with the wing commander, wing executive officer, administrative clerk, first sergeant and historian. PA was also given access to a portable lap-top computer on a space available basis.

Two weeks before TSgt Blaney redeployed, an office in the newly constructed Combat Support Group administrative building was allotted for PA use, but no phone access except through the wing commander.

As senior ranking enlisted female, TSgt Blaney was also tasked as an unofficial liaison to resolve issues pertaining to enlisted women. This included coordination of procurement of personal items, dress and conduct standards, assigning details and personal counseling for individuals as needed.

Direct contact with the commander was often difficult in the beginning as establishing the base, and initiating flying operations was the main priority. The commander held separate weekly staff meetings with the wing staff and combat support group key personnel.

Supervisors and senior staff were generally supportive and cooperative in working with PA. However, information flow was severely restricted due to security requirements and it sometimes took 24-72 hours for the deployment commander to approve the newsletter for posting. A weekly staff meeting, that was frequently cancelled, provided the only consistent contact with the commander. PA was not allowed in the wing staff meetings or when classified information not pertaining directly to PA was being discussed. PA was not informed of operations or subject(s) of commanders conferences with CENTAF officials except when information excerpts were briefed to the entire populace.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

Public Affairs (officer or enlisted) involvement in all deployment planning and operations should be stressed to allow proactive Public Affairs involvement and provide commanders with activities/information impact considerations.

a. Community Relations: No community relations activities were authorized. As the deployment progressed, security police established a rapport with the local Air Force security and eventually joint sports activities were conducted, but without PA involvement either in the coordination or planning phase.

b. Media Relations: No international media were given in-country clearance, thus no media contacts were made. Contact with local media was not approved by host nation authorities.

c. Internal Information: PA's primary function was to provide timely, factual information to all levels and attempt to dispell the numerous rumors that continued to crop up throughout the deployment. A rumor control was established and was reasonably effective in dispelling inaccurate information. A newsletter was published daily, containing favorable comments on exceptional areas/personnel, bulletin items pertaining to safety, fire prevention, MWR activities, morale items, shuttle bus, sick call and dining hall hours, and mission updates when approved. Commanders comments were made through a personal letter from the commander posted on the bulletin board. The last three weeks, the paper was expanded to a four page weekly after news service and copy machine access became available. One hundred copies of the newsletter were made using the camp copy machine at base operations, as the chief of PERSCO objected to the amount of paper used and time required to produce the edition. Papers were hand-carried by PA to each tent, selected offices and gathering places of camp personnel.

A one page history of camp achievements and biographies of key personnel were written and produced for information packets for the numerous distinguished visitors that visited the deployment site.

Hometown news releases were solicited and returned to the individual's home stations for processing.

#### COMMUNICATIONS:

As security was a major factor in communications, PA was authorized access to the commander's telephone on an as needed basis. A secure voice telephone system was installed in the commander's office approximately one month before TSgt Blaney redeployed to home station.

Crossfeed between other AOR Public Affairs staffs was non-existent until early November, as specific locations were not releaseable and the few phone lines were for essential communications only. A PA staff directory was compiled by HQ CENTAF, but as it also contained sensitive information about aircraft types, number of personnel assigned and base locations, copies of the directory had to be hand carried to the various locations when personnel were available to transport the listing. It was treated as a classified document.

Telephone communications between the deployment location and HQ CENTAF were invaluable. Maj Tiedemann and Capt Sierra provided information, fact sheets and biographies as required, and made arrangements for the delivery of the Desert Defender newspaper when the 416th (deployed) was having trouble receiving the paper on a regular basis. They provided information on other PA activities in theater and passed on ideas, suggestions and directions for overcoming information roadblocks caused by initial isolation until stable communication lines could be established.

PA did not begin receiving PA guidance/information messages until late September due to a number of technical difficulties with the communications equipment. This factor was overcome by contacting the in-country USIS team and HQ CENTAF for information until the backlog of messages was received.

Until news release guidance could be obtained, no news releases were authorized by the deployment commander. Subsequently, after release procedures were outlined, four news releases were sent to CENTAF Rear for clearance and an info copy sent to home station with an embargo to hold the releases until written clearance approval was received from CENTAF. None of the four ever received written clearance. Subjects were:

NCO Induction ceremony

Desert reenlistment

Prime BEEF team builds tent city

Mother/Son on active duty assigned to same home station (one deployed-one stateside)

Photos were held at the deployment location until restrictions were lifted and clearance procedures could be simplified and there was a reasonable chance of the photographs being returned to owning base.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 305TH AIR REFUELING WING (H) (SAC)  
GRISSOM AIR FORCE BASE, INDIANA 46971-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: 305 AREFW/PA (Lt Harrison, DSN 928-8222) 18 April 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PAI (SMSgt Spriggs)

1. The following is a list of personnel assigned to 305 AREFW/PA during Operation Desert Shield/Storm:

- Capt Ronald N. McGee, Chief Public Affairs
- 1st Lt William Harrison, Deputy Chief
- MSgt Daryl Green, NCOIC (Deployed 21 AUG 90 to 9 MAR 91)
- SSgt Kenneth Mattingly, NCOIC, Community Relations (PCS April 91)
- SSgt Kathy Gandara, NCOIC, Internal Information
- Sgt Steven Dunn, NCOIC, Information Management
- A1C Clifford Ulmer, Base Newspaper Editor (Deployed 21 AUG 90 to 9 MAR 91)

2. In addition to deploying our NCOIC and newspaper editor to Operation Desert Shield for nearly seven months, the remaining PA staff members carried a full load of Desert Shield/Storm-related projects.

a. Internal Information. When Grissom members began deploying to Desert Shield, it became necessary to fill the gaps between Friday base newspapers with a daily (or as needed) newsletter called the Grissom Racer. Personnel, pay, family and many other important issues were addressed in the Racer. PA became more closely associated with the Family Support Center by providing important information for frequent town meetings that were held for families of deployed people. Base newspapers and newsletters were mailed to each deployed location every week. Although we followed postal regulations very carefully, we received many complaints that newspapers weren't reaching our people every week. This caused much frustration on both ends, and even threatened our credibility at times. In future operations, ensuring that deployed troops receive base publications should be a priority!

b. Media Relations. Prior to Desert Shield, stimulating more than local media interest in the base was always challenging. But as soon as the operation began, media organizations from Indianapolis, Ft. Wayne, South Bend, Lafayette and many other cities became acutely interested in everything we do here. We quickly seized the opportunity and planned media events that would demonstrate the importance of our mission. Although we couldn't talk specifically about our role in Desert Shield, we invited media to tour a KC-135 and talk with various crew members

about what they do. On subsequent occasions, we invited media organizations to see a mobility processing line, and view members boarding aircraft to deploy overseas. It became a routine sight to see one or more satellite trucks parked outside our main gate doing live reports from Grissom. We honored many other requests by reporters wanting to visit the base to interview Air Force people and family members. Although we had isolated cases of reporters becoming frustrated with our policy to not discuss specific missions, deployment locations or numbers deployed, our media relations program improved greatly during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. We had many area media interested in the hometown visit program -- but we were denied by CENTAF on three separate requests. The request process for this program was very confusing, time consuming, and frustrating -- to say the least! It surprises me that anyone was able to take advantage of it. Even considering host country sensitivities, there should have been a more streamlined process for getting local media over to Desert Shield. We missed several ideal opportunities to take media over and back on short-notice missions because of the lengthy approval process.

c. Community Relations. The relationship between Grissom and the surrounding communities has always been positive, but Desert Shield and Storm set the stage for a renewal of public support for the base. We received an overwhelming amount of requests from local organizations to donate care packages for deployed personnel, as well as food and money for our Family Support Center. We tried to make sure that each donation, regardless of the size was appreciated. Whenever possible, we would ask the wing commander to present a personalized color photo of a formation of Grissom aircraft to the donor organization. Most surrounding schools mounted letter writing campaigns, and upon request, we would send base representatives to school rallies to accept their cards and letters. We also made it a high priority to ensure that letters to troops were sent out on the first available aircraft. Returning Grissom personnel have been encouraged to visit local classes they corresponded with -- which has had the added benefit of some very positive media coverage. The speakers bureau also became inundated with requests for Desert Shield-related speaking engagements. We filled as many as possible with aircrew members and commanders who had rotated back from Desert Shield, but the unavailability of color slides or videotape of in-theater SAC operations made it difficult to provide high-quality presentations. We did receive a set of color slides from AVS showing SAC operations, but were told they couldn't be used for off-base presentations -- rendering them useless for our needs. A relatively generic 15-20 minute slide briefing about SAC's contribution to Desert Shield would have been extremely useful for speaking requests.

3. A large ceremony/party honoring redeployed troops, their families and the local communities is planned for 1 May 91. Local service organizations and vendors have flooded the planning committee with donations of food, beverages and money to ensure "Hoosier Homecoming" is a success. The outdoor event will

include an awards ceremony, entertainment and many other activities. We anticipate a large amount of media interest, and we'll provide a media center and flatbed platform for reporters and photographers to have a good vantage point.

4. If you have any questions, please contact me at DSN 928-8222.

*William R. Harrison*

WILLIAM R. HARRISON, 1st Lt, USAF  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs Division

From: 376SWACR 24-APR-1991 20:20:09.70  
To: HQSACPA,376SWACR  
CC:  
Subj:

FROM: 376 SW/ACR (MSgt Strobel) 25 Apr 91

Subject: DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT,  
YOUR MSG 251916Z MAR 91

TO: HQ SAC/PA (SMSgt Spriggs)

1. The following message contains information in response to your message 251916Z MAR 91. Point of contact for the 376th Strategic Wing (376 SW) on Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan, is MSgt JoAnn Strobel, 376 SW/ACR, AV (315)634-1556. DDN address for electronic mail is 376SWACR.

2. The 376 SW Public Affairs Liaison is an additional duty since we are a tenant on Kadena AB. We do not have any 791X0 personnel authorized or assigned to our Wing. As such, we did not have PAOS deployed in support of Desert Storm.

3. Throughout the Persian Gulf Crisis, all Desert Storm media and community relations efforts on Kadena AB were under control of the 313 AD/PA (PACAF) Division. We did, however, have a very strong family support program within the Wing to help our families on the homefront. We also established an excellent working relationship with various base support agencies. A summary of these programs are as follows:

With the strong support and backing from our Wing Commander, Col Gerald M. Beverly, and four Squadron Commanders, the 376 SW had a very active family support program for our dependents of deployed members.

#### DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION:

When it was apparent we would deploy in November, the 376 SW called upon the Kadena Family Support Center for advice on how best to prepare our people and their families. After an initial meeting to discuss our needs, the Family Support Center called a meeting of all the base support agencies that could help us. They put together an excellent predeployment briefing for our families, which included Personal Affairs, Finance, Legal, Medical, Chaplain, DoD Dependent School System, Security Police, and Red Cross. These briefings were held at night to get maximum participation from both the sponsor and spouse. These briefings were an overwhelming success in reducing the stress associated with long-term family separations.

In addition to the family briefings, we also held specialized briefings on a variety of subjects to our military members. Topics included chemical warfare refresher training, and all subjects HQ SAC sent through message traffic.

On the day of departure, we brought families to the flightline to bid their loved ones farewell, and to see them take off. The deployment was a Kadena Team effort, because the entire base contributed to its success. The families

## LESSONS LEARNED:

Initially, even though we were able to tell people that a deployment would soon come, few were totally prepared. This was partly due to the short notice tasking, and partly because very few people had ever been on a major deployment.

We found many spouses, especially non-U.S. Nationals, did not know how to make appointments, balance checkbooks, or do other routine tasks normally done by the head of the family. The Family Support Center briefing was a big help in preparing families in this area. Although nothing makes a long deployment easy, this program certainly made it more manageable.

We also created checklists for people deploying containing such items as family support issues, personal items to take, and how to ensure CWD bags were complete and in good condition.

## POST DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT:

### Spouse Support Meetings:

The Family Support Center was very active in caring for our spouses. They set up spouse support groups and frequently sent out flyers on activities arranged for the families, such as stress management classes.

Also, each of the four 376 SW Squadron Commanders held separate, weekly spouse support group meetings to pass information. These meetings gave the spouses a chance to share information and pictures they received from the deployed locations. It also gave them a chance to share with someone with the same kind of problems. They even worked on arts and crafts for their spouses, and occasionally went bowling and out for ice cream to uplift their spirits.

During these weekly support meetings at Chapel 2, the Chaplains on Kadena paid for childcare out of their fund.

Our support meetings continued even after our deployed men and women returned home. At these meetings we concentrated on reunion problems and coping mechanisms to help our families reduce the stresses brought about by a long separation and eventual reunion.

### Children's Support Group

On 4 Feb 91, the Family Support Center "kicked off" a children's support group for children ages 6 to 12. The children met every Monday to discuss concerns about their parents deployed to Operation Desert Storm locations around the world. Then, on Saturdays, the children met again for "fun day." They went to the movies, made pizzas, designed arts and crafts, built gift boxes for our troops in the field, and just had an all around fun day in a comfortable setting. The lag time between the Monday meeting and Saturday fun day was intentional; it gave each child a milestone to look forward to.

The children also attended support groups with their peers in the various Department of Defense schools located throughout the island. They were referred to the Family Support Center for "Teen Talk Groups" on Wednesdays. The meetings were for

teens only, but they were not limited to teens who had a parent involved in Desert Storm.

Feedback from these meetings and outings indicated that they were both positive and uplifting.

#### Adopt-A-Family/Adopt-An-Airman

Adopt-A-Family was an idea conceived by Maj Nakayama, our OMS/CC. Each family whose spouse was deployed was adopted by a family who was here on Kadena. These families made periodic calls to the adopted families and served as a point of contact if problems arose. The squadron commander interceded if a problem could not be resolved by the host family. Squadron Commanders also called our spouses often to ensure all was well.

Adopt-An-Airman was directed toward the deployed single men and women. Each deployed single Airman was adopted and received cards, letters, and care packages from a host family here on Kadena.

To aid us in maintaining contact with each spouse, each squadron created a Deployed Personnel Information Roster listing deployed members' names, spouses' names, phone numbers, the host families and phone numbers, and any special information such as indentifying spouses who are pregnant or families with special medical problems.

For those spouses who returned home to the United States, we listed a CONUS address and phone number, and return dates. This roster was a quick reference for keeping close contact with spouses in case an emergency arose.

#### Self Help Support:

Self Help Support was a program to identify individuals within the Wing who had certain skills that adopted families might require. This all volunteer list was maintained by the Comptroller Division, and included names, telephone numbers and area of expertise such as: mechanical repair, computer specialists, lawn mowing, checkbook balancing, etc. This list was distributed to each family of a deployed spouse and they were encouraged to call if a special need arose. The list was updated regularly to keep it current.

#### Spouse News Letters:

On Wednesday each week, the four 376 SW Squadron commanders, and a comptroller representative for the Wing met to discuss events, news, or problems that arose over the past week. They compared notes and decided on newsworthy information that should be passed to the spouses. The Wing Commander also wrote letters to spouses and brought information to these meetings he wished to convey to our families.

A list of these announcements was compiled and a letter written by one squadron commander. Responsibility for writing the weekly letter was passed to a different commander each week. By Friday, the letter was then distributed on a Friday afternoon, the squadron commanders finalized their letters and mailed them out. This program kept the spouses

informed of upcoming events and any other newsworthy information.

Like the support meetings, these newsletters were continued even after our troops returned home.

### Holiday Videos:

Two weeks before Christmas, five NCOs set up a video taping studio in our wing briefing room and invited families, co-workers and friends to greet the men and women deployed to Saudi Arabia. Many families and office co-workers came to give a little Christmas cheer. The tape was mailed to forward operating locations as a Christmas greeting.

### Base-wide Support and Assistance

The "Kadena Team" established various milestones for our families to look forward to. In December, we organized many different Christmas parties to keep our families in the festive mood. In January, the 376 SW sponsored two tax seminars for our spouses; one during duty hours in our wing briefing room, and another during the evening at Chapel 2. These seminars were provided by Kadena's tax expert from the Legal Office. Our goal here was to assist our spouses in filling out their income tax forms, if they so desired.

In February, the Protestant and Catholic Women of the Chapel organized a base-wide Desert Shield/Storm Potluck Dinner which was well attended. Additionally, numerous 376 SW volunteers serviced over 40 cars and vans during a Saturday afternoon "deployed spouse car mart." They

performed minor preventive maintenance such as: checking and changing engine oil, cleaning battery terminals, checking tire pressure, checking fluid levels, changing belts, changing light bulbs, and washing vehicles.

In March, we scheduled many different fund raising activities to raise money for our 6 Apr 91, 376 SW Desert Storm family/welcome home picnic. At the picnic, we gave plaques to all the agencies that supported us during this difficult time, and also presented letters of appreciation to the enlisted troops that accomplished important feats in the AOR.

During April, the Veterans of Foreign Wars Post on Okinawa held a welcome back dinner/membership drive for the four 376 SW Squadrons. At these dinners, the VFW supplied all the food, fun, and refreshments for the evening.

Kadena AB is currently in the process of planning a basewide parade and all-around festive affair, for the upcoming Memorial Day weekend, to really welcome our troops home.

### The Personal Touch

Lt Col Stamm, the 376 SW/DO, and his wife held a special dinner for the deployed spouse wives of the 909 AREFS on 22 Feb 91. A regular support group meeting was held in conjunction with this dinner.

our deployment at the start of the war. We were the only support group behind during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Comptroller Division collected over \$2,000 in goods and cash and forwarded items in short supply to our friends out in the

field around the world.

Many other 376 SW offices and base-wide agencies also routed many high demand personal items through us for delivery to troops who were deployed in Saudi Arabia and around the world. In fact, the local chapter of the Veterans Foreign Wars collected boxes of supplies for us to deliver to 376 SW personnel.

We in the 376 SW consider ourselves a family. We developed a Desert Shield/Desert Storm family support program that really worked. If you would like specific examples of letters and flyers mailed to our spouses, etc. just let us know and we'll get them to you as soon as possible. One guide in particular was very helpful; it was the Desert Shield guide for spouses and children put together by the Kadena Mental Health Clinic - entitled, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD: A PRE-DEPLOYMENT GUIDE.

4. In addition to these programs, we arranged for the 313 AD/PA to distribute copies of the KADENA SHOGUN (base newspaper) to the following deployed units during Desert Storm:

- a. 4300 PBW
- b. 1701 AREFW
- c. 1703 AREFW

5. Special articles/issues about the 376 SW published in the base newspaper were as follows:

ARTICLE	ISSUE
a. 909 AREFS Tasking	28 Sep 90
b. Major Recounts Desert Tour	30 Nov 90
c. 376 SW Deployment	30 Nov 90
d. 376 SW Desert History	14 Dec 90
e. Homecoming Feature	15 Mar 91


MSgt JoAnn Strobel sends. Please be sure to confirm receipt of this message to satisfy our suspense. Thank You.

DESERT SHIELD/STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT  
410TH BOMBARDMENT WING  
K. I. SAWYER AFB, MICHIGAN

The following is a start-to-finish depiction of the outstanding support offered by the Public Affairs office of the 410th Bombardment Wing. The events that took place from August, 1990 to present are affectionately known as "Sawyer Storm," for they portray our support to Desert Storm.

As chief of public affairs, it was my honor and privilege to have had the distinctive honor to be the chief of what is without a doubt one of the premier public affairs offices in SAC today.

The hard work, endless hours, and sacrifice by these PA pros cannot be surpassed. It was an honor to lead them in war.

  
JAMES E. MORRIS, Major, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE PERSONNEL

James E. Morris	Major	Chief, Public Affairs
Helen W. Jones	2LT	Deputy Chief, Public Affairs
Edward S. Roth	SSgt	NCOIC, Public Affairs
Steven M. Smith	SSgt	Editor, Northern Light * Deployed Jan 1991 - Saudi Arabia
Timothy J. Luckow	Sgt	NCOIC, Information Management
Randy D. Lawson	Sgt	Electronic Media Specialist
Patrick M. Griffith	Ann	Asst. Editor, Northern Light
Faye Claeys	Civ	Volunteer to Public Affairs

As mentioned above, SSgt Smith volunteered to deploy in support of Desert Storm in January, 1991. It was an honor to have one of our Public Affairs staff serve their country in Saudi Arabia. Steve's job in Saudi has been to serve as an editor of a base newspaper. He has sent us numerous articles from Saudi that have been published in our base newspaper. In his absence, Airman Griffith has stepped to the front and has done an absolutely superior job as editor of our paper. Obviously, the hours have been longer due to Steve's deployment. However, we figured out ways to work smarter, instead of harder. All of the rest of my staff increased their workload and jobs, suspenses, and other subsequent taskings were always met on or before the deadline. These actions by our Public Affairs staff are in the highest traditions of Public Affairs Professionalism.

## NARRATIVE - DESERT SHIELD/STORM

1. INTERNAL SUPPORT - With the deployment of Sawyer personnel beginning in August 1990, our goal was to keep all base personnel and families aware of Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Eighth Air Force, and base plans and events centering on Desert Shield/Storm. Each week we sent over 30 copies of our base paper to known deployed locations throughout Southwest Asia where our troops were stationed. We continue to do this at present and will do so until the last Sawyer airman comes home. Our office has served as the focal point on base for people to call and receive the 'any servicemember' address to write to our deployed members. In September, 1990, we became very active with the base Family Support Center. We gave numerous briefings to spouses of deployed members on how to deal with the media and set up numerous interviews with local and state media. I will go into this in the media portion of this narrative. To help friends and families feel closer to their deployed loved ones, the public affairs office started a program in the base paper called 'Sawyer Shield/Storm.' Our PA team shot family pictures and placed all families in issues of the Northern Light from October to present. These issues were sent to deployed locations with the photos and messages of loved ones to their deployed friends/spouses. On 23 November 1990, the Northern Light had an issue called 'Sawyer Shield Special Edition' that was sent to all deployed locations where Sawyer airmen served. I have attached a copy of this issue for you to see. On 7 December 1990, our PA team videotaped a special Christmas film that featured families wishing their deployed spouses a 'Merry Christmas.' We produced a single copy for each location and sent this out on 14 December 1990 as a Christmas gift from home. In January and February 1990, our PA team received videos from Saudi Arabia and Spain. We carefully edited these tapes and made special videos that were shown on our Wing TV 12 at announced dates. In conjunction, the PA team also made a 6-7 minute video that portrayed the start of Desert Storm and how K. I. Sawyer was involved, including scenes from Saudi of the country and living conditions. With the beginning of Desert Storm, PA set up a 24-hour 'Rumor Control' line to field questions or concerns of base personnel and families about Desert Shield/Storm. Internally, we have done a magnificent job of informing our base personnel, families and those deployed of all events.

2. MEDIA SUPPORT: To say the least, media support has been an absolute whirlwind of activity. Since August 1990, our PA team has fielded over 100 queries, conducted 31 media visits and given 6 speeches in direct support of Desert Shield/Storm. The following are some of the media highlights. Immediately, with the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, we decided to take a very open, pro-active approach. We contacted all area newspapers, television and radio stations to keep them alert to deployments to allow them to film deployments. In October 1990, we started extensive media coverage of our Family Support Center and its role in providing support to families of those deployed and serving on remote tours. In November, WLUC TV-6 from Marquette came to the base to film a segment for NBC showing families sending Christmas wishes to their loved ones serving abroad. Over 50 families participated. From January thru February, our PA team was extensively

involved with escorting media around the base, interviewing base personnel and families on their support and perspectives of the war.

In mid-February 1991, we began a plan to set up a "Welcome Home" for returning Sawyer personnel from Desert Storm. We devised a list of media representatives who could be called to cover welcoming events on a short or long period of notice. Public Affairs further arranged for a sound system on a stand-by basis through our 2001st Communications Squadron to provide music for arrivals of our personnel. At present we have had 14 arrivals totalling approximately 300 of about 400 deployed personnel returning home. This ready recall list of media representatives has paid great dividends as it gave us a list of names and phone numbers (both on and off-duty) to call for media coverage. We have received numerous "thanks and appreciation" by the area media for establishing this network.

Another highlight of our "Welcome Home" plan was the setting up of interviews with our returning personnel and local media. We have had extensive interviews featuring personnel from Operations, Maintenance and support. Interviews have been conducted by WLUC TV-6, of Marquette Mich.; and WJMN TV-3/5 from Escanaba, Mich., and Green Bay Wis. Area newspapers, such as "The Mining Journal" and "Action Shopper" from Marquette, featured numerous stories on our returning troops. As chief of public affairs, I have done extensive radio interviews with updates on K. I. Sawyer's involvement in Desert Storm. These interviews have been with WJNR, Iron Mountain; WDBC, Escanaba; WGLQ, Marquette/Escanaba; WJPD, Marquette; and WNMU, Marquette. Each interview was about 20 minutes in length.

As you can see, the 410th Bombardment Wing PA "Warriors" have had a whirlwind of media activity.

COMMUNITY SUPPORT: Long before Desert Shield/Storm, K. I. Sawyer has enjoyed a long-time tradition of superb relations with all of our communities. To say this relationship has grown even stronger would be an understatement. From the very beginning in August 1990, the question constantly asked by all of the Upper Peninsula (U.P.) communities was, "What can we do to help?" Cities and towns throughout the U.P. flooded stores and flagpoles with yellow ribbons and fliers displaying a tremendous support and loyalty to our men and women serving both at home and abroad in support of Desert Shield/Storm. Let me give you some examples of U.P. support.

On Sunday, 5 August 1990, base personnel and wives joined together with a few local residents and placed yellow ribbons on each flagpole. They also handed out support fliers for vehicles on base. Our PA team provided media support for this. We further joined with "The Mining Journal" and set up a system of using their office as a collection point for local residents to drop off messages of support for our troops. A further show of support for our troops by "The Mining Journal" was a donation of 30-40 extra copies of daily papers which we sent weekly to locations in Desert Storm for our troops. The local Frito Lay Distributor donated over 4,500 bags of chips, which were received and sent to Southwest Asia in November 1990. In early December, the local

Coca Cola Distributor donated approximately 5,000 cans of Coca Cola and Diet Coke, again sent to our troops. In late October 1990, Major Morris designed a program called the 'Waiting Wives Program.' This program in association with direct support from our Family Support Center formed a program which solicited assistance from our local Chambers of Commerce from Ishpeming, Escanaba, Marquette and the Gwinn Business Association. In response to this request for help, over 80 area businesses from local communities offered discounts on goods ranging from car repair to meals. At this point, Major Morris designed a card called the 'Waiting Spouse Card.' This card was given to each spouse of a member deployed to Desert Storm or serving on an unaccompanied remote tour. The card is carried at all times by the spouse to show the merchants that he/she is a 'Waiting Spouse.' Each spouse is given a list of all merchants in each community that participated in this program. The program will continue to operate at the request of the merchants as long as we have people deployed to Desert Storm or serving on remote tours. Talk about community support!

On 26 January 1991, the Ishpeming Chamber of Commerce held its annual K. I. Sawyer Appreciation Day. In conjunction, we were fortunate to have 'Tops In Blue' perform in Ishpeming the same night. These events have further increased the level of community support for and awareness of Desert Storm. At Christmas time, our local schools, in Gwinn as well as the Gwinn Methodist Church gave us copies of their Christmas Programs. We made copies of these programs and sent the copies to locations where Sawyer airmen were stationed. Our PA team also taped the base Christmas cantata and again sent copies to Desert Storm.

On Valentines' Day, 14 February 1991, the Ishpeming and Marquette Chambers of Commerce joined together and purchased over 240 individually wrapped red roses through Forsberg Florists from Marquette. These beautiful roses were sent to the Family Support Center to be given to squadron commanders and first sergeants. The commanders and first sergeants personally delivered a rose to each spouse of a deployed person or someone on a remote tour. The idea for this came from Mrs. Faye Claeys, who does volunteer work for our office. Individual roses were also sent to the spouses at Christmas through the generosity of our Base Exchange.

As mentioned earlier, we are now welcoming our troops home. On 18 May 1991, the local communities are joining together for a 'Welcome Home Desert Storm' parade in Marquette. More news of this will be sent to you upon completion of this parade. The area merchants, chambers of commerce and other business groups are excited about this event. There will be a picnic after the parade. We are eagerly awaiting this super event. As Public Affairs, our role in this parade will center on publicity, filming of the parade and escorting media.

We expect to have numerous speaking engagements by participants of Desert Storm to schools, business groups and chambers of commerce. Our PA staff sent individual letters to all Upper Peninsula chambers of commerce advertising our Desert Storm Speakers' Bureau. So far, we have sent speakers to four schools and one business group. So far, so good. Speaking of schools and groups,

special kudos to all area schools and Boy/Girl Scouts who sent hundreds of letters and baked goods during Holidays and throughout the year. By constantly being involved in community events and civic groups, these generous donations, letters and goods were more plentiful than had we not been involved. Even schools from Illinois, Wisconsin and northern Indiana called asking what they could do to support our troops. The athletic department at Northern Michigan University generously donated athletic supplies, including footballs and basketballs.

The spouses of those deployed or on remote tours certainly had a happier Thanksgiving and Christmas because of the generous donations of food and candy by area business groups and youth organizations such as the Boy/Girl Scouts.

A restaurant in Marquette offered its building for local business groups to host a free Christmas Dinner to all spouses, family members and those on alert duty.

These are the highlights of our very pro-active and highly successful community game plan.

PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS: To be honest, the only problem we faced throughout the entire operation was one of fatigue caused by stress and excessively long hours. However, in all fairness, these same things happened at every base throughout the military.

LESSONS LEARNED: We had no problems. This was due to a great PA staff who fought the war smartly and displayed a tremendous sense of pro-activeness and calmness under fire. I do recommend that SAC give us more lead time for suspenses. But again, in all fairness, SAC has to respond to suspenses from Air Force level. I whole-heartedly commend the superb support that 8 AF/PA and SAC/PA gave us. The outstanding support by Lt Colonel Ulrich and Col Grier was greatly appreciated.

SUMMARY: This was the first war that our young PA 'Tigers' have fought - and we fought well. The total plan encompassing Internal, Media and Community Relations support provided for a superb Public Affairs game plan and a very successful conclusion. This was a total team effort.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 42D BOMBARDMENT WING (SAC)  
LORING AIR FORCE BASE, MAINE 04751-5000



REPLY TO: PA  
ATTN. OF:

22 April 1991

SUBJECT: Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action -- Stateside Support

TO: HQ SAC/PA

1. Office Personnel not involved in deployment:
  - a. SSgt Don Moncrief, NCOIC  
SSgt Kirk Boyd, Chief, Community Relations  
AIC Karrie Lawson, Chief, Media Relations  
Amn Liz Kerns, Editor, base newspaper (Limelite)  
Amn Angela Lybarger, staff writer
  - b. Manpower difficulties were caused due to lack of officer and administrative support. However, the effects of manpower losses were reduced by the NCOIC assuming the officer duties, and the chief of community relations assuming some internal and NCOIC duties, as well as performing majority of administrative functions (member did receive training to perform in that function).
2. Stateside Public Affairs support for Desert Shield/Storm deployment:
  - a. Internal
    - (1). Members of the base newspaper staff ran a special page each week entitled, "Messages to Loved Ones," allowing family members to send brief messages to the deployed. The page was so well received at the deployed location, that it wasn't long before the staff began receiving messages from deployed members to family members back home, resulting in an additional page entitled, "Messages from Loved Ones."
    - (2). Numerous stories concerning the deployment were ran each week in the base newspaper. The newspaper staff also worked on special issues during the deployment, including one that focused on stress during the holidays, particularly Christmas. The issue offered valuable tips on spending, loneliness, etc.
    - (3). The newspaper staff worked with the publisher to have an additional 600 issues of the Limelite printed each week. These issues were boxed up (by publisher) and delivered to the public affairs office, where they were then labeled and sent through BITC to the deployed location. Monitoring of these issues revealed they were reaching the deployed location between 7-14 days.

(4). In addition to the base newspaper being sent to the deployed location, one member of the public affairs staff was also tasked to place into an envelope any and all of the following (on a daily basis): newspapers received from other bases, all local newspapers, and magazine subscriptions received by the public affairs office (which included AF Times, Newsweek, etc.).

(5). The public affairs staff also provided the deployed members numerous amounts and sizes of point-tape, mylar screens, and other equipment/supplies to help them produce a professional newsletter/newspaper, as well as film and videotapes.

(6). Members of the public affairs staff also worked with members of the communication squadron, the Maine-Loring Association (Loring's Military Affairs Committee), New England Telephone, and the base exchange, to establish a Desert FAX, to send messages to the deployed.

(7). The public affairs staff also came up with the idea to make video messages from family members to the deployed (this tasking was later disseminated to the Family Support Center).

#### b. Media Relations

(1). During the deployment, the public affairs staff answered approximately 132 media queries, and had a total of 39 media visits. Despite the hindrance of having the deployed location classified, the staff's efforts paid off in not only maintaining the media's relations with the base, but also in increasing those relations to their highest level ever (in 5 years at Loring).

(2). During the World Series, the PA staff worked with the local television station to film clips of people waving flags, shouting encouragement, etc. These clips were shown at the deployed location (and all of Saudi Arabia), during the series. More than a thousand family members turned up for filming of the clips (which were shot at six different locations). Feedback from the deployed location revealed these clips were a tremendous morale booster.

(3). The most extensive PA effort to occur during the war, was the homecoming. During this time, the PA staff arranged and escorted 13 media affiliations. They also made arrangements for the visit of Maine Senator William Cohen, as well as numerous VIPs. Comments from the media were exceptionally positive, as each PA staff member, along with trained UPARs catered to each affiliate, searching for stories, and gathering an abundance of interviewees for each affiliate. The results were astounding.

c. Community Relations

(1). The extent of community support was remarkable. This area was the easiest to work -- members of the community were constantly focusing their efforts to recognize the men and women deployed, FA merely had to guide/bring their plans to reality.

(2). Numerous letter writing campaigns were handled by the FA staff, also in that category were large posters/signs with signatures from the community.

(3). With the help/coordination of the FA staff, the community was able to generate thousands of pounds of care packages, which were delivered to the deployed location.

4. Problems encountered

a. Plenty of minor problems, but no major problems really encountered.



DONALD R. MONCRIEF, SSgt, USAF  
NCOIC, Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 40TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)  
MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, MONTANA 59402-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN. OF:

PA (MSgt Luoma)

1 May 1991

SUBJECT:

Desert Shield/Storm Public Affairs After Action Report

TO:

HQ SAC/PAO

1. Daniel W. Luoma, MSgt, NCOIC, Public Affairs, Malmstrom AFB, deployed to Cairo West Air Base Egypt from 27 Sept 90 to 15 April 91. I was in theater from 15 Oct 90 to 13 April 91.
2. After arriving in Egypt with Sgt Eric Boomhower from Grand Forks AFB, N.D., we set up temporary operations in the command bunker because it was the only facility on site with a generator. The commander briefed that he wanted to keep the information in the newspaper as down-to-earth and basic as possible. He wanted us to concentrate on the simple things that are big news to people living in austere conditions, like when will we have hot water tanks for heating MRE's, construction of tent city, security concerns and more. Using desk top publishing on a laptop computer, we pumped out our first three-page edition of the "Sand Paper" within 48 hours after we arrived there. With no media involvement at our site, we concentrated on getting out as much internal information as possible. We often changed the paper's format, size and publishing frequency to fit the rapidly changing information needs of the base community. The "Sand Paper" varied in format from a four to five-page weekly to a one page daily depending on the availability of news and the needs of the base community. In all, about 60 issues of the paper were published during the six months I was deployed.
3. Due to local political sensitivities, our presence in Egypt was kept under wraps. No media were allowed access and no photography was allowed on site. Some pictures could be taken but no film could be developed that showed U.S. troops operations in country. This is because we had no combat camera available for developing, so all film would've had to be developed locally by civilians. I visited the Public Affairs office at the U.S. Embassy and explained who I was and what my job was to be. They briefed me on local political sensitivities, gave me some security ground rules and said they would take care of any inquiries from local media. We did release numerous stories by routing articles through CENTAF. Community relations programs were practically nonexistent because of our classified status, but the site was able to donate food, clothing and money to various children's charities through the Embassy. Our donations were credited to "the men and women of Operation Desert Shield/Storm" but no mention was made as to which unit or location.

3. The problems we encountered were those to be expected under the given conditions:

Equipment failure -- Two weeks after arrival, my laptop computer failed.

Solution -- The Zenith dealer in town determined that the hard drive was faulty but did not have a replacement. I asked my office at Malmstrom to send my desktop publishing software package to me so I could load it up on another computer. We produced type-written news letters until the software arrived. Then we co-used a laptop with the legal office.

Lesson learned -- Both myself and Sgt. Boomhower were to bring laptop computers. Sgt. Boomhower did not have a working laptop available when he deployed, so we were working without a backup system. Parent command should be able to provide deploying PA's with an equipment package since some offices do not have the necessary assets available.

Equipment shortage -- Trying to produce a newspaper without outside help requires a good, high-capacity copy machine. This is something not always available in the field. We were able to procure a low quality machine locally. The capacity was low, reliability was poor and print quality was sometimes unreadable.

Solution -- Until we got our copy machine, we ran copies of the paper at the contract hotel we stayed at before tent city opened. after we got the small copy machine, we kept our number of copies low so as not to over task it. About half way through the deployment, we were able to get a better machine and were able to increase both quantity and quality of production.

Lesson learned -- The availability of a copy machine at a deployed location is difficult to predict. Much of this problem could be avoided if computers are deployed with laser printers. (Laser printers would have been doubly welcome in the Gulf because the arid climate tended to dry out ribbons on dot matrix machines.)

  
DANIEL W. LUOMA, MSgt, USAF  
NCOIC, Public Affairs Division



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE (SAC)  
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 92518-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

6 May 91

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PAO (SMSgt Fred Spriggs)

A. Steve A. Mahnke, TSgt, chief of Media Relations

B. N/A

C. N/A

D. N/A

E. N/A

F. Summary of Support for Operation Desert Shield/Storm

- Coordinated with the Defense Logistics Agency for bulk distribution of gifts/materials sent to Desert Shield/Storm AOR. 15AF/PA had both 4300 PBW and 1500 PSW added to Defense Logistics Agency distribution lists for books, magazines, and games.

- Publications delivered by 15AF/CC

- PA obtained materials for both 4300 PBW and 1500 PSW
- Approximately 3,000lbs December-February magazines
  - Sports Afield, Glamour, Crafts, comic books, etc.
  - Ebony, Jet, Spanish-language specialty magazines
  - About 100 different types of publications
- 100 Sunset Magazine 1991 pictorial calendars
- 100 copies of 21 Dec 90 Press Enterprise Newspaper
- 100 copies of 21 Dec 90 March Beacon base newspaper
- 100 copies of November AIRMAN "Desert Shield Special"
- Approximately 60 hardbound books (new)
- Approximately 500 paperback books (used)

- 15AF Band Cassettes

- 350 copies of "Sierra Winter"

- Items divided two-third for 4300 PBW; one-third to 1500 PSW

- Palletized for shipment from March on CC aircraft
- Offload and distribution to be handled by receiving units
  - MSgt. Brockton, CSF and MSgt. Lewis, PA 1500 PSW
  - Lt Moreillon, PA for 4300 PBW

- Videotape "Hi Honeys"
  - POCs advised to facilitate videotape sessions
    - POC at 1500 PSW was MSgt Brockton and MSgt Lewis
    - POC at 4300 PBW was Lt Moreilhon
    - All arranged people and rooms for the taping
  - 15AF worked details with POCs
    - Identification on segments
    - Names, addresses of who to be shown tape
    - Grouping of people by base so all on same tape
  - PA at 4300 PBW monitored their segment for security & policy
- Tapes were distributed to home units by 15AF/PA
  - Home station PAs ensured delivery of tapes for showing

#### 4300 PBW SUPPORT

- Declassifying forward operating locations
  - The 15th Air Force Public Affairs office initiated numerous requests to HQ SAC/PA to declassify the 4300 PBW location. SAC in turn sent the requests to OASD to get the approval. No approval was received: PA briefed 15AF staff not to confirm location.
    - There were several news media representatives standing by at our 15th Air Force bases to deploy if authorized.
    - 15AF/PA also planned to take media representatives to these two locations as soon as cleared.
    - Planned to get media who had altitude chamber cards on B-52 missions in support of Desert Storm and the media without cards on tankers in route to the theater of operations.
    - To augment the PAs in the forward operating locations sent one additional person into the theater. Assistance greatly improved PA support.
- Three person PA staff assigned during deployment
  - PA officer 2nd Lt Marisse Moreilhon, 42BMW
  - PA NCOs Sgt Walke, 42BMW and SrA Wedemeyer, 22AREFW
  - Photographer (not filled)
  - Admin NCO Sgt Smith, 42BMW
- All relatively inexperienced, but did very well
  - Publishing "Island Times" newsletter three times a week
- 15AF/PA had them added to mailing lists for AIRMAN, AF News Service, SAC News Service, Desert Defender newspaper, Pacific Stars and Stripes, and others.
- AIRMAN Magazine visited 4300 PBW to get stories & photos
  - Did tanker story, received info/pictures for possible

B-52 story. AIRMAN editor held B-52 material to be print when cleared (never used).

#### 1500 PSW SUPPORT

- 15AF initiative to assign PA to unit
  - MSgt Lewis, 55SRW/PA arrived 4 Jan 91
  - 15AF/PA received SITREP from commander thanking 15th for sending PA augmentation.
  - MSgt Lewis was available to SAV/augment 4300 PBW/PA if needed.
- 1500 PSW printed the "Gecko Gazette" unit newsletter
  - Host base provided "Tropic Topics" PACAF base newspaper

#### 15AF SUPPORT

- Training of public affairs personnel for possible deployment.
  - 15AF/PA people received small arms and chemical/biological Warfare training to deploy in support of Desert Storm.
  - 15th Air Force PA sent out message to units PAs requiring them to get same training for a last minute deployment.
- Handled media queries from 15th Air Force bases.
  - 15th Air Force Public Affairs Division handled 5-15 media queries daily from base PAs.
  - SAC/PAM called at least four times a week with national media requesting visits to 15th Air Force bases to cover news stories.
- Report to SAC/PAM on 15th Air Force support of Desert Storm.
  - Every Wednesday 15th Air Force PA sent a report to SAC/PAM on 15th Air Force units support of Desert Storm. The report included Desert Storm articles published in their base newspaper, number of media queries and visits and how many articles submitted to the Desert Defender Newspaper.
  - Once the information was compiled it was faxed to SAC/PAM for a briefing given to the CINC.
- Public Affairs Guidance to units.
  - 15AF/PA retransmitted PA Guidance to our units from both SAC and OASD/PA.
  - 15th Air Force PA sent its own guidance to the units from lessons learned from their experience and other units experience.

#### PROBLEMS

- Supplies getting to deployed units.
  - 15th Air Force PA talked to the deployed units regularly

to ensure that they had all the supplies required to perform their tasks.

-- When a unit asked for critical items that they could not acquire, 15AF/PA located the item and got it to them as soon as possible: Items sent include a Z-248 computer with mouse, software for desktop publishing, video cassettes, computer disks, and camera.

-- 15AF/PA put the deployed units on distribution lists for items donated to Desert Storm. They also put them on distribution lists for items of interest for their publications, i.e. AF News Service, SAC News Service, AF Art and Features.

- News clippings from 15th Air Force units.

-- 15AF/PA tasked its units to fax all locally produced news clippings from civilian newspapers to 15AF/PA and SAC/PA.

-- Once 15AF/PA received them they were reviewed and sent to the commander.

#### OTHER SUPPORT

- 15AF Band deployed to AOR

-- Band is currently performing several concerts per day for residual force personnel. Performance attendance 400-4000 per show. The trip is sponsored by the DOD Professional Entertainment Office. The band departed 16 April and is scheduled to return 17 May 91.

-- Band initially planned to deploy in January and later in early April, but trips postponed due to operational changes in the AOR.

- Contingency Support Staff

-- PA served on the 15AF Wartime Advisory Group 1 throughout Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

--- Briefed senior staff on PA guidance.

--- Advised CC on PA factors associated with deployments and operations.

--- PA prepared a contingency news release for possible use on the first day of B-52 initial forward deployment as part of Desert Storm.

#### SUMMARY

- 15AF was a "hands on" participant in CONUS sustaining force operations in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

-- Support proved consistently and mutually beneficial, especially in support of "Orphan" units such as the 1500 PSW and 4300 PBW.

  
FREDRIC C. LYNCH, Lt Col, USAF  
Director of Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 30TH AIR FORCE LOGGING WING (SAC)  
MARCHE AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 92509-0000

9 3 MAY 1991

DEPLY TO  
ATTN: OI

22PA

SUBJECT

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report

HQ SAC/PA

1. Purpose: To provide an after action report concerning this office's involvement in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm during the period between August 1990-April 1991.

2. Personnel: The following individuals were assigned to this division during the reporting period. They include:

- a. Stephenson, Aubrey V., Capt, Director, public affairs
- b. Allison, Bruce, GS-10, Deputy Director, public affairs
- c. Meidlein, Clifford R., MSgt, Noncommissioned Officer in Charge, public affairs
- d. Harvey, Lionel L., TSgt, NCOIC, internal information branch
- e. Palmer, Thomas R., SSgt, NCOIC, media relations branch
- f. Wright, Renee E., Sgt, editor, base newspaper
- g. Rush, James A., SrA, NCOIC, community relations branch
- h. Wedemeyer, Brian T., SrA, staff writer, base newspaper
- i. Carter, Isaac, Sgt, NCOIC, administration

3. Manpower Difficulties: Three personnel actions produced the majority of manpower difficulties for this division. Those actions included:

a. A major manpower difficulty resulted from the base's Installation Restoration Program requirements. To avoid expensive Environmental Protection Agency fines for failing to comply with prescribed milestones, personnel from this office were required to devote many man-hours each week to the community relations plan associated with IRP. Promised funding for a civilian position in this regards failed to materialize. This normal peacetime requirement added sharply to the already heavy wartime workload.

b. The deployment of this division's director to Saudi Arabia for almost seven months greatly added to the workload of the deputy director, NCOIC and NCOIC for internal. Duties formerly handled exclusively by the deputy were shared by enlisted supervisors or placed on hold. The NCOIC for internal was placed under medical care during the early days of the gulf war, compounding an already severe manpower shortage.

c. The base newspaper's staff writer deployed to a location in the Indian Ocean just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. That deployment caused the cancellation of base tours. The NCOIC of community relations transferred to the newspaper staff in order to fill the staff writer's position.

4. Discussion: During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm two individuals from this division deployed. Captain Stephenson was assigned to a KC-135 tanker wing in Saudi Arabia, while Airman Wedemeyer joined a bomb wing at a location in the Indian Ocean. During the director's absence, Mr Allsen assumed the duties of director. Actions undertaken during both operations include:

a. Media Relations--From early August 1990 until March 1991, this division answered 243 news queries (156 for Desert Shield and 87 during Desert Storm) and hosted 131 media visits (73 during Desert Shield and 58 during Desert Storm). The majority of media visits occurred during August (53) and March (48), coinciding with deployments and the return of personnel. One media flight was arranged to Saudi Arabia. Specific media interest centered on:

(1) Movements of Marines through March AFB. More than 14,000 Marines departed for locations in the Middle East and returned to the states via March AFB.

(2) Deployment of the wing's active duty KC-10 Extender and Reserve KC-135 aircraft in support of the operations. Media flight to the AOR included coverage of the wing's KC-10 aircraft transporting cargo and conducting aerial refueling missions, and ground support activities.

(3) Deployment of March AFB personnel to the Middle East. Primary coverage was devoted to the deployment of civil engineering, hospital and security police personnel.

(4) Support of families whose spouses had deployed. Coverage included an ABC World News report on a March AFB support group.

b. Community Relations: Due to deployment of office personnel, many of the normal activities associated with community relations were discontinued during the course of both operations (e.g., base tours, orientation flights). However, other interactions between the base and its surrounding communities surfaced during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Items of note include:

(1) Speaking engagements focused on the base's involvement in the Middle East conflict. More than 20 were conducted during a six-month period.

(2) This office assisted in arranging distributions of numerous civilian contributions to deployed personnel (e.g., cookies, various foods and toiletries). Christmas gifts and decorations were also donated and eventually delivered to several deployed locations.

(3) Each of the base's military affairs committees (base community council, the honorary commanders program, Silver Eagles Group and The Forum) continued during this period. These committees and organizations were instrumental in raising thousands of dollars for the commander's humanitarian fund, supporting families facing hardships due to the operations in the gulf.

(4) Upon the return of Desert Storm participants, nearly every major community in southern California is stepping forward to express their pride and appreciation to the military. Most notably, the neighboring city of Moreno Valley sponsored a Desert Storm Victory Parade and Picnic, with more than 10,000

spectators turning out to cheer for their local Air Force members. March AFB personnel are scheduled to take part in parades in Hollywood, Palm Springs, Riverside, Torrance, Hemet and San Jacinto.

(5) More than 160 March participants were invited to attend the ABC televised USO 50th Anniversary Salute at Universal Studios. The event was also attended by President and Mrs George Bush, former President and Mrs Reagan, former President Gerald Ford, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Gen Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a long list of movie and television personalities, including Bob Hope and Frank Sinatra.


c. Internal Information: The primary goal of internal information during this period was to inform families of deployed personnel about support and assistance available through the base and its neighboring civilian communities. A secondary goal was to keep the base and family members abreast of news relating to deployed units and personnel. To accomplish these goals, the following actions were taken:

(1) Editorials encouraging family members to take part in support group meetings and quickly addressing any areas of concern were written by the wing commander.

(2) News and feature articles highlighting availability of support services, updates concerning deployed units, local base support of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and Reserve contributions to the operations were routinely published in the base newspaper.

(3) When civilian groups and organizations stepped forward with contributions and services, recognition of their efforts were also spotlighted in the paper.

5. Conclusions/Recommendations: A system of caravanning media initiated well before the war proved very effective in handling the large number of print and electronic media visiting this installation during both operations. Strict adherence to media ground rules also paid dividends. Prior coordination with Marine officials allowed coverage at this location, whereas other military installations restricted media. Consideration should be directed towards other "real world" issues surfacing during major contingencies such as Desert Storm. As an example, March's installation restoration program required a considerable amount of attention during this period. In order to avoid costly EPA and state imposed fines for missed deadlines, and due to a failure to promptly secure an environmental information specialist and operating funds through local and command means, this office was required to perform the IRP community relations plan with current manning. This created an extreme shortfall in manning. To overcome this shortfall and other minor manpower deficiencies, office staff expanded their working hours to an average of 65-70 hours a week. Contingency kits, due to funding, fell far below what was actually needed to effectively deploy office personnel. It is recommended that the command establish a pool of deployable equipment (e.g., portable computers, printers, facsimile machines and copiers) to issue to deploying personnel during major operations.

  
AUDREY V. STEPHENSON, Capt, USAF  
Director, Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 940TH AIR REFUELING GROUP (AFRES)  
MATHER AIR FORCE BASE CA 95655-5000

REPLY TO PA  
ATTN OF:

21 April 91

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PA (SMSgt Spriggs)

1. Per HQ SAC/PAO 251916Z Mar 91, the 940th AREFG (AFRES) Public Affairs office, Mather AFB, Calif., submits this report.

a. Name, rank and duty title of office personnel:

Gentry, Susan, 1Lt, Chief, Public Affairs  
Snodgrass, Janet, TSgt, NCOIC  
Meek, Marvin, SSgt, editor, the Refueler  
Miller, Julie, SSgt, admin specialist  
Barthel, Crisa, SrA, admin specialist

b. **Manpower difficulties.** Difficulties did not arise from the deployment of PA personnel but rather from the inherent limitations of a reserve PA staff. Essentially, PA is a "one deep" shop. PA staffers, with the exception of Lt Gentry, are "part time" (UTA only) reservists with full-time civilian jobs. They have been only sporadically available throughout this unit's participation in Desert Shield/Storm. SSgt Meek deployed for a three week period in October 1990. Lt Gentry is a full time Air Reserve Technician and is present for duty daily.

1) PA remedy for manpower shortfall was to solicit help from spouses and family members of deployed reservists, available non-PA reservists, available PA reservists from other units and 940th AREFG clerical staff. Since August 1990, the public affairs office has trained and supervised over twenty persons and for most of the period has had from one to three volunteers working in the office.

c. **Narrative report of PA operations in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.**

1) Background. The 940th was initially alerted on Monday, 6 August 1990 of its impending participation in Operation Desert Shield and on Friday, August 10, voluntarily deployed six aircraft and approximately 200 reservists from the flying, maintenance, combat support, civil engineering, security police and headquarters squadrons to Saudi Arabia. The unit maintained volunteer rotational deployments in the AOR through 31 December, 1990. The volunteer aspect of the deployments vanished in December with the partial call up of the civil engineering squadron.

CE services and firefighter teams deployed to provide "backfill" support at four stateside SAC bases. In January, 1991 the 940th's flying, maintenance and headquarters squadrons received partial call up orders and deployed to two European locations. Another 940th unit, the 406th CLSS at McClellan AFB, was partially activated in January and sent to the AOR. Det 1, 12th Contingency Hospital, was called up and deployed to Europe. Det 1, while a Fourth Air Force unit, is at Mather and receives CBPO and public affairs support from the 940th. February saw the call up of the 940th Clinic and the 940th SPF. Clinic reservists reported to Travis AFB, Calif. and the SPF was deployed to Saudi Arabia. In January 1991, by the direction of HQ AFRES/PA, the 940th public affairs office began taking its guidance directly from 15AF/PA, March AFB, Calif.

**d. Internal relations.** The predominant problem in this area was the proliferation of rumor and misinformation and the difficulty in keeping "part time" reservists fully informed in the unit's Desert Shield/Storm role.

Discussion. The 940th has over 200 full-time reservists (ARTs), who are present for duty daily. PA's primary methods for disseminating information to the ART force were staff meetings, commander's calls, internal memorandums, workcenter visits, special briefings, bulletin board notices and unit newspaper coverage. In spite of ongoing and concentrated public affairs efforts, rumors abounded and much time and energy was spent in rumor control.

Some 1,100 940th members are non-ART reservists who normally are present for duty only on training weekends (UTA) or annual training periods and can not be kept informed on a daily basis. PA arranged for a Commander's Call for every training weekend (UTA) to ensure reservists understood the group's developing role in ODS, what information was classified, and their rights and responsibilities with local media. PA attended an 0630 meeting each UTA Saturday morning to disseminate information to unit commanders. The unit newspaper has carried ODS updates in every issue since September.

Family efforts. Families of deployed members have been kept informed throughout the unit's involvement in ODS. As each initial deployment or rotation occurred, a PA representative sat on the out-processing line to verify family contact information. PA expanded the definition of "family" to include parents, grandparents, siblings, and significant others of departing reservists. These people are normally left out of the loop by the Air Force because of their non-spouse status, but they're critical members of the internal audience because of their influence with the reserve member and their potential future support of this unit and the Air Force Reserve. Accordingly, they, along with spouses, were included in a series of family briefings coordinated by public affairs. Families were briefed by the group commander, pay, personnel, legal, chaplain, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, CHAMPUS, family support center and

public affairs. PA launched an on-going series of family mailings which provided benefits information for spouses and information of a more general nature for non-spouses. Families had a 24-hour "help" number to use in event of emergency, questions or concerns during the deployments. During the day, they called the public affairs office number. After duty hours, they could reach the PAO through the 24-hour command post.

Since August 1990, PA has taken hundreds of calls from family members and has provided assistance and information to hundreds more. Many of the callers have expressed appreciation for the efforts made to keep them in the loop.

Family assistance provided by PA includes deployment updates, information on departure/return of aircraft time/dates, rumor control, information clarification, referral to on and off base helping agencies providing financial, legal, medical and social assistance and many times just being a willing listener.

Deployed members. From August 1990 through December 1990, 940th members rotated every two to four weeks. AUTOVON lines were established with the operating location in Saudi Arabia and PA instituted a series of daily phone calls to the deployed group commander during the first critical weeks of the deployment. PA also mailed local newspapers to the deployment site daily. In January, with the bulk of the 940th call ups in effect and rotations a thing of the past, PA developed a periodic "troop letter" and sent copies to established points of contact at each deployment location. The letters discussed developments in base closure, unit news, local/regional news, family developments and clippings from both daily newspapers. The unit's newspaper, the Refueler, was also sent to deployment POCs.

Base agency coordination. At the outset, PA established POCs in the family support center (FSC), the active duty pay, legal and personnel, the CHAMPUS office and the PRIMUS clinic. The 940th PAO referred countless family members to the many services offered by the host base FSC and referred members in financial straights to Mather's Air Force Aid Society office. Base agencies have been outstanding in their response to the families of activated reservists.

**e. Community Relations.** Public affairs efforts in the community relations area were primarily focused upon speaking engagements, donations and liaison with civilian employers of reservists.

Speaker's Bureau. Following the return of the first aircraft to rotate back to Mather, PA received many requests from community organizations for speakers. The majority of requests came from schools, although churches, youth groups and fraternal organizations also hosted 940th speakers. Organizations were primarily interested in personnel who had been to Saudi Arabia, and there was no dearth of candidates. Prior to any engagement, PA made speakers aware of information that was still classified

and provided necessary equipment (slides, projector, etc.) Every speaking request was filled, and PA also provided speakers to the host base PAO when called upon. 940th speakers were warmly welcomed and their comments were well received. Feedback was consistently positive.

Donations. From September through December 1990, the 940th PAO was inundated with calls from the local community concerning donations for deployed reservists. After coordinating a response with the group commander, the PA rule of thumb was to regard such offers as sincere and tangible expressions of the community's support of this unit and the Air Force. Donations had a very positive impact on 940th members both at Mather and in the AOR, and no appropriate donation was refused.

Acceptable donations were sent to the AOR on a space available basis on the unit's aircraft. PA screened donations for items which would offend Saudi sensibilities and host base SP canines inspected them for explosives and drugs. Donations were shared with the active duty and Air Guard forces at the operating location. PA wrote thank you letters to each donator, which the group commander signed. PA gave "overflow" donations to the host base FSC for further shipment to DLA. Morale value of the donations was inestimable and community ties were strengthened.

Civilian employer support. Civilian employers are the backbone of the reserve capability. PA ensured that each deploying reservist provided accurate contact information on their civilian employers. Hundreds of employers received an initial deployment letter expressing the commander's thanks for their support, his request for their understanding and cooperation, and his recognition of them as vital partners in the defense of the nation. Employers were invited to contact PA with questions or concerns or if they required a copy of the reserve employee's orders. PA also provided information on re-employment rights and responsibilities for both employer and reservist. When the fighting ceased, employers were contacted again to explain why reservists were not yet home. When reservists did begin to return and deactivate, employers received a final letter expressing the thanks of the commander for their support and patriotism. At the time of this report, PA is preparing to send employers certificates of appreciation signed by the HQ AFRES and 940th AREFC commanders. Very few employer problems arose from Desert Shield/Storm, primarily because of the effective liaison between the 940th and the civilian employers. In the near future, all ODS employers will be invited on employer orientation flights.

**f. Media relations.** Media interest was extremely high in August 1990 as the unit prepared to deploy and in the ensuing weeks. Countless calls from every local media outlet have come in to public affairs in the months since August. PA has been able to accommodate most requests. The most significant event was when the first aircraft rotated back from the AOR in September 1990. Every television station, newspaper and radio station in the area was invited to be present on the flightline to greet the

aircraft, and most were present. Because the aircraft arrived at 2300, the television stations broadcast it live from the flight-line. It was a roaring success! However, there have been two continuing problem areas:

Timeliness. SAC/PA guidance prohibited releasing information about upcoming deployments to overseas operating locations, and PA could not take advantage of the high media interest at the moment of greatest impact. For example, after the initial deployment in August, it took seven days for release authority to be granted. By that time, the deployment was hardly "news". Additionally, names of overseas operating locations, numbers of persons deployed, and other "hard" information was not releasable. The resulting articles and reports concerning the 940th were usually short and shallow. NMRs were increasingly frustrated. Unit members became frustrated as well. Nearby military organizations, such as McClellan and Travis AFB and local ANG units consistently released much more timely and in-depth information. Consequently, NMRs had alternative military sources for their much-wanted stories and focused primarily upon the units which could release the most information. 940th members found it difficult to appreciate the PA constrictions on releases when they perceived themselves to be comparatively Tignored by local media.

In the absence of hard information, the media focused upon feature-type articles and reports, such as spouses and children coping with the deployment, disruptions in the civilian, etc. In all cases, public affairs has responded to media queries with all available releasable information and ensured all possible access to the unit, the base, 940th personnel, and acting commanders for all requesting NMR.

Media flight. In September 1990, PA initiated a request for a media flight into the unit's operating location in the AOR. The request was prepared, coordinated and submitted consistent with existing guidance. It cleared AFRES and SAC/PA and was forwarded. NMRs were warned that until final clearnace was granted, there were no guarantees. On the morning we planned to depart, AFRES/PA contacted me to say the request had been denied. After spending the next four hours on the telephone with AFRES, HQ SAC, SAF/PA and others, PA learned that the Air Force guidance had been incomplete. The bottom line: it was not known in Air Force circles at the time of the request that the Saudi government had forbidden NMRs to visit the 940th operating location. Compounding the problem was that Air Force guidance specifically stated not to include trip itinerary in the request. As a result, each addressee apparently assumed the 940th was operating out of Riyadh or Dharahan; no addressee knew where the actual OL was. CENTCOM also required far more lead time than Air Force guidance indicated. Less than an hour before the aircraft was to depart, the media flight was cancelled; no media coverage of the 940th in the AOR was ever obtained. I have attached an after-action report to this report which outlines what happened.

Redeployment. Currently, all deployed 940th units have returned and begun deactivation except for the four CE teams and the 940th SPF. Media interest in returning reservists has been steady, and PA has been able to most grant interviews with returnees and families as requested. PA was able to arrange for four NMRs (television, radio, print) to be present when one of the ops/maintenance contingents arrived back at Mather from a European rotation, but there have been some problems:

NMRs are generally not interested in returnees unless they are returning from the AOR. Those returning from European locations hold much less appeal, and those returning from stateside locations have no appeal.

NMRs want to see large numbers of returnees and their families in a single event. Most 940th returnees have come back in small groups and NMRs are reluctant to participate.

Not all returning 940th personnel arrive at Mather AFB; subsequently, 940th PA could not orchestrate media participation. The 406th CLSS arrived from the AOR in two groups; one at Beale AFB, whose PA team did not intend to provide media coverage, and a small group of three people came into a local commercial airport with a large group of returnees assigned to McClellan AFB. McClellan's PAO provided coverage. The Det 1, 12 CH returnees arrived at Travis, whose PAO invited media.

As they have been since August, local NMRs are eager for stories that focus on negatives: families in financial ruin, children suffering emotional trauma, reservists being fired for having deployed, etc. Fortunately, there have been very few such negative stories in the 940th family, but even in the redeployment phase NMRs are much more interested in the bad news. Typically, when NMRs call with a story angle in mind, they lose interest if PA cannot provide them with a heartbreaker.

**g. Homecomings.** Current PA homecoming initiatives are as follows:

After receiving several calls from community members concerning our plans for welcoming returning reservists, PA coordinated a meeting with those who had expressed interest, the local newspaper editor, host base PA, a number of community activists and business people. That initial meeting has snowballed into the "Rancho Cordova 4th of July Patriots' Welcome Parade and Picnic", honoring reservists and active duty personnel from Mather who participated in ODS. Later, the committee expanded the pool of honorees to include all military veterans of all conflicts. PA is working the participation of the group commander and unit members and a fly-by with unit aircraft. Host base PA is also working a fly-by request for their aircraft. Expected attendance is approximately 5,000 persons and all local media will be invited.

The one unit remaining in the AOR is the 940th SPF;

they will return as a group to Mather some time in May or June. PA will invite families, some employers and all local media. Because many of our SPF members work in civilian law enforcement agencies, PA is requesting a "squad car" with lights and sirens from each agency to be present on the ramp. The blast fence will be painted with welcome home messages and all unit members present will be gathered to greet the aircraft. At this point, PA is working a request to escort a media pool to the AOR, with the group commander, to pick up the SPF and accompany them home.

**h. Recommendations** PAs were requested to provide recommendations on "how SAC can better support a future operation." If this unit has suffered during ODS, it was in the area of media relations.

Releases of information should be much more timely. I see no reason for consistently waiting for so long to grant release authority on deployments to the AOR or other locations overseas. Release should have been made the moment the wheels were in the well and the deployment was underway. The price this unit paid was decreased interest and increased frustration for NMRs and lessened PA credibility. The biggest price was paid by unit members who worked so hard for so long supporting ODS: much less coverage than other military units whose guidance permitted much more timely and substantive releases.

Better inter-service coordination in the public affairs arena. Particularly in the instance of the 940th PA's doomed media flight to the AOR referenced earlier. Air Force guidance of the time was faulty, but it was not the Air Force who answered the mail. It was the local PA, whose credibility with the media took a serious hit in an embarrassing incident which could have been prevented.

A final recommendation concerns use of reserve PA resources in called up units. The MAJCOM should contact each unit supporting ODS and give the local commander discretion to call up PA reservists (or any other reservists they deem critical to support the mission at the home unit). If called up, reserve PA resources would have been available on a full time, non-negotiable basis to assist in a critically-swamped period. Certainly PAOs can obtain mandays from the MAJCOM for their reservists, but the real issue is the reservist's availability. If the reservist has an uncooperative employer or is a student and would suffer academically, the tendency is to choose the path of least resistance and decline the opportunity to work mandays.

**i. Conclusion.** ODS/ODS has been a real learning experience for the 940th PAO, who entered the PA field in September 1989 as a trainee. I am thankful both for the experience and for the assistance provided me willingly and abundantly by Lt Col Lynch and his staff at 15AF/PA. The NAF PA staff was unfailingly responsive and helpful, especially in "crisis" situations or when a quick turnaround was required. Point of contact for this report is 1Lt Susan Gentry, 940th PAO, at DSN 674-2900 or 4657.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 940TH AIR REFUELING GROUP (AFRES)  
MATHER AIR FORCE BASE CA 95655-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

30 Sep 90

SUBJECT: Aborted Media Flight to Saudi Arabia

TO: 452 AREFW/PA

10 AF/PA

HQ AFRES/PA

1. On 5 September 90, I received a letter from Mr. Roy Stearns, reporter for KCRA TV Channel 3, a Sacramento, Calif. NBC affiliate. The letter requested to accompany the 940th to Saudi Arabia to cover local reservists supporting Desert Shield. I contacted Mr. Stearns and briefed him on restrictions and responsibilities of media members accompanying military units to Saudi Arabia. He agreed to the ground rules, and I agreed to process the request upon KCRA's receipt of passports and Saudi visas. Mr. Stearns and I maintained periodic contact.

2. On Monday, 24 September, Mr. Stearns called to say that he had Saudi visas in hand for himself and two other reporters. After reviewing existing guidance, I contacted SMSgt Huston, HQ AFRES, to ensure that the guidance was still current, then prepared the request message. I hoped to obtain approval in time to deploy on the aircraft departing for Saudi Arabia on Wednesday, 26 September, at 1200. The message was coordinated with Col Francis, 10AF/PA before transmission.

3. Throughout following day, Tuesday, 25 September, I remained in contact with Ms. Pam Nault, AFRES/PA, who assured me that the message was correct and consistent with existing guidance. Unwilling to defer preparations until I had an answer, I asked the KCRA reporters to come to the base for chem warfare gear sizing. They did so and were updated on the progress of the request. They also agreed to go through the outprocessing line the following morning for immunizations. I emphasized that although the request seemed to be going smoothly, they should be prepared for a "no". I contacted RAF Mildenhall, the RON point for the mission, to coordinate media activities there and arranged for their billeting, box lunches and invitational travel orders. I got my own immunizations and chem gear and prepared the office for my absence. At close of business, I still did not have an answer, although Ms. Nault indicated that HQ SAC had "blessed" the request. I was told that a reply would come early the next morning.

4. At 0647 on Wednesday, 26 September, Ms. Nault called to say that the request had been denied. The rationale she had been given was that the Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh was undermanned and could not support my request. The information had come from Captain Roper, who was speaking for Lt. Cdr. Knox at the JIB. She was also told that they did not have sufficient lead time to work the request. I protested because existing guidance indicated that requests could be worked in a matter of hours, if necessary. I then departed to meet KCRA at the gate.

5. I told KCRA what had transpired, and Mr. Ed Chapuis, KCRA special projects producer, asked me if I could appeal that decision. We returned to my office, where I contacted Ms. Nault and asked her to elevate the problem. She then contacted USAF/REL.

6. At that point, Mr. Chapuis showed me a letter written by The Honorable Pete Wilson, United States Senator, intervening in their behalf to obtain Saudi visas. The letter was written to the Bureau of Consular Affairs in Washington, D.C. I immediately informed Ms. Nault and faxed her a copy of the letter, while Mr. Chapuis contacted Senator Wilson's office in Washington. During the next hour, Ms. Nault kept me updated on the progress of the appeal, in which legislative liaison people were now involved. I also spoke to Ms. Linda Schuler, Senator Wilson's press secretary, who agreed to fax her documentation to Ms. Nault. Ms. Schuler also contacted the Secretary of the Air Force Legislative Liaison Office, per instructions I had received from HQ AFRES/PA and SAC/PA.

7. Meanwhile, the reporters went through the outprocessing line and obtained their shots, and I spoke with the following persons/agencies:

-Capt Julie Holland, SAC/PA, who said that Air Force guidance differs from DoD, CENTCOM and/or CENTAF guidance regarding media travel in theater.

-Capt Glen Suppe, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. (NOTE: Capt Suppe called ME.) Capt Suppe asked me to explain the situation "from the beginning." He also asked me to fax him a copy of my original request message.

-The next call was also from the Office of the Chairman. This time a Coast Guard O-6, Capt. Plimak, demanded to know who told me my request had been approved. I explained that the problem was not that the request had been approved, but rather that it was disapproved. I also stated that the media members involved were not told that the request had been approved. He then demanded to know why I had not "personally contacted the theater commander" to clear my request! I replied that my chain of command required me to do business with HQ AFRES, which was responsible for elevating my request through proper channels. He repeated both questions almost verbatim, and I repeated my responses.

A third caller from the Chairman's office was Commander Baron, USN. He asked me to repeat my story to him. After I reiterated my response to Capt. Plimak regarding chain of command, Commander Baron asked "If you're so interested in going through the chain of command, why did you fax us your message?" I explained Capt. Suppe's request to him, and he asked me to contact him on a secure line. When we had made contact, he asked our precise operating location, then told me that there was no JIB for that location and he would call back shortly. We were 90 minutes from take off time.

At approximately 1045, Capt Plimak called me from the Chairman's office and asked me to call him on a secure line. I did so, and learned the following:

--Part of the confusion regarding my request was at a level above HQ SAC, where it was 'assumed' that we were going to Dhahran or Riyadh. Since AFRES guidance specifically states NOT to include itinerary in the request message, that assumption went unchallenged.

--The city near the 940th operating location is special to the Saudis, and media members are not allowed there.

--The area is not serviced by a JIB.

--Capt. Plimak stated that such requests should allow for 5-10 duty days for processing. That is contrary to existing guidance, which suggests that requests can be turned around in a matter of hours.


--Lt. Cdr. Baron suggested that his office be an info addressee on future Desert Shield media travel request messages.

8. I briefed the reporters at 11:05. They were extremely disappointed, but had witnessed my efforts on their behalf and were satisfied that all avenues had been tried. I gave them contact information for 349 MAW/PA and 60 MAW/PA at Travis AFB and suggested they apply to either unit. I also gave them a heartfelt and appropriate apology for the breakdown of the system.

9. To summarize: Air Force guidance is indeed disparate from higher guidance on media travel to Saudi Arabia, specifically concerning lead time required to process requests and the issue of itinerary. The Air Force and subsequently AFRES guidance is incomplete concerning Saudi sensitivities on media travel to certain locations. Finally, media travel guidance seems to be keyed to MAC missions, whose accessible locations and rapid cycling in and out of theater facilitate media travel requests.

10. I commend the KCRA reporters. Proceeding on good faith, they worked hard to obtain visas; agreed to abide by ground rules and restrictions; made themselves available for necessary preparations and maintained good humor and flexibility. It is fortunate that in this case, we incurred no ill will from influential local media.

11. I hope that my experience will be of some value to another hard-pressed unit PA somewhere. Hopefully, no one will have to waste precious time pursuing the unattainable or placing local media relations in jeopardy. It is hard to accept that the opportunity to obtain some well deserved recognition for our deployed people is closed to us.

  
SUSAN GENTRY, 1Lt, USAFR  
Chief Public Affairs

- 4 Atch
- 1. 940 AREFG/PA Ltr, 5 Sep 90
- 2. KCRA Ltr, 5 Sep 90
- 3. KCRA Ltr, 11 Sep 90
- 4. Senator Wilson's Ltr, 19 Sep 90



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 384TH BOMBARDMENT WING (H) (SAC)  
MCCONNELL AIR FORCE BASE, KANSAS 67221-5000

25 APR 1991

REPLY TO: PAD  
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: Desert Storm Afteraction Report

TO: HQ SAC/PA

1. Capt Louann J. Woods, Chief, Public Affairs Division  
2Lt Michael I. Garcia, Deputy, Public Affairs Division  
MSgt Allan G. Davis, NCOIC, Public Affairs Division  
SSgt Thomas J. Saunders, Chief, Internal Information  
SSgt Melanie T. Powell, Chief, Community Relations  
Sgt Lawrence C. Dean, Chief, Media Relations  
Sgt Elroy J. Lake, Editor  
Sgt Susanne M. Gibson, Newspaper Staff Writer

We deployed one individual in support of Desert Storm, Sgt Roy Lake, editor. When his notice to deploy came, he spent a few hours with the chief of Internal, SSgt Tom Saunders, teaching him the basics of how to put out a paper on the MacIntosh. We then took SSgt Saunders' job and divided it between Media and ComRel. It took a little shuffling, but it was workable.

2. At the start of Desert Shield, we were so severely undermanned that priorities dictated we concentrate on media and the base paper. As manning difficulties were eased and the base began to deploy personnel, we added spouse support to the priority list. With guidance provided from SAC and above through PAGs and answers to our own queries, we responded to massive amounts of media queries.

3. We took every opportunity to have the media out filming mobility processing lines, aircraft departures and interviewing deploying individuals. We arranged interviews with commanders, chaplains, base psychologist, family support center director and many others who could get our story told. We went through family support center and got an extensive list of spouses willing to be interviewed by the media. The media requests were so numerous that even after several spouse list updates, many spouses were interviewed by three or four different outlets. And finally, we reviewed casualty reporting procedures which we used when three of the casualties were buried in Kansas. Almost without exception, overall media coverage was positive. The only interview request we couldn't help the media with was: All three types (print, T.V., radio) wanted to interview either the base psychologist or chaplain on how they were being swamped by spouses who couldn't cope with their loved one being deployed. We just didn't have that problem here. Whether due to being ready for the separation or that a good solid support network was initiated

immediately, the spouses here coped remarkably well. So, rather than lose the opportunity, we convinced the media to interview for "What steps were being taken to ease the separation," or "What a spouse could do if he or she were having some difficulties." That seemed to go over real well and, maybe, even informed some homebound spouses of what was available.

4. Because of the threatcons, our ComRel program was, for the most part, reduced to providing numerous speakers to off-base groups. We sent speakers out to all school grades to talk on everything from "my job in the Air Force" to (for the younger grades K-4) "Bombs are not likely to drop in Kansas." Intel came up with an unclassified briefing encompassing Persian Gulf history and Iraqi capabilities that was given to the Wichita and Derby military affairs committees and several other adult groups. Every effort was made to fill every speaking request with a qualified Air Force representative. Many of the speakers received media coverage. Tanker crew members were on the six o'clock news receiving hugs from grade school kids in a classroom. Pretty touching.

5. Internally we published info on spouse support group meetings and printed articles on what our deployed forces were doing. We sat up a notebook at the chapel (where the spouse support group met) which contained the latest releasable info and guidance on Desert Shield/Storm. We gave briefings to spouses on being interviewed by media and answered any questions and addressed any concerns they had. We made arrangements for copies of the base paper to be mailed first class to each location McConnellites were deployed. And we sent bulk shipments of the paper on every tanker that deployed. Each time we received info from companies offering special deals or discounts, we sent the info or handouts to both the family support meetings and the Rec Center Ticket and Tour Office for distribution. We arranged a special visit to the base day care center from Bert and Ernie of the Sesame Street Live Production Company and had it open to all children of active duty people. What a tremendous success. There was even TV coverage.

6. When our troops began redeploying, we worked with several civilian "Yellow Ribbon" groups, providing them with times and dates of arrival so they could be there to welcome the troops. Many of our people deployed in smaller groups and are returning the same way, usually on commercial aircraft. We polled the media to determine how they would like to handle the returns. They are notified each time a group larger than 5-7 arrives and each time one of our aircraft comes home. Each base unit sends a contingent out to welcome their own if they come in individually at the airport. The base is planning a basewide welcome home when everyone from McConnell gets back, at which time we'll produce a special issue of the paper with photos of all the homecomings. The city of Wichita is holding a parade downtown, April 27, called "Homecoming in the Heartland," which the base is supporting with people and vehicles. And finally,

many, many local small towns are having special celebrations which we are trying to support with people or flyovers or both depending on volunteers and DOD approval.

7. The only major problem we encountered was getting information cleared for release in a timely manner. Information the Army and Navy were releasing from the beginning took far too long for us to get approved for release. Simple things like, were we deploying people and could media film mobility lines, took forever to get approved. When approval finally came, it was hurry up and catch up. The only solution was to keep trying for approval and coming up with examples of other people releasing the information. However, after the initial confusion things went more smoothly.

8. I appreciate SAC giving me some leeway when it came to who was going to deploy from the shop and for all the subsequent guidance on releasable information and spouse information. The biggest lesson we learned was plans are fine, but you must be flexible enough to take advantage of the opportunity at hand.

*Gail Mc Connell for*

LOUANN J. WOODS, Captain, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

## Desert Storm After Action Report

Benson, Darian D. 1Lt. Deputy Chief, Public Affairs Office Minot Air Force Base N.D. 58701-5000

When Minot Air Force Base was called into action in support of Operation Desert Shield, the Public Affairs Office met the many challenges of keeping troops, family and communities abreast of the situation. The largest problems met in the initial days was coordinating permission at all levels to release information. Reports were coming to the office from local news agencies of other installations releasing numbers of personnel who would be released to Desert Shield duty. As a precautionary measure determined necessary by senior staffers very few individual were given permission to speak to media.

Personnel deploying needed to be briefed on the current situation, host country sensitivities, deployment requirements and comforts to be provided to family members left behind.

So many people needed to know what they could send their spouses and friends the office began running public information "commercials" on the base cable channel. The special information was provided by guest experts who donated their time to the cause of keeping the base population informed. Spots were done by the 57AD/CC, 5BMW/CC, 857CSG/CC, STRAT HOSP/CC, Chaplain etc.

These videos served to keep the base population informed and point individuals in the right direction in finding help for what ever deployment concern they may have.

Developed and distributed a Spouses' Information Handout during a town meeting. Handout included suggestions on how to handle family situations during spouses' deployment; a referral agencies listing; and a description of the Family Support center--the primary focal point for support groups, activities and the primary coordinator for "Operation Warmheart"--a support program for families of personnel deployed during Operation Desert Shield. The program was so greatly envied by North Dakota's Senator Kent Conrad that he asked for MAFB personnel to help spread the program throughout the state to its National Guard and Reserve units.

Planned, coordinated, developed and distributed monthly informational videos entitled "Homefront Videos." By wars end the 57th AD/PA had sent a set of six videos to 15 different locations where TEAM MINOT people were deployed. The videos concept was to film local and national news coverage of North Dakota interest; family activities, personal messages from families, organizational greetings both general and holiday and greetings and well wishes from the city of Minot and its "movers and shakers" just to let everyone who was deployed know they were being missed and appreciated.

Coordinated the collection of nearly 100,000 cookies (Operation Cookie Express) and 3,000 packages of lemonade/Kool-Aid collected by local and state action committees after a report appeared on the national news saying this is what service members wanted.

Coordinated base volunteers to help local citizens send supporting and encouraging words to deployed personnel through over 2,000 Christmas cards and a 1,500 foot yellow (paper) ribbon containing more than 12,000 signatures obtained during the annual North Dakota "Hostfest," a Norwegian fair held in Minot.

Initiated a twice weekly Minot Minutes program on the local base cable channel. Programs original purpose was to air Operation desert Shield up-dates to keep dependents aware of the changing situations. This program has been continued because of praise from base population on program.

Lt. Gen. Robert D. Beckel, 15th AF/CC, was highly impressed with our "Homefront" videos and requested copies. Contact with deployed personnel provided us with very positive feedback concerning our "Homefront" videos. They greatly appreciated being kept abreast of what was happening in North Dakota.

Local support for information was also provided by the Minot Daily News who volunteered and provided newspapers for all identified locations of deployed personnel.

If you would like to see either the "Homefront" or any copies of local news coverage for the period covering the war this information is available on video.



Signature of Darian D. Benson

BENSON D. DARIAN, 1Lt, USAF

Deputy Chief of Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND  
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-5001



REPLY TO  
ATTN. OF: PA

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: CENTAF/PA

1. In your 152201Z message, same subject, you requested our help in compiling data to help us plan for and conduct future operations of this nature. Our attachments contain after action reports from our CONUS base PAOs, as well as reports and lessons learned from our deployed personnel.

2. Desert Shield/Desert Storm surfaced an easily forgotten reality for SAC personnel. Even though SAC isn't known as a "deploying" command like TAC, it can and will happen--and possibly in a big way. Unit deployments left a few of our shops undermanned, requiring temporary cutbacks in some "normal" PA programs until backfills or other management actions could be taken to alleviate the challenges faced by the mid-level NCOICs left in charge of their offices after the PAO, deputy and NCOIC deployed. We're stressing to all our people that public affairs personnel at all levels must plan for deployments and their effects on peacetime programs.

3. Internally, command-wide deployments challenged us to ensure articles published in the SAC News Service explained to people on the homefront why the coalition forces were deployed to the AOR, as well as to provide pertinent information to the families of deployed personnel to help them be better prepared to handle the deployment of their spouses. This ongoing effort, coupled with the outstanding job our personnel community did in establishing family support groups for waiting spouses, ensured the "SAC family" was kept informed on news and information that affected them.

4. Following the suspension of our Civilian Distinguished Visitor's Program because of airlift problems, people assigned in our community relations division became important contributors in our internal and media relations programs, providing invaluable assistance as we responded to increased workloads in our internal and media relations programs.

5. Perhaps our most challenging and frustrating duties during the operation were in our media relations efforts. We recognized early in the operation that our deployed and non-deployed unit PAOs were frustrated by unclear instructions coming out of the AOR, lengthy delays in guidance and unclear

procedures affecting local media travel. Recommend we use the experience we learned during this operation to simplify, clarify and refine future procedures for media travel during large-scale military operations.

6. HQ SAC personnel deployed during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm were: SMSgt Fred Spriggs, 10 Aug-18 Dec 90, JIB Dhahran; MSgt Donna Henry, 24 Aug 90-17 Mar 91, CENTCOM forward; SSgt David Malakoff, 19 Aug-21 Oct 90, CENTAF rear; and Maj Al Matecko and Capt Mick Baker, 3 Sept-4 Oct 90, CENTCOM rear.

7. In summary, SAC has already begun to prepare for the next war. Most importantly, we will start now determining how the public affairs community throughout the Air Force can better work together to write and implement clear and concise guidance--and get it to our unit PAOs quickly.

  
GARY W. EMMONS, Col, USAF  
Director of Public Affairs

3 Tabs  
1. Deployed After Action Reports  
2. 8AF After Action Reports  
3. 15AF After Action Reports



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 55TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING (SAC)  
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-8000



22 MAY 1991

REPLY TO  
ATTN. OF: PA

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PA

1. The following is submitted in response to your message, DTG 192330Z Mar 91:

a. Jeffrey R. Tylo, SSgt, Public Affairs Specialist, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Offutt Air Force Base.

b. Fred B. Lewis, MSgt, 27 Dec 90 through 27 Mar 91.

c. See Attachment 1.

d. During the absence of MSgt Lewis, this office was heavily involved in media and community relations activities.

1) MSgt Lewis, prior to his deployment, was the Public Affairs liaison to the Family Support group, Operation Family Shield. This group originally encompassed only the Offutt community, but evolved into supporting the Omaha/Council Bluffs community. After MSgt Lewis deployed, another Public Affairs member had to take on this additional duty. This involved attending weekly meetings, interfacing with various base/community agencies on a regular basis, and preparing reports for the Family Shield Task Group.

2) The media section was heavily involved in getting the story of Offutt involvement in Desert Shield/Storm to the public. The local and national media made over 230 queries concerning the operation and involvement of local families and support groups. There were over 100 separate media visits to the base. The relationship with the media was very good throughout the operation.

3) The local media was very interested in conducting interviews with spouses of deployed military members. To assist the spouses, the Public Affairs office prepared a handout and distributed this handout to various agencies on base. See Attachment 2.

4) During the operation, the base supported film crews from ABC and CBS. This was in addition to the daily queries, requests for information and interviews. This office accompanied people to local television and radio stations to do interviews.

5) This office contributed over 100 stories for the Desert Defender. The Air Pulse printed over 25 SAC News Service stories on Desert Shield/Storm along with the stories from Air Force News Service.

6) This office took several reporters from the local television stations to Saudi Arabia. TSgt Neil Henriksen was in charge of this effort. See Attachment 3 for his report.

7) The Community Relations Division began receiving requests for information on life in the gulf region. These requests began shortly after the operation commenced and came from local school systems. Eventually, the requests came from community organizations seeking speakers on Operation Desert Shield/ Storm. The Community Relations Division created a speech to discuss the customs of Saudi Arabia and its people along with general information about the country and region. Separate briefings were prepared for 8th grade and below and 9th grade and above. More than 1700 students heard these presentations. These were the subject of a story done by one of the local TV stations.

8) Many Offutt people, upon their return from the area of operation, went into the community to bring a personal perspective on life in the region. On two occasions, a military bus transported several speakers to local school districts. These military people spoke to individual classrooms. This effort was very warmly received and also received media coverage.

9) During the operation, Offutt volunteer speakers gave presentations to nearly 4,700 people in the community. This included the Omaha/Bellevue/ Council Bluffs area as well as Lincoln, Wahoo and other small communities.

10) Over 150 public events were supported by the Public Affairs office, both on and off base.

a. One problem was repeated over and over--spouses making phone calls to the media--giving information that the Public Affairs office was told could not be given. Another problem was the frustration experienced by both the media and the public affairs staff from the mission of the 55 SRW. Due to the sensitive nature of the mission, we could not provide the media with the information they wanted on the wing's involvement.

2. Direct any questions to this office at DSN 271-3663.

  
DENNIS A. PIERSON, Maj, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs Division

3 Atch  
1. After Action Report - MSgt  
Lewis' Deployment  
2. Operation Desert Storm  
Handout  
3. After Action Report - News  
Media Visit to Saudi Arabia

cc: 15 AF/PA

A. Fred B. Lewis, Jr., MSgt, 1500th Provisional Strategic Wing, Anderson AFB, Guam, Director of Public Affairs, TDY from the Public Affairs Division, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Offutt AFB, Nebraska.

B. MSgt Lewis - 27 Dec 1990 through 27 March 1991.

C. I arrived at the 1500th PSW and found a moribund Public Affairs program. A 1-2 page newsletter was produced on an irregular basis and distributed through the Orderly Room distro boxes.

Working closely with my Field Maintenance Squadron's Tech Admin personnel, I got a Zenith Z-248 computer/printer. I began a biweekly publication of 4-5 pages called the Gecko Gazette. The 633rd Air Base Wing's Public Affairs Office was actively involved in the production of the Gecko Gazette. I provided their office with letter-perfect copy on a diskette. They used my diskette to transfer the copy to a MAC computer. We worked together to lay out the paper using Aldus PageMaker desktop publishing software.

I then got a "camera ready" copy from the 633rd ABW Graphics shop's laser printer. Next, I ran off 130 copies, back-to-back, on the Aircraft Readiness Center's photocopier. Distribution to all work centers was through the Orderly Room's distro boxes.

The 1500th PSW had the usual communications links with CONUS -- the base comm center, fax and autovon lines. The 633rd PA office also had electronic mail and SAC News Service via DDN computer.

As soon as the air war began, I received three calls from local media. After talking to 15 AF/PA and waiting for them to talk to DOD, I was cleared to make the simple statement that "B-52s were being used in support of Operation Desert Storm." Due to our unit's cooperation with the 4300th PBW at Diego Garcia, we (the 1500th PSW) were barred from saying anything else.

After the cease-fire, restrictions were relaxed a little. I had two requests to interview a B-52 crew that had participated in the conflict. KAUM, Guam's commercial TV station, and Guam Cable TV made the requests. After KAUM found out that Guam Cable had conducted their interview first, they backed out. As the 1500th began to draw down and technicians were returning to CONUS, the local newspaper came out and interviewed the base and wing commanders at the MAC terminal as the first contingent of technicians departed.

When the B-52s began returning to CONUS, the KAUM anchor, Max Taylor, came out and filmed the aircraft launching and did a plane-side interview with Colonel Duwel, the 1500th PSW Commander.

Twelve news releases were made to various stateside base newspapers. Two telephone interviews were given by me to Agana papers or TV.

D. I encountered no real problems during my deployment. I had the active participation and support of my commander and the host base wing's Public Affairs, Graphics and Photo Lab personnel. In any future Desert Storm-type operation a command dedicated Public Affairs representative should be assigned at the beginning. Although I had good working relations with the host base.

shop, there are some areas where PACAF and SAC were parochial. A command-dedicated PA rep can better look out for his MAJCOM's folks than another command's PA rep who may treat them as "second class citizens."

E. I had no problems, but in the future I feel that any PA reps deployed should take their own computer/printer system with them. Enable or Wordstar would be the software of choice for news publication.

## OPERATION. DESERT STORM

## NEWS MEDIA INTERVIEWS WITH SPOUSES

Public Affairs frequently receives questions from spouses of deployed Desert Storm members on the propriety of participating in news interviews on the operation. The following information is provided to assist you should you be approached to discuss this issue with a news program or newspaper. It was compiled from various sources including regulations and higher headquarters' guidance. If you have any questions after reviewing it, feel free to give Public Affairs a call at 294-3663 or 294-4997.

1. It is permissible to participate in interviews with local print and radio/television media on the subject of Operation Desert Storm. However, we strongly encourage you to immediately contact Public Affairs at 294-3663/4997 if you are approached for an interview.
2. If the spouse is a military member, and the interview is to be held on base, the wing commander or the public affairs officer must approve the interview in advance. If the spouse is a military dependent and the interview is to take place in base housing, permission is necessary as well (Capehart housing is included in this requirement). The public affairs staff can also assist spouses with off-base interviews.
3. Points to remember concerning news interviews:
  - a. If you are called by a reporter, contact Public Affairs immediately.
  - b. Reference Operation Desert Storm, we cannot speak on the locations of deployed forces, unit designations, the number of people deployed or deployments not yet announced publicly. Again, these are the types of specifics Public Affairs can brief you on prior to any interview.
  - c. You are not compelled to answer any questions (particularly those related to Operation Desert Storm) or to justify U.S. policy. In fact, you do not have to agree to any interview if you feel uncomfortable doing so.
  - d. You are urged to request a public affairs representative's presence at any time during an interview. Public Affairs can give you pointers on Operation Desert Storm guidance, reinforce ground rules with the news representatives and assist you with other preparations. News media relations are part of our charter. We will be happy to help with pointers on how reporters conduct interviews, the types of questions likely to be asked during the interview, etc.
4. A news interview can be a positive experience and we have seen many good news stories on Offutt's involvement in Operation Desert Storm. Please remember, when in doubt, give the 55 SRW Public Affairs staff a call. We are here to assist you.

AFTER ACTION REPORT  
55TH SRW MEDIA TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA

When troops began deploying in support of Operation Desert Shield, Omaha television and area print media outlets requested to go to Saudi Arabia and report on Offutt people.

In November, all media outlets were contacted about a proposed trip. The wing commander's only ground rule was all people must have the funds available to fly home commercially. With this stipulation, KMTV (CBS), WOWT (NBC) and KETV (ABC) were the only ones who would finance a return trip.

Because of a limited number of seats on the aircraft, it was decided to send three news anchors and a pool camera person.

The team, with TSgt Neil Henriksen, 55 SRW/PA, as the escort, departed Offutt 27 Dec 90 on an Offutt KC-135. The flight arrived in Athens, Greece, the following morning and remained over night. We departed Athens on the morning of 29 Dec 90, and arrived in Saudi Arabia at noon the same day.

Upon arrival, we were inbriefed by Lt Col Reggie Stewart, Deployed Commander, 55th SRW. TSgt Jim Curtis, assigned to the AWACS/PA unit deployed to the same air base, met us. TSgt Curtis was our PA escort for the visit. The team began filming and conducting interviews immediately. Besides interviewing Offutt people, we were able to visit an Army Patriot unit. Interviews were conducted with people from Nebraska and Iowa who were stationed or transiting through the base.

On the second day, an interview at the hospital provided insight into air mobile hospital operation. We were able to interview a patient who had "fractured" his arm playing football. The hospital administrator was from Bellevue, giving the entire story a local tie.

On the third day, the team went on an air refueling mission aboard a Beale AFB, California, KC-135. An Offutt KC-135 on a mission was refueled over northern Saudi Arabia. It provided the news team an outstanding view of airborne operations.

On arrival back at the base, the team quickly packed their belongings and boarded a Seymour Johnson AFB KC-10 for the return to the states. The flight went to Zaragoza AB, Spain. There the team boarded a C-141 and went to Charleston AFB, South Carolina. From Charleston, the team flew home commercially.

More than 20 stories were done during the three days in Saudi. The coverage was broadcast daily during the week immediately following our return. Clips continue to be used.

No problems were encountered on the trip. It was a great learning experience for everyone involved.

**Public Affairs Persian Gulf War after action report**  
Per HQ SAC MSG 251916Z

126th Air Refueling Wing/Public Affairs Office  
O'Hare ARFF, Chicago

Eduard B. Avis. Sergeant, Public Affairs Administrative Assistant

No public affairs personnel deployed with the unit overseas. Public affairs responsibilities in the AOR were handled by 2Lt Anne Marie Noland from the 160th Air Refueling Group, Rickenbacker AFB.

Hometown public affairs action was extensive:

News media contact:

1) News releases regarding the unit's deployment, coordinated through the state public affairs office (and higher authorities when appropriate), were issued several times: when the unit volunteered for duty on 7 August 1990, when the unit returned from voluntary duty on 30 September 1990, when the unit was alerted for activation on 14 December 1990, when the unit was activated on 20 December 1990, when the unit deployed on 29 December 1990, and when the unit returned on 11 March 1991.

2) News media were invited to the base for press conferences and to meet deploying/returning members on six occasions. Each occasion resulted in satisfactory news media coverage, both print and broadcast. In addition, reporters found and interviewed family members of deployed personnel. A clipping service for the Illinois National Guard headquarters in Springfield located over 1,000 clips regarding the Illinois Air National Guard.

Internal communication:

1) The base newspaper is quarterly, so the public affairs office established a temporary monthly newsletter to disseminate information more quickly. The newsletter was distributed on-base by placing copies in the base cafeteria, to the families through the Family Support Group, and to the deployed members via FAX.

2) A bulletin board in the OMT building was used to display photos and newspaper articles about the deployment.

3) The Family Support Group video-taped a party for the deployed members' children and sent it to the deployed location.

3) Deployed personnel made a video tape of themselves that was distributed on base. Base Commander Col. Harold E. Keistler narrated the tape at the National Guard Association of Illinois convention on 20 April 91.

#### Problems:

1) When we wanted to release vital information, such as the date of deployment, the approval process through the National Guard Bureau and the Strategic Air Command Headquarters was cumbersome. A written procedure regarding how to get approval for release of such information, including a point of contact, would be helpful.

2) We learned that personal mail wasn't reaching our deployed members, resulting in a loss of morale. To help remedy this we asked family members, through the Family Support Group, to mail us — personal messages to be included in a "Personals" section in the monthly newsletter. This was FAXed to the deployed location, ensuring receipt.

#### Lessons:

1) The public affairs staff became more proficient in dealing with the local news media. Chicago is a competitive news market, and we learned that the news media representatives provided extensive coverage when we accommodated them.

2) Cooperation with the base host public affairs office, 948 TAG/PA, and SAF/PA in Chicago, improved and was very helpful.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 HEADQUARTERS 380TH BOMBARDMENT WING (M) (SAC)  
 PLATTSBURGH AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK 12903-8000

REPLY TO  
 ATTN OF: PA

24 Apr 91

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: SAC/PA

1. The following response follows the format of your request:

a(1). Capt Cara Rea, chief ( sick/maternity leave - 9 Aug 90 to 12 Nov 90, PCS-12 Apr 91)

1st Lt Casey Mahon, deputy (deployed 2 Dec 90 to 17 Mar 91, leave 17-29 Mar 91)

MSgt Charles Miller, superintendent

TSgt Annette Crawford, NCOIC (maternity leave & PCS- 7 Dec 90)

SSgt Richard Stone, admin

Sgt Darlene Foote, editor

Sgt Frank Ameduri, chief media relations

SrA Leo Brown, assistant editor (deployed 21 Oct 90 to 21 Dec 90)

SrA Jason Tudor, chief community relations

a(2). The impact of manning problems was minimized through the efforts of the enlisted people in this office, resulting in a very large amount of overtime. Certain programs (mainly tours and speakers bureau) were reduced, which helped ease the workload.

B(1). Internal actions included increased coverage in the base paper; a bi-weekly newsletter for spouses of those deployed which evolved into a monthly supplement to the base paper; weekly town meetings for the spouses (two sessions -- one in the morning and one in the evening); and mailings of the base paper to every location where our people were deployed. Media actions included the first national coverage of refuelings supporting Desert Shield; coverage of all deployments; interviews with spouses; coverage of impact on remaining operations, spouses, spouse support; and coverage of homecoming activities. Community relations efforts started off with generating a letter-writing campaign by setting up a Desert Shield-specific mail drop; providing information on what and how to mail care packages; supporting community donations of non-perishables; encouraging and supporting community organizations providing support to the families.

B(2). Media working relationships were generally great. At times, certain media reps balked at our requests to protect the privacy of the families of those deployed, however, it was only a minor problem. Once we explained our desire to protect the families'

privacy, the media understood. In order to avoid working relationship problems with base agencies, the CSG Commander was put in charge of all spouse-support issues. Weekly meetings the day before the town meetings kept everyone in the loop and eliminated problems before they occurred.

B(3). We converted the base community activity center into a reception center and, between 8 Mar and today, we've welcomed home better than 3,200 people returning from Desert Storm. With community financial support, we've provided food and beverages to everyone passing through the reception center and had billeting and transportation reps available as well as TMO to arrange ongoing flights. The honor guard has met everyone at the entrance to the reception center. We're actively involved with a homecoming parade in Plattsburgh on Armed Forces Day and are planning festivities for July 4th. The city is also planning a big party for all Desert Stormers once the local reserve unit is home and we'll be involved with that.


C(1). Problems were mostly minor and easily solved as they came up. The biggest problem which continued throughout Desert Shield and Storm, was the lack of guidance, conflicting guidance, late (after the fact) guidance and guidance which changed 180 degrees in a matter of a few hours. Many times, we did what we thought best and it seemed to work.

C(2). Another problem involved mailing newspapers and videotapes to deployed locations. Where we had three or four people deployed, we'd address the mail to "Plattsburgh AFB deployed" or "home unit, deployed." We tried both ways, and in some instances, the mail would be returned, stamped "no such unit." People started returning home before we solved this problem.

C(3). I think SAC needs to concentrate future planning on standardized, pre-packaged guidance. We learned a lot about what to and what not to say from this operation. That should be set in boilerplate and pre-distributed to all bases for the next operation. We know what we can say about deployment locations, numbers being deployed, units being deployed, deployment plans, etc. Let's not lose this.

C(4). Lessons learned are many. First, keeping the families informed through weekly town meetings went a long way in maintaining their morale, easing problems, etc. Videotaping messages for holidays, town meetings, and support messages from the community really helped morale of our deployed people. Mailing the base newspaper did the same thing. The local paper also mailed daily to our locations. Encouraging community support was probably the biggest lesson we learned. This helped everyone and all facets of the operation.

C(5). If you need further information, please call DSN 689-5043.

  
CHARLES J. MILLER, MSgt, USAF  
Superintendent of Public Affairs

cc: SAF/PA

**OHIO AIR NATIONAL GUARD**  
**160 Air Refueling Group**  
**Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio 43217-5000**

RTAO: 160 AREFG/PA

30 May 1991

SUBJECT: CENTAF/PA After-action Report

TO: CENTAF/REAR PAS

A. Ann-Maria Noland, 2Lt., Public Affairs Officer

B. N/A

C. I was tasked to establish a Public Affairs operation for the 1712 AREFW(P), a tenant unit of the 363 TFW(P), working at a geographically separated area. I arrived on station approximately three weeks after the wing with no computer. Equipment consisted of a Pentax camera, notebooks and pencils. Within four days after arrival, the 1712th received a CompuAdd computer with complete word processing and desk top publishing software. This was a great help in doing a weekly newsletter to supplement the information in the host unit's daily newsletter. We held two commander's calls during the war. The purpose of the commander's calls were to try and contain rumors and to get feedback from unit personnel on issues such as security, safety and quality of life. Communications with higher headquarters took time, but was adequate. The most frustrating part of communications with higher headquarters offices occurred when no one was in the office and there was no way to leave a message. Cellular phones in the hands of key personnel at Abu Dhabi were very valuable and made internal communication relatively easy. Message traffic was very sporadic to 1712 PA. We received none of the internal PA mail such as News and Notes from CENTCOM JIB or the packages of news articles from Langley. One person was adequate for the daily PA office operation until media visits.

D. Media contact at our location was frequent. The media were given refueling flights at least weekly. Prior to the flights, we focused on a squadron or area of the operation in order to get more than just the flying. I worked very closely with the 363 TFW(P)/PA during media visits. They acted as escorts on 1712th media days and I acted as an escort for them on 363rd media days. This allowed us to work more with the media and to learn their needs better. I also did a few phone interviews with television stations and radio back at home station. This seemed to keep them happy since the Hometown Media Program was on hold. Also, I think this will be a plus in maintaining positive media relations. The following is a list of media visits in-theater: Feb. 7 - Peter Gould, VIS News, BBC: Giafeppa Mella, Vis News: Brunoro Serego, GR1 radio: Gillian Allen, AP photographer: Fay Thompson, United Arab Emirate magazine group reporter: Kathy Evans, AP reporter: Brian Wolff, photographer. Feb. 14 - Suresh Kumar, Khaleej Times reporter: Kathy Evans, AP reporter: Torbjorn Anderson, Expression photographer: Jill Allen, AP photographer: Mike Lamb, James Coyne, Derek Williams, CBS video production crew: Arun Solomon, BBC radio. Feb. 26 - Allensando Gentile, VisNews: Christine Hauser, UPI reporter: Brian Wolff, Paris Match photographer: Nick Ludlow, David D'Ardenne, ABC video production crew: Hasan Bozai, AP photographer: Nithin Belle, Gulf News reporter. We also worked with AFNS reporter SSgt Sarah Hood and a video /still photographer. The combat camera personnel at Abu Dhabi documented 1712 activities, speaking with key personnel on set-up, operations, problems encountered and lessons learned. They also flew a few flights on the 1712th tankers.

A Hometown News Release program was established, sending completed forms through the 363rd PA. Stories and pictures were sent back for the unit newspaper and state magazine for both deployed units, the 126 AREFW and 160 AREFG. In addition to the stories I wrote, some unit members wrote stories or columns for newspapers back home. I reviewed these and sent them through CENTAF to

release. Slides and pictures were taken for history and anticipated future briefings. We faxed back commander's columns for each unit newspaper. I wrote weekly "letters" to the Family Support Center to be read at meetings for families who had members deployed that described living and working conditions, related some amusing stories and talked about morale and faxed them home also. This provided families with some "up-to-date" information on what was happening and painted a picture of what their Guard member was going through. Public Affairs also produced a tape of video messages to send back to each unit for families to view.

I did not become involved in community relations as a Public Affairs because we were restricted to base from the time I arrived until about five days before members of the 1712th redeployed home.

E. The first and major problem I encountered was not being deployed as part of the original package. It was difficult to play catch-up and try to get information on events that had already taken place. Public Affairs should be included in the deployment package. We continued to receive requests from hometown media to visit the deployed locations. Since the program was on hold, we called back and did interviews. Working with home station, we provided them opportunities to do stories at the base and with families of deployed members. This seemed to keep them satisfied.

Another difficulty was satisfactorily meeting the needs/requests of the different mediums within the media pool. The video teams took more time when getting their stories causing the print and still photographers to become impatient. The radio reporters wanted different material than the rest of the pools also -- they were generally able to cover more, shorter stories than the rest of the pool. We were fortunate enough at our location because we usually had enough escorts available to break the media out by video, still photo and print journalist.

*Ann Maria Noland*

ANN-MARIA NOLAND, 2LT, OHANG  
160 AREFG Public Affairs Officer

FROM: 19 AREFW Robins AFB GA/CC

TO: HQ SAC Offutt AFB NE/PAO

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

Ref: HQ SAC PAO Msg 251916Z Mar 91

1. Requested information is provided as follows:

1. Requested INA. Susan Stewart, 1Lt, 19 OMS Squadron Section Commander/wing Public Affairs representative.

B. Coordinated a Desert Storm display at local museum; coordinated with base PA to ensure base paper was sent to five separate FOLS; wrote articles about wing involvement to the extent possible (Robins AFB was playing our involvement low profile); coordinated several media events covering the return of troops; initiated a change to DOD policy allowing coverage of deployments of refueling wings to support the formation of an air bridge to return troops; authored a wing spouse brochure offering tips and valuable information to spouses of deployed personnel; and kept families abreast of ever changing guidance concerning finances, taxes, troop movements, etc.

C. Attempted to have local media deploy, but was not authorized to accompany them, so was unable to assist. Recommend tenant wings be given guidance and authorization to escort local media into the theater of operations. Our wing was disappointed in the amount of coverage provided. Standardization should be attempted and guidance should be more timely.

2. POC is Lt Stewart, 19 OMS/CCQ, DSN 468-3047.

(retype of 19 AREFW msg, 192300Z Apr 91)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 100TH AIR DIVISION (SAC)  
WHITEMAN AIR FORCE BASE, MISSOURI 65305-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

24 Apr 91

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ SAC/PA

1. The following input is provided in response to HQ SAC msg 251916Z Mar 91.

a. Name, Rank, Duty Title of Office Personnel:

Thomas Boneparte; Maj; Chief, Public Affairs  
Lance A. Jay; Capt; Deputy Chief, Public Affairs  
Daniel P. Therrien; TSgt; NCOIC, Public Affairs  
Daniel G. Carpenter; SSgt; Chief, Internal Support/Editor  
David M. Carrigan; Sgt; Chief, Community Relations  
Karen K. Fidnick; Sgt; Chief, Media Relations  
Jeffrey L. Foster; Sgt; PA Information Manager  
L. Scott Ficinus; AIC; Staff Writer

(1) Deployment of office personnel: Maj Boneparte was deployed from 11 Sep - 29 Nov 90. Capt Jay deployed on 22 Jan 91 - present. AIC Ficinus deployed on 18 Apr 91 - present.

(2) Difficulties caused by deployment of personnel: There were tough periods and long hours at times but as the saying goes, "When the going gets tough, the tough get going." That's exactly what happened here. It took a shuffling of priorities and near elimination of the base tour program during the war while we were in Threatcon Bravo but this helped us concentrate our efforts elsewhere as indicated below.

b. Narrative of PA operations in support of Desert Shield/Storm:

(1) Internal

(a) The flow of information to keep personnel informed of military operations began with front page coverage in the first issue of the base newspaper after the Kuwaiti invasion. Coverage continued every week thereafter and we will continue coverage as long as necessary. We did everything conceivable to provide timely news coverage, recognize support, and initiate programs to keep morale high.

(b) We covered deployments and returns, conducted man on the street interviews, released mailing addresses of our troops, provided info on free mail, fax, and phone service, emphasized the need for recreation donations, published greetings and stories from deployees, submitted articles to Desert Defender every week, published many family support activity articles and

features, and expanded coverage to include a weekly section dedicated to family support news. We also took the opportunity to show how stealth technology was proven in combat, particularly since the B-2 is coming to Whiteman. We published articles showing community support such as tying yellow ribbons in neighboring towns, an optometrist who provided free disposable contact lenses for his patients being deployed, comments from area business people showing their support, McDonalds donated 3,000 feet of yellow ribbon which was tied to buildings and poles all over base and much much more. Internal PA initiatives included mailing weekly newspapers to deployed locations, Operation Heart Shield where we provided a means for waiting families and deployees to send Valentine greetings to each other. 68 messages were received and printed. We initiated a Letters from Home section where we'd take pictures of waiting families, get messages and publish them. This was a good means to keep families in touch since the deployees were sent copies of the paper. We also organized a welcoming committee and came up with a plan so every returnee felt appreciated whether there was one or many returnees. When we received word of a group coming home, telephone calls were made on and off base. Radio stations made announcements and flag waving people lined the streets, day or night, to provide a heroes welcome. Every available emergency vehicle from two towns away which had sirens and flashing lights joined up with the returning convoy from 15 miles away and it grew up to a mile long at times with other vehicles joining in to show support. The awaiting receptions were excellent. Additionally, we had an initial ceremony on 5 Apr to honor our troops with more than 200 returned deployees present. Congressman Ike Skelton was present to deliver an address of support and 13 communities issued proclamations and provided food and refreshments for the occasion.

## (2) Media

(a) When Desert Shield began, media interest at Whiteman AFB exploded. 46 media queries were received in Aug 90 alone. PA guidance was quick in coming and we used it to prepare a proactive game plan and ground rules for media and interviewees which made for smooth operation. With tight security limitations during initial stages of the operation, media responses were limited but increased as restrictions were lifted. Media wanted more information but understood the reasons for the restrictions and were happy with any news we could give them and coverage remained positive throughout. From 16 Aug 90 and thereafter, media visits were fast and furious with interviews with deployees, spouses, PA personnel, commanders, and others. 18 media affiliates were handled during that first week alone. To date, 70 Desert Shield/Storm media queries and 26 media visits were handled regarding local impact, deployment coverage, personal experiences, etc. Fifteen news releases were sent out covering deployments, return celebrations and everything in between.

(b) The media did more than provide coverage. They wanted to show support in other ways. For example, KUDL radio in Kansas City did a remote broadcast to kick off a "Voices from Home" program whereby they taped supporting messages from people and sent them to the troops in deployed locations. When we contacted the publishers of our four most widely read

local newspapers about the expressed desire of our troops to get area newspapers to keep up on the news, each publisher supported the idea and has been sending newspapers to our deployed locations ever since.

(c) We worked with audio-visual and took videos of waiting families giving Christmas holiday messages to their deployed loved ones and sent them to the Today Show and affected deployees. As the 15 Jan deadline approached for Saddam to get out of Kuwait, media interest was peaking so we set up a media event on the 14th which included a tour with photo opportunities and interviews with commanders, mobility personnel, support groups, family members and returned deployees. Three days earlier we arranged a similar program with a popular radio station, called the FOX out of Kansas City, MO, to do a live remote on base with interviews throughout the morning. Each initiative we took had very positive results.

### (3) Community Relations

(a) Community support was visible everywhere. Homes and businesses displayed flags, ribbons or other memorabilia. Local citizens provided food, refreshments and funds for family support activities and sent food, books, games, letters, etc. to deployed troops. Many are depicted in Atch 1. Other community support was recognized in the base newspaper and noted above or indicated in attached news clippings as representative samples of the immense community involvement and support.

c. Problems and solutions, lessons learned and recommendations for future operations:

(1) When the war started our hands were tied and had to refer all queries to the Pentagon. Local media want local comments. It might have been better if we had the Pentagon position to pass on.

(2) It was awkward initially when we could grant interviews with deploying troops but not give out their names. It worked a lot better when we were later allowed to let the people decide if they wanted their names released. It may be good to keep the latter approach as standard policy for all operations where interviews are allowed.

(3) Many people departed at a time when they were briefed not to discuss the deployment at all with media because of security and many returned not having been briefed by deployed PAs on the latest media guidelines. We anticipated this and made sure all returning deployees were briefed prior to deplaning or shortly thereafter in most cases. This helped them to deal effectively with media interviews.

*Thomas R Boneparte*

THOMAS BONEPARTE, Major, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

2 Atch

1. Base and Community Support
2. Media Clippings

FROM: 379BMW (SAC)  
Wurtsmith AFB MI 48753-5000

3. A. Manpower

Rank	Name	Duty Title of Personnel
Capt	Banks, Farley K.	Chief, Public Affairs
2nd Lt	Tillis III, John S.	Deputy Chief, PA
MSgt	Stanton, Philip R.	NCOIC, Public Affairs
Sgt	Walke, Debbie A.	Editor, Base Newspaper
SrA	Cox, Sherri D.	Media/Community Relations
Amn	Porter, Koren L.	Public Affairs Specialist
GS-05	Hueber, Marlene M.	Secretary/Admin

Manpower Difficulties:

Sgt Walke deployed from Sept 90-Mar 91.

Sgt Bowers separated Aug 90. AIC Cox arrived in Sept 90.

Sgt Biscoe took over as acting editor from Sept - Dec. He separated from the Air Force in Jan 91. He left the ComRel program to take over as editor. The ComRel duties were divided between PAI/PAD and secretary.

SrA Cox took over as acting editor from January until Sgt Walke returned in late March.

Amn Porter arrived on station in February. Due to processing and training, she was not involved to any great extent in the day-to-day activities of the office during Desert Storm.

Realizing that keeping deployed personnel as well as families informed of the happenings in the Gulf would be an arduous task, our internal information program took on added significance. Besides the running of news service items in the base paper, localized stories of interest to the Wurtsmith community ran almost weekly. Although some may have been news brief type items announcing the date and time of the next support group meeting, others were feature stories like reprints of letters from children to deployed personnel to the presentation and acceptance of a VFW banner which was later sent to our people in Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, our plan was to ensure all our key publics were represented in the paper in some way or other whether it be deployed members, their families, those military people who didn't deploy and civilians. Some of the special issues included two "Welcome Home" editions, March 14 and 21, of the first returning troops. We also published a 16 page insert with the regular paper April 14 consisting of Nose Dock 5 photos where the returnees were first welcomed by their families, photos taken by deployed personnel as well as headquarters PA people in the AOR, a piece on the reunion of two brothers in the

AOR, the purpose and benefits of support groups, and an article on those left behind to support the strategic mission and alert commitment.

Distribution arrangements for copies of the newspaper to deployed personnel follow:

Ref. 48TFW Deployed/PA msg 191700Z Sep 90 requesting base PAOs forward copies of base newspapers and local area newspapers to support deployed contingents participating in Operation Desert Shield for reading rooms. We established a requirement to forward 20 copies to APO NY 09017 as of 21 Sep 90.

379th Bomb Wing/CC visited numerous locations of deployed personnel and found that they were not getting our base newspaper. Effective 29 Nov 90, at the request of 379 BMW/CC, 60 copies were forwarded weekly to the following APO/FPOs:

APO NY 09282	APO SF 96334	APO NY 09697	APO NY 09854
FPO SF 96685	APO NY 09608	APO NY 09893	APO NY 09852
APO NY 09038			

The number of base newspapers sent was increased to 75 in mid Jan 91. The numbers were again increased to 97 papers mailed as of 20 Feb. The following addresses were added. The mailings continued until the end of March.

APO SF 96334	FPO SF 09665	APO NY 09017	APO NY 09282
APO SF 96334/PA		FPO SF 96685/PA	

Public Affairs also played a role in rumor control and activated our Straighttalk Center to keep the base populace informed of the latest information when rumors were rampant. Public Affairs also participated in numerous Operation Spouse Support briefings. These meetings, coordinated by the Family Support Center, were intended to disseminate information to waiting spouses and to advise them on where to go to get help. More than 20 spouse support groups had been formed by the squadrons for these briefings. Participating agencies besides Public Affairs included: Red Cross, Legal, Accounting and Finance, Personal Affairs, CHAMPUS, MWR and the Chapel. Public Affairs briefed media relations -- what to do if contacted by the media; how to come across and how to respond. We had a couple of off-shoots as a result of the spouse support briefings in which this office also participated. Shortly after the war started, there was a town meeting for all support group members, coordinated by the FSC and chaired by the Combat Support Group commander to address problems and concerns from family members. Following the town meeting, the FSC organized a Family Community Council which serves as a forum for family members to air their grievances. In many cases, either family members felt uncomfortable addressing their complaints to commanders or first

sergeants or did not know where to do so. Once the complaint is addressed to the FCC it is then forwarded to the Family Action Information Board, which is comprised of representatives from some of the agencies listed earlier to include Civil Engineering, Personnel, Social Actions and a few others. The FCC and FAIB meets quarterly. The latter is chaired by the CSG commander.

Public Affairs did not escort any hometown media visits into the AOR, although we did receive a few requests. Requests were from downstate broadcast media. At the time, our involvement (the base) was minimal. In addition, we told them that the few people who had deployed either departed from other bases or from commercial airports to other bases. In any case, at that time none of our aircraft were tasked. We did pass on to them what they would need in the event we could arrange local media travel, such as a Saudi Visa request to the Saudi Arabian Embassy.

The working relationship between the media and the base was positive. We were cognizant of their deadlines, supportive of their various story requests and tried to accommodate them as much as possible. On the flip side, they understood our position concerning the importance of operations security and respected our wishes by not pressing too hard for information we were unable to release. Of course, there were a few nerve-racking moments such as the few times they converged upon us on our doorstep, but most of the situations had more to do with numbers than anything else. There were more of them than there were of us. Of course, there were also a few cases where they got information wrong and we corrected it if we could, i.e. calling a B-52 a B-1 or announcing bombers took off this evening from Wurtsmith headed for the Gulf. This happened in August, but there was nothing too serious. On the other hand, there were some stories that were completely taken out of context which left many of us shaking our heads such as the alleged drinking habits of our waiting spouses. (On a positive note this story also struck a nerve among non-military people. We suggested they call the reporter or the reporter's editor to lodge their complaint). One piece, which could have had a negative impact but turned out to be a one day story at best was the Oscoda Press editorial that dealt with the overzealousness of some individuals/groups who were approaching area businesses about donating products or money to various Gulf War causes. We tried to do our part by referring these people to the FSC and coordinating with them before they embarked on this project. The support from base agencies for media interviews was pretty good too. Besides arranging interviews with aircrew members and maintenance folks, we arranged interviews with Disaster Preparedness, Medical, American Red Cross, Mortuary and Casualty Affairs, FSC and spouse groups. However, we did take a little heat from the media when we invited them out to the base to

cover the Desert Heart dinner on February 14. We wanted them to cover the dinner without conducting random interviews of spouses and children. We were concerned not only for the privacy of the family but for potential inadvertant slips of the tongue. As such, we arranged for media to interview only commanders, first sergeants, or spouse group leaders. Finally, things got a little hairy when the base closure announcement coincided with our homecoming party. But this, too, worked out in the end. We set the ground rules upfront that the homecoming was intended to honor our people in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It was not intended as a gathering to ask people their opinions on the closure of the base. They understood and accepted our wishes. Of course, it probably also helped that every squadron offered an officer or two, captains and above, to help us escort media and monitor interviews.

As far as community relations is concerned, we scaled back on a number of our activities like orientation flights, tours and static displays (especially when we went into THREATCON Bravo). However, since the base and community are so intertwined and interdependent and since support for the war was so overwhelmingly positive, the community played a pivotal role in much of what we did. Cases in point: Public Affairs participated in the formulation of a support network that operates downtown and geared toward military families residing off base. Public Affairs worked closely with the Red Cross, FSC, and Chapel in organizing "Hats Off Operation Desert Shield," a program by which participants could drop off articles like paperbacks, audio cassettes, etc., on base, at local business establishments and the Chamber of Commerce. On Valentine's Day, 14 restaurant owners planned a special dinner for military families who had a deployed spouse. The event was called Operation Desert Heart. More than 700 people attended the event in the fitness center annex. On 12 April, we had our homecoming party called Operation Sunrise Success. This event, not only was sponsored by the same restaurant owners but other businesses who donated gift certificates and merchandize to be raffled off as door prizes. This event was open to the public and the attendance at least doubled Operation Desert Heart. Entertainment was provided by the Oscoda High School choir and an area D.J. Some of the special guests included General Stump of the Michigan Air National Guard, Congressman Bob Davis and a staffer from Senator Levin's office. There was talk that Vice President Quayle and Governor Engler were to attend. They didn't. A few coordination and organization problems existed for this event. The trickiest was encouraging media to cover the event without having them publicize the event in advance. We were concerned with crowd control. Nose Dock 5 only holds so many people. We ended up sending out a news release four days prior to the event and asking the media to cover it but not do any pre-event coverage. Again this event was intended for the base and immediate area -- not downstate well wishers. From all indications it

worked and the crowd looked managed and under control. One other potential problem that worked itself out was some of the downstate corporations like McDonalds and Anheuser-Busch wished to participate in the celebration at the consternation of local establishments who felt they were being nudged out by the big boys. We did not wish for this event to appear to be corporately sponsored. A case in point: McDonalds wished to fly their airplane in here. They were already on line to bring their Ronald McDonald House. Public Affairs was asked to gently tell them we appreciate the offer but no thanks. They withdrew it. Following the war, the Michigan State House of Representatives honored the 379th with a resolution commending them for their efforts in the Persian Gulf. Colonel Boykin along with representatives from the 524th Bombardment Squadron, 920th Air Refueling Squadron and 379th Organizational Maintenance Squadron accepted the resolution on behalf of the wing. We also participated in a brief press conference prior to the ceremony chaired by Lewis Dodack, Michigan State Speaker of the House, and Representative Tom Alley, our local state representative. Speaking engagements also increased sharply during the war and after. We've asked those who returned and are taking leave who think that they may get asked to speak in public to contact us first to obtain a briefing. We advise them that media may be present and provide them with media relations information. We also tell them what is and is not releasable.

3C. The amount of suspenses generated from this deployment were (are?) mind boggling. Many of the requirements appeared to overlap each other. Listed below are a few examples.

HQ SAC/PA msg 042125Z Sep 90 requiring inputs and updates on units supporting Desert Shield with info copies to 8AF. POC Capt Edwards. LGX had a similar requirement to their counterpart at SAC. In November, 8AF stated they did not require a copy of this report. This suspense was cancelled 10 Jan 91 per telecon w/SAC/PA.

HQ SAC/PA msg 242236Z Aug 90 requiring weekly submissions to Desert Defender. On two occasions, we were notified that our submissions were chosen (24 Sep, 5 Oct). To date, we have not received a copy of the issues our articles were published in. We received copies of only nine Desert Defenders. (8/30, 9/7, 9/14, 9/21, 9/28, 10/5, 11/30, 12/7 and 12/14.) Throughout the Desert Shield/Storm timeframe, 379 BMW/PA made 30 weekly submissions totaling 122 articles.

HQ SAC/PAI msg 312205Z Aug 90 added a requirement for weekly submissions for the "Around the Bases" section of the Desert Defender. Of the nine issues received, Wurtsmith was shown in this section in six issues (9/21, 9/28, 10/5, 12/7 and 12/14). There may have been more, but we have not received any other copies of the Desert Defender. Throughout the Desert

Shield/Storm timeframe, 379 BMW/PA made 24 weekly submissions totaling 66 items.

Then we had problems with conflicting guidance. For instance, as early as November, guidance came out that said general geographic location of units deployed on Desert Shield (e.g. general city and country location) is unclassified; HQ SAC/PAI msg 201903Z Nov 90. On the other hand, CENTAF PA Digest dated December 90 said "names of military installations or geographic locations of military units in Saudi Arabia or other countries where U.S. forces are based do not use/discuss."

We received a quizzical phone call from 8AF/PA as a result of inquiries from SAC and CENTAF concerning a proposed release we sent the latter under classified cover regarding Wurtsmith B-52s. According to the CENTAF PA Digest dated 1 Nov 90, "The PAG requires the unit PAO to produce a news release about the deployment, which needs to be sent under classified cover to CENTAF PA Rear for review and clearance through CENTAF Battle Staff at Langley..." CENTAF asked why they received our release.

We were also hampered in the early days of the air campaign, probably like other similar units, when we couldn't make comments pertaining to the participation of B-52s even though previous releases had been made concerning tanker support.

The guidance, however, was pretty clear about not discussing future operations. But we were a little puzzled if we were to follow the 2 BMW's example when they set up their media opportunity (msg 242220Z Aug 90). If we were to do the same thing, i.e. have media arrive at the base at a designated hour that would have entailed giving downstate media at least four hours notice of the planned deployment in order for them to get here in time. Would this have been an OPSEC violation?

Our recommendations: Eliminate, reduce or consolidate various headquarters reports. We know everyone has their own special requirements, but it does become a little frustrating to provide the same information to different offices in slightly different formats. We recommend a "one-size fits all report" as implemented by the headquarters so that not every office with a headquarters counterpart does not ask for the same information.

We're extremely grateful that there are fax machines but because of this invention, now U.S. mail isn't good enough. Today everyone wants it now and they want it fast, i.e. newspaper clippings. We've literally spent days, when you add up the countless hours spent at the fax machine, and it was not just because of the bulk of material getting faxed, but rather just trying to get through because all the telephone lines were busy.

We also needed guidance on what is and what is not releasable after the war. Is the pre-war guidance still in effect? For instance, to this date we're still unsure what military installations in Saudi Arabia have been declassified.

Finally, when all is said and done, we are thankful for the support we received from headquarters. Even though things were tough down here in the trenches, we're not so disingenuous to believe that it was a day at the beach at the headquarters either. We appreciate your assistance, patience and responsiveness. You have our gratitude.

(certified copy)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
388th Tactical Fighter Wing  
Hill AFB, UT 84056-5000

FROM: PA

10 Jun 91

SUBJ: Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report

TO: TAC/PA

1. Person completing report: 1st Lt. Jennifer L. Fay, chief of Public Affairs, 388th TFW, Hill AFB, Utah

2. Deployed personnel assigned to 388th TFW (Provisional):  
1st Lt Fay, 30 Aug 90 - 19 Mar 91  
Sgt. Gary L. Kunich, 16 Sep 90 - 19 Mar 91

3. I departed Hill AFB 28 Aug with the 4th TFS, the first of the 388th's two squadrons to deploy to the AOR. I arrived in country 30 Aug and immediately began to look for space to set up shop. After arranging for space in the host base photo lab for PA and the Combat Camera team, the first few days were busy with locating my gear, unpacking and setting up. I carried all items required in the PACK plus additional supplies I thought I might need. Equipment consisted of a laptop computer, portable printer, external floppy drive, 35mm camera with extra lenses, flash, supply of film, batteries, and administrative supplies. I began putting out a daily newsletter on 2 Sep. After two weeks I began publishing the newsletter three times a week. In December, we received a Z-248 computer, laser printer, scanner and PageMaker software and began publishing a four-page newspaper twice a week. It was without equal in the command. (see atch)

Sgt. Kunich arrived 16 Sep. At about this same time we began doing some community relations with the American Business Council in Dubai, UAE (the American community's equivalent of a chamber of commerce). Through this organization we made many valuable contacts including the headmaster of the Jumeriah American School. PA arranged three speaking engagements for the school; two events involved sending three pilots (once before the war and once afterwards), the other event was a career day and an intelligence officer (woman) and a doctor participated.

Through the American Business Council's Home Dinner Program we were able to arrange weekly visits to the homes of American expatriates in Dubai for a day-long visit concluding with dinner with the host family. Since this was the only way people could get off base originally, and due to the hospitality of the families, this was an immensely popular program.

PA conducted two VIP tours of the installation for members of the ABC. This was remarkable because prior to our arrival, Americans had never visited the base. In fact, it was considered a 'secret' airbase by our hosts. Security was, of course, of the highest concern by ourselves and our hosts, so visits were limited to very small numbers of people.

PA began supporting media visits in December. Again, this is remarkable and took some doing to convince our hosts to allow media on the installation. Media had never been on the base before and the hosts were very concerned with keeping our presence a secret thereby lessening any potential for terrorist activity. Once assured of the DOD groundrules, the host commander agreed to allow media visits. In all, PA conducted nine DOD combat correspondent pool visits -- the most of any base in the UAE we believe. Journalists from 25 international news organizations including all U.S. networks, Time, Newsweek, AP, UPI, Reuters, Cox Newspapers, and Scripps-Howard, as well as media from Great Britain, Sweden, Holland, Italy and the UAE participated in the visits.

We also supported an Air Force Times interview with the wing commander, a Scripps-Howard reporter interview with people from Bergstrom AFB, and two telephonic press conferences for Utah media with key wing personnel (16 Jan and 27 Feb). By chance, timing for the two telephonic press conferences was perfect -- the first immediately before the war began and the second the day before the ceasefire. Reaction from the Utah media was overwhelmingly positive. TV supplemented its coverage with stock footage from our combat camera team which we had sent out previously. This was definitely a good idea worth repeating.

In addition to media, we supported the USO in filming a "video news release" on its new Desert Oasis van. We arranged for a desert setting and people (supposedly in Saudi Arabia) gathering around the van enjoying its sound system, TV, popcorn machine, etc. We also supported a Fox TV documentary on the making of "Voices That Care." This project involved coordinating with the USO who arranged for tourist visas for the Hollywood film crew and coordinated their requirements. We also worked with our hosts for the film crew to come to the base and do the filming. This project involved filming the music video of Voices That Care being shown to a group of military people, and conducting individual interviews with Air Force people afterwards on their reactions to the song and the entertainers' support of the troops.

We sent out 37 news releases many of which went to several publications since we had people deployed to our base from 73 different Air Force bases! This created a challenge for PA with only two people assigned, to try to get some kind of coverage for the bases with large numbers of people deployed.

Also, we and Combat Camera were responsible for the Christmas greeting program in which we videotaped more than 100 individual greetings sent back to about 30 home bases for viewing at unit functions. We also were responsible for coordinating the showing of video greetings sent to our deployed base by home station bases.

PA ran the AFRTS mini-TV outlet which wasn't too popular once Dubai Channel 33 began retransmitting CNN early in the war and continued until the end. Also, people were getting movies and home videos through the mail, and MWR arranged with a local video store for several movies a week which competed with AFRTS.

Major events included the 8 Jan 91 crash in northern Saudi Arabia in which the pilot was killed. PA was notified at about midnight. Lt Fay coordinated with the Dubai JIB but was unable to reach anyone at CENTAF/PA. Due to our limited fax capability JIB PAO offered to send the initial news release to CENTCOM/PA and 388TFW/PA (Rear). The JIB header apparently confused CENTCOM and stalled the coordination process. 388th PA rear also had problems getting clearance to make the release locally, even though it had already been made in the AOR. Several hours went by before TAC and SAF/PA would clear the release.

Another crash on 13 March took almost as long to get cleared for release. Since the wing commander was flying at the time, the base commander ordered PA not to make a release until he landed. Upon landing, we coordinated the initial release and sent it to CENTAF/PA for coordination. The following day we received a call from 388th PA Rear saying they still did not have the OK to make the release. In following up, 388th PA was told by CENTAF/PA that the release had been faxed to CENTCOM but no one had followed up to see if it had been received. Again, several hours and much confusion occurred before the release was made. As it turned out, we didn't suffer any problems with the media, but still the potential was there for the AF to look very bad.

#### 4. Problem areas.

a. Manning. The PA office was not adequately manned to support a base population of nearly 3,000 people from more than 70 bases. FIX: Allocate PA assets based on population of base, but take into consideration special cases such as having people from a large number of bases deployed to the same location.

b. Coordination. Though there was a PA Plan for Desert Storm, it seemed in many cases to be unused. Also, procedures changed without any advance notice to field units making it extremely difficult for us to function effectively. FIX: Use the plan and develop procedures and still to them; when they change tell field units!

c. Clearing Stories. It was extremely difficult to get stories from the AOR cleared for stateside publication. Before the war field PAOs could send routine, non-sensitive stories directly to base newspapers. But, once the war began we had to send everything through CENTAF/PA which resulted in stories being very old before getting home. On the other hand, I could host a DOD Media Pool and clear information at the source for international viewing or publication. The two widely differing policies don't make sense. FIX: Make security at the source the policy, including for internal and hometown media.

#### 5. Lessons Learned.

a. The telephonic press conferences worked very well and are well worth repeating for future deployments.

b. Put a fax in your PACK. We relied almost exclusively on the fax machine to send/receive messages to/from Hill AFB because of the time difference.

c. Make sure you get a good fill-in for back home. I did and was ever so fortunate. Capt Jan Lauer of the Salt Lake Recruiting Office filled in from January until we returned and did a superb job. With her here I was free to concentrate on operations in the AOR knowing she was holding down the fort back home. The projects we worked together went very well because we had a good rapport and because she made herself a member of the 388th TFW right from day one.

//Signed//  
JENNIFER L. FAY, 1st Lt, USAF  
Chief of Public Affairs

(Certified Copy)

## AFTER-ACTION REPORT

CAPT JAN LAUER (TDY)  
388TH TFW/PA (REAR)  
HILL AFB, UTAH

### BACKGROUND

I was assigned to the 388th TFW/PA (rear) from 2 Jan - 3 April 1991. Lt Jennifer Fay deployed with the wing in August and LtCol Rocky Raab filled in the months before me. I was sent from the recruiting squadron nearby. My career field is public affairs, but I had been out of it for about four years.

I mistakenly expected there to be not much activity here when I arrived. I believed because two squadrons were in the Gulf and the third would be away for a month of warm-weather flying, there would not be many requests for PA activity. Within my first week of the job, however, I realized my expectations were totally wrong.

When I arrived there was a tasking to put together a news conference for the media via telephone with the deployed commanders. A day later, I was tasked to write a speech for the vice wing commander (to be given to the Federal Executives Assoc on Jan 15). On the 8th of January, Capt Michael Chinburg died in an F-16 crash in the Middle East. All of a sudden, we had our work cut out for us.

### MEDIA ACTIVITIES

Overall, most of the activity in the public affairs office at Hill AFB concentrated on media activities. We responded to requests as well as planned media events. We worked closely with the base public affairs office (AFLC) to coordinate needs and resources. The major media events were the F-16 accident and the subsequent memorial service, two telephone interviews with wing leadership in the Gulf and Homecoming. Overall, this office helped work more than 130 media opportunities in my 90 days. See Tab A for a listing of interviews and events. Information at Tab B gives you an idea of the kinds of questions media have been asking and how we prepare for an interview. Newspaper clippings are at Tab C.

### -F-16 CRASH

When Capt Chinburg died, he was the first from Utah to die in Desert Shield. The media was very interested in everything they could find out about him and the accident. Lt Fay had made a release with CENTAF immediately, and it began making its way to the states. Because of the need for SAF/PA or DOD to make the

release, news of the accident in Utah was delayed about 18 hours. The media accepted it without incident, however, and coverage was fair and sensitive.

#### **-FIRST TELEPHONE INTERVIEW**

The telephone interview was delayed by two days and took place on 12 January, a Saturday. We had some difficulty getting through on AT&T. We reasoned it was the most logical time for families to be talking to their deployed members. The interview was with Col Navarro, wing commander; Col Huddle, DO, and Col Peterson, DCM. Because of the proximity to the F-16 accident, Col Navarro began the interview with some comments on the accident and the sorrow the wing felt at his loss. The question and answer session went well. Each reporter had his or her turn at asking questions; we passed a microphone around the table. Each colonel answered each question thoughtfully and sincerely, and before we ran out of time, the media ran out of questions. The timing for this interview was excellent -- just several days before the start of the war.

#### **-SECOND TELEPHONE INTERVIEW**

The second telephone interview was just as timely. It was held on 27 February, right before the cease-fire was announced. It went equally as well. Those interviewed were: squadron commanders LtCol Welsh and LtCol Rackley, resource manager LtCol Vera and LtCol Gilloth, maintenance. In both interviews it was difficult for media to ask anything besides flying questions. However, when questions were asked about life-style, etc., the two non-flying colonels answered them.

#### **-HOMECOMING**

Media activities at homecoming was a joint venture with base public affairs office. They worked the plan and we augmented their team. I was cochairman, if you want to call it that. We worked with the folks at the hangar on base to work out media requirements and locations. We invited the media out on 8 March to see the arrangements, do a story on the preparations and interview the wives decorating it as well as some early returnees. We had every contingency covered. UPARs escorted each media person, and when they brought more than one camera, those numbers added up. The UPARs were responsible for escorting the media, arranging for interviews and generally making sure everything went smoothly. I and several others were available to make decisions and set major things up. For four days, planeloads of people came through this hangar. In those four days, the F-16 squadrons returned. Because of the media interest, we did not choose to have one symbolic homecoming, but rather, tried to the same for each. It was an exciting and challenging week!

Prior to the arrival at the hangar, several handfuls of people were arriving at the airport. The first big group were battle damage maintenance men from the AFLC side of the house. The same nights they came in, about 6 pilots also arrived. So, the media coverage was fair and plentiful. The media at this time expressed interest in covering just about anything we had. We then make a general rule that if less than 10 arrived, we would not invite media. They agreed and that's how we did most of the activities.

#### APPROACH TO MEDIA DURING WAR

Right after war began, we (with base PA) held a press conference. There were about 9 members, 2 of which were from the 388th. Col Fox, CV and pilot wife Suzanne Scott were our panel members. At the time, we could not even confirm our involvement, but the conference went well. Two TV stations began airing it live, but were preempted by national news.

The media immediately wanted 'wife reactions.' Maybe I am too paranoid, but I was concerned about the possibility of a pilot being held as a POW and video of his wife either aggravating his situation or making her a terrorist target. Now, I'm quite convinced terrorists don't even know Utah is on the map, but then again, Ted Bundy went through here. I worked with the wing commander's wife and made up a short list of volunteers -- mainly wives whose husbands were in leadership positions. A couple of these wives did interviews, and we only used first names. Looking back, this probably wasn't necessary, but it was a concern at the time. The media was happy and they understood the reasoning.

#### APPROACH TO INFORMATION TO INTERNAL AUDIENCE DURING THE WAR

Not long after the war started, an F-16 was shot down. It wasn't ours, but these wives still had Mrs. Chinburg on their minds. Through channels we were quickly able to determine that it wasn't ours and the wives' network was activated. Afterward, I began to think that wasn't a good idea. Wouldn't we know if it WERE one of ours? What would happen if the number of F-16s going down increased and we could not keep up with them? What would happen if the leadership did not know to check into a situation, and wives are sitting at home waiting for a knock on the door? I approached this with the wing CV and the wing commander's wife, and we agreed that although it was definitely reassuring to get a call saying it was not a Hill jet, this policy could only lead us to a situation where wives would worry unnecessarily. At a wives meeting, I brought up this subject and said we would no longer be passing on information about other units' jets. We were not in the loop for that information, and if they saw something on TV, they could be reassured that it wasn't ours, or they would

already have been told. We then explained the procedure should something happen to one of their husbands. Grudgingly, most agreed.

Because most of the publicity at this time was on the pilots' wives and the air war, some resentment was building among the enlisted wives. We also had to be careful of the balance of news between TAC and AFLC deployed members. Lt Fay and her staff had gone out of their way to publish news releases that were balanced and covered different career fields. We passed those releases on to the media, but invariably the ones that would get published were the ones related to the flying. At one point, I asked to attend an enlisted wives' meeting to explain why the media are more interested in the pilots and their wives (they are risking more on a daily basis) and what PA was doing to help even the publicity out (make releases and interview opportunities even). Afterward, several media attended and interviewed some enlisted wives. This could have been a volatile crowd, but I think explaining what happens and our approach helped.

#### LANTIRN

Lt Fay had a media pool that focused on the use of LANTIRN on one squadron of F-16s in the Gulf. Because we knew it was coming, and because we are the first F-16 wing to have LANTIRN, and because the environmental assessment was not out yet, we planned for the subsequent, "tell us about it at Hill AFB" questions. There have already been community meetings where LANTIRN has been explained. But, the timing of the LANTIRN deliveries and the training here (before the EA came out) were sensitive subjects. We worked up some "messages" and Q's and A's in case we were asked. I also made copies of a Martin Marietta tape on LANTIRN to give to the media. They did not ask, but we are still prepared. See Tab D for more information.

#### SUPPORT I RECEIVED

The wing and PA staff here immediately made me feel welcome and a part of the team. Col Fox, CV, answered every piddly question I had and basically gave me the freedom to do what I thought was necessary. I was able to arrange interviews and brief him on it rather than ask for each one. He gave guidance when it was necessary without micro managing. He was supportive and kind. The wives I dealt with equally made me feel a part of the wing family.

Base PA and I met early on and discussed our roles -- when we should work together and when we should not. It has worked out well -- each other offering support or taking the lead. This could not have worked any better.

CENTAF REAR, Capt Eggleston and Capt Malone each were wonderful. I worked mainly with Capt Eggleston, and she was there when I needed her. When I needed to know how TAC felt about a particular interview, she told me. When I needed to know

about the releaseability of our deployed location, she told me. She helped me with the Chinburg accident and the F-16 crash after the war (where the pilot safely ejected). However, on both accidents, there seemed to be a glitch in the coordination above her. In both situations, we were sitting here waiting for the "go" -- to tell the media what happened. In both situations, we waited a LONG TIME. Regarding the second crash, Capt Eggleston tried to call CENTAF, and she received a recording. The problem could not be worked until their morning. Luckily, there was not retribution at this end by the media or anyone else. Just thought you'd want to know about it 'though.

#### PRSA

LtCol McCracken, ALC/PA, is a member of the local chapter of the Public Relations Society of America, and offered herself, Lt Fay and me to speak at their April lunch. The topic is how the military handles "information" in peacetime and in war.

#### FINAL COMMENTS

I am thankful to have had this opportunity. I worked long hours and had a 45-minute commute each day. Most days I was a single parent (my husband travels), and I depended heavily on my babysitter. These were my sacrifices. And I was glad to make them. For many people left here at Hill, they did not get to go to the war. But, from my perspective, I sort of did. It was a good experience for me. It proved I had not lost touch of all my PA skills, and it certainly has been rewarding. I feel doubly fortunate to have been here for the entire war and its homecoming.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS OGDEN AIR LOGISTICS CENTER (AFLC)  
HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH 84056-5999

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PA

10 May 1991

SUBJECT:

After-Action Report for Operation Desert Storm

TO:

HQ AFLC/PA

1. Reference your letter of 11 Apr 91 requesting input for after-action report for Hill AFB, we would like to submit the following information. Please note that we have broken this report into a time sequence and also offered lessons learned/suggestions for future operations.

a. Name of person completing the report: Marilu A. Trainor, Chief, Internal Information.

b. Narrative of how Desert Storm affected your public affairs office and its operation:

#### OVERVIEW

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Ogden Air Logistics Center coordinated the efforts of all AFLC and tenant organizations on base. As a result, our staff's workload almost tripled during the initial phases of the war and kept a steady pace of at least twice the normal workload for the remainder of the operation. During the return operation, our workload again skyrocketed.

From August, 1990 through the end of the conflict, we staged a very pro-active public affairs program to support Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Areas most heavily involved were Media Relations and Internal Information, although our entire staff had to dramatically alter their other programs in order to shift their efforts to support the extraordinary requirements of an operation this size.

PA was at the center of the operations at Hill AFB. We were involved in planning meetings, received great support from our commanders, and were able to tell the base's story effectively.

We relied a great deal on our thermofax machine. In these days of modern communication technology, we found ourselves doing many on-line interviews for radio, many more live interviews for electronic media, and greater indepth stories for print media. We also found ourselves developing comprehensive internal PA programs to educate and inform the workers and family members.

We feel our program was an overall success -- from beginning to end. The casualty was the negative impact it had on the personal lives of our staff. With only one person in Media Relations and three people assigned to the newspaper, we were forced to abandon many other programs because Desert Shield/Desert Storm occupied all of our resources. As a result, many of our other programs suffered extensive damage or total abandonment.

#### DEPARTURE/PLANNING

Soon after Desert Shield began, rumors were rampant on base and in the local community about the potential involvement of Hill units. AF spokesmen were not able to confirm or deny unit participation (confirmed or planned.) Reporters attempting to localize national stories even went so far as to interview gas station attendants, restaurant workers, bar flies and others in the community about rumors they had heard. It was not until just hours before the departure of our initial cadre of military personnel were we able to advise the media about Hill AFB personnel involvement.

More than 1,300 personnel from 21 different organizations were deployed from the base with the majority of these people leaving within a one week window (Aug 28-Sep 3) and going to a single airfield in Southwest Asia. The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing deployed two squadrons of F-16 Fighting Falcons (this represented about 1/3 of our total military assigned to Hill AFB.)

The 388th TFW PA (1Lt Jennifer Fay) deployed on the first passenger aircraft supporting her wing. She knew for less than one week prior to departure that she would be deployed and used this time to gather supplies for her deployed operational site, personal and family plans, etc. Sgt. Gary Kunich, also assigned to the 388th TFW PA, joined Lieutenant Fay about 3 weeks later.

TSgt George Bedsaul, a recent returnee to the PA field, was left with wing PA responsibilities. The OO-ALC PA offered to assume overall PA responsibility for the departure operation and the on-going management of wing public affairs operations during the deployment of wing PA staff members until augmentees could be put into place. That offer was willingly accepted by wing officials and approved by OO-ALC/CC.

Prior to initial deployment, PA was not completely informed of total planned involvement. After it was decided that 388th TFW would deploy, OO-ALC PA conducted weekend media training for key wing and ALC staff members, as well as spouses. During the first two weeks of the operation, more than 80 people were trained by PA staff members.

Simultaneously, PA also developed contingency plans with local media reps. We prepared a "what if" scenario with the news directors and assignment editors so that we would know who to contact at the various media about deployment activities at any time of the day or night. This cooperative planning proved very worthwhile when we were finally able to notify the media about the departures; they were prepared to recall a team on short notice. In fact, we notified the media the first time at 11 PM and they had full crews on site within five hours.

We repeated this early morning notification process two other times that week and received excellent cooperation from the media each time. Most media involved in the departures were the same each day so we knew that we had less re-orientation on our part but needed fresh story ideas to add to the departure scene each time they came out.

When initial troops and aircraft departed HAFB on 30 August, PA used this opportunity to offer the media multiple story ideas between flights the first day. Subsequent visits by the media included interview opportunities with a variety of people. These included (a) war support from AFLC and HAFB; (b) support network setup to help families; (c) reaction of people deploying and those not deploying (wing and ALC personnel); (d) deployment processing; (e) reaction from HAFB workers; (f) chemical warfare equipment/effectiveness, etc.

Because Hill was one of the first western bases to deploy personnel, we enjoyed widespread coverage of all of these activities. We also carefully analyzed what other bases did during the first few days of Operation Desert Shield and repeated those stories whenever they could be localized.

PA encouraged local community participation during the departure and return operations. Media helped us tell the story of the first Utahns leaving the state which later served as a bonding process for the entire state. Subsequent to the departure of AF personnel, other military units received substantial coverage of their operations, as well.

#### LESSON LEARNED DURING DEPLOYMENT:

##### PROBLEM:

(1) CENTAF didn't release which units they were going to deploy, therefore, we couldn't confirm or deny participation. Rumors were rampant. Family members were telling everyone that units were ready for deployment but AF spokesmen were unable to confirm. Initial guidance prohibited us from advising the media until 12 hours prior to deployment (although media already knew due to rumors.) This made it very hard for PA credibility to stand with the media.

FIX: Initial statements should be approved and released in the initial PA guidance messages. Subsequent statements should be available on a fill-in-the-blank basis so that we don't have to spend valuable time coordinating individual unit mobilization releases.

PROBLEM:

(2) Lt. Fay had to expend a lot of time procuring equipment, supplies, etc. because of short notice departure.

FIX: As part of this after-action report, request those PA who were deployed to analyze their requirements and develop a list that we could use in a similar situation or modify for an operation of lesser magnitude. Recommend that all PA's be advised of deployment contents so that they can begin identifying sources of needed supplies and/or assemble full or partial kits now.

PROBLEM:

(3) OO-ALC PA staff members immediately notified AFLC/PA and TAC/PS that we would serve as the focal point for all messages, requests for interviews, etc. Multiple problems occurred at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield because the TAC PA message system didn't include OO-ALC PA as an addressee. Although multiple requests were made to include us as an addressee on these important initial PA guidance messages, that problem was not fixed for at least 2-3 weeks. As a result, we often received incomplete messages or late messages which encumbered our operation.

FIX: TAC should have system whereby they know who the host PA is for their units and be able to rapidly add message addressee for PA guidance.

PROBLEM:

(4) Press kits needed to be tailored to include fact sheets on the units deploying on a certain day. This helped ensure coverage of all units, not just the 388th TFW.

FIX: All organization fact sheets should be regularly updated and kept on file by PA.

**MEDIA TRAINING FOR FAMILY MEMBERS AND WORKERS:**

PROBLEM:

Media training for key personnel and family members was immediately required. Det. 8, 1365th AVS, set themselves up as a full television studio operation. PA staff members developed extensive lists of "dirty questions" and "grilled" prospective interviewees under realistic conditions (rapid firing questions, leading questions, attempting to seek classified information, etc.). Each training session was videotaped, played back and critiqued.

It was very important to train and involve the spouses of deployed workers because the family's story, along with the left-behind workers' stories, were all that remained to be told after the initial departure stories were completed.

Unit commanders' wives were involved in selecting the spouses to interview and commanders recommended workers to be trained and interviewed. These people knew the interviewees best, what the story angle was, and were present during the interview training. This showed support from the top which proved very helpful when conducting the training.

FIX: CENTAF/PA should dedicate some of its staff during the initial days of early unit departures and analyze the news coverage of those departures. From this analysis, they can prepare generic questions and proposed answers that other PA's could use to conduct media training. This would have prevented many PA's originating their own training programs when everyone needed similar questions about this operation. Based on the reports that have aired, CENTAF could still prepare some of these generic subject areas, questions that would be applicable to similar operations, and provide these questions to all PAs for use in future operations. All bases have units that deploy and if these are major deployments, the media interest will remain high and we can bring out these suggestions for media training.

Det. 8 was available to videotape all departures. These tapes were forwarded to TAC, AF and others and used in continuing coverage of AF NOW, etc.

#### MAILING OF NEWSPAPERS TO DEPLOYED PERSONNEL

##### PROBLEM:

Initial guidance was non-existent about authority to mail newspapers to deployed personnel. All available cargo space on outgoing aircraft was dedicated to direct war support. Initial reports from the deployed 388TFW/PA, however, indicated a dire need for information about what operations were still going on at home. Most of the early message traffic (late Aug) indicated a concern about ads placed in commercial enterprise newspapers being objectionable. Since little definition of what was considered "objectionable" was provided, that put the center commander and PA in a predicament on whether to send newspapers and consider the consequences later.

SAF/PA did not develop a guidance/authorization about the number of papers to send on a priority basis (prorated), and authorization to get the papers to the deployed personnel. SAF/PA also didn't define what was objectionable advertising, which caused concern for local authorities. Evidently, the overwhelming desire for local news was given paramount priority and the newspapers were sent without further guidance.

FIX: AF develop a policy.

#### SENDING OF MAIL AND PACKAGES TO TROOPS

##### PROBLEM:

Initial information from AF, DLA, etc. was very confusing as to what was authorized to mail, how donations from citizens should be handled, etc.

DLA was not equipped to handle the overwhelming outpouring of supplies and donated items nor was there any central guidance available early in the operation as to what could be shipped on AF aircraft, etc.

FIX: OASD/PA establish a DOD-wide policy concerning shipment of newspapers, and have information available in the initial PA guidance messages. Deployed units designate a single POC to receive all packages sent from the home base. That person's name, SS# and mailing information should be cleared for public release. This was done by the 388TFW/CC (deployed), and worked well; he was able to receive all shipments and allocate them to the units which were deployed to the central location.

#### UNITED SERVICE ORGANIZATION

##### PROBLEM:

Initial reports suggested that people contact their local USO to get emergency messages to deployed personnel. In states like Utah where there is not an in-state USO, this caused confusion

##### FIX:

Before blanket news releases are made suggesting use of USO or similar organizations, it should be determined whether a local or state organization exists. The Red Cross was probably a better contact for states such as Utah.

#### REQUIRED PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORTING

##### PROBLEM:

Much confusion occurred at the beginning of the operations as to which reports PA was required to format and forward to HQ. Initially, PA prepared daily charts showing coverage received to date and the next few days of media activities planned.

##### FIX:

Generic formats for fill-in-the-blank reports should be established now. Guidance on required reports from CENTAF (or similar command headquarters) and MAJCOM should be included in the initial set of PA guidance messages so PA staffs can include these requirements in their planning efforts.

#### PA AUGMENTEES

Lt. Col. Rocky Raab (IMA attached to OO-ALC/PA) served as the first PA augmentee for the 388th TFW. He reported the day of the first departures and stayed on active duty until Dec 31, funded initially by AFLC and later by TAC. He was subsequently replaced by Capt. Jan Lauer, USAF Recruiting Command in Salt Lake City who stayed until Lt. Fay returned in early April.

These augmentees were invaluable to the wing and to ALC/PA. They were able to coordinate local stories, serve as escort officers, prepare stories for internal and external release, etc. They also kept in constant contact with Lt. Fay.

#### LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT AUGMENTEES:

Use of IMAs or augmentees during deployed operations is mandatory for efficient operations. We were fortunate to have two qualified individuals who were able to work for the wing.

Recommend major commands identify potential PA augmentees and develop a system whereby man days, IMA authorization use, etc could be refined and put into place in a much more rapid manner. Also develop memoranda of agreement between MAJCOMS to be able to use resources that already exist in the local area rather than trying to deploy someone TDY for an extended period of time. That saves the AF money for TDY expenses.

#### CLEARING STORIES

##### PROBLEM:

We had a tremendous problem gaining clearance for stories and photos from the deployed location. This process required us to check through CENTAF and/or CENTCOM on each story and it took a very long time to gain this clearance.

Not enough people were devoted to the task of clearing stories and photos. The system itself is extremely cumbersome and resulted in stories and photos dying on the vine.

**FIX:** Develop a more efficient way to clear stories using authority of deployed commander and PAs.

#### DESERT DEFENDER

We had very positive reports from our deployed personnel on the value of Desert Defender. Good blend of stories, photos, news from home. Support from our end was not a problem.

#### RETURN OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL

We enjoyed tremendous success in our coverage of the return operations. Similar to the departure, most of the Hill forces came back within a condensed time frame. Personnel from HAFB units were some of the first to return to the United States.

The first troops home were from the 2952nd CLSS and returned through the Salt Lake City International Airport. We had tremendous cooperation from the airport authorities. Because we had troops returning on three or four flights per day, most of the media were able to file taped stories as well as report live during one of their newscasts.

We were able to tell the story of family members and co-workers transforming a hangar into a welcome home center. Media were familiarized with the center before the first troops arrived at Hill and they had already worked out the best locations for microwave vehicles, etc.

Each time media were invited to observe homecoming ceremonies, we identified a new newspeg for them so they were able to tell multiple stories besides the original visual of reuniting families.

PA used Unit Public Affairs Representatives and other volunteers to man a media operations center in the hangar. We used a one-on-one approach for escorting media, which worked well. We maintained the same cadre of UPARs who knew the operation, rules for flight line operations, key individuals, etc. UPARs were invaluable assets.

#### LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT RETURN OPERATIONS:

It is best to have one location for all return operations so that media become familiar with routine, microwave access, etc. It is important to work with commanders, commanders' wives, workers, etc on information about the troops returning on specific flights. Inform media about these unique situations to offer fresh news reporting. The media greatly appreciated this help. PA's should continue to train new UPARs who could also be called upon to help during an accident/incident to augment PA.

#### c. Narrative on amount of media contacts including news releases and interviews:

- (1) We initially issued media advisories daily (see sample attached). After operations calmed down, we went back to an as-needed schedule.
- (2) We issued 47 total media releases from 28 August 1990 through 19 March 1991.
- (3) We conducted over 50 interviews during deployment and at least 60 interviews during redeployment activities.
- (4) During the operations, we conducted interviews with personnel in almost all areas of the base's operations including air terminal, missile maintenance, family support, supply, etc.

#### d. Narrative on special internal information efforts:

- (1) Immediately upon the start of Desert Shield, the Hilltop Times carried as many AF and AFLC news service stories as possible. Many of our regular features were suspended to allocate sufficient space for coverage of the quick-turning events. When news broke on Wednesday night or Thursday morning, we wrote

our own reports based on televised briefings and other public sources, rather than wait for AFNS.

(2) Coverage of initial deployment, family support programs, etc. were included in early issues. Continuing and regular columns were established (Desert Storm Update - see samples attached) which informed our readers. We also developed a supplement (attached).

e. Summary:

(1) Shortage of manpower, mobile phones or radios and military vehicles for the PA office was an enormous problem. There were so many media opportunities and stories that could have been told, but we were unable to run an around-the-clock operation due to so few staff. Operation Desert Shield/Storm would have provided excellent training for IMAs. Careful consideration should be given to mobilizing all PA assets and deploying them during the initial days of an operation this size so that they can help orchestrate the story and add to the understanding and subsequent endorsement by the American public to an operation like this.

(2) Establishing a good working relationship with all commanders on base is necessary in order to tell each unit's story. Familiarization tours by PA staff members to all base units is essential to being able to answer questions about the unit's mission.



## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 1ST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (TAC)  
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE VA 23665

REPLY TO

ATTN OF:

PA

7 June 1991

SUBJECT:

PA After Action Report--Desert Shield/Desert Storm

TO:

HQ TAC/PA

### BACKGROUND

1. The Wing Public Affairs Office deployed three people to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm between 7 August 1990 and 10 March 1991. The success of the deployment would not have been possible without the cooperation of both those who remained at home and those who deployed. This after action report addresses the main issues of both offices.

2. The three who deployed were:

- a. Lt Col Tom Sack, AFSC 7916, Chief of Public Affairs
- b. 2nd Lt Don Collins, AFSC 7921, Deployed Deputy
- c. TSgt Marv Kusumoto, AFSC 79170, Deployed NCOIC

3. The Wing's key public affairs people at Langley were:

- a. 1st Lt Mary Dillon, AFSC 7924, Acting Chief
- b. Mrs Talu Sanders, GS-9, Acting Deputy
- c. 2nd Lt Karen Finn, AFSC 7924, Media Branch
- d. SSgt Jim Greeley, AFSC 79150, Newspaper Editor

### EXECUTION

4. Deployment Preparations:

a. Public affairs efforts began on 4 August as TSgt Kusumoto pulled the Office Contingency Kit to inventory it and make arrangements to have it shipped. Deployment arrangements went exactly as planned. All of the guidance over the years from TAC/PA and other sources held PA in good stead for making this move.

b. An interesting aside was public affairs deflecting the interest of local journalists. Wing members were cancelling commitments in the local community. On Saturday, 3 August, the Daily Press questioned why events had to be cancelled with so little notice. Public affairs deflected the reporters without compromising the security of the Wing's preparations.

5. Lt Col Sack arrived 8 August and TSgt Kusumoto two days later in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Lieutenant Collins joined the deployment on 31 August. Two additional enlisted members were requested through personnel channels, but the

request was never filled.

6. The home media program:

a. Not only did the home office support the deploying members, but also took on the tremendous media burden which began immediately. The office responded to almost 400 media requests in the first month alone. By the time the Gulf War concluded, the office had entertained almost 1,000 media contacts, not to mention more than 1,000 queries from families and the general public. As part of the base's Desert Storm Events Team, Wing/PA played a major role supporting the deployed members.

b. The major lesson learned was how to organize such a massive influx of media. At first, Wing PA attempted to handle each journalist or news organization one-on-one. This proved impractical, so the office moved to hosting one event each week. Media interest was so high, the base had to run some sessions twice each time to accommodate the numbers attending.

c. The office coordinated arrangements for and escorted two local media trips to Saudi Arabia. This became a point of contention between CENTAF Rear and the deployed First Wing members over the timings and order of arrivals of the local news organizations.

7. The deployed media program:

a. Deployed public affairs entertained more than 500 media contacts. The first visit was 16 August with the arrival of the DOD Media Pool. The DOD media pool was originally scheduled to appear at 1700 on 15 August for its initial visit to the First Wing. Key deployed personnel waited at the alert area until after 1830, then determined the media tour would not show up. Shortly after 1900, an Army colonel called the PA office to say that the media tour would be at the Wing in about 20 minutes. We told him not to bring them. This caused upheaval. The tour was rescheduled for 16 August. While coordinating this second attempt, we discovered the DOD representatives (many would eventually set up the JIB) were pulling First Wing people for interviews with newsmen without coordination with any First Wing officials. The operational commander retains the authority to direct the people assigned to his unit. Insofar as it relates to public affairs, these DOD people had no business free lancing media opportunities in the First Wing without the consent of the Wing Commander. Among Wing concerns were the security considerations associated with Wing activities and lack of knowledge of DOD people on which Wing people made good representatives to put before the press.

b. We established a standardized tour of Wing facilities which came to be known alternately as the breakfast tour and/or the sluggo tour. Wing PA's challenge was balancing the evolving expectations of the media against the constantly changing

operational schedule of the Wing. All of this experience proved helpful, however. Just before Desert Storm kicked off, we initiated a meeting with a group of media which were scheduled to be on Air Force pools during the opening days of the war. The Wing Commander's goal was to educate them on tactical air operations. We did this because some journalists--after visiting a couple of different air wings--expressed confusion over exactly which aircraft played what role. Colonel McBroom walked the journalists through hypothetical missions explaining the role of the different aircraft in a composite force. We were able, also, to incorporate many lessons learned over the months of Desert Shield into a local action public affairs plan, tab A, which helped get our Desert Storm efforts smoothly off the ground with full cooperation of the Wing's senior leadership.

c. Working with the JIB. Overall everything went okay although rocky at times: (1) The overriding obstacle was the disagreement over who ran the Wing Commander's public affairs program. The JIB never understood completely that only he did. (2) One of the biggest hiccups with the JIB came over public affairs handling of the SECAF visit to Dhahran. The JIB unilaterally worked a press availability for the Secretary. On the day the Secretary arrived, the JIB notified, not public affairs, but the Wing protocol officer that the media availability must be scheduled. The Wing leadership, although reluctant because of the short notice, accommodated it. The Secretary, however, expressed no interest in a media availability. The Secretary and his party wanted to spend the short time available with the troops. The wing protocol officer called the JIB and told them the event was off. Had the JIB involved Wing PA, the problem might have been avoided. (3) Responsibility for host base support became another issue of contention between the Wing and the JIB. The JIB needed a wide variety of support: uniform items, chem gear for media, drivers for JIB buses, sometimes buses also, communications including secure voice and hotlines to be notified of Scud missile attacks and other emergencies which might bear on JIB personnel survival, etc., etc. The Wing supported where it could. Instead of the piecemeal approach taken by the Dhahran JIB, possibly all JIB needs could be identified and formalized into a mobility plan that would include identifying and mandating sources of support. The field level units could then plan to provide this support and have it ready in future deployments. (4) The press pool system, and the inflexible way in which it was administered by the JIB worked to the disadvantage of the Wing (and hence to the Air Force). The JIB discouraged the wing from working with some of the press members, who had come to be respected among our leadership, because the journalists were not members of a particular pool. We spent a lot of time negotiating with the JIB getting permission to work around the restrictions. Typical issues of contention included whether or not an operational commander had the right to invite specific media members to his office for interviews; also, whether or not reporters could follow up individually on stories' after initial visits as part

of a pool. Supporting journalists as unilaterals became a major point of contention from a lot of different points of view. As a result, we felt fewer and fewer opportunities were being made available to tell the public about our Air Force activities. The limitations of the JIB policies hit home about three-fourths of the way through the air campaign. Our Wing Commander was urged by CENTAF Forward officials to promote the importance of the air war. The commander asked us to hand pick a pool of journalists that he could talk to openly. He was looking for people who would allow him to be off the record when he needed to be even though the bulk of the discussion would be on the record. This is where the trust and confidence which Wing PA had built with the reporters was helpful. Getting the JIB concurrence to do it was an act of God, and in the end (also at the last moment), the JIB took half the group for another media pool. That was an unfortunate decision, given the importance of this particular interview in promoting public understanding of the effectiveness of the air war and extending it before the start of the ground war.

d. Hometown News Center. Supported twice during the deployment. Got about 700 radio, print, and TV hometowners. Both visits went well.

8. Deployed internal information programs:

a. The 'Out of Control.' This was the Wing's weekly newsletter. It contained primarily policy guidance from the commander and his senior staff and kept Wing members informed of procedures important to their survival in the Dhahran area. Every issue was cleared through both the Combat Support Element and Wing Commanders.

b. The Langley Flyer. Mary Dillon says the need for information from Saudi was at 'a rabid level' at Langley. Yet, the CENTCOM internal information policy guidance was very restrictive. The Flyer played a much smaller role than it should have in supporting a critically important aspect of the Wing's internal information program. By 10 September, deployed PA had sent three stories back to Langley for use in the Flyer. Each story highlighted the good work our people were doing. More importantly, the stories showed our families that their loved ones were okay. I can remember arguing with Mary Dillon over the phone several times in September to start putting these stories in The Flyer. In Dhahran, we were being told stories could be cleared by the on-scene PAO. This conflicted with stateside guidance. At Langley, Lt Dillon was concerned about retribution from TAC/PA if she ran stories not cleared by TAC, and, in fact, simply refused to do it without TAC/PA approval. The Wing Commander eventually determined that higher headquarters restrictions on our internal information program were counterproductive and ordered publication of the stories. Fortunately, higher headquarters restrictions were starting to loosen up, so no real conflict evolved. The stupidity of it all

was restricting what we could tell our own families through internal information channels when more than 400 news representatives from all over the world were visiting bases like Dhahran and releasing information virtually unrestricted and without any serious form of censorship. Unfortunately, the deployment was into October before The Flyer began running stories from Saudi on a regular basis. Restrictions on photography created a similar problem, and, I don't believe, was ever resolved to anyone's satisfaction. For photography, the release policy was also too restrictive. It appears higher headquarters underestimated the knowledge and competence of local PAOs concerning security and classification of film. Requiring all photography to go through combat camera seems like a poor decision. Families wondered why they had a better chance of seeing their loved ones on the six o'clock news than in The Flyer. If national media has access to information, internal should have been afforded the same consideration.

c. Family Support Video Tapes. PA deployed with its Panasonic VHS camera. The interest at home in the welfare of deployed members was so high, the Wing Senior Enlisted Advisor came over to Saudi about a week into the deployment. Together we spent another week capturing 35mm slide of Wing members working, doing 'Hi, Moms' with the video camera, and video taping the dormitory, the dining facility, and other support areas. The chief took all this back to Langley where he blended it in with other video footage. I'm told an audible sigh went through the audience as the chief made this presentation to the families and that it went a long way to reassuring families that their loved ones were being looked after. Eventually, we were able to provide monthly to family support a professionally edited, high quality video simply because the Saudi media center extended themselves so completely to meeting our needs. We must also recognize the work of Chief Morley, who had people and equipment available to smooth out any problems we encountered.

d. Combat Camera. Probably one of our least successful relationships of the deployment. Combat camera came with a list of requirements. The Wing's focus was on defense of the Kingdom. Combat camera wanted to fly 'fun' sorties, DACT etc. No real time defensive combat air patrols . . . our primary mission. By contrast, CMSgt Don Sutherland of Airman Magazine visited the Wing for more than a week in October. We covered the First Wing from A to Z. First Wing flew the Chief twice to capture pertinent aerial still photography. It was a pleasure to deal with a true professional. The Wing also supported other video documentation teams: (1) the 82nd Airborne; (2) a DOD combat camera crew led by Sgt First Class Ferino (3) three aerial qualified Air Force combat cameramen, after Desert Storm kicked off, were flown routinely. (4) The Wing also supported fully the TAC/CSV requirement in December. Overall, the Wing supported combat camera fully although not without some adversarial moments.

e. The CENTCOM Cultural Awareness Film. During November, Wing PA supported two visits from the CENTCOM PA staff, to support filming the CENTCOM Cultural Awareness film.

f. Training Video Tapes. Wing PA produced four training videos: (1) gas mask training; (2) M-16 maintenance; (3) Law of Armed Conflict; and (4) Refilling a canteen under chemical conditions.

9. Deployed community relations programs. Played a role in Wing activities both in Dhahran and around Langley. (1) At Dhahran, the Wing Commander hosted six groups of Saudi-Aramco employees (mostly American) to tours of First Wing facilities, between October and December. We worked with the Chapel staff and put together the deployed equivalent of a civic leader tour. Hosted about 500 people before it was all over. (2) Wing Commander spoke in October before 300 members of the American Businessmen's Association. (3) Air Transportable Hospital hosted at least four tours for area school children in October and November. (4) Supported community relations in the United States. All our people were deeply touched by the number of school children who wrote the Wing and encouraging our forces in the Gulf. PA initiated scripted and produced (through our very good friends in the Saudi Media Center) a 27 minute video tape of First Wing activities in Desert Shield. We had sufficient copies reproduced to include with letters of thanks back to schools and other organizations which showed support to those deployed. In January, PA wrote a second script and, again with the help of the RSAF, produced a 26 minute Desert Storm video. The Wing Commander and other unit members have used this one in public presentations since returning from Saudi. Both video tapes have been warmly received, and have gotten a lot of mileage in promoting the Air Force's role in the Gulf among schools and civic groups.

#### 10. Public Affairs Equipment:

a. The deployed element discovered quickly that a computer should accompany each member who goes. The home office supported by shipping two computers.

b. Protective covers for the computers and periodic preventive maintenance from the local comm guys kept our computers running smoothly the entire time we had them. Computer keyboard covers which allow typing were especially important.

c. Mobility Equipment Recommendations: (1) PA's should be authorized rucksacks (Alice Packs), medium or large size, ideal for carrying chemical defense equipment while freeing hands to do PA work such as taking pictures or tackling media. (2) Flak Jackets are a must. The threat of terrorism between our tents on the base and the hotel off base was enough to mandate this requirement. Unfortunately, the Air Force doesn't authorize them for public affairs. This should be corrected. (3) Every PA

mobility kit should have a fax machine and a telephone answering system similar to what the home office uses for its action line program. The fax machine requirement is self explanatory. The telephone answering system would have been helpful in rumor control and communications with the media/JIB. (4) Equipment requirements for radios and televisions should be upgraded. Office needed a radio which had AM/FM and shortwave, and capable of accepting external speakers for large groups to listen to. The television requirement worked out okay with the arrival of the Sony 15 System television and a video tape playback machine. The authorizations should be upgraded officially for such equipment. The television currently authorized would have proven inadequate for the occasion. (5) The Honda generator proved unnecessary for public affair work. It got lots of use supporting a chemical attack warning system for airbase operability. We discovered, however, that civil engineers more than cover for everyone's power requirements. Recommend the generator requirement be dropped from the contingency kit.

11. Other observations. Listed below are those miscellaneous activities/observations which I didn't feel reasonably fit anywhere else in the report:

a. Protocol. The Wing deployed without a protocol officer. I took a stab at it, but by the fifth congressional visit (with a growing number of others on the horizon), we requested a protocol officer be sent over. I was happy to get out from under the burden.

b. The Dhahran air base phone situation was inadequate to meet communications needs. One commercial phone line, which did not always work and did not go beyond Saudi Arabia, was shared with the nine members of the deployed JAG. PA relied on the phone systems in the Wing Commander's tent and at the JIB. The Wing Commander had autovon and secure voice. The JIB had great commercial access.

c. Transportation support was great. We discovered early on that print media and radio have different expectations than television and still photographers. Transportation assigned PA two Isuzu Troopers which enabled us to divvy up our media. On rare occasions, we needed bus support and always got it. Wing transportation is good folks.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

12. For media, hire an Air Force 0-6 to run the JIB, and be responsive to the needs of field level operational commanders. For internal, develop a policy which allows field level commanders to release information back to their local areas at

the commander's discretion. For equipment, provide better, more complete kits for the survival of each individual deploying; and for the office, authorize whatever is needed from fax machines to computer modems for networking to improve convenience and speed of communications.

  
THOMAS L. SACK, Lt Col, USAF  
Public Affairs Officer

Tabs:  
A. PA War Plan  
B. Video Tapes



# DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 366TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (TAC)

MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE ID 83648-6000

24 APR 1991

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

SUBJECT: After-Action Report, Operation Desert Shield/Storm

TO: HQ TAC/PA

1. BACKGROUND: The following TAC personnel was tasked to deploy to Taif, Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield/Storm between 28 Aug 90 to 28 Mar 91:

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>DUTY TITLE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
CAPT	Robert K. Thompson	7924	Chief, Public Affairs	48TFW(P)

2. EXECUTION:

a. Upon arrival at Taif, the base was closed to photography, news media and the distribution of newsletters of any kind. Worked closely with the Saudi Chiefs of Security, Intelligence and Recce Photo Lab to gain Saudi higher headquarter's approval for clearance and publication.

b. PA products had to be coordinated through wing, vice, and combat support group commanders, and the Saudi Chiefs of Security, Intelligence and Recce Photo Lab.

c. For the first 13 weeks of Desert Shield, operated as a one man shop. Wrote nine issues of the Warrior Weekly as well as serving as the only on-base still and video cameraman.

d. Escorted media during VIP visits which included: the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the CENTCOM Commander, the CENTAF Commander as well as the Saudi Arabian Chief of Joint Military Forces.

e. Hosted two four-day visits by DOD Combat Correspondent Pools as well as several visits by AF-level media teams including Combat Camera, AF Now and Airman Magazine.

f. Responded to following mishaps: F-111F Class A mishap, EF-111 takeoff mishap, F-111F refueling mishap, and an EF-111 Class A mishap.

3. SUPPORT:

a. In November, Sgt Troy Prine arrived and took over duties as editor. MSgt Lee Hinchey arrived in December as NCOIC. Both are from RAF Lakenheath.

b. During Desert Shield/Storm, Taif PA spent in excess of \$10,000 for photographic services and over \$60,000 in contract printing costs.

4. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommend future deployments send a PAO with a photo lab photographer. It is also recommended that the photographer deployed be able to run a "field lab" with the capability to develop and print black and white photos (a minimum requirement).



ROBERT K. THOMPSON, Capt, USAF  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs

DESERT STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT  
363RD TACTICAL FIGHTER WING PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
SHAW AFB, S.C. 29152-5060

PERSON COMPLETING REPORT:

Thomas A. Barth, Captain, Chief of Public Affairs

PERSONS DEPLOYED:

Thomas A. Barth, Captain, Chief of Public Affairs  
10 Aug 90 - 15 Mar 91

Detroit Whiteside, SSgt, NCOIC of Public Affairs  
10 Aug 90 - 15 Mar 91

PAO NARRATIVE

Upon arrival at our deployed location, our biggest challenges were first to find a place (cool if possible) to set up shop. Fortunately, our wing commander ensured we were located close to him and wanted to get a newsletter going ASAP. The following day, armed with a transformer, one power jack, one electric typewriter and lots of tape, our first newsletter hit the streets. Because of the amount of people and the fact that there were many different living and working areas, we produced nearly 250 two sided copies (our circulation quickly grew to 750 two sided copies throughout the deployment). Our commander's guidance was clear...getting out an internal newsletter with key information was a top priority. "People have to know what's going on!" It was just as well we focused initially on the internal aspect of PA - our location had one phone line. Lines for the phone line usually meant a two hour wait. Compound the wait with the fact that the lines were usually busy at Riyadh meant a distinct frustration at trying to get the big picture. We, in fact, had an easier time calling home station late our time, early for CONUS, to relay what we needed to find out. They in turn would contact TAC/PA and get the answers. After several weeks of shifting offices due to improving conditions, our Public Affairs office stabilized in terms of no more moving, proximity to wing/CC (20 feet away), air conditioning, electrical outlets, etc. Our offices location didn't change throughout the last four months. There we were close to both a STU III and a TAC line, had our own answering machine, were on the brick network for emergencies, and "in the middle of things." We were also able to work a newspaper contract with a local paper to keep our people current on world events, sports, etc. Our wing also received STARS & STRIPES after three months on station. We were also fortunate enough to be given a 702 to help us in our

administrative duties, as well as typing. Sgt Dave Edwards of the 363rd Tactical Fighter Wing deserves special recognition for his help. His help literally saved hours of work from the PA staff.

#### MEDIA CONTACT

Because of our location's classification as secret, initial media contact was null. Higher headquarters guidance stated we should not publicize our unit's location and conduct no interviews. However, video tapes as well as initial releases were sent back to CENTAF/PA Forward for clearance. In total, our office produced over 45 releases for both external and internal use. Many of those releases included "Diary Entries" of people's thoughts during the war. Because of our location, our first media pool visit was not until four months after our arrival. Our O-6's were heavily involved in the planning from the start to make sure we made each visit a success. We had three media visits before January, and after January, we conducted a media day with the pool every Friday, and as needed on other days. All pools were coordinated through the Dubai JIB.

Internally, the deployed PA forces focused on: a daily newsletter, pictures, stories, keeping the commanders informed of current Air Force doctrine and policies through copies of guidance and briefings by PA. On the home front at Shaw AFB, our base newspaper had a four page section each week strictly on Operation Desert Shield/Storm. In this section, informative stories, editorials, and information was highly received by the base populace and local community.

Host nation community relations kept us busier than we expected. The large American and British work force in our deployed country was committed to making members of our wing "feel at home." Because of this, PA worked extensively with the business men and women, American school principals and teachers, and embassy in setting up socials, sport outings, base tours and holiday outings. I can't say enough for the civilian community for their support. They spent much of their own money and even more of their time in making sure we were comfortable.

#### PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

My biggest gripe was the whole clearance procedures regarding stories/slides/videotapes. The process of clearing stories by CENTAF/PA Forward took far too long. Photograph clearance was even worse. It only got better in January - when the wing

commander deployed had the approving authority for all releases. Unfortunately, the old system went back into effect once the war started. My recommendation is to let the wing commander decide what's important, classified, sensitive and the like. Major topics to be avoided should be sent out to CC and PA. No wing commander is going to be risky when it comes to releases - nor will any PA officer worth his/her salt. The wing commander has the authority during peacetime for release, why change it in wartime?

Photographs were another bone of contention as all film had to be sent to the Pentagon for developing and approval. All of us in the field were scared to death of the "black hole" and losing our slides and photographs. Unfortunately in many cases, that's exactly what happened. I am unsure if we will ever see those pictures again. The true shame is those pictures are important to us, and meaningless to someone not associated with our deployment. We worked a film developing contract at our location to get quick turnaround on our pictures and slides. This helped because we sent copies of the photos for release for clearance and had the originals with us for posterity. Then again, we were luckier than most due to our location (near a city). Near the end the photo clearance authority was on track with the deployed commander and the vice commander back home.

Being photograph enthusiasts certainly helped in PA's resolve to take plenty of pictures. However with all the demands of setting up our office and pumping out time consuming newsletters, we were missing key photograph opportunities. We tried, but were missing some. Our remedy was to get our wing commander involved with the combat camera chief at Riyadh to actually set up a combat camera detachment at our location. I felt this was especially important because at the time we were not receiving media and it was a great chance to get professional products to the media and interested military parties. I cannot say enough for the professionalism of our combat camera detachment and TSgt Wayne Evans of Norton AFB. His crew worked tirelessly documenting our wing and our people. Their products have gone a long way in helping us meet our media and community demands of "what was it like" when we got home. Every major unit must have at least a dedicated photographer and videographer when deployed. Relying on PA to get all the shots is just not reliable enough.

The media pool was a distinct learning experience! Fortunately with an extremely capable PA NCO and even more enthusiastic colonels and base populace, media visits were made easy. The trouble with the diversified media pool is it is hard to please each of the different media at the same time. Each has their own needs and quirks. After one visit we knew what they were and were able to meet them. However, the "pool" calls on both the patience of the media and the military members

working or being interviewed by the pool. It worked great when we had professional, courteous media. It was disastrous when we didn't. Special thanks to Dubai JIB members Capt Terry Gates and Lt Colleen Wise for their enthusiastic and energetic efforts to make sure the 363rd was high on the media's visit list.

One of our biggest hits was our daily newsletter. We kept it diversified, fun, local and on a good delivery routine. If you would have told me before we deployed people would be interested in reading a daily newsletter, especially for seven months, I doubt I'd believed you. Yet everyday we barely could keep all 750 copies from being grabbed hot off the press. Our commander stayed heavily involved, as well as all the deputies, and members of the wing. Our daily column, Thumbs Up and Down, was highly regarded where we put in birthdays, anniversaries, and 'atta boys. It took a lot of time each day, but our people really looked forward to it.

The last point I'd like to bring up is my concern regarding CENTAF/PAO Forward. Realizing that it had to be as confusing for him as it was for us in the field, I still think CENTAF/PAO could have done a better job in terms of letting us know in the field what other units were doing. In many cases he was unsure who was doing what and seemed unconcerned with what we were doing. I felt I probably could have made it through the whole deployment without calling CENTAF/PAO Forward and he wouldn't have cared. I will compliment Captains Oscar Seara and Gay for their timely answers and willingness to help. The enlisted force was always willing to help but in many cases were not informed on what was going on. However, the arrival of Sgt Glaize seemed to change that. He truly stayed "on top of things" - and we had a lot of confidence in him. However, I will say during our five aircraft accidents, CENTAF/PA Forward was everything we could ask - responsive and supportive.

All in all, it was truly an exciting experience for myself and my NCO. We got to do things we've been trained for and felt like we really helped the commander where he needed it most. Working with the media, news releases, photos and a daily newsletter sure kept us busy. But heck, what else did we have to do!

THOMAS A. BARTH, Capt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

(certified copy)

Desert Storm After-action Report

37th TFW/PA

A. Robert C. Shelton Jr., MSgt.

Chief of Public Affairs for 37th Tactical Fighter Wing

B. In addition to Sergeant Shelton, the wing had A1C Donald Kusturin assigned to the deployed unit. Airman Kusturin deployed to the 37th TFW(P) from his home unit at the USAF Academy. Dates in theater: Sgt Shelton, 20 Aug 90 - 18 Mar 91; Airman Kusturin, 19 Nov 90 - 5 Apr 91.

C. Wing public affairs operations were established in the area of responsibility within 72 hours of the wing's deployment operations. Initially equipment available was limited to the deployment kit borrowed from Nellis AFB. However, this equipment was enhanced with the arrival of the 366th Combat Support Group element which offered computer assistance. The 366th CSG's assistance and equipment made the PA taskings easier to accomplish and more enjoyable to do. Although initial manning appeared to be adequate, additional manpower was determined to be needed later in the deployment--Airman Kusturin.

Communication links were established within 24 hours with the Headquarters, CENTAF Forward element. Although available access to commercial telephones were possible, the majority of AOR communications were done via the Defense

Switching Network. Commercial telephone access enhanced PA channels from the AOR to USAF CENTAF/PA Rear.

D. Initially media contacts were restricted--our deployed location was classified. However, 15 news releases were prepared, cleared and released through CENTAF/PA Forward. Media visits and interviews were later allowed and took a lot of coordination time away from the wing's internal information efforts. Two media pools visited our deployed location and covered a variety of subjects (i.e. commander, stealth pilots, deployment experiences, etc.). Media affiliations escorted during deployment included CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, Japan, Saudi Arabia television crews; ABC, NBC, CBS, Japan radio; New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Detroit Free Press, European Stars and Stripes, Saudi News and other newspapers; AIRMAN Magazine, Air Force Now and several Joint Combat Camera units.

A very good working relationship was developed with our Saudi Arabian hosts. Community relations activities were planned, coordinated and executed in a very effective manner. These activities included visits from the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Central Command commander, U.S. Central Air Forces commander. Community activities included field day events, discussions with teachers and handling holiday festivities for local children.

E. Initial problem was knowing where we were going or what would be there when we arrived. We were fortunate to have been deployed to the base that we were.

All in all our deployment went pretty smoothly. Proper planning and having basic equipment allowed public affairs operations to begin almost immediately. Therefore, offering the wing a readily available means to help the commander with his policies and procedures.

//Signed//

Robert C. Shelton, Jr.

(Certified Copy)

Subj: Repatriated POW Public Affairs Escort Summary Report

To: SAF/PATR

1. I was notified by USAFE/PAM at 1530 on 8 Mar 91 that a Public Affairs escort was requested from each base that had a Repatriated Prisoner of War. Funding for the temporary duty assignment to Andrews AFB was being handled by Secretary of the Air Force Operation Yellow Ribbon. I was tasked to handle media contact for RPOW Capt William F. Andrews, 10TFS pilot. On the morning of 9 Mar 91, I flew on a commercial airline out of Frankfurt, Germany, and arrived that evening at Dulles Airport, outside of Washington, D.C. Billeting was at Andrews AFB and I rented a vehicle during the two-week TDY.
2. I worked mainly out of the media center but near the end of the TDY I used the 1776ABW public affairs office as my work center. A typical day's activities included fielding media queries, setting up interviews, and assisting other public affairs officers with their RPOW media activities. Internal Air Force coordination channels were with the wing public affairs staff, the Malcolm Grow USAF Medical Center staff, and the Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs Operations Division.
3. On 10 Mar 91, the RPOWs flew into Andrews AFB at 1200. The base public affairs media center at base operations processed approximately 400 media members for the return home ceremony. After the ceremony, private time for the families was set aside. I began fielding media requests to interview Capt Andrews within minutes of arriving at the media center.
4. I visited Capt Andrews at the hospital on 11 Mar 91. He was on morphine for the pain from his broken leg. We briefly talked about media contacts. He told me that he was only interested in talking to his hometown newspapers. He has two "hometowns" since he grew up in the Syracuse, NY, area and his parents moved to the Harrisburg, PA, area. He did not want to talk to any national media. He tentatively agreed to local newspaper interviews because he wanted to get a message of thanks to all the people who supported his family and said prayers for him while he was in the Middle East.
5. Capt Andrews had surgery on 12 Mar 91 so I didn't see him until 13 Mar 91. I briefed him on the latest interview requests from local and national media. He was still on morphine and not in any shape to attend the scheduled Air Force Media Training conducted in the medical center auditorium for the other RPOWs.
6. A media conference was held on 14 Mar 91 at the Andrews AFB Officers' Club. A decision was made that morning to allow Capt Andrews to be part of the media conference despite not receiving

the Media Training from the previous day. All eight RPOWs took part in this optional media conference. Capt Andrews was asked only one question about how did he get captured.

7. Four public affairs escorts and I went to the Pentagon on the afternoon of 15 Mar 91 to meet Brig Gen (sel) Robertson, SAF/PA, and tour the Air Force public affairs offices. Several of us used the opportunity to coordinate various details of our respective RPOWs' media schedules.

8. Capt Andrews spent the weekend of 16-17 Mar 91 on a hospital pass with his family. I spent the morning of 16 Mar 91 talking to various network news program producers on the latest media non-availability for Capt Andrews. With no media interest the rest of the weekend, I visited downtown Washington, DC.

9. On 18 Mar 91, Capt Andrews and I went to the Pentagon for the one-on-one SAF/PA Media Training program normally given to brigadier generals. Mrs Andrews also attended. The session was very beneficial to Capt and Mrs Andrews. During the ride back to Andrews AFB, Capt Andrews and I worked out a new schedule of media he would grant interviews with. He felt more comfortable with taking on hometown television/radio stations after the media training session but he still didn't want to talk to national news media. I then set up the next three days with several interviews.

10. The 1776ABW newspaper editor and I interviewed Capt Andrews in his hospital room on 19 Mar 91. This served two purposes--to give Capt Andrews a chance to practice his media training on "friendly media" and also to get coverage in the Andrews AFB and Hahn AB newspapers as well as an Air Force News Service article. Photographs for internal newspaper use were shot by the base newspaper editor and provided to me.

11. On 20 Mar 91, Capt Andrews conducted an in-person interview with the Washington, DC, representatives of the Harrisburg "Patriot" and the Syracuse "Post Standard" newspapers. Next, he did a telephone interview with WSWF radio in Seneca Falls, NY, and then one with "The Citizen" newspaper from the same area.

12. Three separate television interviews with the hometown network affiliates from the Harrisburg, PA, area were conducted at the Andrews AFB Officers' Club on 21 Mar 91. Agreements were made with each station (WGAL, WHTM, and WHP) to provide a copy of their story to their sister affiliates in the Syracuse, NY, area. Later that day, Capt Andrews conducted a telephone interview with the "Finger Lake Times" newspaper in New York state.

13. Based on Capt Andrews guidance, I turned down all national and non-hometown media requests. I briefed him on all requests that I set up or turned down. The following is a list of media

that weren't granted interviews: L.A. Times, WJLA TV, Inquirer Gazette, WUSA TV, Washington Post, Larry King Live, MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour, People Magazine, Primetime Live, 20/20, Fox Morning News, and Newsweek.

14. Capt Andrews was released as of yesterday from the Malcolm Grow USAF Medical Center at Andrews AFB and will return to the Harrisburg area to visit his parents until after Easter. He then plans to return to Hahn AB, Germany. All items to be sent to Capt Andrews should be sent in care of my office: 50TFW/PA, Attn: Capt Ballew, APO, NY 09122. I can be reached at 01149-6543-51-7715. To reach the office telefax number, substitute 6436 for the last four numbers. The Autovon number is 450-7715 and telefax 450-6536.

15. The only suggestion I have concerns providing the TDY public affairs officers with a wallet-sized card outlining all the different telephone access numbers. Include information on how to dial base, local off-base, WATS, Autovon, and credit card calls.

16. This RPOW Public Affairs Escort duty worked well for me once Capt Andrews' physical condition allowed the media training and interviews to take place. Before that, I was able to help other RPOW PA escorts with the initial flurry of media activity while being in on the various evolutions of media guidance. I think it would have been difficult to step into the middle of this without the help of the other TDY public affairs officers from the start. Working with Capt Andrews from the beginning established a good rapport that will continue for the inevitable interviews to follow once he arrives back in Germany. Knowing each others' background from the beginning helps us to present his POW experience as part of a "good news" Air Force story.

*J. Robert Ballew*

J. ROBERT BALLEW, Capt, USAF  
Chief, Public Affairs

cc: 50TFW/CC  
17AF/PA  
USAFE/PA

*[Handwritten initials]*

FROM: 7241 ABG Izmir TU/PA

TO: HQ USAFE Ramstein AB GE/PAR

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

1. Ref: CENTAF/Rear PA msg 152201Z Mar 91, same subj, information follows:

A. Bryan A. Holt, Capt, Chief, Public Affairs, 7241 ABG

B. Bryan A. Holt, Capt, 16-18 Aug 90, TDY to Incirlik AB (SSgt Michael Fletcher, and Sgt Tina M. Hughes - Izmir only)

C. Impact on communications was minor. Problem areas were getting through to headquarters and contacting off-duty after hours PA rep

D. Releases focused on what we were doing to support war efforts. Izmir distributed 11 releases and conducted one press conference. Capt Holt assisted with news media coverage at Incirlik AB, TU, to include press conference with appx 82 news media agencies.

E. Problem areas included increase in terrorist activity. There was confusion and heightened tension in the community. Lesson learned: more town meetings, articles and news flashes were needed. Also PA establish an 18-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week rumor control program at the beginning of war. PA guidance received was greatly needed and appreciated. Should be noted because of hi-tech of CNN, many stories were on the wire before headquarters could be notified.

(reprint of 7241 ABG/PA msg 091200Z May 91)

Memo for record

2 March 1990

Subject: Public Affairs After-Action Report

1. There were two people assigned to the Public Affairs Staff during the deployment of the 870th Contingency Hospital at RAF Little Rissington:

Name	Rank	AFSC	Title
Michael Rein	Capt	7924	Public Affairs Officer
Rosaire Bushey	Sgt	7915	Public Affairs Specialist
*Cecily Christian	Capt	7924	Public Affairs Officer

(\* -- Temporarily assigned while Capt Rein was away for one week)

The PA staff was on temporary duty status to support the deployed hospital staff. Each of the PA staff are assigned to USAF bases within the United Kingdom.

2. The PA staff performed a number of activities in support of the mission:

- prepared daily newsletter which was delivered to various duty sections around the base
- the PAO was a member of the hospital commander's executive staff
- PA assisted the Community Relations Adviser with community relations programs relating to public affairs
- PA specialist prepared articles for base newspaper of hospital staff members
- PAO answered several news media inquiries daily and arranged media interviews and visits with hospital staff.
- maintained liaison with higher headquarters concerning statistics on patient movement
- arranged still and video photography of hospital staff for official documentation and inclusion in home base newspapers.

3. For more details of public affairs activities during the activation of the Contingency Hospital, contact Capt. Rein at (0451) 810224 after 5 March.

*Cecily Y. Christian*  
CECILY Y. CHRISTIAN, Capt, USAF  
Public Affairs Officer

RO49

Memo for Record

4 March 1991

Subject: Public Affairs After-Action Report  
870th Contingency Hospital

1. The following summarizes the Public Affairs support of the 870th Contingency Hospital deployed to RAF Little Rissington, United Kingdom.

**TASKING AND DEPLOYMENT**

The Public Affairs tasking to support the 870th CH came from Third Air Force at RAF Mildenhall. One Public Affairs officer (AFSC 7924) and one specialist (AFSC 7915) were assigned to the unit. The PAO arrived 21 January, seven days after hospital activation. The specialist arrived 11 days after activation on 25 January.

**OFFICE SET UP AND LOCATION**

The Public Affairs office was located in a building next to the commanders, so access to the commander was fairly easy. PA was in the same building with the Chaplain staff, Legal office and Red Cross staff and shared the same office with the Community Relations Adviser. The office was in the same building housing a lounge with cable television, giving the PA staff access to CNN news reports and CENTCOM/DOD news briefings. Office space was plentiful, but the staff had four chairs and three tables as furnishings (two of the chairs were used to hold office supplies).

**SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT**

The staff had one word processing computer, one typewriter and supplies which came from the PAO's home base. Some forms were provided by the 20th TFW/PA staff. The PAO had to have a commercial phone line installed in the office since no phones were originally available for public affairs use.

**DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

During the six week operation, the public affairs staff performed a range of duties. In order to get vital information to the 2,000 deployed hospital staff, Public Affairs produced a daily newsletter with Gulf and local news. The newsletter was distributed to various locations around the base by 11 a.m. The PA specialist wrote several newspaper articles for the home base newspapers of the hospital staff. A big part of the PA operation was working with the media. There were several requests for interviews (on base and by telephone) which were done by the PAO or by members of the hospital staff. PA managed a hometown news release program which generated about 75 releases during the deployment. As a members of the hospital commander's staff, the PAO assisted with certain protocol functions and with several visits from distinguished visitors and general officers. The PA staff worked closely with the Community Relations Adviser on Community Relations matters. Prior to the Family Reception Center becoming fully operational, the PAO assisted two family members who arrived at Little Rissington to visit patients being treated here. PA maintained a liaison with 3AF/PA concerning patient counts and movements at the hospital.

During the deployment, the originally assigned PAO returned to his home unit for one week. During his absence, the PAO slot was filled by another PAO within 3AF.

2. The following are areas of concern which should be addressed for future planning of Public Affairs support of hospital deployments:

**Problem:** The PAO arrived seven days after the hospital was activated. Many problems with communication and several media questions arose as a result of no formal communication medium being established.

**Solution:** The PAO should arrive when the hospital staff arrives, especially if there is a large contingent in place. The PAO can begin producing the newsletters immediately which will ease a lot of initial deployment apprehension and communication breakdowns. Early deployment of the PAO will allow that person to become familiar with the hospital mission, hospital staff and the base which is vital to successful PA operations. That person can 'set up shop' before being overwhelmed with PA activities.

**Problem:** No hospital PA resources were deployed with the hospital staff. Since the in-country PA staff was coming from missile and flying wings, becoming familiar with the hospital operation while establishing the PA operation presented more challenges than were necessary.

**Solution:** It would significantly help the in-country PA staff if there were PA personnel familiar with the hospital mission. Although the in-country public affairs personnel are familiar with host-country press concerns and sensitivities (which is vital to the PA operation), the best media and internal information activities for the hospital are best served by a unit public affairs staff member. Ideally, the PA staff should be one deployed officer and NCO, and one in-country PAO or senior NCO. Should the hospital reach maximum casualty occupation, there may be a need for one more public affairs specialist.

**Problem:** The staff had no access to message traffic which would have been useful for preparing daily newsletters.

**Solution:** The PA staff at the deployed location should be an addressee on all news service and PAO message traffic.

**Problem:** There was no fax machine available in the public affairs offices, but the staff had access to a fax in the wing headquarters building.

**Solutions:** Only for convenience sake in sending out press releases and sending information to home base newspapers might a deploying unit consider putting a fax machine in the PA office. If there is not fax available at another location on base, a PA fax machine is imperative.

**Problem:** The equipment used in the hospital PA office came from the office of the in-country PAO as did most supplies and equipment.

**Solution:** This did not present too much of a problem since the base from which the equipment came is in drawdown stages; however, had it come from a fully manned PA office, the temporary equipment loss may have hindered PA operations at that location. If a deploying unit sends a PA staff, that staff should bring, at a minimum, a typewriter or a word processing computer, PA form and plenty of administrative supplies.

**Problem:** There was only one telephone line available for public affairs use. ~~during~~.

**Solutions:** This, again, did not present a major problem; however, if the hospital is filled to capacity with battle casualties, it will be necessary to have at least two telephone lines in the office to handle the barrage of incoming media calls.

3. Overall, the Public Affairs operation at Little Rissington was a successful one with the hospital and staff receiving a great deal of positive, uncontroversial press coverage. Media were very receptive to the restrictions and limitations placed on questions and interviews, but most would have appreciated the opportunity to have patient interface and more specific details of the hospital operation. The hospital executive staff appreciated the daily newsletter and the assistance it provided in getting important information to the deployed hospital staff.

*Cecily Y. Christian*  
CECILY Y. CHRISTIAN, Capt, USAF  
Public Affairs Officer

**Little Rissington Stats:**

On Site Media Visits - 19  
Telephone Interviews - 43  
HTNRs - 76  
Total Patients - 177



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 48TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (USAFE)  
APO NEW YORK 09179-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA (MSgt Hinchler)

13 May 91

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation Desert Storm

TO: HQ USAFE/PAR  
APO 09094-5001

The following after action report is submitted as requested in HQ USAFE/PAR message dtg 211800Z Mar 91:

A. MSgt Lee D. Hinchler; Superintendent, Public Affairs.

B. Sgt Troy L. Prine; 27 Nov 90 - 22 Mar 91.  
MSgt Lee D. Hinchler; 3 Dec 90 - 29 Mar 91.

C. When I arrived in-theater I found a well-established internal information program operated by Capt Bob Thompson, 366 TFW/PA, who had been in-country since late August. This included a commercially-produced, funded weekly newspaper. Sgt Prine, in-country one week, had already assumed duties as editor. Lack of word-processing capability made the newspaper effort more tedious than necessary, but this problem was solved with the deployment from CENTAF rear, of a laptop computer, received in early January. Both Capt Thompson and Sgt Prine had deployed with 35 mm cameras, and another had been obtained through local purchase. The deployed wing commander, however, desired more local audiovisual capabilities and two VHS camcorders, two video cassette recorders, a TV and blank tapes were ordered in mid-December and purchased locally by contracting personnel. Communications were, at best, extremely poor, and only got worse when the war started. Our only reliable way to contact CENTAF rear, was by using tactical phones in the wing command post, located some 3 miles from the PA office. The first two weeks I was in-country, no vehicle was assigned to PA. This was remedied in mid-December at the same time PA relocated to within one mile of the command post, but some two miles from tent city, chow hall, hospital, etc. No contact was initiated or received with any other wing PA offices in the AOR. Looking back, I wish we had established the normal PA to PA network for ideas, feedback, etc.

D. Media contact was almost nonexistent due to Saudi sensitivities about our location. Press did accompany the vice president and secretary of state on Jan 1 and Jan 8 respectively, but the stature of the visitors necessarily made them the focus of reports. A DOD media pool visited the base days two through four of the war. A second pool visited late in the war. This was the extent of media contact.

E. The following problem areas were encountered:

1) The wing commander desired more audiovisual capabilities than a PA office is trained to provide. Deployment of base photo lab-level assets could have solved this.

2) Logistical support for PA was deplorable when I arrived, probably due to only one PA person being there. As the empire grew, we got a larger office, our own vehicle, a computer, and access to AFN/CNN television.



LEE D. HINCER, MSgt, USAF  
Superintendent, Public Affairs Office

cc: 3AF/PA



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS 86TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (USAFE)  
APO NEW YORK 09094-5000



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA (480-5914)

8 May 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After-Action Report (Your 211800Z MAR 91 Msg)

TO: HQ USAFE/PAR

1. The information you requested is provided below:

**a. Media Relations**

(1) Media visits to the base that required an escort from our office and which resulted in an interview are listed by month and number: Aug (4), Sep (3), Dec (3), Jan (16), Feb (6).

(2) News releases are listed by month and number: Aug (3), Dec (1), Jan (5), Feb (1), Mar (4).

(2) Media queries are listed by month and number: Aug (14), Sep (12), Oct (1), Nov (5), Dec (1), Jan (57), Feb (26), Mar (1).

**b. Internal Information**

(1) Releases made to AFN radio and television are listed by month and number: Aug (4), Sep (1), Nov (1), Dec (2), Jan (12), Feb (8), Mar (7).

(2) Rumor control calls are listed by month and number: Oct (1), Nov (1), Dec (3), Jan (178), Feb (25), Mar (3).

(3) Number of stories published in the Kaiserslautern American community newspaper are listed by month: Aug (11), Sep (18), Oct (4), Nov (18), Dec (23), Jan (33), Feb (45), Mar (41).

**c. Community Relations:**

(1) The 316 AD/CC and 322 ALD/CC personally briefed area German leaders in December about Ramstein operations.

(2) Twice in January, security police commanders and the community deputy commander briefed area German police officials and the legal director about increased security at military installations and surrounding areas.

(3) German-American clubs, through family support agencies, provided support for families and single service members.

**d. Lessons Learned:**

(1) The 316 AD/CC established daily Desert Shield/Storm staff meetings during December. Meetings were conducted at end of normal duty day. Attendees were restricted to the commanders of the base, communications, aircraft operations, maintenance, supply, medical, security police, military airlift group, Army community, plus the public affairs officer. The only topic discussed was Desert Shield/Storm. Problems were discussed openly and possible solutions bantered back and forth. Majority of items for AFN and a large percentage of newspaper articles resulted from these daily meetings. We briefed each day on numbers and topics of rumor control and what our responses were. That way, commanders were able to spread the word to their people and we were able to gather additional information that was germane to the topic. Worked like a charm! We also briefed the commander and staff on all media queries and upcoming media visits.

(2) After war started, our office began 12-hour shifts and 24-hour operations at request of our commander. We were initially quite busy (see number of rumor control calls and media queries). Wide-spread interest quickly waned, however, and we returned to normal duty hours, except for chief and deputy chief, who remained on opposite 12-hour shift until mid-February. We staggered duty shifts so that staff members were at work from 0600 to 1900 each duty day, also ensuring that a German speaker was always available during the same time. Besides keeping the office manned for a longer period, staff members were able to avoid the major rush hour jam at base entry gates, thus eliminating or lessening one stress element.

(3) The transportation squadron provided us additional military vehicles for our exclusive use. Eliminated usual hassles encountered when media need escort and office members need military transport to semi-secure and secure areas.

(4) Communications group installed a secure voice STU III in our office on short notice. Telephone was extremely valuable.

(5) We kept local AFN station manager clued into what was happening, essentially providing him a de-brief of each day's Desert Shield/Storm staff meeting. The information exchange and relationship that developed were invaluable in getting information to the community.

**e. Problems/Solutions:**

(1) Problem: conflicting/confusing PA guidance, especially where EUCOM media policy lagged the DOD and USAF policy.

Solution: Frequently sought HQ USAFE/PAM guidance.

(2) Problem: Media interest in casualty processing, plus our "ownership" of two contingency hospitals in remote locations, will stress our media support capabilities in future similar operations.


Solution: Re-think 4102-type tasking. Rather than sending people out, we may need augmentation into 86 FW/PA.

(3) Problem: AFN-K is out of the information loop; didn't know what was going on.

Solution: (a) Interim: daily briefings by PA to AFN-K station manager;

(b) Long-term: AFN-E needs to develop more downward information flow to AFN-K to improve situational awareness of Germany-wide and theater-wide issues.

2. If you require additional information, please call me or SMSgt Lee at 480-5914.



BRUCE E. LEWIS, JR., Major, USAF  
Chief of Public Affairs



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE  
APO NEW YORK 09094-5001



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PAR

13 March 1991

SUBJECT:

Joint Task Force Proven Force After-action

TO:

PA

## 1. BACKGROUND

a. In August there was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. This was immediately followed by United Nations resolutions condemning Iraq and demanding their withdrawal. The United States and a coalition of freedom loving nations, at the invitation of Saudi Arabia and others in the region, began a massive build-up of troops and equipment in the world's biggest sandbox.

b. In mid-November I received a call from the DOJ guys asking me what my clearance was. Then they said come to a "Charlie-one" meeting. Later called JTF Proven Force.

c. The first Charlie-one meeting was in a vault. We signed statements saying, "on pain of death we would never reveal anything we ever saw or heard regarding Charlie-one." That was the day I briefed you on Charlie-one.

d. After a bunch of meetings, during which we drew plans for a deployment to a then classified location, everything was placed on hold except the meetings. I really went to a lot of meetings.

e. The USAFE plan was forwarded to EUCOM for their imprimatur. EUCOM then rebuilt the plan to their specification. I may be wrong, but I don't believe the PA annex was ever approved.

1) From the Public Affairs view, USAFE/PA defined a low-key operation. A 7924, a 79170 and a clerk at the FOL, and a 7916, a 79199, two 79150s and a clerk at the MOB (augmented by the available staff).

2) EUCOM/ECPA included requirements for three more officers, one 46Q (Army PA Specialist), a videographer, a still photographer, and a broadcast specialist (who was supplied as needed by Det. 5, EBS). Special Operations Command later augmented briefly with one officer.

f. The plan also contained guidance for the conduct of JTFPF JIB activities.

g. A constant, throughout the planning stage, was the notion that none of what we were planning would happen without the concurrence of the Turkish Government.

## 2. DISCUSSION

a. On 15 January 1991, the first Public Affairs contingent (Col. Don Kirchoffner, deputy EUCOM/ECPA and LtCol. P.J. Crowley, chief USAFE/PAC) departed for Incirlik AB, Turkey. Later that day, LtCol. Dick Sheffield, deputy Special Operations Command PA, arrived looking for LtCol. Crowley. We found a place for him to spend the night and sent him in pursuit of LtCol. Crowley the following day. At some point, Major Mike Maher, 8th Infantry Division/PA, and his wife arrived at my office, looking for the PAX terminal. I gave him directions, told him of the next available flight and sent him off. At this same time, Sgt. Sherrie Hosch, chief of media 20TFW/PA at RAF Upper Heyford, was rousted out by the system and launched for Incirlik. The system also tried to launch Capt. Will Humiston, 66ECW/PA and MSgt. Thad Hosley, NCOIC 32TFG/PA to Incirlik. Due to unanticipated hand-wringing they were delayed for a week. On the 16th SSgt. Gina Kravitz, 316AD/PAM and I attended an AFFOR departure briefing. We were told we would depart the next day. Broken airplanes and higher priority traffic delayed our departure until 18 Jan. We traveled to Incirlik via T-43. A pretty good flight.

b. We were greeted by TSgt. Martha Davis, NCOIC 39TACG/PA. Initially, Sgt. Hosch and SSgt. Kravitz camped out at her house. Col. Kirchoffner had a suite in senior officer quarters and the rest of us lived at the "JIB Hilton." It was adequate, better than tents, but not real good. LtCols Crowley and Sheffield, Major Maher and Capt. Humiston, were able to acquire a rather plush accommodations in the BOQ soon after they arrived. Our videographer, TSgt. Derick Brown, from Rhein-Main; and still photographer, Sgt. Efrain Gonzalez, from Zweibrücken were quartered by the Combat Camera folks. Navy Lieutenant Jim Fallon, 6th Fleet/PA arrived on the 19th and secured quarters with one of the MAC officers assigned at Incirlik. Sergeants Hosch and Kravitz lived with a broadcast specialist from Det. 5, European Broadcast Squadron. SSgt. Joseph Marin, our chief clerk from the 86th TFW, arrived 20 Jan and was also housed, courtesy of Det 5, EBS. MSgt. Thad Hosley roomed with 39TACG/PA editor, Sgt. Guy Volb. I shared quarters with CMSgt. Gary Sumrall, Det 5, EBS commander. When SSG Leonard Kennedy arrived (Army 71L/clerk), 5 Feb, he was inappropriately assigned to J-3. We retrieved him the following day, but he elected to maintain his room at the school. TSgt. Davis went on emergency leave and made her house available to the then visiting "Galaxy" ensemble from the USAFE Band. As they were departing, a terrorist incident forced Capt. Judy Burk, 39TACG/PA to move on base and she went into Sergeant Davis' house. SSG Hope Rickman arrived 10 Feb and moved in with Capt. Burk at Sgt. Davis' house. Which leaves, on the military side, A1C Stanton Peay, 39TACG/PA staff writer, who was already living on base with a friend when we arrived and A1C Toni Yeoman, 39TACG/PAA, the lone dormitory dweller in the crowd. Mr. Mehmet Birbiri, community relations advisor for the 39TACG/PA, resided at his home, with his family throughout the period of the deployment.

c. Our initial guidance from EUCOM/ECPA was that the United States Embassy in Ankara desired no announcement of who, what, or why we were at Incirlik. We were restricted from answering any questions of any operational nature. Further, no news media representatives were allowed on base because of host nation sensitivities. These restrictions continued even after the President of Turkey announced our presence to the world and the Turkish Parliament voted to support our operations.

d. Since we could do no aggressive media relations, we began an aggressive Internal Information program to cover the activities of assigned organizations. We wanted stories for unit newspapers, Air Force and Army service-wide publications, video footage for EBS and AFN, and video postcards for everyone. Host nation sensitivities and EUCOM/ECPA guidance did not permit the release of any of those stories prior to my departure. We wrote some really plain vanilla stuff.

e. We were told that the wraps could come off our operation at any time from the start. As a result, several staff members devoted their time to developing a media operation plan. The plan included senior staff briefings, facilities tour and static displays. It was not implemented during my tenure.

f. Our videographic capability did involve the JTF PA in the production of video programs to representatively depict the spectrum of activity of both the Joint Task Force and the Air Force Forces. This was an on-going effort from about the fourth week we were there.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### a. Planning

1) I think deployment plans need to be written with a lot of flexibility. When a component gets the lead tasking to develop an operational concept, they need to have part of the concept in the bag. Since none of the components have the resources to build a very large operation without outside help, I believe it would be useful if the unified command had a group of different packages we could draw unit line numbers from to help us build a time phased deployment document. If it is a primary Army effort, most of the troops should be Army. If it is Air Force oriented, most of the troops should be Air Force, etc.

a) Basic building block could be a company grade officer, a staff NCO (E-5/E-6) and a clerk.

b) Increment two Public Affairs specialists (E-3/E-4)

c) Increment one still photographer.

d) Increment one videographer.

e) Increment one broadcast specialist.

f) Increment one duty driver and vehicle.

g) Increment one field grade officer (O-4/O-5).

h) Increment one senior NCO (E-7-E-9).

i) Increment one senior field grade officer (O-6).

2) If we have all those coded into the Joint Operational Plans Enhancement System (JOPES) all we do is determine the lead component. Then name the lead officer and pull a basic package with appropriate increments that the theater can support. If we try to pull a plan package, as EUCOM did for this deployment, we end up with some inappropriate people. For instance, we really didn't need a Navy Public Affairs Officer, not that we didn't use him, we just had no Navy involvement--stuff like that needs to be adjustable. Also, we planned for a small PA contingency staff at the forward operating location. When the troops to do that arrived, the decision was made to not send them forward. We used them for other useful things, but probably should have sent them home right then.

## b. Operation

1) We initially set up with a command information branch made from the 39TACG/PA staff. Their charter was to continue publication of the "*Tip of the Sword*" newspaper, publish any additional information sheets deemed necessary or appropriate, work with the broadcast detachment to use every means available to get the word to the troops, to maintain contact with the base commander and community to ensure their needs were cared for and to do things like work with "*Stars and Stripes*" to get free newspapers for the troops. With minor adjustments as people came and departed that phase of the operation remained constant.

2) Media Relations began as a small planning cell with the potential to draw from the other branches, based on speculation that the future held heavy activity. The Media staff also handled the queries from news media representatives, answered the rumor control line and responded to action line calls. In addition to developing a media activity plan, we met media representatives at the gate and told them they couldn't come on base. We talked to them on the telephone and told them "we didn't, couldn't and wouldn't discuss operational matters." Then we wouldn't talk to them about anything else either. We had a constant barrage of calls, both local and from media in the United States for the first couple weeks. Once they figured out that we weren't going to say anything they quit calling. (Not completely, of course, but they really died down.) Those that were in Adana at the outset, left. One other area of Media Relations involvement centered on determining release potential for stories cranked out by the Products Branch. Early on, we were cock-eyed optimists--we remained so throughout, but some days it was tough. Except for a flurry of potential media opportunities during President Turgat Ozal's visit to the base, media relations were frustrating, but mostly disappointing. I was brought up that part of our charter in Public Affairs is to keep the American public informed about what we are doing in the Air Force--and everywhere else in joint operations--and we were not able to do that.

3) The Products Branch was established to focus our writing and photographic talent toward telling the story of JTF Proven Force in words, pictures and videotape. The initial concept was to deploy them to one unit at a time and have them work every aspect, from mission to personality stories on paper, film and tape. That way we could market a full package of information. The concept was good, but because mission requirements varied from unit to unit and because the things our folks needed to do to cover the unit pointed them there at different times, the team visit didn't work. We adopted a more flexible program of letting the unit's availability drive who went where when. An early problem was insufficient transportation to get all the troops where they needed to be when they needed to be there. We found, when we are making people heros, they will frequently provide the transportation to let us do it--feet also work. One of the most useful things we did was allow our information management troops to occasionally go out with the Products troops so they could get a feel for what we were really up to. It was a real morale builder.

d. Our administrative overhead, two deployed and one resident, may have seemed like too much to some. When you have an operation going around the clock; however, you need full time admin help. They handled chores like going to supply, copy reproduction, distribution of "*Early Birds*" and "*Stars and Stripes*", answering the telephones, washing and fueling the trucks, and a thousand things that the rest of us didn't have to think about because they were there. They are a tremendous asset and we must always ensure we have information management support whenever and wherever we deploy. And we must not forget to nurture them as they support us.

e. As time passed and we saw how things were going, we made adjustments to the staff. We took a large contingent in. I believe that was a correct decision. Their employment, or limitations thereto, was a result of host nation sensitivity and the desire of the JTF commander. Those go with the territory and we must always respect them. If it was a perfect world, there would be no war. There are never perfect circumstances for war. From a Public Affairs standpoint, this was a frustrating and disappointing effort. But in the big scheme of stuff like this, we did our job. We went out and talked to the troops. We made them feel good about what they were doing. We helped them realize how important the things they did were to the total effort--partly by the fact that we couldn't talk about it! From a lessons learned perspective there are a few things I think we did real well.

1) We got excellent troops! From the Air Force side, I was able to work with the numbered air forces to get a good mix. I was able to tell them what we were looking for and they came back with samplings to chose from (very narrow samplings!) We need to do better at getting everyone there at the start.

2) Everyone arrived ready to work.

3) We deployed the right equipment. We need to look at developing a deployment kit like our friends at Tactical Air Command have at each of their bases. Possibly at the NAFs, or one at USAFE/PA and one at USAREUR/PA (EUCOM funded). We should never deploy with Alps P-1000 printers because they have short lived ribbons and their print quality sucks. The STU IIIs were essential--more would have been better. We needed more minicassette recorders and a couple cameras for the reporters. We were fortunate the host PA had a copier. If we ever need to go to a more austere location, a transportable copier would be a definite boon. Probably a 5KW generator would be helpful too.

4) We received excellent cooperation from all the deployed units. We wanted to tell their story and they wanted us to.

5) Det. 5, European Broadcast Squadron couldn't have been more supportive. They found ways to house our troops. They shared our frustration at not being able to tell our story to the internal audience. They loaned us some very talented troops to help out with our video effort. They called us whenever anything came in over the wire service to ensure we knew what was going on in the world.

6) The 39th TACG/PA opened their office and their homes to us and made us feel welcome. They shared their knowledge of the base and the Adana area and culture with us. They too shared many frustrations with us and from time-to-time were frustrated by us.

7) Mr. Jackson Short and the staff of the Incirlik Civilian Personnel Office shared their equipment and space with us. They virtually turned the bulk of their office over to us. We couldn't have asked for better support. In a future contingency, where U.S. civilians are evacuated, the civilian personnel office is a good place to look for space. And they have lots of computers and typewriters.

8) We can live where we work during the initial surge, but must find other shelter fairly quickly. (Everyone in our group used deodorant.)

9) Senior officers need chem warfare training before they deploy.

10) PA troops eat a lot of pizza! The Army doesn't like beer.

#### 4. OPINIONS

a. Are like armpits, most folks have at least one and some stink.

b. When we go to war, we expect to work long hours. We shouldn't; however, inflict more hours on ourselves than are absolutely necessary. I don't know if our sister services trust their enlisted folks to pull on-call duty or not--I've been doing it since I was an A3C, back in '65--but after a 12-hour day, if folks are living at places with telephones, it shouldn't be too hard to figure out a way to contact them if you need them. And if you must staff the office around the clock, do it with one person who has the phone list.

c. Deployed PAs should not be in the business of getting television service to forward operating locations. If FOLs need television service, the PA should advise the responsible broadcast squadron or higher headquarters and let them be responsible for action beyond that point. If commanders want things like CNN International, that should be between them and their contracting folks--that's not a PA problem or concern and we should never be in the middle of it. (Remember, this is an opinion, it doesn't necessarily agree with the realities of life.)

d. When folks participate in war, they need to dress right to give the appearance of being on the team. In this war, the proper attire for PA folks was the Battle Dress Uniform in either woodland or desert shading. At the deployed location, the host PA had no BDUs. Neither did the deployed Navy lieutenant. They acquired them, but weren't ready when the whistle blew. Small point, but everyone noticed.

e. Most of the folks on the JTF Proven Force Joint Information Bureau staff, to include the information management troops would have preferred to have been in Saudi Arabia--I among them. We weren't, so we made the best of it.

f. We aren't training our folks for war--psychologically. Back in the olden days we went to war in an Information Office. We took pictures and wrote stories for our paper. We put it out every week. We sent stories to "7th AF News". We escorted news media representatives. We called in attack reports as they occurred. We worked with the intell folks to get information on good missions our pilots had flown and wrote them up for clearance and release through MAC-V. At Phan Rang, we ran our own radio station for a couple hours every evening, run from the Information office. What this is leading up to, is we ran a fairly busy Public Affairs operation. It was different from what we do at many other Public Affairs Offices only by degree and circumstances. The troops deployed to Incirlik were aghast because we were only doing "regular Public Affairs stuff". Somehow the message that what we do in peacetime we do in wartime didn't reach them until there were there and the war had started. "All they were doing was writing stories." Yes, they could have been escorting news media and responding to queries, but that wasn't our job for this one. Maybe that's a little more exciting than "just writing stories", but in war, as in peace, we do what's there to be done. PA supervisors at every level need to tell their troops (officers and enlisted), "In war the main difference is we work long hours, sometimes get shot at, now and then we get hit and we learn to love our gas masks--other than that, we do our jobs." Now for those who feel an urgency to be frontline, combat journalists, well they're going to have to get in touch with Peter Arnett and folks of his ilk--'cause us military journalists (at least us blue-suited folks) is writers, not fighters. This paragraph is not to condemn the troops that went. Except for their desire to be more involved with the intensity of media work, they worked long hours in cold, rain and darkness searching out the troops and trying to tell the story of our back door approach to the war without complaint. There were a bunch of troops around the command who were terribly disappointed they didn't get to go too--maybe next time.

g. I'll stop now. This is a brief outline of my thoughts. Some is more detail than you ever wanted to know, some is too brief to make any sense. I think we made a contribution by our presence. I wish we could have done more.



DAVID E. SMITH, CMSgt, USAF  
Resource Manager

A. THADDEUS HOSLEY, MSgt (32TFG/PA)

B. THADDEUS HOSLEY, MSgt: Incirlik AB, Turkey 21 Jan. - 14 Feb. 91

C. The Joint Information Bureau at Incirlik was set up very well. There were enough personnel for the task and more than ample supplies and equipment. The only thing lacking was the use of a high-speed copier, but the reproduction shop provided excellent support. As far as manpower, equipment and communications is concerned, it couldn't have been better. This glowing assessment is due largely to the fact that the JIB was co-located with the base public affairs shop. The public affairs staff augmented the JIB in every area. Without their assistance there would have been a greater concern for manpower, equipment and communication.

D. Specific numbers were not briefed to JIB staff.

E. One problems encountered involved far too many levels of approval of internal stories and media releases. As an example, one story would pass through seven and sometimes eight hands before final approval. A simple solution is to designate one intermediate level review, one media officer and of course the JIB commander. This would eliminate the excessive re-writes.

(1) Communication within the JIB in my opinion needed help. JIB members were rarely given a "how goes it" briefing which often left them in the dark about what was going on. Everyone should be briefed if not daily, weekly about what is going on and how their job fits in.

(2) Transportation from home units to the deployed site was debated by headquarters and it was a SATO/transportation issue. Their mission was to get me to the deployed destination as fast as possible. They chose commercial air, however for some reason, unknown/discussed USAFE/PA decided that I should wait for military airlift. Traveling out of Soesterberg, the Netherlands, created a problem because military airlift is non-existent except for a large deployment. As a result of this decision, I was trucked in the middle of the night to Sembach AB, Germany, where I waited five days for airlift to Turkey. My only suggestion here is, please let the transportation people do what they're trained to do. As long as the orders authorize civilian air, there should not have been a problem.

(3) Transportation for the JIB left a lot to be desired. Three vehicles were assigned to support four journalists, a photographer, a videographer, administration and the executive staff. For everyone to be able to do their job, flexibility must be maintained. In a war-time environment, things happen too fast to be hampered by logistical problems. The transportation situation put a pinch on everyone's ability to respond.

F. No input.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND  
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 45433-5001

4 JUN 1991

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After-Action Report


TO: USCENTAF REAR/PA

1. AFLC's five air logistics centers played a vital role in supporting Desert Shield/Storm. Because of their role and support, all of the command's public affairs offices were extremely busy providing the necessary guidance to commanders, media relations support and community relations assistance.

2. There was a common theme from every center--the largest impact was in the media relations area. Most reported their workload tripled. Our center at Kelly AFB said they had more than 400 inquiries, and all the centers were swamped by media visits hungering for the latest up-to-the-minute story. Some interesting lessons learned follow.

3. POC for this report is MSgt Michael Grinnell, AFLC/PAL, DSN 787-3778.

FOR THE COMMANDER

  
HAROLD L. ROTHGEB JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Public Affairs

1 Atch  
Lessons Learned

## LESSONS LEARNED

### MEDIA RELATIONS

a. Most centers said that conflicting or slow moving public affairs guidance made their jobs more difficult and in many cases just started more rumors. From our wing at Wright-Patterson AFB, "Public Affairs Guidance was unclear in an estimated 80 percent of the message traffic. Guidance was inconsistent and contradictory." This was echoed by the PA staff at Robins AFB; "The seemingly inconsistent application of release policy caused some difficulties." The same thoughts were expressed from our center at Hill AFB which had problems with confirming the deployment of units. Hill's recommended fix would be an initial statement about deploying units that was approved and released in the initial public affairs guidance message. Subsequent statements should be available on a fill-in-the-blank basis so that PA staffs don't have to spend valuable time coordinating individual unit mobilization.

b. Tinker AFB experienced a perfect example of what happened. Reporters were literally counting aircraft as they took off from the base and speculating on their destination. In every instance pointed up by our PA offices, this type of reporting just fueled the already burning rumor fires that existed on base.

c. However, along with the problems, our public affairs staffs did some proactive work. The Robins AFB commander held two press conferences during this time. One was focused on the mission and the other on the deployments and logistics movement.

d. At Wright-Patterson AFB, the press was invited out to participate in actual training exercises. This provided some positive Air Force messages.

e. When initial troops and aircraft departed Hill AFB, the PA staff used this opportunity to offer the media multiple story ideas between flights the first day. The press then followed up on these ideas which provided the Air Force positive exposure.

f. Hill AFB PA also conducted media training for key staff members and spouses. The Hill PAO pointed out that it was important to train and involve the spouses of deployed people

because the family story, along with the left-behind workers' stories were all that remained to be told after the initial departure stories were completed.

g. Tinker AFB PA used the media to get important information out to the work force and viewing audiences. For example, they invited the media to cover the deployment of hospital people so the people being served by the hospital would know services would be curtailed.

h. All of the centers were pleased with the homecoming coverage by the media. By then it seemed that good planning by both PA and media resulted in good and positive coverage for the Air Force. One bit of advice was even, after the media seemed to lose interest, make sure media is invited to every homecoming because you just don't know what story will will happen.

i. Because of the manning problems, Hill AFB used UPARS to man a media operations center. They were invaluable because Hill uses a one-on-one escort approach. However, at Wright-Patterson, the augmentees provided "warm bodies." Wright-Patterson indicated that should an incident have occurred, the augmentees capabilities would have been insufficient to handle a problem.

j. Amount of media contacts:

Hill AFB--47 news releases and 50 interviews.

Kelly AFB--6 news releases and 400 quires.

Tinker AFB--30 news releases, 15 media advisories and 200 media queries.

Robins AFB--966 queries.

#### Community Relations

a. Along with the influx of media activity, all the centers reported a huge amount of queries from the public mainly due to the patriotic feelings in the local community. Robins AFB reported that it was important to have the humanitarian airlift telephone number at hand. Tinker said that a large number of requests from the community wanted to know about what items to send the troops.

b. Several centers had an increase of speaker requests to address the war effort. Along with this community leaders wanted the Air Force to be represented at meetings to plan home rallies and parades. All of these activities took their toll on already short handed PA staffs.

### Internal Information

- a. There was consensus about Desert Storm coverage in the base newspapers. Most published a local item a week along with the material received from AFNS.
- b. One problem did arise at Tinker AFB. They never received a clear answer as to whether or not they could publish photographs that troops were sending. Tinker also pointed out that the only photographs they remember seeing were troops eating cookies.
- c. Kelly AFB published 17 newsletters during this period. In the newsletter, the PA staff included maps and background information on the different countries in the Persian Gulf region. They also included information from the daily DOD news briefings.
- d. Internal communication efforts

Hill AFB--Carried AFNS and local stories, weekly.

Tinker AFB--One mission story and one family feature a week.

Kelly AFB--17 newsletters. In the base newspaper, 44 local generated stories and 75 stories from Air Force wire services.

2750th ABW--Weekly stories from AFNS and locally generated stories.

Robins AFB--Printed special newsletter. In base newspaper, ran support services stories, as well as news services and local stories

### Other areas

- a. Wright-Patterson and Kelly planned for worse case casualty reception scenarios. Wright-Patterson did not have a plan in place and started from scratch, but with the assistance of the hospital people, a plan was written, coordinated and in place by the time the ground war started. This reinforces how important planning is for this type of massive operation.
- b. The shortages of manpower, mobile phones and military vehicles for the PA office was an enormous problem for the staff at Hill AFB. They could have run an around-the-clock operation, but because of the lack of staff had were unable to do so.
- c. It soon became apparent to all of our centers that working close with the commanders was vital. Without the

commander's support, the PA mission would not have gotten off the ground.

### Lessons learned

a. Problem: Hill AFB notified AFLC/PA and TAC/PA that they would serve as focal point for all messages, requests for interviews, etc. Problems occurred because Hill was not included in message traffic. It took about three weeks to fix.

Fix: TAC should ensure host unit PAs are added to their public affairs guidance messages.

b. Problem: Initial guidance was non-existent about authority to mail base newspapers to deployed personnel. Most early message traffic indicated a concern about ads being objectable.

Fix: Air Force needs develop a policy ahead of time with joint commands about base newspaper dissemination in operating areas.

c. Problem: Confusion occurred at the beginning of the operation as to which reports PA was required to format and forward to headquarters. Initially, PA prepared daily charts showing coverage received to date and the next few days' media activities.

Fix: Generic formats for fill-in-the-blank reports should be established now. Guidance on required reports from CENTAF and MAJCOM should be included in the initial set of PA guidance messages so PA staffs can include these requirements in their planning efforts.

d. Problem: A problem occurred in gaining clearance for stories and photos from the deployed location. Not enough people were devoted to the task of clearing stories and photos. The system itself is extremely cumbersome, and resulted in stories and photos dying on the vine.

Fix: Develop a more efficient way to clear stories using authority of deployed commander and PA.

### Headquarters perspective

From a headquarters perspective, neither Desert Shield nor Desert Storm started smoothly. With no advance guidance, both AFLC headquarters and field units had to use good basic PA sense in addressing media and community questions and

concerns. More often than not, the recourse was to forward queries to SAF/PA or DOD. As the situation progressed from Shield to Storm, we started receiving photo slides from AAVS. However, we were not permitted to use them either internally or externally. There was nothing apparently classified or sensitive about the material and appeared to be an exercise to make room to store more slides in the AOR. Resolution of this matter would be of significant help in the future.

**Summary**

AFLC's PA staffs did an outstanding job in telling the Air Force story by using all three PA mission areas. Unclear policy guidance and the slowness of getting this guidance to the field seems to be the main problem that needs to be worked for future contingencies. But even with this, PA staffs in all of our centers used their resources, experience and ingenuity to provide vital and necessary support to their commanders, communities and the Air Force.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER  
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TX 78150-6001

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PA

5 Aug 91

SUBJECT: Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report

TO SAF/PA

1. Attached after action report is provided for your review.
2. Some of the recommendations in this report have the potential for PA application Air Force wide, and we'd be happy to discuss these points with your staff.
3. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call us at DSN 487-5167/6141.

*Valerie Elbow*

VALERIE A. ELBOW, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief of Public Affairs

Atch  
Report

cc: TAC/PA  
AFESC/PA  
AFNEWS/CC

## AFMPC/PA DESERT SHIELD/STORM AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Office personnel management -- AFMPC/PA worked Operation Desert Storm with two officers, two enlisted personnel and one civilian. In addition, one civilian volunteered 3.25 hours at the beginning of the war to help answer telephones, and one senior NCO worked three 2-hour shifts to help staff news media queries. The full-time active duty PA staff covered 24-hour operations seven days a week from 16 Jan 91 to 4 Feb 91; the average work shift ranged from 9 to 13 hours.

2. Several administrative procedures helped the flow of information within the office and ensured the office maintained continuity:

a. PA chief's office was vacated, and we established a Desert Storm PA operations center in that room. This allowed for a centralized area for administrative and reference material (see discussion below). In addition, the cable television in that room was on 24 hours a day to allow PA to monitor and record newscasts as required.

b. Each PA worker kept a time-action log. People were required to read all the time-action logs at the beginning of their shift. This proved to be a valuable way to pass along unfinished taskings as well as important procedures, points of contact or facts to all PA members. In addition to the logs, the office had a master sign-in/out sheet to track days, times and total hours people worked.

c. To ensure an appropriate flow of office correspondence, we established a series of desktop boxes:

- (1) incoming correspondence (taskings)
- (2) incoming correspondence (general)
- (3) outgoing correspondence (copies)
- (4) correspondence to be filed

People were required to go through all the boxes at the beginning of their shift and to initial all incoming and outgoing correspondence. Taskings would be removed and worked by the action officer/NCO as appropriate, and then a copy of the finished product would be placed in the outgoing correspondence box. The last person to initial the general incoming correspondence or the outgoing correspondence would place it in the "file" box for final disposition.

d. We also established a series of desktop boxes to work news media queries. Categories were:

- (1) Incoming

(2) Being Staffed -- PA's copy would be in here while the original was being staffed within the center

(3) Need Call Back -- ready for response

(4) Completed/Needs Coordination -- Every PA member would read query and initial bottom of AF Form 39. This ensured everyone was aware of what sort of issues were being worked within the center. The last person to initial the query would place it in the file box.

(5) On Hold (many of these concerned policy which had not been determined, including requests for release of demographic information directly relating to Desert Shield/Storm)

(6) File

e. Each PA worker had a Desert Storm Desktop Reference Book (see tab 1) which included a chart of nonhostile/hostile casualty status and corresponding hostile casualty categories, releasable information associated with each casualty status, reference telephone numbers and quick-reference demographic figures.

f. We established a large three-ring binder for overall PA continuity. Established tabs were:

(1) Public Affairs Guidance

-- DOD guidance

-- Air Force guidance

-- AFMPC guidance

-- Misc. guidance (from SG/PA, ARPC/PA, etc.)

(2) General Desert Storm Continuity Information

(alphabetical collection of fact sheets, point papers, etc., cleared for release in response to query -- see tab 2 for index)

(3) OASD/PA and SAF/PA Casualty Reports -- copies of messages

g. We established a large three-ring binder for alphabetical listing of Air Force demographics to be used in responding to queries. See tab 3 for index. This did not include Desert Shield/Storm demographics, which were generally not available.

h. A comprehensive question-and-answer packet, with several accompanying fact sheets, was designed and cleared through the Directorate of Casualty Matters for use when responding to news media queries (see tab 4). This proved extremely helpful when dealing with the flood of media calls. This package was kept inside the large PA continuity book.

i. We established an alphabetical accordion file to maintain all information on Air Force casualties, by name.

j. We established a clipboard with a printout of all casualty information that had been forwarded to SAF/PA, AFESC/PA and TAC/PA. For future operations, recommend establishing a system to maintain an accurate tally of publicly released casualties, including name, rank, unit and base, hometown, and date of casualty. Someone within the PA community needs to keep a current list because this information was constantly being requested. No one at any level seemed to have a good list, and we spent a lot of time verifying and correcting other people's lists. Since similar requests went to the other services, OASD/PA may be the most logical organization to maintain a master casualty list.

k. We maintained a clipboard with DOD press brief transcripts, tabbed by date with the most current date on top. Frequently asked questions were marked so people in our office could use the same response for calls received in the office. All PA staffers were required to read the press briefs, as well as local and national press coverage of the war.

3. AFMPC/PA should work to get the following capabilities as soon as possible to facilitate everyday operations and to ensure adequate support in future operations:

a. The office needs its own facsimile machine. A great deal of time was spent away from the office at other people's fax machines. Since we were not the "owners," other needs often take priority, forcing us to delay vital correspondence.

b. All office computers should be hooked up to the local area network (LAN) to communicate with each other, to communicate with other computers within the center, and to easily communicate via the Defense Data Network with other PA offices throughout the Air Force and Department of Defense. Approval has been granted for this, but funding has not been allocated.

4. AFMPC/PA experienced more than double the normal number of media queries since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield. Response to media and public queries became one of our most important and time-consuming tasks. See tab 5 for a list of topics of interest.

a. Statistics on numbers of media queries received at AFMPC/PA:

- (1) 448 queries between 1 Jan 90 and 1 Aug 90
- (2) 397 queries between 2 Aug 90 and 31 Dec 90

(3) 705 queries between 1 Jan 91 and 31 May 91

5. Following are personnel issues with PA impact.

a. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- AFR 190-1 does not provide adequate guidance on PA involvement with casualty operations. In addition, it was extremely difficult to coordinate and disseminate PA policy on casualty matters throughout DOD (see tab 6 for a chronology of Casualty/PA coordination efforts for guidance on casualty matters).

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA add information to AFR 190-1. Specifically, casualty terminology/definitions, casualty notification procedures and time line, legal considerations, releasable information (by casualty category) and where PAOs should go for more information. Information should be consistent with OASD/PA guidance, DOD and USAF casualty regulations, Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act.

b. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- There was a lot of confusion about the release of information, specifically timing and content, for people declared in casualty status of missing or "duty status -- whereabouts unknown" (DUSTWUN). Specifically USCENTCOM (FWD) released information about aircraft crashes before AFMPC had confirmed notification of next of kin was complete. This left OASD/PA, SAF/PA and AFMPC/PA unable to answer a flood of calls asking for crewmembers' names and may have contributed to undue stress for family members who had not yet received information through Air Force channels.

(2) Recommendation -- AFR 190-1 and OASD/PA guidance must be more specific about casualty information flow, release authority and content of releasable information.

c. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- The Air Force Casualty Operations Center (AFMPC/DPMC) handles all contingency casualties, including Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel called to active duty. For Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the Casualty Operations Center had microfiche records on all activated Guard/Reserve people. In addition, some Guard units do not have full CBPO personal affairs support, which is the normal route for confirming notification of next of kin.

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA establish who has public affairs responsibility for Guard/Reserve people once they're called to active duty. Also, there are coordination considerations with NGB/PA, ARPC/PA, etc.

d. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- PA (at all levels) may get involved in news media requests to interview families of POWs. Although AFMPC's Missing Persons Division acts as primary point of contact with the families, local PA support may be needed if the family agrees to talk to the media. To keep POWs as safe as possible, families are discouraged from talking with the media. If interviews do take place, however, the PA office closest to the family would be in the best position to provide support.

(2) Recommendation -- Make realistic scenario training and orientation part of PA officer and senior NCO courses at the Defense Information School. PAOs can expect requests for interviews and extensive coverage from international media. Also, SAF/PA should issue Public Affairs Guidance, where appropriate, for future contingencies.

e. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- PA community did not properly track non-hostile casualties and ill/injured people. There was no good way to count these casualties or to provide even the most basic information about them.

(2) Recommendation -- For future contingencies, PA should consider the feasibility of establishing a system to track names, casualty categories, timing and destination of travel, who provides PA support at each stop, nature of PA support, etc.

f. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- DUSTWUN casualty status was often referred to as "missing," which made it confusing when the Air Force officially changed a person's status from DUSTWUN to Missing. This resulted in confusion at SAF/PA and inaccurate news media reports. It also confused family members who assumed their loved one's status had changed without their knowledge. To illustrate, early in the war, a briefer from USCENTCOM forward officially briefed the news media that an F-15 pilot was "missing." SAF/PATR asked us to have the Casualty Operations Center contact the member's commander to change the person's status from DUSTWUN to missing. This was an inappropriate request, because a commander's determination of casualty status does not hinge on what's being reported in the news media.

(2) Recommendation -- Since the confusion is sure to come up again in future contingencies, the issue of DUSTWUN versus "missing" should be settled now. OSD guidance should be distributed to all services, and all service documents and publications should be changed accordingly to reflect the guidance.

g. Casualty Operations

(1) Observation -- We did not anticipate the volume of calls we received from the American public offering gifts, money and mail to the families of Air Force POWs/MIAs. In addition, we have continued to receive calls from the public sector and from various Air Force units who want to invite these families, as well as family members of deceased Air Force pilots, to special memorial events or to speaking engagements. AFMPC's Missing Person Division handled each request for contact with POW/MIA families, and the Casualty Operations Center maintained contact with families of deceased members. See tab 7 for a summary of significant actions.

(2) Recommendation -- We need to anticipate a similar level of interest in future contingencies. SAF/PA should issue PA guidance at the appropriate time, explaining that AFMPC works with the families, warning PAs that family members are under a great deal of stress and instructing PAs to avoid making any commitments on behalf of the family or the Air Force.

h. Personnel Issues

(1) Observation -- Local PA offices did not know basic information about personnel issues, such as local casualty notification procedures. Many questions could have been answered at the local level either through the consolidated base personnel office or from information kept in the PA office. In addition to news media interest, many of the personnel issues, policies and procedural changes affected the Air Force community and required coverage through internal information channels. See tab 8 for a list of personnel issues that arose from Desert Shield/Storm; base PA offices can expect similar issues in future contingencies.

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA or AFNEWS establish a series of one-page information sheets that local PA offices can keep on hand to answer public/media queries. Subject matter would be timeless, with updates provided AF-wide as required. MAJCOMs and FOAs would be tasked to provide information.

i. Personnel Issues

(1) Observation -- AFMPC/PA experienced a flood of calls asking for various types of demographic information about deployed Air Force people. We were never able to get permission through the personnel or public affairs chain of command to release demographics on deployed people. See tab 9 for more information.

(2) Recommendation -- Based on our experiences with this war, SAF/PA should establish a list of demographic

categories that will be requested in future contingencies. Realistic determination about the releasability of these figures should be established ahead of time. Appropriate service agencies should be tasked by OSD to gather these figures at the onset of a contingency, and these agencies should make the gathered information easily available upon request to PAOs calling on behalf of the public and news media.

j. Awards and Decorations

(1) Observation -- We have received a steady stream of calls since the end of the war concerning awards and decorations for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. AFMPC only processes high-level decorations (approved by Secretary of the Air Force) and high-level foreign service medals. Although AFMPC tracks numbers of awards and decorations approved (by MAJCOM), the Air Force Cross and Medal of Honor are the only two medals awarded where AFMPC can provide recipients' names. All award authority below Air Force Cross for Desert Shield/Storm was delegated to CENTAF/CC (General Horner), which makes CENTAF(REAR)/DP the OPR for DS decorations. Many requestors calling our office expressed frustration at the lack of information about awards/decorations for the war, and had been incorrectly referred to us by public affairs offices at every level.

(2) Recommendation -- In the future, the MAJCOM/PA office should coordinate with its DP office to work out a series of appropriate responses to media/public queries. USCENTAF Decorations Guidebook, Desert Shield/Storm (tab 10) is included as an example of good information PA offices should have on hand for future contingencies.

6. Following are other PA considerations in relation to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

a. PA Continuity

(1) Observation -- PA policy and lines of communication were unclear. PA policy on the release of information, particularly timing and content, was not consistent between deployed and non-deployed PA people.

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA work with OASD/PA and applicable unified command PA offices to determine:

- responsibilities of each Air Force PA office involved
- PA chain of command
- clear lines of PA communication
- procedures for policy dissemination to ensure continuity among and between various PA players

b. PA Continuity

(1) Observation -- Lessons learned from this war will benefit PA operations in future contingencies.

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA gather inputs from all PA offices, assess inputs, send comprehensive report to MAJCOM and base PA offices, and change/update AFR 190-1 where appropriate. Also recommend SAF/PA work appropriate PA issues with OASD/PA to resolve confusion and ensure DOD/PA regulations address wartime conduct of public affairs.

c. PA Continuity

(1) Observation -- Historical documentation is easier to collect if gathered from the beginning of a contingency and maintained throughout the operation. In addition, PA would benefit from a system that makes note of problems encountered, lessons learned, ideas that worked, etc.

(2) Recommendation -- In the future, SAF/PA direct all PA shops at the beginning of a contingency to maintain historical information, problems, lessons learned, good ideas, etc., in standardized format. SAF/PA periodically collect inputs, consolidate information and disseminate report(s) back to MAJCOM and base PA offices.

d. Communication

(1) Observation -- It is often difficult to reach PA people during off-duty hours.

(2) Recommendation -- AFNEWS add appropriate command post telephone numbers to USAF Public Affairs Staff Directory.

e. Communication/Media Relations

(1) Observation -- PA offices often refer reporters/callers to other PA shops without really knowing if the reference is appropriate or the best place to send the caller.

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA publish discussion of appropriate protocol in PA Policy Letter encouraging telephone coordination with other PA offices before referring requestors.

f. Media Relations

(1) Observation -- News media are intensely interested in coverage of "firsts" (e.g., first casualty of deployment, first pilot into combat, first MIA of war, first woman POW, etc.)

(2) Recommendation -- Recognize first-time events (or unique elements within an event) and prepare for media interest with comprehensive, cleared information in a useful format (Q&A, fact sheets, etc.)

g. Internal Information

(1) Observation -- Base papers could benefit from list of suggested story ideas, especially during build-up and tear-down phases of operation, to tell "support" story.

(2) Recommendation -- SAF/PA, along with unified and major command PAs involved in the contingency, list and distribute possible story ideas for local editors to pursue. List could include MWR/entertainment support, mail, AAFES support, people features, volunteer help, support for families, how deployed people get creature comforts (such as meals and shelter), etc.

h. Internal Information

(1) Observation -- Information in Desert Defender was crucial; Air Force could have benefited from service-wide distribution.

(2) Recommendations:

- establish publication plan/guidance for future contingencies based on lessons learned from Desert Defender;
- ensure MAJCOM PAs place emphasis on local PA contributions to the publication;
- consider Air Force-wide distribution of publication; or
- consider having Airman magazine change to weekly publication that could cover contingency news and features and could be distributed to deployed areas as well as throughout the Air Force; plans could be written directly into Airman contract.

i. Air Force Hotline

(1) Observation -- AFNEWS did not have all the information it needed to help concerned citizens when they called the Desert Storm hotline.

(2) Recommendation -- AFNEWS provide SAF/PA with a list of categories of information requested from callers. SAF/PA consider these categories when tasking PA offices to provide information for future contingencies. Appropriate information from MAJCOM and local PAs could be fed directly to hotline coordinators.

7. Comments and questions concerning this report may be directed to AFMPC/PA, Lt Col Valerie Elbow, DSN 487-6141, FAX DSN 487-3965.

*Valerie Elbow*

VALERIE A. ELBOW, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief of Public Affairs

10 Tabs

1. Desktop Reference Material
  2. Index (Continuity Information)
  3. Index (USAF Demographics)
  4. Casualty Qs & As for Media
  - \* 5. Media Relations Analysis
  - \* 6. Chronology of PA Guidance Coord
  - \* 7. Offers of Gifts
  - \* 8. DS Personnel Issues
  - \* 9. Release of DS Demographic Info
  - \* 10. CENTAF Decorations Guidance
- \* omitted

USAF CASUALTIES

1. Nonhostile casualties --  
(nonbattle, but can occur in designated combat area or zone)
2. Hostile casualties --  
(casualties resulting from battle or terrorist activity)

Nonhostile/Hostile Casualty Status	Hostile (only) Casualty Category
Deceased	KIA (Killed in Action)
	DWRIA (Died of Wounds Received in Action)
<hr/>	
DUSTWUN (Duty Status -- Whereabouts Unknown) -- transitory casualty status applicable only to military personnel; commander does not have enough information to make a determination of deceased or missing. ** NOT RELEASABLE TO NEWS MEDIA OR GENERAL PUBLIC **	none
Missing	MIA (Missing in Action)
	Captured (commonly called POW)
	Detained (commonly called hostage)
<hr/>	
Ill or Injured:	
VSI (Very Seriously Ill or Injured)	WIA (Wounded in Action) for injured personnel; none for ill personnel.
SI (Seriously Ill or Injured)	"
III (Incapacitating Illness or Injury)	"
NSI (Not Seriously Injured)	"

17 JAN 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 CHIEF OF INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,  
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE COMMANDANT &  
 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, MARINE CORPS

SUBJECT: Release Procedures for Identification of Casualties

In the event of hostilities in the Middle East, public identification of U. S. casualties will be made by the Directorate for Defense Information in a Department of Defense news release. In addition to identifying those service members killed in action and those who die of wounds, injuries or disease, the names of those declared missing in action and those confirmed as prisoners of war, will also be released.

The responsibility for ensuring next-of-kin notification rests with each military department. The submission of names by military department public affairs offices for release by DDI will constitute certification that next-of-kin notification has been accomplished. No list of names should even be brought to DDI unless next-of-kin notification has been completed.

Efforts are currently underway to automate casualty release procedures, but until this is accomplished, names should be submitted to DDI twice daily, at 1130 hours and again at 1630 hours, alphabetized by state on a plain sheet of white paper in the following format:

**KILLED IN ACTION (OR DIED OF WOUNDS)**

United States Army

California

Colonel John E. Doe, 46, Los Angeles, Headquarters Company, 13th Airborne Division

**MISSING IN ACTION (OR PRISONER OF WAR)**

United States Air Force

Doe, John E., Colonel, age 32

Only name, rank, age and branch of Service will be released for MIA/POW.

Service lists will be consolidated by DDI and released daily at approximately 1200 and 1700 hours.

Requests for additional information on personnel killed in action, and those who died of wounds, injuries or disease, releasable under the Privacy Act (such as decorations and awards) will be directed to the public affairs offices of the military departments.

USAF CASUALTIES RELEASABLE INFORMATION

Casualty Status: Missing

1. DPMC will verify next of kin have been notified.
2. AFMPC/PA will pass along basic information to SAF/PATR and CENTAF/PA (REAR).
3. SAF/PATR will pass along information to OASD/PA.
4. OASD/PA makes initial announcement of casualty.
5. Local release authorized after OASD announcement.

INITIAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM AFMPC:

Releasable	For PA information/use only
Name, sex	Social Security Number
Rank	Marital Status
CONUS Home Unit	Overseas Home Unit
Casualty Status	Age (Date of birth)
Date of Incident	
Location of incident	(country)

RELEASABLE INFORMATION:\*

Name, rank, unit (?), age (?), date of occurrence and where casualty occurred (if releasable).

Casualty Status: DUSTWUN\*

Do not release information about individuals in this status.

\* Memo for Record/17 Jan 91

Per OASD/PA memo, releasable information for those DUSTWUN or missing includes name, rank, age and branch of service only.

The casualty status of Air Force men and women is determined by their commander. Examples of casualty statuses include deceased, missing, very seriously ill, and duty status-whereabouts unknown. Duty status-whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) is used as a temporary casualty status until a commander has enough information to accurately determine an individual's actual status. Once an investigation, which may include search and rescue, has been completed, the commander declares the individual missing, deceased, absent without official leave or returned to military control. The DUSTWUN casualty status applies only to military members, and is normally assigned for 10 days or less.

An example of when a commander may determine that the DUSTWUN casualty status is appropriate is if an aircraft fails to return to base following a combat mission over hostile territory. If there were no witnesses to accurately determine the pilot's fate or whereabouts of the aircraft and the aircraft could not possibly still be airborne based on its fuel load, the commander would initially declare the crewmember DUSTWUN.

USAF CASUALTIES RELEASABLE INFORMATION

Casualty Status: Ill/Injured

- 1. DPMC will verify next of kin have been notified.
- \*\* Information can only be released once NOK have been notified. NOK notification is automatic unless members expressly request otherwise. Some may request NOK not be notified; in these cases, information is not releasable. \*\*
- 2. AFMPC/PA will keep SAF/PATR and CENTAF/PA (REAR) advised of specific information on all cases.
- 3. SAF/PATR will keep OASD/PA advised. Prior release by OASD/PA is not required.

INITIAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM AFMPC:

Releasable	For PA information/use only
Name, sex	Social Security Number
Rank	Marital Status
CONUS Home Unit	Overseas Home Unit
Casualty Status	Age (Date of birth)
Date of Incident	
Location of incident	(country)

INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM AFMPC WITH ONE-DAY LEAD -- WILL BE PROVIDED UPON REQUEST ONLY:

Home of Record (city, state)  
 Place of entry (city, state) into service  
 (NOTE -- For further information, refer reporter to home unit Public Affairs)

RELEASABLE PER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974:

Name, military grade/rank, date of rank, commission source, date entered active duty, duty status, Air Force specialty code, pay date, military base pay, allowances (except basic allowance for quarters, family separation allowance, or any other allowance that would indicate marital/dependent status), promotion number, sex, professional military education, CONUS unit of assignment and location (if releasable), past and present assignments (if releasable), future assignments that are firm (except overseas), date the casualty occurred, where the casualty occurred (if releasable).

RELEASE ONLY WITH THE PATIENT'S CONSENT:

Date of admission to or release from a medical facility, current assessment of patient's condition (phrased as "stable, good, fair, serious or critical"), type of wound or injury suffered ("small arms wound, fragment wound, arm fracture," for example), allowances that indicate marital/dependent status, age (date of birth), civilian awards, civilian education (degree/major areas of study/graduation year), dependent information, home of record, marital status, official photo (except key

personnel), home address, home telephone number, national origin, and race.

As of 2100/16 Jan 90

TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Department of Defense

News Media

DOD Press Desk: (703) 697-5131

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Air Force

News Media

Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs

(703) 695-0640/5766

FAX (703) 614-7486

General Public

Desert Storm Hotline

1 (800) 253-9276

Next of Kin

Next of kin will receive a toll-free number for their use only.

Casualty --

Mortuary --

Volunteers to Come Back on Active Duty (separated USAF)

Air Reserve Personnel Center

Personnel Mobilization Center (ARPC/PMC)

1 (800) 525-0102, ext 365

---

Army

News Media

(703) 695-5135

General Public

1 (800) 626-1440

(703) 614-0739

Next of Kin

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**Navy**

News Media

Navy News Desk  
(703) 697-5342 or 5343

General Public

Office of Information (CNINFO)  
1 (800) 732-1206

Next of Kin

Emergency Coordination Center  
1 (800) 255-3808

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**Marine Corps**

News Media

(703) 614-2958

General Public

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Next of Kin

1 (800) 523-2694

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**Coast Guard**

News Media

(202) 267-1933 or 0930

General Public

1 (800) 367-8724

Next of Kin

1 (800) 283-8724

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**Department of Veterans Affairs**

News Media

(202) 233-2741

General Public

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DESERT STORM CONTINUITY INFORMATION INDEX  
 Air Force Aid Society  
 Air Force Times  
 Awards/Decorations/Medals  
 Casualty  
     Death statistics AF-wide (1980-1990)  
     DUSTWUN explanation  
     Next of kin notification procedures  
     Notification Guide (AFP 30-8)  
     Releases  
     Reporting  
     Sample notification messages & letters  
 Decorations  
 Dependent Care Responsibilities  
 Family Support Centers (DOD)  
 Family of wounded (airfare)  
 Mail (personal)  
 Military couples  
 Missing (casualty status)  
     Assistance available to next of kin  
     Benefits/Entitlements for POW/MIA  
     Laws and policies governing missing status  
     Mail to/from POWs and to MIAs  
     Media contact with next of kin  
     Pay for those in missing status  
     Procedures the AF takes when MIA/POW  
     Promotions for POW/MIA  
     Terms and definitions  
 Pilot retention  
 Pregnancy  
 Promotions  
     Enlisted promotion process  
     Recommendation process for officers  
 Retiree recall  
 Senior service school  
 Sole Surviving Son or Daughter Policy  
 Telephone numbers  
     Assistance Organizations (DPMAS)  
     Disabilities Branch (AFMPC)  
     Entitlements information (DPMAS)  
     Overseas evacuations (info numbers)  
     Retirements Branch (AFMPC) and various retiree affairs  
     Separations Branch (AFMPC)  
     Survivor Benefits Plan (info)  
     Toll free hotlines (DOD)  
 Threat Condition (THREATCON) Procedures (OI 208-1)  
 UN resolutions (USC 660-678)  
 Women in the Air Force  
 Worldwide locator

## DEMOGRAPHICS

- Children (see Parents)
- Couples (see Military Couples)
- Conscientious Objectors
- Deaths
  - by cause of death (1980 - 1990)
- Dependents (see Parents)
- Desert Storm (see Memos for Record)
- Enlisted (see Strength)
- Ethnic Group (see Race)
- Force Strength (see Strength)
- General Statistics (see "One-Liners")
- Grade (see Strength)
- Memos for Record (PA)
- Military Couples (DPMRPP1) -- also see "Parents"
  - Dependents, number of
  - Enlisted and enlisted/officer couples
  - Military couples with dependents
  - Officer and officer/enlisted couples
  - Other Services (married to AF member)
  - Pregnancies (officer/enlisted)
  - Single Member Sponsors (male/female, officer/enlisted)
- Minorities (see Race)
- MONSTRAA Index and directions for use
- Officers (see Strength)
- "One-Liners"/General Statistics (DPMYI) -- since 1983
  - Academic Education
  - Age
  - Commission Source
  - Dependents
  - Enlistment Terms
  - Marital Status
  - Overseas
  - Professional Military Education
  - Race/Ethnic Group
  - Sex
  - Total Force Strength (officers/enlisted)
- Parents (officer and enlisted)
  - Military Married to Civilian
  - Military Married to Military
  - Single Parents

All three above have the following breakdown:

  - Total Dependents in Household
  - With Dependents
  - With Dependent Children
  - With Dependent Children Age 18 and Younger
- Pilots
  - Age (by grade)
  - Commission Source (by grade)
  - Grade
- Pregnancies
- Race
  - Blacks (by grade, 1977 - 1990)

DOD Desert Shield Fact Sheet (race/ethnic groups):  
Desert Shield percentages (all branches)  
Percentage of total force (all branches)  
Combat arms (all branches)  
Grade (by sex)  
Sex (by officer/enlisted)  
Rank (see Strength)  
Rated Officers (see Pilots)  
Religious Denomination  
Enlisted (numbers and percentage)  
Officer (numbers and percentage)  
Sex (see specific demographic grouping desired)  
Single Parents (see Parents)  
Strength  
AFMPC strength (officers, enlisted, civilians)  
Citizenship (US and non-US for active duty AF)  
Grade (1948 - 1990)

## Benefits and Entitlements

Q: What benefits and entitlements are provided to family of deceased members?

A: Read or fax information from AFP 211-15, "Benefits for Dependents and Survivors of Active Duty Casualties."

Q: Who takes care of transportation of body and burial arrangements?

A: Refer caller to Air Force Engineering and Services Center's Mortuary Affairs. The public affairs office can be contacted at (904) 283-6114, DSN 523-6114.

Q: Explain SGLI (Servicemen's Group Life Insurance). Does a deceased member automatically get SGLI?

A: SGLI is offered to all service members, and most of them elect to accept SGLI coverage (monthly premiums are deducted from participating service members' paychecks). The maximum SGLI payment is \$50,000. The member designates the amount of insurance coverage (\$10K, \$20K, \$30K, \$40K or \$50K), or elects no coverage, and specifies the beneficiary(ies).

Q: What benefits and entitlements are provided to family of missing members?

A: Read or fax attached cleared statement (#1).

Captured -- see "Missing"

DUSTWUN (Duty Status -- Whereabouts Unknown)

Q: What is DUSTWUN?

A: Read or fax attached cleared statement (#2).

Entitlements -- see "Benefits and Entitlements"

Family -- see "Next of Kin"

## Funerals

Q: Who takes care of transportation of body and burial arrangements?

A: Refer caller to Air Force Engineering and Services Center's Mortuary Affairs. The public affairs office can be contacted at (904) 283-6114, DSN 523-6114.

Life insurance -- see "Benefits and Entitlements"

Mail to POWs -- see "Missing"

## Missing

Q: What benefits and entitlements are provided to family of missing members?

A: Read or fax attached cleared statement (#1).

Q: How do I send mail or packages to a POW?

A: Only immediate family can send anything through the Red Cross to a POW. (See attachment #3.)

Q: Who is considered immediate family?

A: The spouse, children and parents of casualty.

Q: How can I send something (letter or package) to the family of a POW or MIA?

A: Procedures are still being worked out for this.

Q: Do missing and captured people get promoted? How?

A: Read or fax attached cleared statement (#4).

Q: What happens if a missing person is later declared captured or killed?

A: Certain laws and Air Force policies apply. Read or fax attached information sheet (#5).

Q: Is there a maximum amount of time a person can be missing?

A: No; however, a full review of a case is made before a year expires. Read or fax attached information sheet (#5).

Q: Are there any Prisoners of War from the Vietnam War?

A: Yes, one. Air Force Col. Charles E. Shelton.

Q: What are the numbers of those missing from other wars?

A: WWII -- 78,750

Korean War -- 8,200

Vietnam War -- 2,283, specifically:

Air Force -- 826

Army -- 678

Navy -- 451

Marine Corps -- 285

Coast Guard -- 1

Civilians -- 42

#### Next of Kin

Q: Who is considered immediate family?

A: The spouse, children and parents of casualty.

Q: Who does the Air Force consider to be a person's primary and secondary next of kin?

A: The person most closely related to the casualty is the primary next of kin. Any other relative is a secondary next of kin. For example, a married person's spouse is the primary next of kin, and children and parents are secondary next of kin; the parents are primary next of kin for a single person with no children.

(Note: Air Force concerns itself with notification to spouse; children; parents; persons identified by the member

on the DD Form 93, Record of Emergency Data; and Servicemen's Group Life Insurance beneficiaries.)

#### Notification Process

Q: Exactly how does the Air Force notification process work?

A: Read or fax attached cleared statement (#6).

Q: Does the Air Force notify next of kin in person?

A: In cases of personnel who are missing or deceased, next of kin notification is always accomplished in person by a uniformed Air Force representative. In cases of personnel who are ill or injured, notification of next of kin may be accomplished either in person, by telegram, or by telephone, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the illness or injury. In cases of illness or injury, if the person is capable of communicating, he or she is asked if the next of kin should be notified, and the wishes of the member will be followed.

Q: How long does notification usually take?

A: Next of kin are notified as soon as possible after the status of the casualty has been determined. The notification is directed by the Air Force Casualty Operations Center, and is normally accomplished within a matter of hours.

Q: What if family members cannot be reached or are not at home?

A: Notification is still done in person. The notification team checks the residence often until the family members return home. If the family is on vacation or away from home for an extended period of time, the notification team will get help from state and local authorities through the Air Force Casualty Operations Center.

Q: What if the next of kin live outside this country?

A: Notification officers are used from overseas bases wherever possible. If this is not possible, officers can be used from the U.S. Embassy. In extreme cases, notification can be made through the country's Red Cross. In extremely rare cases, local police can be used to ensure a timely notification.

Q: What if there is no Air Force installation nearby?

A: The Air Force Casualty Operations Center contacts officers at the nearest Air Force Reserve unit, Air National Guard unit, Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps detachment, Air Force Recruiting Unit, etc., and provides instructions and guidance for notification procedures.

Q: What if the next of kin is in poor health and in danger of an adverse reaction in the event of unexpected or bad news?

A: If the Air Force is aware of the situation, the Air Force Casualty Operations Center will ask other persons listed on the member's DD Form 93, Record of Emergency Data, for the name and address of a person who could notify the ill relative and provide adequate support.

Q: What about other family members?

A: If the primary next of kin want other family members notified, they can provide the Air Force with a list of names and telephone numbers. The Air Force will notify secondary next of kin of a casualty by telephone at the request of the immediate family.

c: What about concerned friends or distant relatives who want to check on the status of a loved one?

A: They can call the Air Force's Desert Storm Hotline at 1 (800) 253-9276.

#### Personal Effects

Q: Who takes care of handling a dead person's personal effects?

A: Refer caller to Air Force Engineering and Services Center's Mortuary Affairs. The public affairs office can be contacted at (904) 283-6114, DSN 523-6114.

Prisoners of War -- see "Missing"

#### Red Cross

Q: What role does the Red Cross play in the case of POWs?

A: Refer caller to Red Cross at (202) 639-3308.

SGLI -- See "Benefits and Entitlements"

**BENEFITS AND ENTITLEMENTS**  
(for POW/MIA Personnel and Dependents)

**ASSIGNED/EXCESS FAMILY HOUSING:** Dependents of a military member who is officially reported as POW/MIA are permitted to retain assigned family housing for up to 12 months. Installation Commanders are encouraged to allow dependents to remain in quarters beyond the 12 month period until the member's missing or captured status is terminated. The Air Force maintains a list of government installations having housing which is excess to Air Force requirements. If you are a dependent, you may move at government expense, provided you meet the eligibility requirements as explained by your assistance representative. If you are interested, contact that office for details.

**VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOME LOAN BENEFITS:** The spouse of a POW/MIA member may guarantee one home mortgage in his/her own right. The entitlement to initiate a home loan guarantee will be terminated at the same time the member's missing or captured status is terminated. The spouse's entitlement to a loan under this program does not reduce or eliminate the military member's eligibility to a home loan in his/her own right. The provisions of the law have no effect on state laws regarding home loans. If you are interested in a Veterans' home loan, you should consult with the local Staff Judge Advocate to determine the effect of the law in your local area. Your local Veterans Administration office can also provide you with details on this benefit. (38 USC 1801(b)(3))

**MOVEMENT OF DEPENDENTS, HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS AND MOTOR VEHICLES:** One movement of dependents, household goods, and privately owned vehicle is authorized for a member who is absent for a period of more than 29 days in a missing status. Another movement may be authorized by the Secretary of the Air Force or designated representative when the member has been officially reported as absent for a period of more than 1 year in a missing status. Dependents, household goods and privately owned vehicle may again be moved when official notice is received that the member is removed from missing status.

**DEFENSE CREDIT UNIONS:** The Department of Defense has ruled that spouses and children of POW/MIA personnel may become members of the Defense Credit Unions if a standard qualifying amendment is adopted by the credit union, namely: "Members of the US Armed Forces, active or retired, or their dependents or dependent survivors who are eligible by law or regulation to receive and are receiving benefits (e.g., commissary and exchange privileges, medical services, etc.) from... military installation." This is an individual matter which each Credit Union will decide for itself. If you desire to join, ask your assistance representative if you are eligible.

**LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUMS:** If the military member was paying premiums on a life insurance policy by direct remittance to the company at the time they became missing and you wish to continue these payments, we suggest that you consider initiating an allotment for this purpose. When insurance premiums are paid by allotment, the premium usually is lowered since companies give policy holders the lower annual rate even though payments are made in 12 equal installments. This is an easy and convenient way of paying premiums and assures that there will be no missed payments. Write to the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center (AJCTC), Denver, Colorado 80279, advising them of your desires. State the amount of payment, frequency with which payments are now made (monthly, bimonthly or quarterly), policy number, and full name of the company and address to which premiums are paid.

**SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS:** A DD Form 1300, Report of Casualty, showing that a member is missing in action or captured is considered as a written indication of an intent to claim Social Security benefits at a future date. This document will serve as a statement of intent to claim benefits from the Social Security Administration either by the member or by any other eligible person. When and if an application is eventually filed by any claimant, the date the original DD Form 1300 was prepared indicating that the member was missing in action or captured will be used as the filing date. A DD Form 1300 is sent to the Social Security Administration when a member is declared a POW or MIA. The Administration will hold the DD Form 1300 until a claim is filed, or until they receive notice that none will be filed.

The law permits the payment of social security lump sum when the body of an insured member is not available for burial and the member had no spouse who was living with them at the time of death. (The law already provides that the spouse of a worker who was living with them before their death can get the lump-sum death payment whether or not the body is available for burial.) The lump-sum death benefit will be paid to any equitable entitled person, or persons, to the extent and in proportion to the expenses each person incurred in connection with the death of the insured member. The expenses could include a memorial service, a memorial marker, a site for the marker, or other expenses customarily incurred in connection with a death.

**USE OF BASE DINING HALL FACILITIES:** Dependents and relatives of personnel who are POW/MIA are authorized to utilize base dining halls. The frequency with which dependents and relatives may use the dining halls and the cost of the meal involved will be determined by the base commander concerned.

**VETERANS ADMINISTRATION EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS:** Under Chapter 35, Title 38, US Code, "Dependents Educational Assistance," the spouses and children of POW/MIA members of the Armed Services are authorized educational assistance. The educational benefits, which are in the form of monetary grants from the Veterans Administration, are the same as those to which the spouses or children would be currently entitled if the spouse or parent were deceased or 100 percent disabled as the result of the service

connected illness or injury. Educational benefits are authorized to spouses and children (generally age 18-25) of members who have been in a POW/MIA status for a period of 90 days or more. The entitlement to educational benefits will be terminated at the same time the member's POW or MIA status is terminated; however, if the spouse or children are enrolled in an educational program at that time, the semester or quarter may be completed using VA assistance. Any educational entitlement under this program will be deducted from any subsequent entitlement under any other program. The period of eligibility for educational benefits is limited to *ten* ~~eight~~ years. Details of the educational benefits have been distributed to local base education offices. If you desire to participate in this program, you should consult with the education office at your assistance base. Documents needed will be a current DD Form 1300 and a marriage or birth certificate. The nearest Veterans Administration office can furnish additional information on this program. (38 USC 170Ka)(1)(c))

**INCOME TAX:** Public Law provides that the entire amount of compensation of US Armed Forces members and of civilian employees who are prisoners of war, missing in action or in a detained status, is tax deferred until such time as they are Returned to Military Control (RMC) or determined to be deceased.

**SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN (SBP):** Chapter 73, Title 10, USC includes the Survivor Benefit Plan, which at retirement allows members to elect to provide a monthly annuity after death up to 55% of their retired pay to their spouse and/or children or, in the absence of such dependents, certain other eligible persons. The annuity is reduced when the spouse reaches age 62 due to anticipated Social Security benefits. The Survivor Benefit Plan also has an additional active duty service benefit for the member who has over 20 years active duty. Should this member die on active duty, his spouse will receive 55% of the retired pay which he would have been eligible to receive had he retired. Survivor Benefit Plan will complement the Dependency and Indemnity Compensation, which is paid whenever a member dies on active duty, to reach this 55% figure. This is an automatic benefit for survivors of active duty members who were retirement eligible at time of death (or declared deceased).

**POWER OF ATTORNEY:** Public Law 92-540 amends the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to extend a power of attorney executed by a service member who is now listed as POW/MIA. The power of attorney must have expired after the member entered a POW/MIA status and must designate the member's spouse, parent, or other named relative as his attorney in fact. This new law may or may not be effective in facilitating commercial transactions initiated by POW/MIA next of kin; since the consummation of such commercial transactions as the conveyance of real property and the transfer of securities is primarily a matter of local law. A power of attorney executed after 22 January 1973 may not be extended under the law if the document clearly indicates that the power granted expires on the date specified even though that person, after the date of execution of the document, enters a missing status. See your legal assistance officer for further explanation of how this law affects you.

EXPLANATION OF THE CASUALTY STATUS OF  
DUTY STATUS - WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN (DUSTWUN)

Casualty regulations of all the military services allow a member's commander to place an individual in a transitory (temporary) casualty status of DUSTWUN. This casualty status has been in existence since 1979 and it applies to both hostile/battle casualties and nonhostile/nonbattle casualties. It is used whenever the member's commander believes the individual may be a casualty whose absence is involuntary (as opposed to a voluntary absence of AWOL), but insufficient evidence or information presently exists to determine the member's actual status. This casualty status is used for approximately 10 days or less following the individual's disappearance to allow the member's commander and other investigative sources time to gather additional information. At any time sufficient information is received, but normally no later than the end of the 10 day period, the member's commander, in coordination with the service's casualty office, declares the individual either missing, deceased or returned to military control, as appropriate. In rare cases it may be determined that the individual's absence was voluntary, in which case, the member's commander declares the individual AWOL.

## FORWARDING MAIL TO PERSONNEL WHO ARE CAPTURED (POW)

The American Red Cross, National Headquarters (ARC, NHQ) has established the Gulf Tracing/POW Unit to trace inquiries and work in concert with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the delivery of messages to/from POWs being held by the Iraqi forces.

The American Red Cross via their local chapter and Red Cross office on military installations will provide message forms to transmit personal messages to the POWs. Messages must be of a personal nature. The message form, once completed by the sender (must be immediate family), will be sent by the American Red Cross Chapter or Station Office to ARC, NHQ for forwarding to the ICRC. As a protection against possible terrorism, the ARC, NHQ has instructed their units to provide only the POW's name, rank, SSAN and branch of service.

Questions of a technical nature may be addressed to the ARC, NHQ International Social Services, AC 202-639-3308; however, they recommend families contact their local Chapter or Red Cross office on military installations in this regard.

As a matter of information, during the Iraq/Iran War, no letters or packages were permitted to or from POWs. Message forms, pictures and prescription glasses were the only permissible items passed to and from the POWs. In some instances, the ICRC was not even permitted to verify POW status on captured/held prisoners. Should the Iraqi authorities not honor these arrangements, the ICRC will attempt to establish an alternate delivery method.

## PROMOTIONS

**HOW POW/MIA PERSONNEL ARE PROMOTED:** Missing in action and captured Air Force officers and airmen continue to be considered for promotion along with their contemporaries, and their promotion eligibility is closely monitored by the respective promotion branch at the Air Force Military Personnel Center. Air Force policy provides for each missing and captured officer and airman to be considered for promotion to the next higher grade when they attain eligibility for the grade for which they are competing. Eligibility for officers is based on date of rank in current grade, and for airmen, time in grade and time in service. Selection board members are fully cognizant of the status of POW/MIA personnel and every effort is made to insure that each individual is given fair and equitable consideration.

When personnel are selected for promotion, they are assigned a promotion sequence number. The purpose of the sequence number is to designate relative seniority among all members who have been selected for promotion to the same grade during that cycle. Allocation of sequence numbers is based on such selection factors as length of time in present grade and length of service. Personnel are then promoted in numerical sequence as vacancies occur in the grade to which they are being promoted. This system is necessary because the Air Force has a ceiling on the number of personnel who may serve in the various grades at any one time; consequently, promotions must be regulated.

Soon after each selection cycle, we advise each next of kin whose member has been selected for promotion. However, since the effective date is contingent on grade vacancies we are unable to furnish the date on which the promotion will actually take place. As a member's sequence number is reached, promotion orders are published and copies are forwarded to the next of kin and the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center. Grade and pay adjustments are made at that time.

Public Law 92-169, enacted 24 November 1971, amends Titles 37 and 38, United States Code, relating to promotion of members of the Uniformed Services who are in a missing status. This law provides that the promotion of a member while he/she is in a missing status is fully effective for all purposes, including Federal benefits to survivors. The law stipulates that the promotion is effective even when the death of the missing member is later determined to have occurred prior to the promotion. This means that payment of Six Months' Death Gratuity and Dependency and Indemnity Compensation will be based on the pay of the higher grade or rank to which a member was promoted while in a missing status. Formerly, Death Gratuity and Dependency and Indemnity Compensation paid to survivors of servicemen was based on the pay grade held by the member on the date death was determined to have occurred.

## LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING MISSING STATUS

The status of a missing member is changed to deceased when information is received which establishes conclusively that the member is dead. This determination must be made by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel, acting in behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, as provided by law (Chapter 10, Title 37, United States Code).

A determination of death based on conclusive evidence can be made at any point in time. Conclusive evidence permits no reasonable doubt as to death. It might, for example, consist of eyewitness statements which were not available at the time of the incident, or statements of ground forces who discover remains at a crash site several years after an individual was shot down. The finding of remains, however, is not mandatory for making a determination of death. Thus, conclusive evidence may exist when an aircraft is lost at sea and the ensuing search establishes that there were no survivors. Determinations can also be based upon evidence given by individuals who have personal knowledge of the death--for example, statements of eyewitnesses which leave no doubt that a member or crew died when an aircraft crashed.

Let's discuss missing in action people--those whom we do not know are captured or detained and on whom conclusive evidence of death has not been received during their first year of loss. If the true status of an individual who is missing in action cannot be determined within 12 months from the date he entered that status, Section 555 of the law requires that a full review of his case be made before the year expires. This review consists of a complete evaluation of all available information. Following this review, and at the end of the 12 months in the missing in action status, the person is officially continued in a missing status if they can reasonably be presumed to be living. On the other hand, should the evidence indicate the member can no longer be presumed to be alive, a presumptive finding of death is made. If a finding of death is made at this time, the date of death will be recorded as the day following the expiration of the 12 months' period of missing. In cases where the missing status was continued beyond a year, and a finding of death is made, the date of death is the date the change in status is effected. This date is not considered to be the actual or probable date of death but is established in accordance with the law for the purpose of terminating pay and allowances and permitting the settlement of the member's accounts. Reviews on subsequent annual anniversaries are not made. The member remains in this status until new evidence becomes available or other events occur which would warrant a change in status, and member's pay and allowances continue.

The Air Force continually reviews the cases of our missing members and tries to obtain information to resolve the missing status. In many instances information will not become available until the cessation of hostilities in which we may be involved.

When a missing member's case is to be reviewed for the purpose of making any status determination, NOK who are in receipt of governmental financial benefits must be guaranteed certain rights under the decision resolved in McDonald v. McLucas, D.C.N.Y. 1974 371F. Supp. 831, affirmed 958.Ct. 297; 419, U.S. 987, 42 L.Ed 2d 261. Therefore, affected NOK must be given notice of a status review and afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend a hearing; given reasonable access to the information upon which the status review will be based, and permitted to present any information which they consider relevant to the proceeding. The NOK can exercise the option of either attending a hearing, with or without legal counsel, at the Air Force Military Personnel Center, waiving hearing rights or submitting written information while waiving the right to attend a hearing. A hearing, therefore, is the event that occurs when the NOK receiving governmental financial benefits exercise the first option. A review, on the other hand, is that action which is taken when either the second or third option is exercised.

The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel, acting in behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for administration of the Air Force Missing Persons program. He does, in fact, perform the mandatory reviews discussed above and, in addition, performs additional reviews of individual cases whenever he feels that the circumstances call for another consideration of the available facts and circumstances. When either a determination of death based on the receipt of conclusive evidence or a presumptive finding of death is made, the member's next of kin are personally notified by a uniformed Air Force officer or as they so choose. In addition, they are advised of all the circumstances in writing, and casualty assistance is continued.

The responsibility for determining the official status of downed Air Force personnel is a serious matter. It involves the consideration of all available evidence and information, with every related factor taken into consideration. Great care is exercised in administering this law. In making status determinations, the basic evidence consists of the circumstances of the disappearance, the results of search, local conditions of terrain, statements of witnesses, intelligence information, and any other relevant facts and circumstances. Each case is judged individually on its own merits. Although the personal desires and beliefs of the family are sympathetically considered, the law does not permit these desires and beliefs to control the decisions that are made.

## Air Force Casualty Notification Procedures

1. When an Air Force active duty member or an Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard member on active duty or inactive duty for training becomes a casualty, the member's home or deployed unit immediately notifies the Air Force Casualty Operations Center at Randolph Air Force Base near San Antonio, Texas.
2. The Air Force Casualty Operations Center operates 24 hours a day to ensure next of kin are notified in a prompt, dignified and compassionate manner whenever a casualty occurs. The Center determines the location of the primary and secondary next of kin based on information in each service member's personnel records. The Center then tasks the closest Air Force officer to personally notify the primary next of kin. Whenever an Air Force person is declared dead, missing or whereabouts unknown, the next of kin are notified in person by a notification team. 3. The notification team consists of the notification officer, who holds the rank of at least a major, and may include, if available, a medical member or nurse and a chaplain. The notification officer is always of equal or higher rank to the Air Force member.
4. The notification officer prepares a letter to be delivered to the next of kin. The letter is addressed to the next of kin and quoted from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel for Military Personnel and is the official acknowledgement from the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff. The letter contains the facts and may include a brief statement of known circumstances.
5. Once the Air Force has notified the primary next of kin, the AF will also notify secondary next of kin, if requested by the primary NOK. Secondary next of kin notifications are accomplished in the same manner. 6. Search Progress Notifications in missing and whereabouts unknown cases are usually made daily if an active search and rescue is being performed. These updates on search and rescue efforts can be provided by the Air Force Casualty Operations Center, the member's commander or commander's designated representative.
6. After initial notification, the Air Force provides two basic types of assistance:
  - a. The primary next of kin is assigned a Casualty Assistance Representative (usually from the AF installation nearest the next of kin) who provides assistance concerning benefits and entitlements such as unpaid pay and allowances, government life insurance, death gratuity, etc.
  - b. The Mortuary Services Office of the Air Force Engineering and Services Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., helps the next of kin on all matters concerning the shipment of remains, disposition of personal effects, burial and other arrangements (ie., honor guard, etc).

7. If an Air Force person is ill or injured, the Air Force notifies next of kin, usually by telephone. Some commanders may choose to notify next of kin in person. Also, the ill or injured AF member can request notification be done in person because of the next of kin's age or poor health. If an AF member is able to communicate, he or she may request next of kin not be notified. In this instance, the AF would not notify the next of kin.

8. Medical progress notifications are made to the primary and secondary next of kin about every four days or when there is a reported change in the member's condition or if there is a scheduled movement or surgery of the patient. Medical updates can be provided by the Air Force Casualty Operations Center or the member's commander (or representative). Other family members wishing to know the status of an AF member should contact the primary or secondary next of kin for information.



## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE RESERVE

ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA 31098-0001

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PA

10 May 91

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After-Action Report (Your Msg, 152201Z Mar 91)

TO: HQ TAC/PA

ATTN: Lt Col Stanek

1. As specified in our message, 211748Z Mar 91, same subject, attached is HQ AFRES/PA's Desert Storm after-action report. The report applies to HQ AFRES/PA only--units will submit their own reports through their gaining MAJCOMs.

2. If you have any questions pertaining to our submission, please contact Major David L. Geary, Chief, Community Relations Division, DSN 468-6721.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Michael R. Mickelson".

MICHAEL R. MICKELSON, Lt Col, USAF  
Acting Director of Public Affairs

1 Atch  
Desert Storm After-Action Report

SUBJECT: Desert Storm-After Action Report for HQ AFRES/PA

a. Report submitted by: Lt Col Michael R. Mickelson, Acting Director of Public Affairs, Headquarters Air Force Reserve.

b. Deployed personnel: TSgt Shirley Glaze, NCOIC, Community Relations Division, was assigned to the Joint Information Bureau, Dhahran International Hotel, from 17 Jan 91 to 20 Mar 91.

c. PA operations were never established in the AOR.

d. Narrative:

(1) Media Relations activities:

(a) Responded to more than 325 media queries since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

(b) Arranged news articles in major newspapers and wire services, such as the New York Times, Miami Herald, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, AP and UPI.

(c) Scheduled broadcast stories on the Reserve on national media such as "The Joan Rivers Show" (ABC); CNN; WGN-Chicago Cable; "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings" (ABC); "CBS Evening News with Dan Rather" (CBS); "Real Life with Jane Pauley" (NBC); and, "The Today Show" (NBC).

(d) Distributed eight major news releases on subjects ranging from "Reservists Volunteer for Operation Desert Shield" to "A Top Gun of the Warthog."

(e) Distributed "Memo for Correspondents" every 2 to 3 months to more than 300 major US media outlets.

(2) Community Relations activities:

(a) Sent an open letter to employers of reservists from the Chief of Air Force Reserve through national news media.

(b) Worked with the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs) to increase the interface between units and their respective state committees.

(c) Provided 25,000 certificates of appreciation from the Chief of Air Force Reserve to units for presentation to employers of reservists.

(d) Provided 25,000 general certificates of appreciation for presentation by units to deserving individuals and companies.

(e) Coordinated reservists' appearances in numerous national news media (network television, radio, and major newspapers and magazines)--many of these features and interviews mentioned community and employer support.

(f) Provided guidance and support material quickly through the command-wide electronic mail network to enhance community and employer support.

(3) Internal Information activities:

(a) Provided 77 stories to field units, major commands and Air Force public affairs offices. Topics ranged from pay and benefits to call-up and mission news stories. The stories were also picked up by Desert Defender, On Guard and the Air Force News Service.

(b) Provided monthly Commander's Call topics to field units and the Air Force.

(c) Arranged for Westover AFB, Massachusetts, to be featured in an Air Force Now film.

(d) Wrote the script for a briefing on Westover AFB as a major hub for operations for Desert Shield/Storm.

(e) Updated the wire services, such as DOD News, AP, UPI, Reuters, Air Force News Service, and Air Force Reserve News Service, as many as six times a day at the peak of Operation Desert Storm. These wire services are provided to field units, major commands, the Pentagon and other military services. They are normally updated twice daily.

e. Problem Areas/Lessons Learned and Solutions:

PROBLEM 1: In a call-up of Reserve units, two terms are used about 'control' of these units: administrative and operational. However, there is no across-the-board, clear distinction of what these terms mean, where they begin and end, and no knowledge of the terms by the gaining command. In public affairs matters during Desert Shield/Storm, we found uncertainty at several command levels on the 'administrative' vs 'operational' control of AFRES units called to active duty by the gaining commands. We found many asking basic questions; such as, "Do called-up units follow guidance of the gaining command (operational control) or AFRES (administrative control)?" or "Once a unit is called up by the gaining command, does the unit's chain of command change?"

SOLUTION 1: We need to develop a clear distinction of what constitutes 'administrative' versus 'operational' control in a call-up. The current delineation is blurred, subject to interpretation, and not suitable in a contingency or wartime situation. The optimum solution is for all to know the chain of command for a called-up unit has indeed temporarily changed, and

that on all but clearly routine matters (pay, personnel), the unit has become part of the gaining command.

**PROBLEM 2:** At the onset of Desert Shield, participating public affairs people needed guidance fast from OASD/OSAF and it did not appear. Lessons learned from Grenada and Operation Just Cause taught the public affairs community that field units needed public affairs guidance fast in a fast-breaking, major military operation. In Just Cause, for example, initial guidance for field units came more than 12 hours after action commenced. In Desert Shield, initial guidance was also slow. When initial guidance was sent, it went from one level downward to another via AUTODIN. This led to further delay. Once again we need to address the problem of not getting initial guidance from the top levels of the military to field units quickly. When a major military operation is announced in Washington, DC, PAOs instantly receive queries from the public and the media. Field PAOs immediately look to the top for guidance on what to say or not say. Also, in an advanced technological age, we continue to rely on the slow and old technology of AUTODIN as the optimum method to relay information quickly.

**SOLUTION 2:** Initial public affairs guidance on fast-breaking military operations should receive much higher priority at the top levels of the public affairs community. Similarly, the advance of computer telecommunications technology gives us the opportunity to share critical guidance quickly with all field PAOs. We need to develop this capability.

**PROBLEM 3:** We observed an endless flow of guidance, some of it conflicting, from numerous sources (OASD/PA, CENTCOM/PA, TAG/PA, MAC/PA, SAC/PA and SAF/PA).

**SOLUTION 3:** We believe, in wartime, all guidance should come from OASD and the leading unified command. In this situation, the only issuers of public affairs guidance should have been OASD/PA and CENTCOM/CENTAF/PA.

**PROBLEM 4:** Reserve public affairs officers were not called up or deployed with their units. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the field public affairs offices were overloaded with work; however, because most of our public affairs officers are civil service Air Reserve Technicians, they are not required to work beyond an 8-hour workday. Active-duty philosophy was no PA reservist was to be activated until all active-duty resources were exhausted.

**SOLUTION 4:** Reserve public affairs officers should be called up at the same time as their attached unit to accommodate the increased workload.



## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE RESERVE  
ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA 31098-0001

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PA

1 Aug 91

SUBJECT: USCENTAF/PA After-Action Report (Your Msg, 232000Z Jul 91)

TO: USCENTAF/PA  
ATTN: Lt Col Stanek

1. Attached are four lessons learned. The first two were submitted to HQ USAF/RE for their use, and the others are part of the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) report.

2. If you have questions, please let me know. We appreciate your asking us for an input to this valuable report.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Michael R. Mickelson".

MICHAEL R. MICKELSON, Lt Col, USAF  
Acting Director of Public Affairs

1 Atch  
Lessons Learned (4)

## Lesson Learned

1. **Issue defined:** Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) was received from a number of sources, including CENTAF/PA (Rear), OSAF/PA and the MAJCOMs. However, with mobilized Reserve units deployed to the USCENTCOM AOR, it's questionable whether OSAF/PA should have been a player in generating Desert Shield/Storm-related PAG, other than retransmitting guidance from OASD/PA. Mobilized units not deployed should have received PAG from their respective MAJCOMs with AOR-related PAG from CENTAF/PA (Rear) funneled through the same MAJCOMs with information copies to HQ AFRES and NGB/PA.
2. **Key facts and discussion:** More than 60 PAG messages were received by HQ AFRES/PA during the Desert Shield/Storm period. In most instances, this information was retransmitted--either in whole or in part--to AFRES subordinate units. It appeared that the Air Force unified component--CENTAF/PA (Rear)--was not communicating with OSAF/PA (not keeping them in the loop). Consequently, OSAF/PA was passing on, in some cases, redundant information to MAJCOMs/FOAs.
3. **Mission impact:** At times, there was confusion in analyzing and conveying PAG to NAF/unit Public Affairs offices.
4. **Related issue:** Sidestepping of national media query by CENTAF/PA (Rear).
5. **Suggested fix and benefit:** OASD/PA, OSAF/PA, CENTAF/PA and MAJCOM-FOA/PAs (and perhaps other military service Public Affairs offices) meet to discuss how PAG was generated, disseminated, utilized and its net effects. Benefits would include providing more accurate and timely information for commander/PAO use in internal information, and media and community relations activities; enhancing unit morale; and fostering stronger Reserve credibility in the community.
6. **Next step:** Topic discussion between USAF/REL and OSAF/PA.
7. **Time frame:** Within next 6 months.

## Lesson Learned

1. **Issue defined:** Considerable confusion existed with the piecemeal call-up of Air Force Reserve people, flights, and squadrons. Some took their direction from the gaining major command, while others remained under AFRES' operational control.
2. **Key facts and discussion:** Most of us were ready for wing/group call-ups. The call-up by UTCs, flights and squadrons threw us into confusion. Unit commanders and others suddenly had to answer two commands. For example, one of two airlift squadrons in a wing is called up; the other is not. Two commands (MAC and AFRES) are now giving guidance and direction. The commander and many members of his staff have to sort through gaining-command and AFRES guidance and determine which guidance applies to which unit. The potential for conflicting guidance is high at all command levels within AFRES. In a declared national emergency or war, units need a clear line of authority for the entire unit.
3. **Assess mission impact:** Not having single, clear command lines causes inefficiency, uncertainty, and decreased combat effectiveness.
4. **Related issues:** Not applicable.
5. **Suggested fix and benefit:** Whenever the President declares a national emergency and upon DOD order, all Air Force Reserve units would come under the operational control of their gaining major commands. This does not mean they would be automatically called to active duty. It does mean the operational chain of command would change at one time for everyone in one action. Administrative control would not change from current directives.
6. **Next step:** Coordination with the gaining major commands.
7. **Time frame:** Next 6 months.

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 91952-19750 (00010), submitted by HQ AFRES/PA, COL MACALUSO, 468-6721, (912) 926-6721.
2. (U) No type DESERT SHIELD conducted by JCS on 9/19/90.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: No keywords.
4. (U) TITLE: LACK OF QUICK INITIAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
5. (U) OBSERVATION: AT THE ONSET OF "DESERT SHIELD," PARTICIPATING PUBLIC AFFAIRS PEOPLE NEEDED GUIDANCE FAST FROM OASD/OSAF AND IT DID NOT APPEAR.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM GRENADA AND "JUST CAUSE" TAUGHT THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNITY THAT FIELD UNITS NEEDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FAST IN A FAST-BREAKING, MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION. IN "JUST CAUSE," FOR EXAMPLE, INITIAL GUIDANCE FOR FIELD UNITS CAME MORE THAN 12 HOURS AFTER ACTION COMMENCED. IN "DESERT SHIELD," INITIAL GUIDANCE WAS ALSO SLOW. WHEN INITIAL GUIDANCE WAS SENT, IT WENT FROM ONE LEVEL DOWNWARD TO ANOTHER VIA AUTODIN. THIS LED TO FURTHER DELAY. ONCE AGAIN WE NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF NOT GETTING INITIAL GUIDANCE FROM THE TOP LEVELS OF THE MILITARY TO FIELD UNITS QUICKLY. WHEN A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION IS ANNOUNCED IN WASHINGTON, DC, PAOs INSTANTLY RECEIVE QUERIES FROM THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA. THE FIELD IMMEDIATELY LOOKS TO THE TOP FOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT TO SAY OR NOT SAY. ALSO, IN AN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL AGE WE CONTINUE TO RELY ON SLOW, OLD TECHNOLOGY, AUTODIN, AS THE OPTIMUM METHOD TO RELAY INFORMATION QUICKLY.
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: INITIAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON FAST-BREAKING MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD RECEIVE A MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY AT THE TOP LEVELS OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNITY. SIMILARLY, THE ADVANCE OF COMPUTER TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY GIVES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE CRITICAL GUIDANCE QUICKLY WITH ALL FIELD PAOs. WE NEED TO DEVELOP THIS CAPABILITY.
9. (U) COMMENTS:
  - (U) SUBJECT: NONE
  - (U) INTEROPERABILITY: NONE
  - (U)

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 02437-68882 (00020), submitted by HQ AFRES/PA, COL MACALUSO, 468-6721, (912) 926-6721.
2. (U) Operation DESERT SHIELD conducted by JCS on 10/24/90.
3. (U) KEYWORDS: No keywords.
4. (U) TITLE: UNCERTAINTY OVER 'ADMINISTRATIVE' VS 'OPERATIONAL' CONTROL IN A CALL-UP
5. (U) OBSERVATION: IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATTERS DURING 'DESERT SHIELD,' WE FOUND UNCERTAINTY AT SEVERAL COMMAND LEVELS ON THE 'ADMINISTRATIVE' VS 'OPERATIONAL' CONTROL OF AFRES UNITS CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY BY THE GAINING COMMANDS.
6. (U) DISCUSSION: IN A CALL-UP OF RESERVE UNITS, TWO TERMS ARE USED ABOUT 'CONTROL' OF THESE UNITS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ACROSS-THE-BOARD, CLEAR DISTINCTION OF WHAT THESE TERMS MEAN, WHERE THEY BEGIN AND END, AND NO KNOWLEDGE OF THESE TERMS BY THE GAINING COMMAND. WE FOUND MANY ASKING BASIC QUESTIONS, SUCH AS: DO CALLED-UP UNITS FOLLOW GUIDANCE OF THE GAINING COMMAND (OPERATIONAL CONTROL) OR AFRES (ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL)? WHAT AREAS OF GUIDANCE, IF ANY, ARE "OFF-LIMITS" FOR AFRES FOR A CALLED-UP UNIT? ONCE A UNIT IS CALLED UP BY THE GAINING COMMAND, DOES THE UNIT'S CHAIN OF COMMAND CHANGE?
7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: WE NEED TO DEVELOP A CLEAR DISTINCTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES "ADMINISTRATIVE" VS "OPERATIONAL" CONTROL IN A CALL-UP. THE CURRENT DELINEATION IS BLURRED AND, SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION, IS NOT SUITABLE IN A CONTINGENCY OR WARTIME SITUATION.
8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: THE OPTIMUM SOLUTION IS FOR ALL TO KNOW THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR A CALLED-UP UNIT HAS INDEED TEMPORARILY CHANGED, AND THAT ON ALL BUT CLEARLY ROUTINE MATTERS (PAY, PERSONNEL), THE UNIT HAS BECOME PART OF THE GAINING COMMAND.
9. (U) COMMENTS:
  - (U) SUBJECT: PLANS AND POLICY
  - (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP
  - (U) Action managed by: AFRAP, action worked by: , RAP number: .  
Lesson distributed by: JCLL.



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
HEADQUARTERS EASTERN SPACE AND MISSILE CENTER (AFSPACECOM)  
PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32925-5002

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

PA

1 May 91

SUBJECT:

Desert Storm After-Action Report, USCENTAF Rear/PA Message 152201Z Mar 91  
(same subject)

TO:

AFSPACECOM/PA

1. This report is submitted IAW referenced message and per format suggested in that message. Please note that ESMC/PA didn't have any personnel deployed in support of either Operation Desert Shield or Operation Desert Storm. We didn't establish public affairs operations in the AOR.
2. Name, rank and duty title of PAO completing this report: Kenneth E. Warren; captain; Deputy Director of Public Affairs.
3. Our workload increased by an average of about 15 percent across the board in support of the Gulf War effort. The bulk of that increase was felt in media relations where we coordinated and/or participated in approximately 100 interviews, responded to about 600 general public and news media queries, distributed about 50 releases (including call outs advising news media of deployments and redeployments to Patrick) and conducted about 25 escorts to various war-related activities. In internal information, we devoted an average of about 10 percent of the editorial space in our base newspaper to war-related stories. This included six editorials, five front page stories, a feature story on local businesses that volunteered support and a story written by a member of one of our tenant units who was deployed to Saudi Arabia. Several war-related items were also included in the commander's call topics we distributed. Other than halting Patrick AFB and Cape Canaveral AFS tours due to increased threat conditions, the war also increased the workload in our community relations program. We coordinated 12 speeches and public appearances that were directly related to Operation Desert Shield or Storm, and coordinated military participation in several 'welcome home' events including activities sponsored by Disney World, Universal Studios Florida and the Cocoa Beach Area Chamber of Commerce.
4. The main problem areas we encountered were providing news media access to deploying forces during the early phases of the campaign and to the families of the deployed and also providing official speakers to groups seeking speeches on restricted topics.

KENNETH E. WARREN, Capt, USAF  
Deputy Director of Public Affairs



## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 3D SPACE SUPPORT WING (AFSPACECOM)  
PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE, COLORADO 80914-5000

REPLY TO  
ATTN: CF

PA (4-7847)

9 May 91

SUBJECT

Input For Operation Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: HQ AFSPACECOM/PA

1. Our media contact during Operation Desert Storm consisted mostly of escorting media for Ft Carson and Army reserve deployments. We escorted media on base for 19 Ft Carson deployments with a total of 80 local and national news media outlets represented. We also have supported 10 redeployments of Army troops with 56 media outlets represented. In addition, we supported one 302nd Tactical Airlift Wing deployment to England with 10 media outlets represented.

2. We conducted a program to distribute special Operation Desert Storm editions of the Gazette Telegraph to base organizations so they could send the papers to their deployed people. The special editions were weekly condensed versions of the Gazette Telegraph with news from home for deployed troops. We distributed about 75 copies a week.

3. We publicized family support center information concerning Desert Storm families. We also facilitated television interviews with Jill Ruffman, family support center coordinator, on what the programs available to help families affected by Desert Storm.

4. We produced a news release and escorted media for a blood drive to support Operation Desert Storm. All three local television stations and the Gazette Telegraph covered the story.

5. The Space Observer produced many stories pertaining to Peterson Complex and AFSPACECOM involvement in Operations Desert Shield and Storm.

a. AFSPACECOM playing a key role supporting Desert Shield forces in Middle East crisis (30 Aug 90)

b. 302nd TAW, Ft Carson detachments deploy (6 Sept 90)

c. 302nd TAW volunteers deploy to RAF Mildenhall (13 Sept 90)

d. 302nd TAW reservists return from Desert Shield deployment (11 Oct 90)

- e. 302nd contributing to Operation Desert Shield (13 Dec 90)
- f. Peterson clinic supporting operations in the Middle East (10 Jan 91)
- g. Base operations supports deploying troops (24 Jan 91)
- h. 302nd TAW places nearly 500 reservists on active-duty status (31 Jan 91)
- i. Complex units deploy to the Middle East (7 Feb 91)
- j. Reservists return from Gulf duty (14 Feb 91)

*Amy P. Castro*  
AMY P. CASTRO, 1Lt, USAF  
Deputy Chief, Public Affairs

FROM: PA

30 April 1991

SUBJECT: Desert Storm After Action Report

TO: AFSPACECOM/PA

1. The following information is submitted per 21 Mar 91 telefax:

A: Individual completing report: SSgt Thomas H. Clements, NCOIC Media Relations Division.

B: Person Deployed: SSgt Andrew Glaze, in-theater 30 Nov 90 through 1 Apr 91.

C. Narrative: More than 150 queries received from local media to include three daily newspapers, three television network affiliates and several radio stations. Several "waiting spouses" were interviewed on a regular basis during operation. Two early return troops were extensively interviewed by all local media. Stories were generally upbeat and positive. Contacts initiated by PA included departure of support personnel which was covered extensively, and the continuing return of personnel which has had diminishing interest among local media. Internal efforts included coverage in base paper of larger group deployments and publicity for various support programs available for family members. Community Relations efforts included speaking to students at schools who had family deployed and providing liaison to local groups who wanted to show their appreciation to deployed personnel. This included a book drive that resulted in more than 100,000 books donated to deployed troops. More than 200 non-media calls were fielded relating to Desert Storm. Speakers Bureau requests have increased and virtually all are for Desert Storm participants. Tours were tracked during moratorium and most have been rescheduled. Tour activity has increased since moratorium was lifted. Both Media and ComRel divisions worked a homecoming for a local Army Reserve member injured in a Scud missile attack; coordinating media coverage during his arrival and hospital stay, and arranging a Purple Heart presentation at the Lompoc Chamber of Commerce. ComRel continues to work with local groups on appreciation events that will last up to 4 July.

D. No serious problems to report. Appreciate as much clear guidance as possible, as soon as possible.

//Signed//

THOMAS R. WORSDALE, Lt Col, USAF  
Director, Public Affairs  
HQ Western Space and Missile Center  
Vandenberg AFB CA 93437-6021

(Certified Copy)

